893.80 AnnotationSub. (1g) is constitutional. There is a rational basis for restricting the opportunity to bring suit to six months for claimants who have been served with a notice of disallowance and to three years when claimants have not been served. That there are different time periods does not violate equal protection guarantees. Griffin v. Milwaukee Transport Services, Inc., 2001 WI App 125, 246 Wis. 2d 433, 630 N.W.2d 536, 00-0861. 893.80 AnnotationThe existence of a known present danger should not turn on the subjective impressions of a citizen-witness. A public officer’s duty to act becomes absolute when the nature of the danger is compelling and known to the officer and is of such force that the officer has no discretion not to act. Hoskins v. Dodge County, 2002 WI App 40, 251 Wis. 2d 276, 642 N.W.2d 213, 01-0834. 893.80 AnnotationA proper application of the known danger exception to public officer immunity begins with the assumption that the officer was negligent in failing to perform, or in inadequately performing the act in question. To pierce immunity the circumstances must have been sufficiently dangerous so as to give rise to a ministerial duty not just to act generally but to perform the particular act upon which liability is premised. Lodl v. Progressive Northern Insurance Co., 2002 WI 71, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314, 00-0221. 893.80 AnnotationBoth state and municipal immunity under sub. (4) are subject to several exceptions representing a judicial balance struck between the need of public officers to perform their functions freely and the right of an aggrieved party to seek redress. There is no immunity against liability associated with 1) the performance of ministerial duties imposed by law; 2) known and compelling dangers that give rise to ministerial duties on the part of public officers or employees; 3) acts involving medical discretion; and 4) acts that are malicious, willful, and intentional. Lodl v. Progressive Northern Insurance Co., 2002 WI 71, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314, 00-0221. 893.80 AnnotationNothing in Cords, 80 Wis. 2d 525 (1977), suggests that a ministerial duty is placed on the government to protect the public from every manifest danger. The Cords known and present danger exception to sub. (4) immunity did not apply to a pipe that was used as a footbridge over a creek when the public was not invited to so use it, a sidewalk was provided to cross the creek not far from the pipe, and the use as a footbridge presented an obvious danger. Caraher v. City of Menomonie, 2002 WI App 184, 256 Wis. 2d 605, 649 N.W.2d 344, 01-2772. 893.80 AnnotationThe analysis of immunity under sub. (4) assumes negligence. The existence of a form clearly and unambiguously detailing information requested of a high school guidance counselor did not transform the counselor’s counseling obligations into a ministerial act. The counselor’s failure to provide correct advice in the face of clear and unambiguous information goes to the counselor’s negligence, not the nature of the counselor’s duty. Scott v. Savers Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 2003 WI 60, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715, 01-2953. 893.80 AnnotationAny fire department created pursuant to s. 60.55, whether formed under ch. 181 or 213, is a government subdivision or agency entitled to immunity under sub. (4). Mellenthin v. Berger, 2003 WI App 126, 265 Wis. 2d 575, 666 N.W.2d 120, 02-2524. 893.80 AnnotationA ministerial duty cannot arise from a manufacturer’s instructions because a ministerial duty must be imposed by law. Law means an act of government and includes statutes, administrative rules, policies, or orders and plans adopted or contracts entered into by governmental units. Meyers v. Schultz, 2004 WI App 234, 277 Wis. 2d 845, 690 N.W.2d 873, 04-0542. 893.80 AnnotationA municipality may be immune from nuisance suits depending on the nature of the tortious acts giving rise to the nuisance. A municipality is immune from suit for nuisance predicated on negligent acts that are discretionary in nature. A municipality does not enjoy immunity from suit for nuisance when the underlying tortious conduct is negligence comprised of acts performed pursuant to a ministerial duty. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District v. City of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 8, 277 Wis. 2d 635, 691 N.W.2d 658, 02-2961. 893.80 AnnotationDecisions concerning the adoption, design, and implementation of a public works system are discretionary, such as the adoption of a waterworks system, the selection of the type of pipe, the placement of the pipe in the ground, and the continued existence of the pipe, are legislative decisions for which a city enjoys immunity. A city may be liable for its negligence in failing to repair the leaky water main if it had notice of the leak and was under a ministerial duty to repair it prior to a break. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District v. City of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 8, 277 Wis. 2d 635, 691 N.W.2d 658, 02-2961. 893.80 AnnotationIt is contrary to the protection afforded by sub. (1) [now sub. (1d)] to force a government entity to spend resources and taxpayer money to investigate every injury when the requisite 120-day notice is not given on the mere chance that the injury may turn out to be catastrophic, irrespective of how minor it may seem initially. Moran v. Milwaukee County, 2005 WI App 30, 278 Wis. 2d 747, 693 N.W.2d 121, 04-0709. 893.80 AnnotationThe known and compelling danger exception to immunity under sub. (4) is determined on a case-by-case basis. A dangerous situation will give rise to a ministerial duty when there exists a danger of such force that the time, mode, and occasion for performance is evident with such certainty that nothing remains for the exercise of judgment and discretion. The duty arises by virtue of particularly hazardous circumstances that are both known to the municipality or its officers and sufficiently dangerous to require an explicit, non-discretionary municipal response. It is not enough that the situation require the employee to do something about it. Voss v. Elkhorn Area School District, 2006 WI App 234, 297 Wis. 2d 389, 724 N.W.2d 420, 05-3037. But see Engelhardt v. City of New Berlin, 2019 WI 2, 385 Wis. 2d 86, 921 N.W.2d 714, 16-0801. 893.80 AnnotationService of a notice of disallowance must be upon the claimant and strictly comply with those modes of service set out in sub. (1g), which requires that service be made by either registered or certified mail. The return of a receipt for registered or certified mail signed by the claimant and the return of registered mail addressed to the claimant are examples of proof of service acceptable under sub. (1g). Pool v. City of Sheboygan, 2007 WI 38, 300 Wis. 2d 74, 729 N.W.2d 415, 05-2028. 893.80 AnnotationSub. (1m) applies to medical malpractice claims against governmental bodies that fall within the scope of this section. Ch. 655 does not contain any statute of limitations provision that conflicts with this section. The generally exclusive nature of ch. 655 does not prevent the application of this section when applicable. Rouse v. Theda Clark Medical Center, Inc., 2007 WI 87, 302 Wis. 2d 358, 735 N.W.2d 30, 05-2743. 893.80 AnnotationThe University of Wisconsin Hospital & Clinics Authority is a “political corporation” under sub. (1) (a) [now sub. (1d) (a)] that falls within the notice of claim requirement of this section. Rouse v. Theda Clark Medical Center, Inc., 2007 WI 87, 302 Wis. 2d 358, 735 N.W.2d 30, 05-2743. 893.80 AnnotationThere is a three-point test for when the notice-of-claim requirement in sub. (1) (b) [now sub. (1d) (b)] has to give way: 1) whether there is a specific statutory scheme for which the plaintiff seeks exemption; 2) whether enforcement of sub. (1) [now sub. (1d)] would hinder a legislative preference for a prompt resolution of the type of claim under consideration; and 3) whether the purposes for which sub. (1) [now sub. (1d)] was enacted would be furthered by requiring that a notice of claim be filed. Oak Creek Citizen’s Action Committee v. City of Oak Creek, 2007 WI App 196, 304 Wis. 2d 702, 738 N.W.2d 168, 06-2697. 893.80 AnnotationSub. (1) (b) [now sub. (1d) (b)] did not apply to an action for mandamus seeking to compel a city council to comply with the direct-legislation statute, s. 9.20. Oak Creek Citizen’s Action Committee v. City of Oak Creek, 2007 WI App 196, 304 Wis. 2d 702, 738 N.W.2d 168, 06-2697. 893.80 AnnotationAdministrative code provisions imposed a ministerial duty on a municipality to place a water main at a specified depth. When the municipality installed the water main at an appropriate depth to prevent freezing and the surface was subsequently graded so that the water main was no longer at the required depth, there was no breach of the ministerial duty. The design of the overall development, including the soil grading, was a discretionary act and enjoyed governmental immunity. DeFever v. City of Waukesha, 2007 WI App 266, 306 Wis. 2d 766, 743 N.W.2d 848, 06-3053. 893.80 AnnotationUnder Lyons, 207 Wis. 2d 446 (1996), an independent professional contractor who follows official directives is an agent for the purposes of sub. (4) or is entitled to common law immunity when: 1) the governmental authority approved reasonably precise specifications; 2) the contractor’s actions conformed to those specifications; and 3) the contractor warned the supervising governmental authority about the possible dangers associated with those specifications that were known to the contractor but not to the governmental officials. Estate of Brown v. Mathy Construction Co., 2008 WI App 114, 313 Wis. 2d 497, 756 N.W.2d 417, 07-1543. See also Bronfeld v. Pember Cos., 2010 WI App 150, 330 Wis. 2d 123, 792 N.W.2d 222, 09-2297. 893.80 AnnotationUnder the Lyons, 207 Wis. 2d 446 (1996), test, the specification question is not what other safety precautions might have been taken, but whether the safety requirements provided by the contract were reasonably precise specifications. A contract is reasonably precise if it reasonably and precisely lists items required. Common sense dictates that items not required by the contract do not obligate the contractor to provide them. Estate of Brown v. Mathy Construction Co., 2008 WI App 114, 313 Wis. 2d 497, 756 N.W.2d 417, 07-1543. 893.80 AnnotationA spirit rule book for cheerleading, not officially adopted by a school district, lacked the absolute, certain, and imperative direction that prescribes and defines the time, mode, and occasion for an action’s performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion. As such, the plaintiff did not show that the rule book created an absolute, certain, or imperative duty that fell within the ministerial duty exception to governmental immunity under sub. (4). Noffke v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156, 06-1886. 893.80 AnnotationSo long as a precautionary measure is taken in response to an open and obvious danger, the law is that the government remains immune from suit under sub. (4). In this case, the trial court found that a teacher took no precautionary measure to deal with a known danger. While the teacher had the option to pick one precautionary measure over another, the teacher did not have the option to do nothing, and the exception to immunity applied. Heuser v. Community Insurance Corp., 2009 WI App 151, 321 Wis. 2d 729, 774 N.W.2d 653, 08-2760. 893.80 AnnotationA government entity is not entitled to immunity for a failure to maintain its property as to a condition of disrepair or defect or a failure to operate. In this case, once the sewerage district had notice that its deep tunnel was draining the aquifer in downtown Milwaukee to the detriment of property owners, it had an “absolute, certain and imperative” duty to repair the tunnel. As the entity responsible for the tunnel, and being aware that the tunnel was causing structural damage to the plaintiff’s property, the district had a ministerial duty to repair the tunnel. Because it did not, it enjoyed no immunity for its negligence under sub. (4). Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, 2011 WI App 76, 334 Wis. 2d 620, 800 N.W.2d 518, 07-0221. 893.80 AnnotationThree factors should be considered when determining whether to exempt a specific statute from the notice of claim requirements: 1) whether there is a specific statutory scheme for which the plaintiff seeks exemption; 2) whether enforcement of the notice of claim requirements would hinder a legislative preference for a prompt resolution of the type of claim under consideration; and 3) whether the purposes for which this section was enacted would be furthered by requiring that a notice of claim be filed. Antitrust actions brought under s. 133.18 are not exempt from the notice of claim requirements found in sub. (1) [now sub. (1d)]. E-Z Roll Off, LLC v. County of Oneida, 2011 WI 71, 335 Wis. 2d 720, 800 N.W.2d 421, 09-0775. 893.80 AnnotationThe first step in the ministerial duty analysis is to identify a source of law or policy that imposes the alleged duty. Merely arguing, in general terms, that a municipality that alters the normal course of traffic on a road must take measures to ensure the public can safely travel on the road and not pointing to any statute, regulation, or policy that imposes this duty, fails to do so. Even assuming the county had a duty to ensure reasonably safe travel during road construction, that duty would not be ministerial. How to safely control traffic in a construction zone is an inherently discretionary decision requiring the exercise of judgment. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Outagamie County, 2012 WI App 60, 341 Wis. 2d 413, 816 N.W.2d 340, 11-1211. 893.80 AnnotationIt is evident that the plain meaning of “action” in sub. (3) is a judicial proceeding. While two other subsections within this section utilize the term “suit,” those subsections are unrelated; they operate independently and without reference to sub. (3). Thus, it does no mischief to interpret suit and action to have the same meaning. Sub. (3) provides for one damages cap, per person, per action. Anderson v. Hebert, 2013 WI App 54, 347 Wis. 2d 321, 830 N.W.2d 704, 12-1313. 893.80 AnnotationVolunteer firefighters are actuated by a purpose to serve the fire department from the moment they choose to respond to an emergency call. Because of that, they are operating within the scope of their employment for the purposes of sub. (4) immunity. Brown v. Acuity, 2013 WI 60, 348 Wis. 2d 603, 833 N.W.2d 96, 11-0583. 893.80 AnnotationUnder s. 346.03 (3), the driver of an emergency vehicle may proceed through a red stop signal only if the driver’s vehicle gives a visual and an audible signal. A driver who did not give an audible signal has no discretion to proceed through a red stop signal. The statute sets forth “absolute, certain and imperative” requirements concerning the “performance of a specific task.” Thus s. 346.03 (3) imposes upon a driver a ministerial duty to stop at a red stop signal, and a driver who does not falls within the ministerial duty exception to public officer immunity. Brown v. Acuity, 2013 WI 60, 348 Wis. 2d 603, 833 N.W.2d 96, 11-0583. 893.80 AnnotationThe monetary damage cap in sub. (3) does not violate equal protection. The plain meaning of sub. (3) is to limit the dollar amount of recovery to be paid for damages, injuries, or death to $50,000 per claimant, but the plain meaning of that provision has no bearing on the availability of equitable relief such as abatement. Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, 2013 WI 78, 350 Wis. 2d 554, 835 N.W.2d 160, 07-0221. 893.80 AnnotationA municipal entity may be subjected to claims for equitable relief to abate a negligently maintained nuisance that is a cause of significant harm and of which the municipal entity has notice. Under Willow Creek, 2000 WI 56, and Johnson, 207 Wis. 2d 343 (1996), equitable relief will be barred when a municipal entity is entitled to immunity. When a plaintiff seeks equitable or injunctive relief against a municipal entity, a court must first answer the threshold question of whether immunity applies. If a court concludes that the actions the plaintiff is seeking to stop through a suit in equity are legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial, then the suit must be dismissed because the governmental entity is protected by immunity. Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, 2013 WI 78, 350 Wis. 2d 554, 835 N.W.2d 160, 07-0221. 893.80 AnnotationWhen a governmental contractor seeks immunity under sub. (4), the contractor must show both that the contractor was an agent as that term is used in sub. (4) and that the allegedly injurious conduct was caused by the implementation of a decision for which immunity is available for governmental entities under sub. (4). A governmental contractor seeking to assert the defense of immunity should clearly allege in the pleadings why the injury-causing conduct comes within a legislative, quasi-legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial function as set out in sub. (4). Showers Appraisals, LLC v. Musson Bros., Inc., 2013 WI 79, 350 Wis. 2d 509, 835 N.W.2d 226, 11-1158. See also Melchert v. Pro Electric Contractors, 2017 WI 30, 374 Wis. 2d 439, 892 N.W.2d 710, 13-2882. 893.80 AnnotationWhile s. 346.03 provides statutory privileges of authorized emergency vehicles exempting their operators from certain rules of the road, it also explicitly states that an operator of an emergency vehicle is not relieved of the “duty to drive or ride with due regard under the circumstances for the safety of all persons.” The duty of “due regard under the circumstances” is a ministerial duty for purposes of determining immunity under this section. Legue v. City of Racine, 2014 WI 92, 357 Wis. 2d 250, 849 N.W.2d 837, 12-2499. 893.80 AnnotationNothing in Wisconsin law bars class action against a governmental body that is a mass action of named claimants bringing similar claims, provided that each claimant has complied with this section. Townsend v. Neenah Joint School District, 2014 WI App 117, 358 Wis. 2d 618, 856 N.W.2d 644, 13-2839. 893.80 AnnotationTo evaluate whether named claimants gave sufficient notice under this section, the issue is whether the notice they filed substantially complied with all the requirements of this section. To substantially comply, a notice must satisfy two related but distinct notice requirements. Sub. (1d) (a) imposes a “notice of injury” requirement of “written notice of the circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent or attorney” and a “notice of claim” requirement under sub. (1d) (b) that notice of the claimant’s identity and address, along with an itemized statement of relief sought, was presented to the proper person at the governmental body and was denied. Actual notice and lack of prejudice are an alternative to the written notice for sub. (1d) (a) but not for sub. (1d) (b). Townsend v. Neenah Joint School District, 2014 WI App 117, 358 Wis. 2d 618, 856 N.W.2d 644, 13-2839. 893.80 AnnotationWhether claims were presented by the claimants’ authority is a function of the requirement under sub. (1d) (a) that a claim be “signed by the party, agent or attorney” or, in the alternative, that the governmental body had actual notice. In this case, the notice was signed by an attorney “for Claimants and Class,” and the “class” was defined as the persons whose names, addresses, and claims were itemized on an attached list. If the notice of claim were a pleading in court, the attorney’s signature would have sufficed to indicate the attorney’s status as representative for the identified clients and “need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit.” Townsend v. Neenah Joint School District, 2014 WI App 117, 358 Wis. 2d 618, 856 N.W.2d 644, 13-2839. 893.80 AnnotationWhen a gas company provided the only training for natural gas leak emergencies for the entire city fire department, the responsibility for training first responders on how to respond to natural gas emergencies was effectively delegated to the gas company. The gas company’s first responder handbook that accompanied the training was the only written protocol available describing how city employees were to handle natural gas emergencies and was effectively adopted by the city when it delegated its specialized training authority to the gas company. The fire department had a ministerial duty based on the city’s delegations of both the emergency response training and the performance requirements in the handbook. Oden v. City of Milwaukee, 2015 WI App 29, 361 Wis. 2d 708, 863 N.W.2d 619, 14-0130. 893.80 AnnotationThe “known danger” exception, a subset of the ministerial duty exception, to governmental immunity did not apply in this case. The police department performed its ministerial duty by promptly acting in response to sexual assault allegations regarding a child reported by the school principal and performing a criminal investigation. The child’s objection in this lawsuit was to the scope of the investigation, inferring that the police should have somehow deduced or learned through additional investigation that the child’s uncle was assaulting the child. The “how” and “scope” of the investigation performed by the police department were discretionary acts rather than a ministerial duty and thus the police department was entitled to immunity. D.B. v. County of Green Lake, 2016 WI App 33, 368 Wis. 2d 282, 879 N.W.2d 131, 15-1301. 893.80 AnnotationThe scope and breadth of the county’s investigation of abuse reported under s. 48.981 (2) falls within the county’s discretion rather than being a ministerial act. Therefore, immunity under sub. (4) applied to a county, when the county’s investigation followed the requirements of s. 48.981 (3) (a) 3. by referring the matter to the police for investigation within 12 hours of receiving the report. D.B. v. County of Green Lake, 2016 WI App 33, 368 Wis. 2d 282, 879 N.W.2d 131, 15-1301. 893.80 AnnotationThe known danger exception to governmental immunity under sub. (4) applies when an obviously hazardous situation known to the public officer or employee is of such force that a ministerial duty to correct the situation is created. Simply allowing for the exercise of discretion does not suffice to bring an action under the blanket of immunity provided by sub. (4) when the facts or allegations reveal a duty so clear and absolute that it falls within the concept of a ministerial duty. In this case, the fact that there may have been several possible ways in which the defendant could have fulfilled its ministerial duty did not affect the resolution of the case. It was sufficient for the court to conclude that a ministerial duty was created by the obviously hazardous circumstances presented in the case. Engelhardt v. City of New Berlin, 2019 WI 2, 385 Wis. 2d 86, 921 N.W.2d 714, 16-0801. 893.80 AnnotationIn this case, the condominium association alleged causes of action for public and private nuisance against the village for hosting public performances at a pavilion constructed in a public park in the village. Under the common law of nuisance, every continuation of a nuisance is a new nuisance. Therefore, for purposes of the notice of claim statute, each individual concert that was alleged to be a nuisance constituted a new event giving rise to a new 120-day notice of injury period under sub. (1d) (a). Yacht Club at Sister Bay Condominium Ass’n v. Village of Sister Bay, 2019 WI 4, 385 Wis. 2d 158, 922 N.W.2d 95, 17-0140. 893.80 AnnotationNoncompliance with this section is an affirmative defense and not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit. Maple Grove Country Club Inc. v. Maple Grove Estates Sanitary District, 2019 WI 43, 386 Wis. 2d 425, 926 N.W.2d 184, 16-2296. 893.80 AnnotationA village’s oral policy to pump water out of a lift station when water reaches a certain level did not create a ministerial duty to act, and rules of the Department of Natural Resources emphasized the discretionary nature of the decision. Because the task was discretionary, the village was immune from suit for negligence under sub. (4). Pinter v. Village of Stetsonville, 2019 WI 74, 387 Wis. 2d 475, 929 N.W.2d 547, 17-1593. 893.80 AnnotationIn this case, even if a growing snow and ice ramp created by a city’s alleged negligent plowing practices was known to the city, the danger was not sufficiently compelling to give rise to a ministerial duty. A commonplace icy condition on the street where the plaintiff was injured did not create a danger so severe and so immediate that a response was demanded. To conclude otherwise would ignore the realities that Wisconsin pedestrians are accustomed to icy winter conditions and that a Wisconsin municipality will never be able to address every potentially unsafe snow and ice accumulation on its roadways and must instead exercise its discretion in determining how and when to respond to them. Knoke v. City of Monroe, 2021 WI App 6, 395 Wis. 2d 551, 953 N.W.2d 889, 19-2003. 893.80 AnnotationThe first sentence of s. 893.83 grants municipalities a period of absolute immunity for claims based on snow and ice accumulations that have existed less than three weeks. The second sentence clarifies that immunity is not absolute if the snow or ice accumulation has existed for three weeks or more—under such circumstances, a claim is subject to this section, like any other tort claim against a municipality. Knoke v. City of Monroe, 2021 WI App 6, 395 Wis. 2d 551, 953 N.W.2d 889, 19-2003. 893.80 AnnotationThe first sentence of sub. (1d) (a) outlines the requirements of formal notice of injury. There are four elements: 1) proper timing (within the first 120 days); 2) proper service under s. 801.11 (governing service of process in civil actions); 3) proper signatory; and 4) a description of the circumstances of the claim. That notice simply alerts the defendant that an incident occurred that might thereafter ripen into a claim. Formal notice of the claim itself comes later. Clark v. League of Wisconsin Municipalities Mutual Insurance Co., 2021 WI App 21, 397 Wis. 2d 220, 959 N.W.2d 648, 19-0954. 893.80 AnnotationTo mitigate the potential harshness that might ensue from the strict application of the formal notice of injury requirement, the statute contains a savings clause. The second sentence of sub. (1d) (a) allows for substantial compliance, excusing a plaintiff’s failure to provide formal notice when: 1) the defendant had actual notice of the claim; and 2) the plaintiff shows to the satisfaction of the court that the delay or failure to give the requisite formal notice has not been prejudicial. In at least one respect, the actual notice requirement may be more difficult to meet than formal notice: actual notice must be “of the claim,” rather than of the mere “circumstances” that may later give rise to a claim. On the other hand, actual notice is not limited to a particular timeframe and may occur outside the 120 days following the injury-causing event. In this case, the plaintiff’s submission of the notice of claim form served double-duty as both actual notice under the savings clause and notice of claim under sub. (1d) (b). Clark v. League of Wisconsin Municipalities Mutual Insurance Co., 2021 WI App 21, 397 Wis. 2d 220, 959 N.W.2d 648, 19-0954. 893.80 AnnotationPrejudice in the context of sub. (1d) (a) has been defined as the inability of a party to adequately defend a claim because the party lacked sufficient opportunity to conduct a prompt investigation. The date on which a defendant had “actual notice of the claim” may bear on prejudice, but it is certainly not dispositive. The key inquiry is what, if anything, would the defendant have done differently had the plaintiff timely served a statutorily compliant written notice describing the circumstances of the claim? It is conceivable that the answer to this “what if” question could be affected by when the defendant first learned of the actual claim. An example might be when the defendant’s awareness of an injury was not enough to prompt an investigation sufficient to protect the defendant’s interests—when, in other words, only the defendant’s knowledge of a potential lawsuit could have prompted such an investigation. But whether that is true in any given case should be assessed as part of the overall factual inquiry into prejudice. Clark v. League of Wisconsin Municipalities Mutual Insurance Co., 2021 WI App 21, 397 Wis. 2d 220, 959 N.W.2d 648, 19-0954. 893.80 AnnotationThe six-month time period under sub. (1g) is a statute of limitations. A plaintiff asserting that a defendant is equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense must show the defendant’s action or nonaction that induced the plaintiff’s reasonable reliance thereon to the plaintiff’s detriment. In addition, inequitable or fraudulent conduct must be established. Kornreich v. Town of Cedarburg, 2023 WI App 46, 409 Wis. 2d 118, 996 N.W.2d 72, 22-0198. 893.80 AnnotationDiscussing liability of vocational, technical, and adult education [now technical college] districts and of their officers and employees. 77 Atty. Gen. 145. 893.80 AnnotationA town that responds to a Level B hazardous waste release in its own capacity, in the absence of a county wide agreement, does not receive immunity from civil liability under s. 895.483 (2), but other statutory and common law immunities apply. OAG 1-99. 893.80 AnnotationThis section is preempted in 42 USC 1983 actions and may not be applied as it conflicts with the purpose and effects of federal civil rights actions. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 101 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1988). 893.80 AnnotationA claim of excessive force in the course of making a seizure of the person is properly analyzed under the 4th amendment’s objective reasonableness standard. A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the 4th amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007). 893.80 AnnotationWhether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time the action was taken. When an alleged 4th amendment violation involves a search or seizure pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner. There is a narrow exception allowing suit when it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 182 L. Ed. 2d 47 (2012). 893.80 AnnotationSub. (4) bars direct suits against municipalities for the torts of their employees. It does not preclude suing the officer directly and using s. 895.46 to indirectly recover from the municipality. Graham v. Sauk Prairie Police Commission, 915 F.2d 1085 (1990). 893.80 AnnotationOnce a deputy assumed a duty to protect a person subsequently murdered in a room adjacent to where the deputy was present, the deputy’s obligation was no longer discretionary and the deputy was no longer entitled to immunity under sub. (4) for decisions made at the murder site. Losinski v. County of Trempealeau, 946 F.2d 544 (1991). 893.80 AnnotationImmunity of elected officials under sub. (4) is not defeated by the possibility that the officials’ acts were malicious. Farr v. Gruber, 950 F.2d 399 (1991). 893.80 AnnotationThe state may not be sued by a citizen under the wrongful death statute. Pinon v. Wisconsin, 368 F. Supp. 608 (1973). 893.80 AnnotationDiscussing civil rights actions against municipalities. Starstead v. City of Superior, 533 F. Supp. 1365 (1982). 893.80 AnnotationA county was not vicariously liable for its sheriff’s alleged use of excessive force when the complaint alleged an intentional tort. Voie v. Flood, 589 F. Supp. 746 (1984). 893.80 AnnotationDecisions by law enforcement officers concerning whether and how to arrest someone are discretionary for purposes of sub. (4). Wilson v. City of Milwaukee, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (2001). 893.80 AnnotationThe duty to report abuse of children to authorities under s. 48.981 is ministerial and not discretionary. Baumgardt v. Wausau School District Board of Education, 475 F. Supp. 2d 800 (2007). 893.80 AnnotationClaims under the wage claim statute, s. 109.03, are not exempt from the requirements set forth in this section. Gilbertson v. City of Sheboygan, 165 F. Supp. 3d 742 (2016). 893.80 AnnotationThe exception to discretionary immunity under sub. (4) for malicious, willful, and intentional conduct can apply to negligence claims. Price v. Mueller-Owens, 516 F. Supp. 3d 816 (2021). 893.80 AnnotationKnowledge of the relevant events isn’t enough to qualify as actual notice under sub. (1d) (a). Rather, the defendants must have notice of the claim. Among other things, that means that the defendants must have notice of the specific relief that the plaintiff is requesting. Stabenow v. City of Eau Claire, 546 F. Supp. 3d 787 (2021). 893.80 AnnotationThe Discretionary Function Exception to Government Tort Liability. Wyant. 61 MLR 163 (1977).
893.80 AnnotationRevising Wisconsin’s Government Immunity Doctrine. Annoye. 88 MLR 971 (2005).
893.80 AnnotationMunicipal Liability: The Failure to Provide Adequate Police Protection—The Special Duty Doctrine Should Be Discarded. Krause. 1984 WLR 499.
893.80 AnnotationWisconsin Recovery Limit for Victims of Municipal Torts: A Conflict of Public Interests. Ulrich. 1986 WLR 155.
893.80 AnnotationReining in Municipalities: How to Tame the Municipal Immunity Monster in Wisconsin. Dudding. 2004 WLR 1741.
893.80 AnnotationPushing the Reset Button on Wisconsin’s Governmental Immunity Doctrine. Bullard. 2014 WLR 801.
893.80 AnnotationSeveral Police Supervisor Immunities From State Court Suit May Be Doomed By the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Fine. WBB Oct. 1977.
893.80 AnnotationGovernment Immunity for Safe Place Statute Violations. Cabush. Wis. Law. Oct. 1999.
893.80 AnnotationFighting City Hall: Municipal Immunity in Wisconsin. Pollack. Wis. Law. Dec. 2000.
893.80 AnnotationReturning to First Principles? Governmental Immunity in Wisconsin. Johnson-Karp. Wis. Law. Apr. 2014.
893.82893.82 Claims against state employees; notice of claim; limitation of damages. 893.82(1)(1) The purposes of this section are to: 893.82(1)(a)(a) Provide the attorney general with adequate time to investigate claims which might result in judgments to be paid by the state. 893.82(1)(b)(b) Provide the attorney general with an opportunity to effect a compromise without a civil action or civil proceeding. 893.82(1)(c)(c) Place a limit on the amounts recoverable in civil actions or civil proceedings against any state officer, employee or agent.
