A trial court’s failure to conduct a hearing to determine if a defendant’s waiver of counsel is knowingly made is harmless error absent a showing of prejudice. A trial court need not make a finding that a defendant is competent to proceed without counsel unless there is doubt that the defendant is competent to stand trial. State v. Klessig, 199 Wis. 2d 397, 544 N.W.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-1938. In certain situations a court may find that a defendant has waived counsel without having expressly done so. Waiver was found when the defendant constantly refused to cooperate with counsel while refusing to waive the right and when the court found the defendant’s intent was to “delay, obfuscate and compound the process of justice.” State v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 546 N.W.2d 406 (1996), 93-2445. The test for ineffective assistance of counsel under the state constitution is the same as under the federal constitution. In such cases the burden is placed on the defendant to show that the deficient performance of counsel prejudiced the defense. State v. Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d 219, 548 N.W.2d 69 (1996), 94-0208. Read together, ss. 809.32 (4) and 977.05 (4) (j) create a statutory, but not constitutional, right to counsel in petitions for review and cases before any court, provided counsel does not determine the appeal to be without merit. When counsel fails to timely file a petition for review, the defendant may petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the supreme court has the power to allow late filing. State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 201 Wis. 2d 246, 548 N.W.2d 45 (1996), 95-1096. Whether counsel is deficient by not requesting the polling of individual jurors upon the return of a verdict depends on all the circumstances, not on whether counsel explained to the defendant the right to an individual polling. State v. Yang, 201 Wis. 2d 725, 549 N.W.2d 769 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-0583. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of interest there must be an actual conflict that adversely affected the attorney’s performance. Simultaneous representation of a criminal defendant and a witness in that case in an unrelated civil case resulted in an actual conflict. State v. Street, 202 Wis. 2d 533, 551 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-2242. Counsel is not ineffective when the general theory of the defense is discussed with the defendant, and when based on that theory, counsel makes a strategic decision not to request a lesser-included instruction because it would be inconsistent with or harmful to the theory of the defense. State v. Eckert, 203 Wis. 2d 497, 553 N.W.2d 539 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-1877. When a prosecutor elicits testimony that can only be contradicted by defense counsel or the defendant, if defense counsel could not reasonably foresee the dilemma and the defendant has decided not to testify, defense counsel must be permitted to testify. State v. Foy, 206 Wis. 2d 629, 557 N.W.2d 494 (Ct. App. 1996), 96-0658. Counsel was deficient when it failed to object at sentencing to a prosecutor’s sentence recommendation after agreeing in a plea bargain to make no recommendation. The defendant was automatically prejudiced when the prosecutor materially and substantially breached the plea agreement. State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997), 94-3364. But see State v. Nietzold, 2023 WI 22, 406 Wis. 2d 349, 986 N.W.2d 795, 21-0021. Whenever a defendant seeks to proceed pro se, a colloquy to determine whether the waiver is knowing and voluntary is required. The colloquy is to ensure that the defendant: 1) made a deliberate choice to proceed without counsel; 2) was aware of the difficulties and disadvantages of self-representation; 3) was aware of the seriousness of the charge or charges; and 4) was aware of the general range of the possible penalties. When there is no colloquy and post-conviction relief is requested, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing on the waiver, and the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the waiver was knowingly made for the conviction to stand. State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), 95-1938. There is a higher standard for determining competency to represent oneself than for competency to stand trial. The standard is based on the defendant’s education, literacy, fluency in English, and any disability that may affect the ability to communicate a defense. When there is no pretrial finding of competency to proceed and post-conviction relief is sought, the court must determine if it can make a meaningful nunc pro tunc inquiry. If it cannot, or it finds that it can but the defendant was not competent, a new trial is required. State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), 95-1938. It was ineffective assistance of counsel to advise a defendant to go to trial and lie rather than agree to a plea agreement. Despite the defendant’s participation in fraud on the court, the defendant was entitled to vacation of the defendant’s sentence and a return to pretrial status, although offering the prior proposed plea agreement was not required. State v. Fritz, 212 Wis. 2d 284, 569 N.W.2d 48 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-1905. When a defendant proves ineffective assistance of counsel occurred at the pretrial stage, the defendant must be granted a new trial. State v. Lentowski, 212 Wis. 2d 849, 569 N.W.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2597. An in-court identification subsequent to a lineup in violation of an accused’s right to counsel is admissible only if the state carries the burden of showing that the in-court identification is based on observations of the suspect other than the lineup. State v. McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d 156, 570 N.W.2d 384 (1997), 95-2052. Having disputed relevant portions of the presentence investigation at the sentencing hearing, it was trial counsel’s duty to see that the disputes were fully resolved by a proper hearing. Failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Anderson, 222 Wis. 2d 403, 588 N.W.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-3070. Whether a defendant’s motion for substitution of counsel, with an accompanying request for a continuation, should be granted depends on the balancing of several interests. State v. Wanta, 224 Wis. 2d 679, 592 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-0318. A defendant’s prejudicial deprivation of appellate counsel, be it the fault of the attorney or the appellate court, is properly remedied by a petition for habeas corpus in the supreme court. State ex rel. Fuentes v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 225 Wis. 2d 446, 593 N.W.2d 48 (1999), 98-1534. A defendant who alleges counsel was ineffective by failing to take certain steps must show with specificity what the action, if taken, would have revealed and how the action would have affected the outcome. State v. Byrge, 225 Wis. 2d 702, 594 N.W.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1999), 97-3217. When defense counsel has appeared for and represented the state in the same case in which counsel later represents the defendant and no objection was made at trial, to prove a violation of the right to effective counsel, the defendant must show that counsel converted a potential conflict of interest into an actual conflict by knowingly failing to disclose the attorney’s former prosecution of the defendant or representing the defendant in a manner that adversely affected the defendant’s interests. State v. Love, 227 Wis. 2d 60, 594 N.W.2d 806 (1999), 97-2336. See also State v. Kalk, 2000 WI App 62, 234 Wis. 2d 98, 608 N.W.2d 428, 99-1164; State v. Henyard, 2020 WI App 51, 393 Wis. 2d 727, 948 N.W.2d 396, 19-0548. There is a distinction between the consequences on appeal of a trial court error and the consequences of that same error when it is raised in an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel context. The fact that a preserved error could lead to automatic reversal does not mean the same result will be reached when the error was waived. State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999), 98-0273. The defendant’s assertion of the 6th amendment right to counsel was evident during interrogation when the defendant asked whether the police officer thought he should have an attorney and if he could call a person known to the officer to be a criminal defense lawyer. State v. Hornung, 229 Wis. 2d 469, 600 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1999), 99-0300. Inherent in a defendant’s choice to proceed pro se is the risk, which the defendant knowingly assumes, that a defense not known to the defendant will not be presented during trial. State v. Clutter, 230 Wis. 2d 472, 602 N.W.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1999), 99-0705. A defendant has a substantive due process right to enforce a plea agreement after the plea has been entered. Defense counsel’s failure to inform the defendant of that right or to pursue enforcement of the agreement constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Scott, 230 Wis. 2d 643, 602 N.W.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-2109. A defendant’s unusual conduct or beliefs do not necessarily establish incompetence for purposes of self-representation. Although a defendant may exhibit beliefs that are out of the ordinary and make references that may antagonize jurors, that does not reflect a mental defect that prevents self-representation. State v. Ruszkiewicz, 2000 WI App 125, 237 Wis. 2d 441, 613 N.W.2d 893, 99-1198. Except when charges have been filed in a closely-related case derived from the same factual predicate, the 6th amendment right to counsel is offense specific and attaches to a particular offense only after adversary proceedings are commenced. The 6th amendment does not prohibit the interrogation of a defendant in regard to a murder in the absence of counsel retained in a bail jumping case. State v. Badker, 2001 WI App 27, 240 Wis. 2d 460, 623 N.W.2d 142, 99-2943. In making its separate determination of whether a defendant is indigent for purposes of court-appointed counsel, the trial court should consider federal poverty guidelines. If a defendant has no assets and an income well below the poverty level, the trial court should set forth why it determined that the defendant could afford counsel. State v. Nieves-Gonzalez, 2001 WI App 90, 242 Wis. 2d 782, 625 N.W.2d 913, 00-2138. An indigent sexually violent person is constitutionally entitled to assistance of counsel in bringing a first appeal as of right from a denial of the person’s petition for supervised release. State ex rel. Seibert v. Macht, 2001 WI 67, 244 Wis. 2d 378, 627 N.W.2d 881, 99-3354. There was ineffective assistance of counsel when the notice of appeal for the denial of a ch. 980 petition for supervised release was filed one day late in circuit court. Under Douglas, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), and Anders, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the court of appeals could not conduct an independent review for error when the individual lacked requested representation. State ex rel. Seibert v. Macht, 2001 WI 67, 244 Wis. 2d 378, 627 N.W.2d 881, 99-3354. A reviewing court is not required to view defense counsel’s subjective testimony as dispositive of an ineffective assistance claim. The testimony is simply evidence to be considered along with other evidence in the record that a court will examine in assessing counsel’s overall performance. State v. Kimbrough, 2001 WI App 138, 246 Wis. 2d 648, 630 N.W.2d 752, 00-2133. For a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel on direct appeal, the defendant must be aware of: 1) the rights to an appeal, to the assistance of counsel for the appeal, and to opt for a no-merit report; 2) the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se; and 3) the possibility that if appointed counsel is permitted to withdraw, successor counsel may not be appointed. The necessary colloquy may be accomplished by written communications with the defendant, initiated either by the court or by counsel seeking to withdraw. State v. Thornton, 2002 WI App 294, 259 Wis. 2d 157, 656 N.W.2d 45, 01-0726. Opening a letter marked “Legal Papers” outside of an inmate’s presence may have violated an administrative rule, but it was not a violation of the 6th amendment right to counsel. For the right to counsel to have an arguable application, there must, as a threshold matter, be some evidence that the documents in the envelope were communications with an attorney. State v. Steffes, 2003 WI App 55, 260 Wis. 2d 841, 659 N.W.2d 445, 02-1300. When in closing argument counsel concedes guilt on a lesser count in a multiple-count case, in light of overwhelming evidence on that count and in an effort to gain credibility and win acquittal on the other charges, the concession is a reasonable tactical decision and counsel is not deemed to have been constitutionally ineffective by admitting a client’s guilt contrary to the client’s plea of not guilty. State v. Gordon, 2003 WI 69, 262 Wis. 2d 380, 663 N.W.2d 765, 01-1679. When a court finds numerous deficiencies in a counsel’s performance, it need not rely on the prejudicial effect of a single deficiency if, taken together, the deficiencies establish cumulative prejudice. Whether the aggregated errors by counsel will be enough to meet the Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), prejudice requirement depends upon the totality of the circumstances at trial, not the totality of the representation provided to the defendant. State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305, 01-1589. Under Dean, 163 Wis. 2d 503 (1991), a trial court is only obligated to advise a defendant of the right to counsel. The trial court is not required to conduct a colloquy that includes specific advice to a defendant that the right to appointed counsel is broader than the right to counsel provided by the state public defender and includes the right to counsel appointed by the court and paid for by the county. State v. Drexler, 2003 WI App 169, 266 Wis. 2d 438, 669 N.W.2d 182, 02-1313. No law requires that a motion to withdraw be filed any time an attorney appointed by the public defender terminates the attorney’s postconviction/appellate representation of a defendant. Counsel for the defendant did not render ineffective assistance by closing his file without first obtaining court permission to withdraw or otherwise seeking a contemporaneous judicial determination that his client had knowingly waived either the right to appeal or the right to counsel. State ex rel. Ford v. Holm, 2004 WI App 22, 269 Wis. 2d 810, 676 N.W.2d 500, 02-1828. An attorney may not substitute narrative questioning for the traditional question and answer format unless counsel knows that the client intends to testify falsely. Absent the most extraordinary circumstances, such knowledge must be based on the client’s expressed admission of intent to testify untruthfully. While the defendant’s admission need not be phrased in magic words, it must be unambiguous and directly made to the attorney. State v. McDowell, 2004 WI 70, 272 Wis. 2d 488, 681 N.W.2d 500, 02-1203. When a defendant informs counsel of the intention to testify falsely, the attorney’s first duty shall be to attempt to dissuade the client from the unlawful course of conduct. The attorney should then consider moving to withdraw from the case. If the motion to withdraw is denied and the defendant insists on committing perjury, counsel should proceed with the narrative form of questioning, advising the defendant beforehand of what that entails and informing opposing counsel and the circuit court of the change of questioning style prior to use of the narrative. State v. McDowell, 2004 WI 70, 272 Wis. 2d 488, 681 N.W.2d 500, 02-1203. An alleged violation of the requirements of Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194 (1997), can form the basis of a collateral attack as long as the defendant makes a prima facie showing that the defendant did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel, which shifts the burden to prove that the defendant validly waived the right to counsel to the state. The state may elicit testimony from the defendant at an evidentiary hearing in an attempt to meet its burden and, in turn, the defendant may not raise the 5th amendment privilege against testifying. State v. Ernst, 2005 WI 107, 283 Wis. 2d 300, 699 N.W.2d 92, 03-1728. When a defendant seeks to proceed pro se, the circuit court undertakes a two-part inquiry, ensuring that the defendant: 1) has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to counsel; and 2) is competent to proceed pro se. The record must demonstrate an identifiable problem or disability that may prevent the defendant from making a meaningful defense. The circuit court need not always make an express finding as to which specific problem or disability prevented the defendant from being able to meaningfully represent himself or herself. State v. Marquardt, 2005 WI 157, 286 Wis. 2d 204, 705 N.W.2d 878, 04-0958. A deaf defendant who was shackled during trial and sentencing had the burden to show that the defendant in fact was unable to communicate, not that the defendant theoretically might have had such difficulty. State v. Russ, 2006 WI App 9, 289 Wis. 2d 65, 709 N.W.2d 483, 04-2869. A defendant’s constitutional right to effective representation for the purpose of exercising the right to directly appeal a conviction did not require postconviction counsel to offer the defendant the option of a “partial no-merit” report on any potential issues remaining after the defendant declined for strategic reasons to pursue an issue having arguable merit. The U.S. Constitution requires only that an indigent’s appeal will be resolved in a way that is related to the merit of that appeal. State ex rel. Ford v. Holm, 2006 WI App 176, 296 Wis. 2d 119, 722 N.W.2d 609, 02-1828. While courts sometimes can override a defendant’s choice of counsel when deemed necessary, nothing requires them to do so. Requiring a court to disqualify an attorney because of a conflict of interest would infringe upon the defendant’s right to retain counsel of the defendant’s choice and could leave the accused with the impression that the legal system had conspired against the accused. State v. Demmerly, 2006 WI App 181, 296 Wis. 2d 153, 722 N.W.2d 585, 05-0181. Generally, a defendant who validly waives the right to conflict-free representation also waives the right to claim ineffective assistance of counsel based on the conflict, although there may be instances in which counsel’s performance is deficient and unreasonably so even in light of the waived conflict of interest. State v. Demmerly, 2006 WI App 181, 296 Wis. 2d 153, 722 N.W.2d 585, 05-0181. A lawyer’s failure to investigate is not deficient performance if the lawyer reasonably concludes, based on facts of record, that any investigation would be mere wheel-spinning and fruitless. When there is reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable. State v. Walker, 2007 WI App 142, 302 Wis. 2d 735, 735 N.W.2d 582, 06-0562. It is recommended, if not required, that circuit courts take certain steps to determine whether a defendant has forfeited the right to counsel: 1) provide explicit warnings that, if the defendant persists in specific conduct, the court will find that the right to counsel has been forfeited; 2) engage in a colloquy indicating that the defendant has been made aware of the difficulties and dangers inherent in self-representation; 3) make a clear ruling when the court deems the right to counsel to have been forfeited; and 4) make factual findings to support the court’s ruling. State v. McMorris, 2007 WI App 231, 306 Wis. 2d 79, 742 N.W.2d 322, 06-0772. But see State v. Suriano, 2017 WI 42, 374 Wis. 2d 683, 893 N.W.2d 543, 15-0959. It would be unreasonable to require a circuit court to engage in a colloquy to ensure that the defendant deliberately relinquished the right to counsel in circumstances where the defendant will verbally insist he or she did not. In cases in which the defendant’s words are inconsistent with the defendant’s conduct, such a colloquy would be farcical. State v. McMorris, 2007 WI App 231, 306 Wis. 2d 79, 742 N.W.2d 322, 06-0772. Although an indigent defendant does not have the right to pick the defendant’s trial lawyer, the defendant is entitled to a lawyer with whom the defendant can communicate. The ability-to-communicate assessment is left to the reasoned discretion of the trial court. The court must make sufficient inquiry to ensure that a defendant is not cemented to a lawyer with whom full and fair communication is impossible; mere conclusions, unless adequately explained, will not fly. State v. Jones, 2007 WI App 248, 306 Wis. 2d 340, 742 N.W.2d 341, 07-0226. There is no 6th amendment effective assistance of counsel right to subpoena police reports and other non-privileged materials prior to a preliminary examination. State v. Schaefer, 2008 WI 25, 308 Wis. 2d 279, 746 N.W.2d 457, 06-1826. Wisconsin affords a convicted person the right to postconviction counsel. It would be absurd to suggest that a person has a right to counsel at trial and a right to counsel on appeal, but no right to the assistance of counsel at a postconviction proceeding in the circuit court, which is often the precursor to and augments the record for an appeal. State v. Peterson, 2008 WI App 140, 314 Wis. 2d 192, 757 N.W.2d 834, 07-1867. A defendant does not have the right to be represented by: 1) an attorney the defendant cannot afford; 2) an attorney who is not willing to represent the defendant; 3) an attorney with a conflict of interest; or 4) an advocate who is not a member of the bar. State v. Peterson, 2008 WI App 140, 314 Wis. 2d 192, 757 N.W.2d 834, 07-1867. The circuit court’s decision to remove counsel of choice is discretionary. The court does not have unfettered freedom to deprive a defendant of retained counsel. Whether removal for conflict was proper rests on whether the court balanced the defendant’s right to be represented by retained counsel against the court’s interest in the appearance of fairness and diffusing what it characterized as a potential conflict. State v. Peterson, 2008 WI App 140, 314 Wis. 2d 192, 757 N.W.2d 834, 07-1867. When making a determination whether to allow the defendant’s counsel of choice to participate, the circuit court must balance the defendant’s right to select counsel against the public’s interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice. Several factors assist the court in balancing the relevant interests, for example: the length of delay requested; whether competent counsel is presently available and prepared to try the case; whether prior continuances have been requested and received by the defendant; the inconvenience to the parties, witnesses, and the court; and whether the delay seems to be for legitimate reasons or whether its purpose is dilatory. State v. Prineas, 2009 WI App 28, 316 Wis. 2d 414, 766 N.W.2d 206, 07-1982. A trial court has no duty to advise a defendant of the right to self-representation if the defendant has not clearly and unequivocally invoked the right to self-representation. State v. Darby, 2009 WI App 50, 317 Wis. 2d 478, 766 N.W.2d 770, 08-0935. The fact that the government might know an informant hopes to receive a benefit as a result of providing information does not translate into an implicit agreement between the government and the informant if the informant is thereafter placed into an environment where incriminating information can be obtained. If there is hope, and nothing else, then the informant cannot be construed to be a government agent eliciting a statement in violation of the 6th amendment right to counsel. State v. Lewis, 2010 WI App 52, 324 Wis. 2d 536, 781 N.W.2d 730, 09-0429. The police do not have a duty to bar charged defendants’ visits with potential informants; indeed such a requirement would be unfair to prisoners. Also, when a person offers to assist the police, the police need not try to stop the person from providing assistance. As long as the police do nothing to direct or control or involve themselves in the questioning of a person in custody by a private citizen, such questioning does not violate the 5th or 6th amendments. State v. Lewis, 2010 WI App 52, 324 Wis. 2d 536, 781 N.W.2d 730, 09-0429. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194 (1997), is the controlling authority for determining whether a defendant validly waived the right to counsel. However, when the circuit court failed to engage a defendant in the four lines of inquiry as prescribed in Klessig but determined that two of the four lines of inquiry were not satisfied, the circuit court did not commit automatic error requiring a new trial because the defendant could not have validly waived the defendant’s right to counsel. State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, 326 Wis. 2d 179, 786 N.W.2d 40, 08-1521. But see Imani v. Pollard, 826 F.3d 939 (2016). Nothing bars a defendant from requesting substitution of counsel, nothing bars the public defender from choosing to make substitute counsel available, and nothing bars a court from granting such a request, but a court is not required by this section or by the 6th amendment to the U.S. Constitution to do so solely because a defendant requests it. State v. Jones, 2010 WI 72, 326 Wis. 2d 380, 797 N.W.2d 378, 08-2342. A defendant’s request to withdraw from self-representation and proceed with the assistance of counsel rests in the trial court’s discretion. A request to reinstate the right to counsel is akin to a request for substitution of counsel. A trial court may err by denying a request to revoke pro se status when the denial is merely to punish the defendant or is based on a rigid insistence on expedition in the face of a justifiable request for delay. A trial court does not erroneously exercise its discretion by preventing a defendant from reasserting the right to counsel merely to hinder the progress of the case against him. State v. Rhodes, 2011 WI App 145, 337 Wis. 2d 594, 807 N.W.2d 1, 10-0435. The right to select counsel of one’s choice has been regarded as the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee. Deprivation of the right is complete when the defendant is erroneously prevented from being represented by the lawyer the defendant wants, regardless of the quality of the representation received. To disqualify an attorney as a witness in a case, the state must show that the attorney is a necessary witness. It was an error to disqualify an attorney based solely on the fact that the attorney acted as a translator for his client. State v. Gonzalez-Villarreal, 2012 WI App 110, 344 Wis. 2d 472, 824 N.W.2d 161, 11-1259. In order to establish a 6th amendment violation on the basis of a conflict of interest, a defendant who did not raise an objection at trial must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s counsel had an actual conflict of interest based on the facts of the case. An actual conflict of interest exists when the defendant’s attorney was actively representing a conflicting interest so that the attorney’s performance was adversely affected. Counsel is considered per se ineffective once an actual conflict of interest adversely affecting counsel’s performance has been shown. A defendant need not prove that some kind of specific adverse effect or harm resulted from the conflict. State v. Villarreal, 2013 WI App 33, 346 Wis. 2d 690, 828 N.W.2d 866, 11-0998. A claim for ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel must be filed with the circuit court, either as a s. 974.06 motion or as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A defendant arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, conversely, may not seek relief under s. 974.06 and must instead petition the court of appeals for a writ of habeas corpus. State v. Starks, 2013 WI 69, 349 Wis. 2d 274, 833 N.W.2d 146, 10-0425. But see State ex rel. Warren v. Meisner, 2020 WI 55, 392 Wis. 2d 1, 944 N.W.2d 588, 19-0567. A defendant who argues that the defendant received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in a habeas petition because certain arguments were not raised must show why the claims the defendant believes should have been raised on appeal were “clearly stronger” than the claims that were raised. State v. Starks, 2013 WI 69, 349 Wis. 2d 274, 833 N.W.2d 146, 10-0425. Under Padilla, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), counsel’s failure to advise a defendant concerning clear deportation consequences of a plea bargain is prejudicial if the defendant shows that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances. The defendant is not required to show that there would be a different outcome or that the defendant had real and viable challenges to the underlying veracity of the conviction. State v. Mendez, 2014 WI App 57, 354 Wis. 2d 88, 847 N.W.2d 895, 13-1862. But see State v. Shata, 2015 WI 74, 364 Wis. 2d 63, 868 N.W.2d 93, 13-1437. The court where an alleged ineffective assistance of counsel occurred is the proper forum in which to seek relief unless that forum is unable to provide the relief necessary to address the ineffectiveness claim. The remedy for an attorney’s failure to file a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief is an extension of the timeframe to file the notice. Because the circuit court is without authority to extend the deadline to file a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief, the proper forum lies in the court of appeals. State ex rel. Kyles v. Pollard, 2014 WI 38, 354 Wis. 2d 626, 847 N.W.2d 805, 12-0378. Failure to call a potential witness may constitute deficient performance. A failure to call a key witness, however, does not always necessarily constitute deficient performance. The failure to call a witness may have been a reasonable trial strategy. State v. Jenkins, 2014 WI 59, 355 Wis. 2d 180, 848 N.W.2d 786, 12-0046. Montejo, 556 U.S. 778 (2009), effectively established that a waiver of Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), rights is sufficient to waive the 6th amendment right to counsel and that such a waiver is not presumed invalid merely because the defendant is already represented by counsel. This section does not provide greater protections than the 6th amendment of the U.S. Constitution in the context of a waiver of the right to have counsel present during questioning. State v. Delebreau, 2015 WI 55, 362 Wis. 2d 542, 864 N.W.2d 852, 13-1108. The U.S. Supreme Court in Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), declined to adopt a federal constitutional competency standard and specifically recognized an individual trial court’s authority to make competency determinations. Nothing in Edwards establishes severe mental illness as the only circumstance in which a trial judge may deny the right of self-representation. The Wisconsin standards established by Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194 (1997), are not contrary to Edwards. Whether a defendant is competent to proceed pro se is uniquely a question for the trial court to determine. State v. Jackson, 2015 WI App 45, 363 Wis. 2d 484, 867 N.W.2d 814, 13-2859. Trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to inform the defendant that his no-contest plea to substantial battery was certain to result in his deportation and permanent exclusion from the United States. Because federal immigration law is not “succinct, clear, and explicit” in providing that the defendant’s substantial battery constituted a crime involving moral turpitude, the defendant’s attorney needed to do no more than advise him that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. State v. Ortiz-Mondragon, 2015 WI 73, 364 Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 717, 13-2435. Any language in Mendez, 2014 WI App 57, that suggests that Padilla, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), requires an attorney to advise an alien client that a conviction for a deportable offense will necessarily result in deportation is withdrawn. An attorney is required to “give correct advice” about the possible immigration consequences of a conviction. The attorney in this case satisfied that requirement by correctly advising the client that his guilty plea carried a “strong chance” of deportation. Executive action, including the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion, can block the deportation of deportable aliens. State v. Shata, 2015 WI 74, 364 Wis. 2d 63, 868 N.W.2d 93, 13-1437. Counsel’s trial strategy decisions, even those appearing unwise in hindsight, will not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel so long as they are reasonably founded on the facts and law under the circumstances existing at the time the decision was made. It was not unreasonable for defendant’s counsel to allow an investigator to testify that the victim was telling the truth when counsel’s goal was to demonstrate that the investigator’s investigation was limited due to the investgator’s bias. State v. Smith, 2016 WI App 8, 366 Wis. 2d 613, 874 N.W.2d 610, 14-2653. Under Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485 (1983), trial counsel’s decisions must be based upon facts and law upon which an ordinarily prudent lawyer would have then relied. This standard implies deliberateness, caution, and circumspection, and counsel’s decision must evince reasonableness under the circumstances. When counsel articulated no tactical reason implying deliberateness, caution, and circumspection for failing to call a witness and the record was devoid of any factual basis for a strategy that supported that failure, defense counsel’s performance was deficient. State v. Honig, 2016 WI App 10, 366 Wis. 2d 681, 874 N.W.2d 589, 14-2968. The 6th amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel does not require defense counsel to inform a defendant about the possibility of civil commitment under ch. 980 when the defendant enters a plea to a sexually violent offense. State v. LeMere, 2016 WI 41, 368 Wis. 2d 624, 879 N.W.2d 580, 13-2433. Physical separation between a defendant and the defendant’s attorney during a plea hearing, absent more, will not be analyzed as a complete denial of the right to counsel under Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). Such a claim may instead be analyzed under the framework set forth in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). State v. Anderson, 2017 WI App 17, 374 Wis. 2d 372, 896 N.W.2d 364, 15-2611. Failure to raise arguments that require the resolution of unsettled legal questions generally does not render a lawyer’s services outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance sufficient to satisfy the 6th amendment. State v. Lemberger, 2017 WI 39, 374 Wis. 2d 617, 893 N.W.2d 232, 15-1452. The standard to use in forfeiture of trial counsel cases established under Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721 (1996), is upheld. There are two situations when a defendant loses the right to counsel: 1) a defendant may knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to counsel; and 2) a defendant may forfeit the right to counsel. The triggering event for forfeiture is when the court becomes convinced that the orderly and efficient progression of the case is being frustrated. State v. Suriano, 2017 WI 42, 374 Wis. 2d 683, 893 N.W.2d 543, 15-0959. Scenarios triggering forfeiture of the right to trial counsel include: 1) a defendant’s manipulative and disruptive behavior; 2) withdrawal of multiple attorneys based on a defendant’s consistent refusal to cooperate with any of them and constant complaints about the attorneys’ performance; 3) a defendant whose attitude is defiant and whose choices repeatedly result in delay, interfering with the process of justice; and 4) physical or verbal abuse directed at counsel or the court. State v. Suriano, 2017 WI 42, 374 Wis. 2d 683, 893 N.W.2d 543, 15-0959. The contention that a defendant cannot forfeit the right to counsel unless the defendant’s actions were done with an intent or purpose to delay is rejected. Contrary language in Coleman, 2002 WI App 100, and any other case requiring proof of intentional, purposeful delay is overruled. State v. Suriano, 2017 WI 42, 374 Wis. 2d 683, 893 N.W.2d 543, 15-0959. Shata, 2015 WI 74, and Ortiz-Mondragon, 2015 WI 73, stand for the proposition that, when the law is not “succinct, clear, and explicit,” counsel is not deficient by accurately warning a client of the “risk of adverse immigration consequences.” Defendant’s counsel had no constitutional duty to give specific, direct advice on how pleading guilty would affect the defendant’s possibilities for readmission beyond the accurate, generalized warnings that were given. State v. Villegas, 2018 WI App 9, 380 Wis. 2d 246, 908 N.W.2d 198, 15-2162. Circuit courts reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel following multiple-count trials may conclude that deficient performance prejudiced only one of the multiple convictions. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), clearly contemplates such a result and does not require reversal on all counts when the prejudice proven affected only a single count. State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89, 16-0897. The Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), prejudice test is distinct from a sufficiency of the evidence test. A defendant need not prove the outcome would more likely than not be different in order to establish prejudice in ineffective assistance cases. The defendant must prove there is a reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the error. State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89, 16-0897. Counsel must either reasonably investigate the law and facts or make a reasonable strategic decision that makes any further investigation unnecessary. The court reviews the reasonableness of trial counsel’s decisions not with the benefit of hindsight, but in the context of the circumstances as they existed at the time counsel made the decisions. The court must consider the law and the facts as they existed when trial counsel’s conduct occurred. State v. Pico, 2018 WI 66, 382 Wis. 2d 273, 914 N.W.2d 95, 15-1799.
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wisconsinconstitution
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