Chapter 940

940.03 Annotation Felony murder is committed when the death of another person is caused by a defendant during the commission of certain crimes, including burglary. The elements of burglary include the intent to either steal or to commit a felony. The evidence demonstrated that the defendant in this case forced his way into a building and started shooting with two guns, which was indicative of an intent to recklessly endanger the safety of those inside—a felony. Therefore, the defendant was convicted of a valid crime. State v. Mays, 2022 WI App 24, 402 Wis. 2d 162, 975 N.W.2d 649, 21-0765.

940.04 940.04 Abortion.

940.04(1) (1) Any person, other than the mother, who intentionally destroys the life of an unborn child is guilty of a Class H felony.

940.04(2) (2) Any person, other than the mother, who does either of the following is guilty of a Class E felony:

940.04(2)(a) (a) Intentionally destroys the life of an unborn quick child; or

940.04(2)(b) (b) Causes the death of the mother by an act done with intent to destroy the life of an unborn child. It is unnecessary to prove that the fetus was alive when the act so causing the mother’s death was committed.

940.04(5) (5) This section does not apply to a therapeutic abortion which:

940.04(5)(a) (a) Is performed by a physician; and

940.04(5)(b) (b) Is necessary, or is advised by 2 other physicians as necessary, to save the life of the mother; and

940.04(5)(c) (c) Unless an emergency prevents, is performed in a licensed maternity hospital.

940.04(6) (6) In this section “unborn child” means a human being from the time of conception until it is born alive.

940.04 History History: 2001 a. 109; 2011 a. 217.

940.04 Annotation Aborting a child against a father’s wishes does not constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. Przybyla v. Przybyla, 87 Wis. 2d 441, 275 N.W.2d 112 (Ct. App. 1978).

940.04 Annotation Sub. (2) (a) proscribes feticide. It does not apply to consensual abortions. It was not impliedly repealed by the adoption of s. 940.15 in response to Roe, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). State v. Black, 188 Wis. 2d 639, 526 N.W.2d 132 (1994).

940.04 Annotation The common law “year-and-a-day rule” that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381, 01-3063.

940.04 Annotation The state may prohibit first trimester abortions by nonphysicians. Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 96 S. Ct. 170, 46 L. Ed. 2d 152 (1975). But see Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 213 L. Ed. 2d 545 (2022).

940.04 Annotation Discussing the viability of an unborn child. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 99 S. Ct. 675, 58 L. Ed. 2d 596 (1979).

940.04 Annotation Poverty is not a constitutionally suspect classification. Encouraging childbirth except in the most urgent circumstances is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 100 S. Ct. 2671, 65 L. Ed. 2d 784 (1980).

940.04 Annotation Discussing abortion issues. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 103 S. Ct. 2481, 76 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1983); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 103 S. Ct. 2517, 76 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1983); Simopoulas v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 103 S. Ct. 2532, 76 L. Ed. 2d 755 (1983).

940.04 Annotation The constitution does not confer a right to abortion. Therefore, a rational-basis review is the appropriate standard for a constitutional challenge to abortion laws. A law regulating abortion, like other health and welfare laws, is entitled to a strong presumption of validity. It must be sustained if there is a rational basis on which the legislature could have thought that it would serve legitimate state interests. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 213 L. Ed. 2d 545 (2022).

940.04 Annotation Wisconsin’s abortion statute, former s. 940.04, 1969 stats., is unconstitutional as applied to the abortion of an embryo that has not quickened. Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (1970). But see Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2228, 213 L. Ed. 2d 545 (2022).

940.04 Annotation When U.S. Supreme Court decisions clearly made Wisconsin’s antiabortion statute unenforceable, the issue in a physician’s action for injunctive relief against enforcement became mooted, and it no longer presented a case or controversy over which the court could have jurisdiction. Larkin v. McCann, 368 F. Supp. 1352 (1974).

940.05 940.05 Second-degree intentional homicide.

940.05(1) (1) Whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class B felony if:

940.05(1)(a) (a) In prosecutions under s. 940.01, the state fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in s. 940.01 (2) did not exist as required by s. 940.01 (3); or

940.05(1)(b) (b) The state concedes that it is unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in s. 940.01 (2) did not exist. By charging under this section, the state so concedes.

940.05(2) (2) In prosecutions under sub. (1), it is sufficient to allege and prove that the defendant caused the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another.

940.05(2g) (2g) Whoever causes the death of an unborn child with intent to kill that unborn child, kill the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or kill another is guilty of a Class B felony if:

940.05(2g)(a) (a) In prosecutions under s. 940.01, the state fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in s. 940.01 (2) did not exist as required by s. 940.01 (3); or

940.05(2g)(b) (b) The state concedes that it is unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in s. 940.01 (2) did not exist. By charging under this section, the state so concedes.

940.05(2h) (2h) In prosecutions under sub. (2g), it is sufficient to allege and prove that the defendant caused the death of an unborn child with intent to kill that unborn child, kill the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or kill another.

940.05(3) (3) The mitigating circumstances specified in s. 940.01 (2) are not defenses to prosecution for this offense.

940.05 History History: 1987 a. 399; 1997 a. 295.

940.05 Note Judicial Council Note, 1988: Second-degree intentional homicide is analogous to the prior offense of manslaughter. The penalty is increased and the elements clarified in order to encourage charging under this section in appropriate cases.

940.05 Note Adequate provocation, unnecessary defensive force, prevention of felony, coercion and necessity, which are affirmative defenses to first-degree intentional homicide but not this offense, mitigate that offense to this. When this offense is charged, the state’s inability to disprove their existence is conceded. Their existence need not, however, be pleaded or proved by the state in order to sustain a finding of guilty.

940.05 Note When first-degree intentional homicide is charged, this lesser offense must be submitted upon request if the evidence, reasonably viewed, could support the jury’s finding that the state has not borne its burden of persuasion under s. 940.01 (3). State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 465, 508 (1983). [Bill 191-S]

940.05 Annotation The prosecution is required to prove only that the defendant’s acts were a substantial factor in the victim’s death; not the sole cause. State v. Block, 170 Wis. 2d 676, 489 N.W.2d 715 (Ct. App. 1992).

940.05 Annotation The common law “year-and-a-day rule” that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381, 01-3063.

940.05 Annotation The Importance of Clarity in the Law of Homicide: The Wisconsin Revision. Dickey, Schultz, & Fullin. 1989 WLR 1323.

940.06 940.06 Second-degree reckless homicide.

940.06(1) (1) Whoever recklessly causes the death of another human being is guilty of a Class D felony.

940.06(2) (2) Whoever recklessly causes the death of an unborn child is guilty of a Class D felony.

940.06 History History: 1987 a. 399; 1997 a. 295; 2001 a. 109.

940.06 Note Judicial Council Note, 1988: Second-degree reckless homicide is analogous to the prior offense of homicide by reckless conduct. The revised statute clearly requires proof of a subjective mental state, i.e., criminal recklessness. See s. 939.24 and the NOTE thereto. [Bill 191-S]

940.06 Annotation Second-degree reckless homicide is not a lesser included offense of homicide by intoxicated use of a motor vehicle. State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 576 N.W.2d 912 (1998), 96-2830.

940.06 Annotation The common law “year-and-a-day rule” that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381, 01-3063.

940.06 Annotation The second-degree reckless homicide statute requires both the creation of an objectively unreasonable and substantial risk of human death or great bodily harm and the actor’s subjective awareness of that risk. The circuit court’s refusal to instruct the jury about the effect of the parents’ sincere belief in prayer treatment for their child on the subjective awareness element of second-degree reckless homicide did not undermine the parents’ ability to defend themselves. The second-degree reckless homicide statute does not require that the actor be subjectively aware that the actor’s conduct is a cause of the death of the actor’s child. The statute and the jury instructions require only that the actor be subjectively aware that the actor’s conduct created the unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm. State v. Neumann, 2013 WI 58, 348 Wis. 2d 455, 832 N.W.2d 560, 11-1044.

940.06 Annotation The only difference between first-degree and second-degree reckless homicide is that “utter disregard for human life” is a required element for first-degree, but not second-degree, reckless homicide. In this case, there was evidence that the defendant acted in fear for his own life, not necessarily with utter disregard for the victim’s life. Based on that evidence, the circuit court should have instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of second-degree reckless homicide as well as first-degree reckless homicide. State v. Johnson, 2021 WI 61, 397 Wis. 2d 633, 961 N.W.2d 18, 18-2318.

940.06 Annotation The Importance of Clarity in the Law of Homicide: The Wisconsin Revision. Dickey, Schultz, & Fullin. 1989 WLR 1323.

940.07 940.07 Homicide resulting from negligent control of vicious animal. Whoever knowing the vicious propensities of any animal intentionally allows it to go at large or keeps it without ordinary care, if such animal, while so at large or not confined, kills any human being who has taken all the precautions which the circumstances may permit to avoid such animal, is guilty of a Class G felony.

940.07 History History: 1977 c. 173; 2001 a. 109.

940.07 Annotation The common law “year-and-a-day rule” that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381, 01-3063.

940.08 940.08 Homicide by negligent handling of dangerous weapon, explosives or fire.

940.08(1) (1) Except as provided in sub. (3), whoever causes the death of another human being by the negligent operation or handling of a dangerous weapon, explosives or fire is guilty of a Class G felony.

940.08(2) (2) Whoever causes the death of an unborn child by the negligent operation or handling of a dangerous weapon, explosives or fire is guilty of a Class G felony.

940.08(3) (3) Subsection (1) does not apply to a health care provider acting within the scope of his or her practice or employment.

940.08 History History: 1977 c. 173; 1985 a. 293; 1987 a. 399; 1997 a. 295; 2001 a. 109; 2011 a. 2.

940.08 Note Judicial Council Note, 1988: The definition of the offense is broadened to include highly negligent handling of fire, explosives and dangerous weapons in addition to firearm, airgun, knife or bow and arrow. See s. 939.22 (10). [Bill 191-S]

940.08 Annotation The common law “year-and-a-day rule” that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42, 261 Wis. 2d 249, 661 N.W.2d 381, 01-3063.

940.08 Annotation In order to establish that the defendant was guilty of the crime of homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon under sub. (1), the state had to prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) the defendant operated or handled a dangerous weapon; 2) the defendant operated or handled a dangerous weapon in a manner constituting criminal negligence; and 3) the defendant’s operation or handling of a dangerous weapon in a manner constituting criminal negligence caused the death of another human being. State v. Langlois, 2018 WI 73, 382 Wis. 2d 414, 913 N.W.2d 812, 16-1409.

940.09 940.09 Homicide by intoxicated use of vehicle or firearm.

940.09(1) (1) Any person who does any of the following may be penalized as provided in sub. (1c):

940.09(1)(a) (a) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.

940.09(1)(am) (am) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a vehicle while the person has a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.

940.09(1)(b) (b) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a vehicle while the person has a prohibited alcohol concentration, as defined in s. 340.01 (46m).

940.09(1)(bm) (bm) Causes the death of another by the operation of a commercial motor vehicle while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more but less than 0.08.

940.09(1)(c) (c) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.

940.09(1)(cm) (cm) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a vehicle while the person has a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.

940.09(1)(d) (d) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a vehicle while the person has a prohibited alcohol concentration, as defined in s. 340.01 (46m).

940.09(1)(e) (e) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation of a commercial motor vehicle while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more but less than 0.08.

940.09(1c) (1c) 

940.09(1c)(a) (a) Except as provided in par. (b), a person who violates sub. (1) is guilty of a Class D felony. Upon conviction, the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence under s. 973.01 and the term of confinement in prison portion of the bifurcated sentence shall be at least 5 years except that a court may impose a term of confinement that is less than 5 years if the court finds a compelling reason and places its reason on the record.

940.09(1c)(b) (b) A person who violates sub. (1) is guilty of a Class C felony if the person has one or more prior convictions, suspensions, or revocations, as counted under s. 343.307 (2). Upon conviction, the court shall impose a bifurcated sentence under s. 973.01 and the term of confinement in prison portion of the bifurcated sentence shall be at least 5 years except that a court may impose a term of confinement that is less than 5 years if the court finds a compelling reason and places its reason on the record.

940.09(1d) (1d) A person who violates sub. (1) is subject to the requirements and procedures for installation of an ignition interlock device under s. 343.301.

940.09(1g) (1g) Any person who does any of the following is guilty of a Class D felony:

940.09(1g)(a) (a) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a firearm or airgun while under the influence of an intoxicant.

940.09(1g)(am) (am) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a firearm or airgun while the person has a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.

940.09(1g)(b) (b) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a firearm or airgun while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.

940.09(1g)(c) (c) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a firearm or airgun while under the influence of an intoxicant.

940.09(1g)(cm) (cm) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a firearm or airgun while the person has a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.

940.09(1g)(d) (d) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a firearm or airgun while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.

940.09(1m) (1m) 

940.09(1m)(a) (a) A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon an information based upon a violation of any combination of sub. (1) (a), (am), or (b); any combination of sub. (1) (a), (am), or (bm); any combination of sub. (1) (c), (cm), or (d); any combination of sub. (1) (c), (cm), or (e); any combination of sub. (1g) (a), (am), or (b); or any combination of sub. (1g) (c), (cm), or (d) for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence.

940.09(1m)(b) (b) If a person is charged in an information with any of the combinations of crimes referred to in par. (a), the crimes shall be joined under s. 971.12. If the person is found guilty of more than one of the crimes so charged for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence, there shall be a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and for purposes of counting convictions under s. 23.33 (13) (b) 2. and 3., under s. 23.335 (23) (c) 2. and 3., under s. 30.80 (6) (a) 2. and 3., under s. 343.307 (1) or under s. 350.11 (3) (a) 2. and 3. Subsection (1) (a), (am), (b), (bm), (c), (cm), (d), and (e) each require proof of a fact for conviction which the others do not require, and sub. (1g) (a), (am), (b), (c), (cm), and (d) each require proof of a fact for conviction which the others do not require.

940.09(2) (2) 

940.09(2)(a) (a) In any action under this section, the defendant has a defense if he or she proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the death would have occurred even if he or she had been exercising due care and he or she had not been under the influence of an intoxicant, did not have a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood, or did not have an alcohol concentration described under sub. (1) (b), (bm), (d) or (e) or (1g) (b) or (d).

940.09(2)(b) (b) In any action under sub. (1) (am) or (cm) or (1g) (am) or (cm) that is based on the defendant allegedly having a detectable amount of methamphetamine or gamma-hydroxybutyric acid or delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol in his or her blood, the defendant has a defense if he or she proves by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the incident or occurrence he or she had a valid prescription for methamphetamine or one of its metabolic precursors or gamma-hydroxybutyric acid or delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol.

940.09(3) (3) An officer who makes an arrest for a violation of this section shall make a report as required under s. 23.33 (4t), 23.335 (12) (j), 30.686, 346.635 or 350.106.

940.09 History History: 1977 c. 173; 1981 c. 20, 184, 314, 391; 1983 a. 459; 1985 a. 331; 1987 a. 399; 1989 a. 105, 275, 359; 1991 a. 32, 277; 1993 a. 317; 1995 a. 425, 436; 1997 a. 237, 295, 338; 1999 a. 32, 109; 2001 a. 16, 109; 2003 a. 30, 97; 2009 a. 100; 2015 a. 170; 2015 a. 197 s. 51; 2019 a. 31.