893.43893.43 Action on contract. 893.43(1)(1) Except as provided in sub. (2), an action upon any contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied, including an action to recover fees for professional services, except those mentioned in s. 893.40, shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred. 893.43(2)(2) An action upon a motor vehicle insurance policy described in s. 632.32 (1) shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred. A cause of action involving underinsured motorist coverage, as defined in s. 632.32 (2) (d), or uninsured motorist coverage, as defined in s. 632.32 (2) (f), accrues on the date there is final resolution of the underlying cause of action by the injured party against the tortfeasor. 893.43 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323; 2015 a. 133. 893.43 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.19 (3) renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
893.43 AnnotationA bonus plan to compensate for increased profits is a contract. Younger v. Rosenow Paper & Supply Co., 51 Wis. 2d 619, 188 N.W.2d 507 (1971). 893.43 AnnotationAn action to recover benefits under a pension plan is an action to enforce a contract, not an action for wages. Estate of Schroeder v. Gateway Transportation Co., 53 Wis. 2d 59, 191 N.W.2d 860 (1971). 893.43 AnnotationAn action for personal injuries resulting from medical malpractice, although based on contract, is subject to the three-year limitation for injuries to the person. Estate of Kohls v. Brah, 57 Wis. 2d 141, 203 N.W.2d 666 (1973). 893.43 AnnotationAn action by an insured against an insurance agent for failing to procure requested coverage is not an action against the insurer on the policy, but is an action resting upon the agent’s contract with the insured to procure the insurance coverage agreed upon subject to the statute of limitations for contract. Estate of Ensz v. Brown Insurance Agency, Inc., 66 Wis. 2d 193, 223 N.W.2d 903 (1974). 893.43 AnnotationA cause of action for contribution is based upon a contract implied by law and must be brought within six years after one joint tortfeasor has paid more than the tortfeasor’s share. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Osborn Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 66 Wis. 2d 454, 225 N.W.2d 628 (1975). 893.43 AnnotationWhen an employer deducted a “hypothetical tax factor” from salaries of its overseas employees so as to equalize compensation of its employees worldwide, an action to recover amounts so deducted had to be brought within the limitation period on wage claims, and not the period on other contract claims. Sussmann v. Gleisner, 80 Wis. 2d 435, 259 N.W.2d 114 (1977). 893.43 AnnotationIf the object of a disputed contract is the end product or fruit of human labor rather than the labor per se, s. 893.19 (3) [now this section] applies rather than s. 893.21 (5) [now s. 893.44]. Rupp v. O’Connor, 81 Wis. 2d 436, 261 N.W.2d 815 (1978). 893.43 AnnotationPartial payment of an obligation made prior to the running of the statute of limitations tolls the statute and sets it running from the date of payment. St. Mary’s Hospital Medical Center v. Tarkenton, 103 Wis. 2d 422, 309 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1981). 893.43 AnnotationA breach of a roofing contract occurred when the faulty roof was completed, not when the building was completed. State v. Holland Plastics Co., 111 Wis. 2d 497, 331 N.W.2d 320 (1983). 893.43 AnnotationAn unjust enrichment claim accrues when a cohabitational relationship terminates. The court does not determine what statute of limitations, if any, applies. Watts v. Watts, 152 Wis. 2d 370, 448 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1989). 893.43 AnnotationA contract cause of action accrues at the time of the breach. The discovery rule is inapplicable. CLL Associates v. Arrowhead Pacific Corp., 174 Wis. 2d 604, 497 N.W.2d 115 (1993). 893.43 AnnotationThis section applies to actions for the recovery of sales commissions. Erdman v. Jovoco, Inc., 181 Wis. 2d 736, 512 N.W.2d 487 (1994). 893.43 AnnotationA party’s deficient performance of a contract does not give rise to a tort claim. There must be a duty independent of the contract for a cause of action in tort. Atkinson v. Everbrite, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 724, 592 N.W.2d 299 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-1806. 893.43 AnnotationFor actions seeking coverage under an underinsured motorist policy, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of loss, which is the date on which a final resolution is reached in the underlying claim against the tortfeasor, be it through denial of that claim, settlement, judgment, execution of releases, or other form of resolution, whichever is the latest. Yocherer v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2002 WI 41, 252 Wis. 2d 114, 643 N.W.2d 457, 00-0944. 893.43 AnnotationThe label of the documents here—“access easement agreement”—and the fact that each was signed by both parties did not transform the grants of easement into contracts subject to contract law. The plaintiffs alleged that a driveway could not be built on the easements described in the agreements because of a wetland delineation and sought a modification of the easements. This claim for relief was an action to enforce the recorded easements, albeit a modified version, and was therefore governed by s. 893.33 (6), not the contract statute, this section. Mnuk v. Harmony Homes, Inc., 2010 WI App 102, 329 Wis. 2d 182, 790 N.W.2d 514, 09-1178. 893.43 AnnotationThe running of the six-year statute of limitations under this section [now sub. (1)] that applies to enforcement of a note does not prevent timely foreclosure of the mortgage that secures the note. Bank of New York Mellon v. Klomsten, 2018 WI App 25, 381 Wis. 2d 218, 911 N.W.2d 364, 17-0405. 893.43 AnnotationThe statute of limitations for a subrogated claim is the same as the statute of limitations that would apply to the claim if it had not been subrogated. In this case, the plaintiff insurance company was subrogated to the insured’s contract claim that the defendant insurance company breached its duty to defend the insured. Because subrogation does not change the identity of the cause of action, the plaintiff’s claim was also for breach of contract. Claims for breach of contract have a six-year statute of limitations under sub. (1). Steadfast Insurance Co. v. Greenwich Insurance Co., 2019 WI 6, 385 Wis. 2d 213, 922 N.W.2d 71, 16-1631. 893.43 AnnotationRescission is not an “action upon the contract,” as that phrase is used in this section. CMFG Life Insurance Co. v. RBS Securities, Inc., 799 F.3d 729 (2015). 893.43 AnnotationA claim for unjust enrichment is a quasi-contractual claim. Accordingly, Wisconsin courts have applied sub. (1)’s six-year limitations period for contract-based claims to quasi-contractual claims. Smith v. RecordQuest, LLC, 989 F.3d 513 (2021). 893.43 AnnotationAn unconscionability of contract claim is governed by this section. Dairyland Power Cooperative v. Amax Inc., 700 F. Supp. 979 (1986). 893.44893.44 Compensation for personal service. 893.44(1)(1) Any action to recover unpaid salary, wages or other compensation for personal services, except actions to recover fees for professional services and except as provided in sub. (2), shall be commenced within 2 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred. 893.44(2)(2) An action to recover wages under s. 109.09 shall be commenced within 2 years after the claim is filed with the department of workforce development or be barred. 893.44 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.21 (5) renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. Actions to collect fees for professional services are brought under s. 893.43. [Bill 326-A]
893.44 AnnotationA stock-purchase plan as a reward for increased profits is not subject to s. 893.21 (5) [now this section]. Younger v. Rosenow Paper & Supply Co., 51 Wis. 2d 619, 188 N.W.2d 507 (1971). 893.44 AnnotationProfessional services by a physician or attorney, although not customarily performed in the profession, may be classified as professional if requested by reason of the professional’s expertise and training, if the professional then utilizes that knowledge and training. If the services are so classified depends upon the facts of the particular employment. Lorenz v. Dreske, 62 Wis. 2d 273, 214 N.W.2d 753 (1974). 893.44 AnnotationSection 893.21 (5) [now this section] does not apply unless services are actually rendered. Yanta v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 66 Wis. 2d 53, 224 N.W.2d 389 (1974). 893.44 AnnotationIf the object of a disputed contract is the end product or fruit of human labor rather than the labor per se, s. 893.19 (3) [now s. 893.43] applies rather than s. 893.21 (5) [now this section]. Rupp v. O’Connor, 81 Wis. 2d 436, 261 N.W.2d 815 (1978). 893.44 AnnotationAn unjust enrichment claim accrues when a cohabitational relationship terminates. The court does not determine which statute of limitations, if any, applies. Watts v. Watts, 152 Wis. 2d 370, 448 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1989). 893.44 AnnotationThis section applies only to actions for wages already earned. Lovett v. Mt. Senario College, Inc., 154 Wis. 2d 831, 454 N.W.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1990). 893.44 AnnotationThis section does not apply to actions for the recovery of sales commissions. Erdman v. Jovoco, Inc., 181 Wis. 2d 736, 512 N.W.2d 487 (1994). 893.44 AnnotationThe distinguishing feature of personal services under this section is whether the human labor itself is sought and is the object of the compensation or whether the end-product of the service is purchased. Paulson v. Shapiro, 490 F.2d 1 (1973). 893.45893.45 Acknowledgment or new promise. No acknowledgment or promise shall be sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract, whereby to take the cause out of the operation of this chapter, unless the same be contained in some writing signed by the party to be charged thereby. 893.45 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323. 893.45 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.42 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
893.46893.46 Acknowledgment, who not bound by. If there are 2 or more joint contractors or joint personal representatives of any contractor, no such joint contractor or joint personal representative shall lose the benefit of this chapter so as to be chargeable by reason only of any acknowledgment or promise made by any other of them. 893.46 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323; 2001 a. 102. 893.46 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.43 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
893.47893.47 Actions against parties jointly liable. In actions commenced against 2 or more joint contractors or joint personal representatives of any contractors, if it shall appear, on the trial or otherwise, that the plaintiff is barred by this chapter as to one or more of the defendants but is entitled to recover against any other or others of them by virtue of a new acknowledgment or promise or otherwise, judgment shall be given for the plaintiff as to any of the defendants against whom the plaintiff is entitled to recover and for the other defendant or defendants against the plaintiff. 893.47 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323; 2001 a. 102. 893.47 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.44 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
893.48893.48 Payment, effect of, not altered. Nothing contained in ss. 893.44 to 893.47 shall alter, take away or lessen the effect of a payment of any principal or interest made by any person, but no endorsement or memorandum of any such payment, written or made upon any promissory note, bill of exchange or other writing, by or on behalf of the party to whom the payment is made or purports to be made, is sufficient proof of the payment so as to take the case out of the operation of this chapter. 893.48 HistoryHistory: Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 784 (1975); 1979 c. 323. 893.48 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.46 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
893.49893.49 Payment by one not to affect others. If there are 2 or more joint contractors or joint personal representatives of any contractor, no one of them shall lose the benefit of this chapter so as to be chargeable by reason only of any payment made by any other of them. 893.49 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323; 2001 a. 102. 893.49 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.47 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
893.50893.50 Other actions. All personal actions on any contract not limited by this chapter or any other law of this state shall be brought within 10 years after the accruing of the cause of action. 893.50 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323. 893.50 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.26 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
TORT ACTIONS
893.51893.51 Action for wrongful taking of personal property. 893.51(1)(1) Except as provided in sub. (2), an action to recover damages for the wrongful taking, conversion or detention of personal property shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred. The cause of action accrues at the time the wrongful taking or conversion occurs, or the wrongful detention begins. 893.51(2)(2) An action under s. 134.90 shall be commenced within 3 years after the misappropriation of a trade secret is discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence. A continuing misappropriation constitutes a single claim. 893.51 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323; 1985 a. 236. 893.51 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is based on previous s. 893.19 (6), without change in substance, but with some expansion of language to make clear that accrual of the cause of action is not delayed until the person bringing the action learns of the wrongful taking or detention. An action for recovery of the personal property is subject to s. 893.35 which is also based on previous s. 893.19 (6). [Bill 326-A]
893.51 AnnotationA wrongful detention claim is separate from a conversion claim. A wrongful detention claim may arise against a possessor of previously converted or wrongfully taken property. Under those facts, a wrongful detention claim is available and, for purposes of sub. (1) and s. 893.35, accrues at the time the property is obtained. No demand is necessary. Mueller v. TL90108, LLC, 2020 WI 7, 390 Wis. 2d 34, 938 N.W.2d 566, 17-1962. 893.51 AnnotationSub. (1) and s. 893.35 are statutes of repose, not statutes of limitation. A statute of repose provides that a cause of action must be commenced within a specified amount of time after the defendant’s action that allegedly led to injury, regardless of whether the plaintiff has discovered the injury or wrongdoing. With regard to a wrongful detention claim, the statutes focus on when the wrongful detention begins, not when the property owner discovers or knows of the detention. Mueller v. TL90108, LLC, 2020 WI 7, 390 Wis. 2d 34, 938 N.W.2d 566, 17-1962. 893.52893.52 Action for damages for injury to property. 893.52(1)(1) Except as provided in sub. (2) and in any other case where a different period is expressly prescribed, an action, not arising on contract, to recover damages for an injury to real or personal property shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred. 893.52(2)(2) An action, not arising on contract, to recover damages for an injury to real or personal property that are caused or sustained by, or that arise from, an accident involving a motor vehicle shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred. 893.52 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323; 2015 a. 133. 893.52 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is based upon previous s. 893.19 (5) which is split into 2 separate provisions. See s. 893.53 for the other provision. [Bill 326-A]
893.52 AnnotationSection 893.19 (5) [now this section] applies to actions based on negligent construction of dwellings. The statute begins to run when the plaintiff suffers injury. Abramowski v. Wm. Kilps Sons Realty, Inc., 80 Wis. 2d 468, 259 N.W.2d 306 (1977). 893.52 AnnotationThe limitation period begins when evidence of resultant injury is sufficiently significant to alert the injured party to the possibility of a defect. Tallmadge v. Skyline Construction, Inc., 86 Wis. 2d 356, 272 N.W.2d 404 (Ct. App. 1978). 893.52 AnnotationIn actions for legal malpractice, the date of injury, rather than the date of the negligent act, commences the period of limitations. Auric v. Continental Casualty Co., 111 Wis. 2d 507, 331 N.W.2d 325 (1983). 893.52 AnnotationA cause of action accrues when the negligent act occurs, or the last in a continuum of negligent acts occur, and the plaintiff has a basis for objectively concluding that the defendant caused injuries and damages. Kolpin v. Pioneer Power & Light Co., 162 Wis. 2d 1, 469 N.W.2d 595 (1991). 893.52 AnnotationThis section permits parties to contract for lesser limitations periods and to specify the day the period begins to run, in which case the “discovery rule” does not apply. Keiting v. Skauge, 198 Wis. 2d 887, 543 N.W.2d 565 (Ct. App. 1995), 95-2259. 893.52 AnnotationA claim for asbestos property damage accrues when the plaintiff is informed of the presence of asbestos and that precautions are necessary. Banc One Building Management Corp. v. W.R. Grace Co., 210 Wis. 2d 62, 565 N.W.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1997), 95-3193. 893.52 AnnotationIn the case of a claim for faulty workmanship, a builder’s representation can result in a justifiable delay in discovering the cause of an injury. Whether the plaintiff’s course of conduct is reasonable is a question of fact. Williams v. Kaerek Builders, Inc., 212 Wis. 2d 150, 568 N.W.2d 313 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2396. 893.52 AnnotationA plaintiff can rely on the discovery rule only if the plaintiff has exercised reasonable diligence. Jacobs v. Nor-Lake, Inc., 217 Wis. 2d 625, 579 N.W.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-1740. 893.52 AnnotationA party’s deficient performance of a contract does not give rise to a tort claim. There must be a duty independent of the contract for a cause of action in tort. Atkinson v. Everbrite, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 724, 592 N.W.2d 299 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-1806. 893.52 AnnotationThe accrual of a stray voltage claim is governed by the discovery rule. When the defendant utility went to the farm three times and found no problem, the plaintiff could not be faulted for accepting the results of the utility’s testing and continuing to search for other possible sources of the problem. Allen v. Wisconsin Public Service Corp., 2005 WI App 40, 279 Wis. 2d 488, 694 N.W.2d 420, 03-2690. 893.52 AnnotationSection 893.57, and not this section, applies to a claim alleging intentional trespass. Because the existence of damages for injury to real property is not necessary to maintain a claim for intentional trespass, sub. (1) cannot govern an intentional trespass claim. Munger v. Seehafer, 2016 WI App 89, 372 Wis. 2d 749, 890 N.W.2d 22, 14-2594. 893.52 AnnotationAn action for a permanent nuisance must be filed within the applicable statutes of limitations, but an action for a continuing nuisance may be maintained beyond the ordinary statutes of limitations. The appropriate factors to consider in deciding whether a nuisance is continuing are: 1) whether it constitutes an ongoing or repeated disturbance or harm; and 2) whether it can be discontinued or abated. If both factors are present, a nuisance is deemed to be continuing. In this case, claims for nuisance based on property damage that related to disrupted “views and vistas” accrued when wind turbines were erected, and those claims were for permanent nuisances, not continuing nuisances. Therefore, the claims were subject to sub. (1). Enz v. Duke Energy Renewable Services, Inc., 2023 WI App 24, 407 Wis. 2d 728, 991 N.W.2d 423, 21-0989. 893.53893.53 Action for injury to character or other rights. An action to recover damages for an injury to the character or rights of another, not arising on contract, shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of action accrues, except where a different period is expressly prescribed, or be barred. 893.53 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323; 2017 a. 235. 893.53 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is based upon previous s. 893.19 (5) which is split into 2 provisions. See s. 893.52 for the other provision. [Bill 326]
893.53 AnnotationThis section applies to legal malpractice actions that sound in tort. Acharya v. Carroll, 152 Wis. 2d 330, 448 N.W.2d 275 (Ct. App. 1989). 893.53 AnnotationDiscussing the application of the discovery rule to legal malpractice actions. Hennekens v. Hoerl, 160 Wis. 2d 144, 465 N.W.2d 812 (1991). 893.53 AnnotationThis section and the discovery rule apply to engineering malpractice actions. Milwaukee Partners v. Collins Engineers, Inc., 169 Wis. 2d 355, 485 N.W.2d 274 (Ct. App. 1992).