Chapter 939

939.22(21)(j) (j) Kidnapping, as prohibited in s. 940.31.

939.22(21)(k) (k) Intimidation of witnesses, as prohibited in s. 940.42 or 940.43.

939.22(21)(L) (L) Intimidation of victims, as prohibited in s. 940.44 or 940.45.

939.22(21)(m) (m) Criminal damage to property, as prohibited in s. 943.01.

939.22(21)(mg) (mg) Criminal damage to or threat to criminally damage the property of a witness, as prohibited in s. 943.011 or 943.017 (2m).

939.22(21)(n) (n) Arson of buildings or damage by explosives, as prohibited in s. 943.02.

939.22(21)(o) (o) Burglary, as prohibited in s. 943.10.

939.22(21)(p) (p) Theft, as prohibited in s. 943.20.

939.22(21)(q) (q) Taking, driving or operating a vehicle, or removing a part or component of a vehicle, without the owner’s consent, as prohibited in s. 943.23.

939.22(21)(qm) (qm) Carjacking, as prohibited in s. 943.231.

939.22(21)(r) (r) Robbery, as prohibited in s. 943.32.

939.22(21)(s) (s) Sexual assault of a child, as prohibited in s. 948.02.

939.22(21)(t) (t) Repeated acts of sexual assault of the same child, as prohibited in s. 948.025.

939.22(21)(u) (u) Sexual assault of a child placed in substitute care under s. 948.085.

939.22(22) (22) “Peace officer” means any person vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for crime, whether that duty extends to all crimes or is limited to specific crimes. “Peace officer” includes a commission warden and a university police officer, as defined in s. 175.42 (1) (b).

939.22(23) (23) “Petechia” means a minute colored spot that appears on the skin, eye, eyelid, or mucous membrane of a person as a result of localized hemorrhage or rupture to a blood vessel or capillary.

939.22(24) (24) “Place of prostitution” means any place where a person habitually engages, in public or in private, in nonmarital acts of sexual intercourse, sexual gratification involving the sex organ of one person and the mouth or anus of another, masturbation or sexual contact for anything of value.

939.22(28) (28) “Property of another” means property in which a person other than the actor has a legal interest which the actor has no right to defeat or impair, even though the actor may also have a legal interest in the property.

939.22(30) (30) “Public officer”; “public employee”. A “public officer” is any person appointed or elected according to law to discharge a public duty for the state or one of its subordinate governmental units. A “public employee” is any person, not an officer, who performs any official function on behalf of the state or one of its subordinate governmental units and who is paid from the public treasury of the state or subordinate governmental unit.

939.22(32) (32) “Reasonably believes” means that the actor believes that a certain fact situation exists and such belief under the circumstances is reasonable even though erroneous.

939.22(33) (33) “Restricted controlled substance” means any of the following:

939.22(33)(a) (a) A controlled substance included in schedule I under ch. 961 other than a tetrahydrocannabinol.

939.22(33)(b) (b) A controlled substance analog, as defined in s. 961.01 (4m), of a controlled substance described in par. (a).

939.22(33)(c) (c) Cocaine or any of its metabolites.

939.22(33)(d) (d) Methamphetamine.

939.22(33)(e) (e) Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol, excluding its precursors or metabolites, at a concentration of one or more nanograms per milliliter of a person’s blood.

939.22(34) (34) “Sexual contact” means any of the following if done for the purpose of sexual humiliation, degradation, arousal, or gratification:

939.22(34)(a) (a) The intentional touching by the defendant or, upon the defendant’s instruction, by a third person of the clothed or unclothed intimate parts of another person with any part of the body, clothed or unclothed, or with any object or device.

939.22(34)(b) (b) The intentional touching by the defendant or, upon the defendant’s instruction, by a third person of any part of the body, clothed or unclothed, of another person with the intimate parts of the body, clothed or unclothed.

939.22(34)(c) (c) The intentional penile ejaculation of ejaculate or the intentional emission of urine or feces by the defendant or, upon the defendant’s instruction, by a third person upon any part of the body, clothed or unclothed, of another person.

939.22(34)(d) (d) Intentionally causing another person to ejaculate or emit urine or feces on any part of the actor’s body, whether clothed or unclothed.

939.22(36) (36) “Sexual intercourse” requires only vulvar penetration and does not require emission.

939.22(37) (37) “State-certified commission warden” means a commission warden who meets the requirements of s. 165.85 (4) (a) 1., 2., and 7. and has agreed to accept the duties of a law enforcement officer under the laws of this state.

939.22(38) (38) “Substantial bodily harm” means bodily injury that causes a laceration that requires stitches, staples, or a tissue adhesive; any fracture of a bone; a broken nose; a burn; a petechia; a temporary loss of consciousness, sight or hearing; a concussion; or a loss or fracture of a tooth.

939.22(40) (40) “Transfer” means any transaction involving a change in possession of any property, or a change of right, title, or interest to or in any property.

939.22(42) (42) “Under the influence of an intoxicant” means that the actor’s ability to operate a vehicle or handle a firearm or airgun is materially impaired because of his or her consumption of an alcohol beverage, hazardous inhalant, of a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under ch. 961, of any combination of an alcohol beverage, hazardous inhalant, controlled substance and controlled substance analog, or of any other drug, or of an alcohol beverage and any other drug.

939.22(44) (44) “Vehicle” means any self-propelled device for moving persons or property or pulling implements from one place to another, whether such device is operated on land, rails, water, or in the air. “Vehicle” does not include a personal delivery device, as defined in s. 340.01 (43fg).

939.22(46) (46) “With intent” has the meaning designated in s. 939.23.

939.22(48) (48) “Without consent” means no consent in fact or that consent is given for one of the following reasons:

939.22(48)(a) (a) Because the actor put the victim in fear by the use or threat of imminent use of physical violence on the victim, or on a person in the victim’s presence, or on a member of the victim’s immediate family; or

939.22(48)(b) (b) Because the actor purports to be acting under legal authority; or

939.22(48)(c) (c) Because the victim does not understand the nature of the thing to which the victim consents, either by reason of ignorance or mistake of fact or of law other than criminal law or by reason of youth or defective mental condition, whether permanent or temporary.

939.22 History History: 1971 c. 219; 1973 c. 336; 1977 c. 173; 1979 c. 89, 221; 1981 c. 79 s. 17; 1981 c. 89, 348; 1983 a. 17, 459; 1985 a. 146 s. 8; 1987 a. 332, 399; 1993 a. 98, 213, 227, 441, 486; 1995 a. 69, 436, 448; 1997 a. 143, 295; 2001 a. 109; 2003 a. 97, 223; 2005 a. 273, 277, 435; 2007 a. 27, 97, 127; 2009 a. 28, 276; 2011 a. 35; 2013 a. 83, 214, 265; 2017 a. 13, 364; 2019 a. 68; 2023 a. 10; s. 35.17 correction in (9).

939.22 Annotation It was for the jury to determine whether a soft drink bottle, with which the victim was hit on the head, constituted a dangerous weapon. Actual injury to the victim is not required. Langston v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 288, 212 N.W.2d 113 (1973).

939.22 Annotation An unloaded pellet gun qualified as a “dangerous weapon” under sub. (10) in that it was designed as a weapon and, when used as a bludgeon, was capable of producing great bodily harm. State v. Antes, 74 Wis. 2d 317, 246 N.W.2d 671 (1976).

939.22 Annotation A jury could reasonably find that numerous cuts and stab wounds constituted “serious bodily injury” under sub. (14) even though there was no probability of death, no permanent injury, and no damage to any member or organ. The phrase “or other serious bodily injury” was designed as an intentional broadening of the scope of the statute to include bodily injuries that were serious, although not of the same type or category as those recited in the statute. La Barge v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 327, 246 N.W.2d 794 (1976).

939.22 Annotation A jury must find that acts of prostitution were repeated or were continued in order to find that premises are “a place of prostitution” under sub. (24). Johnson v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 672, 251 N.W.2d 834 (1977).

939.22 Annotation Sub. (14), either on its face or as construed in La Barge, 74 Wis. 2d 327 (1976), is not unconstitutionally vague. Cheatham v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 112, 270 N.W.2d 194 (1978).

939.22 Annotation Definitions of “under the influence” in this section and in s. 346.63 (1) (a) are equivalent. State v. Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d 18, 386 N.W.2d 47 (1986).

939.22 Annotation To determine whether an infant was “born alive” under sub. (16), the s. 146.71 standard to determine death is applied, as, “if one is not dead he is indeed alive.” State v. Cornelius, 152 Wis. 2d 272, 448 N.W.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1989).

939.22 Annotation A dog may be a dangerous weapon under sub. (10). State v. Sinks, 168 Wis. 2d 245, 483 N.W.2d 286 (Ct. App. 1992).

939.22 Annotation Portions of the defendant’s anatomy are not dangerous weapons under sub. (10). State v. Frey, 178 Wis. 2d 729, 505 N.W.2d 786 (Ct. App. 1993).

939.22 Annotation An automobile may constitute a dangerous weapon under sub. (10). State v. Bidwell, 200 Wis. 2d 200, 546 N.W.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-0791.

939.22 Annotation A firearm with a trigger lock is within the definition of a dangerous weapon under sub. (10). State v. Norris, 214 Wis. 2d 25, 571 N.W.2d 857 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2158.

939.22 Annotation When a mother agreed to the father taking a child on a camping trip, but the father actually intended to permanently take the child and did abscond to Canada with the child, the child was taken based on the mother’s “mistake of fact,” which under sub. (48) rendered the taking of the child to be “without consent” and in violation of s. 948.31. State v. Inglin, 224 Wis. 2d 764, 592 N.W.2d 666 (Ct. App. 1999), 97-3091.

939.22 Annotation The definitions in subs. (9) and (9g) are sufficiently specific that when incorporated into a probation condition they provide fair and adequate notice as to the expected course of conduct and provide an adequate standard of enforcement. State v. Lo, 228 Wis. 2d 531, 599 N.W.2d 659 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-2490.

939.22 Annotation Sub. (19) includes female and male breasts as each is “the breast of a human being.” The touching of a boy’s breast constitutes “sexual contact” within the meaning of s. 948.02 (2). State v. Forster, 2003 WI App 29, 260 Wis. 2d 149, 659 N.W.2d 144, 02-0602.

939.22 Annotation “Materially impaired” as used in sub. (42) does not have a technical or peculiar meaning in the law beyond the time-tested explanations in standard jury instructions. Therefore, the circuit court’s response to the jury question to give all words not otherwise defined their ordinary meaning was not error, comported with s. 990.01, and did not constitute an erroneous exercise of discretion. State v. Hubbard, 2008 WI 92, 313 Wis. 2d 1, 752 N.W.2d 839, 06-2753.

939.22 Annotation Shooting a person in the thigh at a range of 16 to 18 feet with a shotgun is practically certain to cause at least a protracted loss or impairment of the function of the victim’s leg and is injury constituting “great bodily harm” within the meaning of sub. (14). The fact that the defendant’s conduct was intended to neutralize the threat posed by the victim did not negate the fact that, by firing the shotgun at the victim’s thigh, the defendant intended to cause great bodily harm by committing an act that he was aware was practically certain to result in great bodily harm to the victim. State v. Miller, 2009 WI App 111, 320 Wis. 2d 724, 772 N.W.2d 188, 07-1052.

939.23 939.23 Criminal intent.

939.23(1) (1) When criminal intent is an element of a crime in chs. 939 to 951, such intent is indicated by the term “intentionally”, the phrase “with intent to”, the phrase “with intent that”, or some form of the verbs “know” or “believe”.

939.23(2) (2) “Know” requires only that the actor believes that the specified fact exists.

939.23(3) (3) “Intentionally” means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified, or is aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause that result. In addition, except as provided in sub. (6), the actor must have knowledge of those facts which are necessary to make his or her conduct criminal and which are set forth after the word “intentionally”.

939.23(4) (4) “With intent to” or “with intent that” means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified, or is aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause that result.

939.23(5) (5) Criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge of the existence or constitutionality of the section under which the actor is prosecuted or the scope or meaning of the terms used in that section.

939.23(6) (6) Criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge of the age of a minor even though age is a material element in the crime in question.

939.23 History History: 1979 c. 89; 1987 a. 332 s. 64; 1987 a. 399; 1993 a. 486.

939.23 Note Judicial Council Note, 1988: Subs. (3) and (4) are conformed to the formulation of s. 2.02 (2) (b) ii of the model penal code. [Bill 191-S]

939.23 Annotation A person need not foresee or intend the specific consequences of an act in order to possess the requisite criminal intent and is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of the act. State v. Gould, 56 Wis. 2d 808, 202 N.W.2d 903 (1973).

939.23 Annotation Instructions on intent to kill created a permissible rebuttable presumption that shifted the burden of production to the defendant, but not the burden of persuasion. Muller v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 450, 289 N.W.2d 570 (1980).

939.23 Annotation The court properly refused to instruct the jury on a “mistake of fact” defense when the accused claimed that the victim moved into the path of a gunshot intended only to frighten the victim. State v. Bougneit, 97 Wis. 2d 687, 294 N.W.2d 675 (Ct. App. 1980).

939.23 Annotation The constitutionality of sub. (3) is upheld. State v. Smith, 170 Wis. 2d 701, 490 N.W.2d 40 (Ct. App. 1992).

939.23 Annotation The trial court’s wholesale exclusion of the defendant’s proffered expert and lay testimony regarding posttraumatic stress disorder from the guilt phase of a murder trial without valid justification violated the defendant’s right to present a defense and to testify on her own behalf. Morgan v. Krenke, 72 F. Supp. 2d 980 (1999).

939.24 939.24 Criminal recklessness.

939.24(1) (1) In this section, “criminal recklessness” means that the actor creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to another human being and the actor is aware of that risk, except that for purposes of ss. 940.02 (1m), 940.06 (2) and 940.23 (1) (b) and (2) (b), “criminal recklessness” means that the actor creates an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to an unborn child, to the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or to another and the actor is aware of that risk.

939.24(2) (2) Except as provided in ss. 940.285, 940.29, 940.295, and 943.76, if criminal recklessness is an element of a crime in chs. 939 to 951, the recklessness is indicated by the term “reckless” or “recklessly”.

939.24 History History: 1987 a. 399; 1989 a. 56 s. 259; 1993 a. 445; 1997 a. 295; 2001 a. 109; 2013 a. 307.

939.24 Note Judicial Council Note, 1988: This section is new. It provides a uniform definition of criminal recklessness, the culpable mental state of numerous offenses. Recklessness requires both the creation of an objectively unreasonable and substantial risk of human death or great bodily harm and the actor’s subjective awareness of that risk.

939.24 Note Sub. (3) continues the present rule that a voluntarily produced intoxicated or drugged condition is not a defense to liability for criminal recklessness. Ameen v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 175, 185 (1971). Patterned on s. 2.08 of the model penal code, it premises liability on whether the actor would have been aware if not in such condition of the risk of death or great bodily harm. The commentaries to s. 2.08, model penal code, state the rationale of this rule in extended fashion. [Bill 191-S]

939.24 Annotation There is no crime of “attempted homicide by reckless conduct” since the completed offense does not require intent while any attempt must demonstrate intent. State v. Melvin, 49 Wis. 2d 246, 181 N.W.2d 490 (1970).

939.24 Annotation Felony murder is committed when the death of another person is caused by a defendant during the commission of certain crimes, including burglary. The elements of burglary include the intent to either steal or to commit a felony. The evidence demonstrated that the defendant in this case forced his way into a building and started shooting with two guns, which was indicative of an intent to recklessly endanger the safety of those inside—a felony. Therefore, the defendant was convicted of a valid crime. State v. Mays, 2022 WI App 24, 402 Wis. 2d 162, 975 N.W.2d 649, 21-0765.

939.24 Annotation With respect to first-degree reckless injury under s. 940.23 (1) (a), a successful assertion of self-defense under s. 939.48 (1) negates an element of the crime, rendering self-defense a negative defense rather than an affirmative defense. Because, under sub. (1), the “criminally reckless conduct” element of reckless injury requires proof that the defendant has created an “unreasonable” and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm to another person, proof that the defendant reasonably believed that the other person posed a risk of death or great bodily harm to himself and that the use of force was necessary to eliminate that risk will necessarily preclude a finding that the defendant’s use of force was unreasonable and criminally reckless. Once a defendant establishes the existence of a statutory affirmative defense, Wisconsin law imposes on the state the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Brown v. Eplett, 48 F.4th 543 (2022).

939.24 Annotation Due Process and the Voluntary Intoxication Defense. Larson. Wis. Law. Feb. 2019.

939.25 939.25 Criminal negligence.

939.25(1) (1) In this section, “criminal negligence” means ordinary negligence to a high degree, consisting of conduct that the actor should realize creates a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or great bodily harm to another, except that for purposes of ss. 940.08 (2), 940.10 (2) and 940.24 (2), “criminal negligence” means ordinary negligence to a high degree, consisting of conduct that the actor should realize creates a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or great bodily harm to an unborn child, to the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or to another.

939.25(2) (2) If criminal negligence is an element of a crime in chs. 939 to 951 or s. 346.62, the negligence is indicated by the term “negligent” or “negligently”.

939.25(3) (3) This section does not apply to s. 948.21.

939.25 History History: 1987 a. 399; 1989 a. 56 s. 259; 1997 a. 180, 295; 2017 a. 283.

939.25 Note Judicial Council Note, 1988: This section is new. It provides a uniform definition of criminal negligence, patterned on prior ss. 940.08 (2), 940.24 (2) and 941.01 (2). Criminal negligence means the creation of a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or great bodily harm to another, of which the actor should be aware. [Bill 191-S]