Chapter 971

971.23(11)(a)1. 1. “Defense” means the defendant, his or her attorney, and any individual retained by the defendant or his or her attorney for the purpose of providing testimony if the testimony is expert testimony that relates to an item or material included under par. (b).

971.23(11)(a)2. 2. “Reasonably available” means sufficient opportunity for inspection, viewing, and examination at a law enforcement or government facility.

971.23(11)(a)3. 3. “Sexually explicit conduct” has the meaning given in s. 948.01 (7).

971.23(11)(b) (b) Any undeveloped film, photographic negative, photograph, motion picture, videotape, or recording, which includes any item or material that would be included under s. 948.01 (3r), or any copy of the foregoing, that is of a person who has not attained the age of 18 and who is engaged in sexually explicit conduct and that is in the possession, custody, and control of the state shall remain in the possession, custody, and control of a law enforcement agency or a court but shall be made reasonably available to the defense.

971.23(11)(c) (c)

971.23(11)(c)1. 1. Notwithstanding sub. (1) (e) and (g), a court shall deny any request by the defense to provide, and a district attorney or law enforcement agency may not provide to the defense, any item or material required in par. (b) to remain in the possession, custody, and control of a law enforcement agency or court, except that a court may order that a copy of an item or material included under par. (b) be provided to the defense if that court finds that a copy of the item or material has not been made reasonably available to the defense. The defense shall have the burden to establish that the item or material has not been made reasonably available.

971.23(11)(c)2. 2. If a court orders under subd. 1. a copy of an item or material included under par. (b) to be provided to the defense, the court shall enter a protective order under sub. (6) that includes an order that the copy provided to the defense may not be copied, printed, or disseminated by the defense and shall be returned to the court or law enforcement agency, whichever is appropriate, at the completion of the trial.

971.23(11)(d) (d) Any item or material that is required under par. (b) to remain in possession, custody, and control of a law enforcement agency or court is not subject to the right of inspection or copying under s. 19.35 (1).

971.23 History History: 1973 c. 196; 1975 c. 378, 421; 1989 a. 121; 1991 a. 223; 1993 a. 16, 486; 1995 a. 27, 387; 2001 a. 16; 2005 a. 42, 279; 2007 a. 20; 2009 a. 28, 138, 276; 2011 a. 284; 2017 a. 59.

971.23 Annotation Inadequate preparation for trial that results in a district attorney’s failure to disclose all scientific reports does not constitute good cause for the failure if the defense is misled, but this is subject to the harmless error rule. Wold v. State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973).

971.23 Annotation When a prosecutor submitted a list of 97 witnesses the prosecutor intended to call, the court should have required the prosecutor to be more specific as to those the prosecutor really intended to call. Irby v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 311, 210 N.W.2d 755 (1973).

971.23 Annotation When a party successfully moves to have material masked or deleted from a discovery document, the proper procedure to be pursued is to place it in a sealed envelope or container, if necessary, so that it may be preserved for appellate review. State v. Van Ark, 62 Wis. 2d 155, 215 N.W.2d 41 (1974).

971.23 Annotation Under both the provisions of this section and the constitutional duty of the state to disclose to a criminal defendant evidence that is exculpatory in nature, there is no requirement to provide exculpatory evidence that is not within the exclusive possession of the state and does not surprise or prejudice the defendant. State v. Calhoun, 67 Wis. 2d 204, 226 N.W.2d 504 (1975).

971.23 Annotation Although substantial evidence indicated that the state had subpoenaed its “rebuttal” witness at least two weeks before the witness was called to testify and deliberately held the witness back for “dramatic” effect, no objection or motion to suppress was made on the proper ground that the witness was not a bona fide rebuttal witness; hence objection to the witness’s testimony was waived. Caccitolo v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 102, 230 N.W.2d 139 (1975).

971.23 Annotation The prosecutor’s duty to disclose does not ordinarily extend to discovery of criminal records from other jurisdictions. The prosecutor must make good faith efforts to obtain records from other jurisdictions specifically requested by the defense. Jones v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 337, 230 N.W.2d 677 (1975).

971.23 Annotation Police officers’ “memo books” and reports were within the rule requiring production of witness statements because the books and reports were written by the officers, the reports were signed by them, and both officers testified as to the incident preceding the defendant’s arrest. State v. Groh, 69 Wis. 2d 481, 230 N.W.2d 745 (1975).

971.23 Annotation When the state calls a witness not included in its list of witnesses, the preferable procedure is not to strike the witness but to allow a defendant, who makes a timely showing of surprise and prejudice, a continuance sufficient to interview the witness. Kutchera v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 534, 230 N.W.2d 750 (1975).

971.23 Annotation The written summary, under sub. (1), of all oral statements made by the defendant that the state intends to introduce at trial is not limited to statements to the police. Incriminating statements made by the defendant to two witnesses were within the scope of the disclosure statute. Kutchera v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 534, 230 N.W.2d 750 (1975).

971.23 Annotation All statements, whether possessed by direct-examining counsel or cross-examining counsel, must be produced; mere notes need not be produced. State v. Lenarchick, 74 Wis. 2d 425, 247 N.W.2d 80 (1976).

971.23 Annotation When the defendant relied solely on an alibi defense and on the day of trial the complaining witness changed the witness's mind as to the date of the occurrence, a request for a continuance based on surprise was properly denied because the defendant failed to show prejudice from the unexpected testimony. Angus v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 191, 251 N.W.2d 28 (1977).

971.23 Annotation A generalized inspection of prosecution files by defense counsel prior to a preliminary hearing is so inherently harmful to the orderly administration of justice that the trial court may not confer such a right. Cleveland v. Circuit Court, 82 Wis. 2d 454, 262 N.W.2d 773 (1978).

971.23 Annotation Under sub. (8) (d), the state must provide the names of all people who will testify at any time during the trial that the defendant was at the scene of the crime. Tucker v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 630, 267 N.W.2d 630 (1978).

971.23 Annotation The trial court erred in ordering the defense to turn over “transcripts” of interviews between defense counsel, the defendant, and alibi witnesses, when oral statements were not recorded verbatim. Pohl v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 290, 291 N.W.2d 554 (1980).

971.23 Annotation The prosecutor’s repeated failure to disclose prior statements of witnesses was not prosecutorial overreaching that would bar reprosecution after the defendant moved for a mistrial. State v. Copening, 100 Wis. 2d 700, 303 N.W.2d 821 (1981).

971.23 Annotation Under the facts of this case, the victim’s medical records were not reports required to be disclosed under sub. (5). State v. Moriarty, 107 Wis. 2d 622, 321 N.W.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1982).

971.23 Annotation When the defendant was not relying on an alibi defense and did not file a notice of alibi, the court did not abuse its discretion in barring alibi testimony. State v. Burroughs, 117 Wis. 2d 293, 344 N.W.2d 149 (1984).

971.23 Annotation There are three different situations of prosecutorial nondisclosure, each with a different standard: 1) when the undisclosed evidence shows the prosecutor’s case included perjury; 2) when the defense made a pretrial request for specific evidence; and 3) when the defense made no request or a general request for exculpatory evidence. State v. Ruiz, 118 Wis. 2d 177, 347 N.W.2d 352 (1984).

971.23 Annotation A defendant charged as a “party to a crime” for conspiratorial planning of a robbery was not required to give an alibi notice regarding testimony concerning the defendant’s whereabouts during planning sessions, as an alibi is a denial of being present at the scene of the crime when it was committed. State v. Horenberger, 119 Wis. 2d 237, 349 N.W.2d 692 (1984).

971.23 Annotation When blood alcohol content is tested under statutory procedures, results of the test are mandatorily admissible. The physical sample tested is not evidence intended, required, or even susceptible of being produced by the state under sub. (4) [now sub. (1) (g)] or sub. (5). State v. Ehlen, 119 Wis. 2d 451, 351 N.W.2d 503 (1984).

971.23 Annotation When the state impounded a vehicle but released it to a scrap dealer before the defendant’s expert could examine it, the charge was properly dismissed for destruction of exculpatory evidence. State v. Hahn, 132 Wis. 2d 351, 392 N.W.2d 464 (Ct. App. 1986).

971.23 Annotation Sub. (7) requires determination by the trial court of whether noncompliance was for good cause. If it was not, exclusion is mandatory; if it was, sanction is discretionary. State v. Wild, 146 Wis. 2d 18, 429 N.W.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1988).

971.23 Annotation Criminal defendants are not required to comply with the rules of criminal procedure to obtain a record available under the open records law. State ex rel. Young v. Shaw, 165 Wis. 2d 276, 477 N.W.2d 340 (Ct. App. 1991).

971.23 Annotation When the state inferred that a complainant sought psychological treatment as the result of a sexual assault by the defendant but did not offer the psychological records or opinions of the therapist as evidence, it was not improper to deny the defendant access to the records when the court determined that the records contained nothing that was material to the fairness of the trial. State v. Mainiero, 189 Wis. 2d 80, 525 N.W.2d 304 (Ct. App. 1994).

971.23 Annotation Although of public record, it is an intolerable burden on a defendant to be required to continually comb criminal records to determine if any of the state’s witnesses are subject to criminal penalty. The burden is on the state to provide this information, particularly in light of a discovery request for the criminal records of the state’s witnesses. State v. Randall, 197 Wis. 2d 29, 539 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1995).

971.23 Annotation Sub. (2m) requires disclosure of relevant substantive information that a defense expert is expected to present at trial whether as to findings, test results, or a description of proposed testimony. The privilege against self-incrimination and the right to present a defense are not violated by the requirement. State v. Revels, 221 Wis. 2d 315, 585 N.W.2d 602 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-3148.

971.23 Annotation This section does not provide for postconviction discovery, but a defendant has a right to postconviction discovery when the sought-after evidence is relevant to an issue of consequence. State v. O’Brien, 223 Wis. 2d 303, 588 N.W.2d 8 (1999), 96-3028.

971.23 Annotation The state’s failure to disclose that it took samples but failed to have them analyzed affected the defendant’s right to a fair trial because it prevented the defendant from raising the issue of the reliability of the investigation and from challenging the credibility of a witness who testified that the test had not been performed. State v. DelReal, 225 Wis. 2d 565, 593 N.W.2d 461 (Ct. App. 1999), 97-1480.

971.23 Annotation When an indigent defendant requests the state to furnish a free transcript of a separate trial of a codefendant, the defendant must show that the transcript will be valuable to the defendant. State v. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238, 97-1219.

971.23 Annotation Sub. (2m) (am) requires that any statement made by a witness named in a list under sub. (2m) (a) must be disclosed. Once a party is included on the list of witnesses under sub. (2m) (a), statements by the witness must be disclosed. State v. Gribble, 2001 WI App 227, 248 Wis. 2d 409, 636 N.W.2d 488, 00-1821.

971.23 Annotation “Plans to use” in sub. (1) (b) embodies an objective standard—what a reasonable prosecutor should have known and would have done under the circumstances of the case. The issue is whether a reasonable prosecutor, exercising due diligence, should have known of the defendant’s statements before trial and, if so, would have planned to use them in the course of trial. The knowledge of law enforcement officers may in some cases be imputed to the prosecutor. Good faith alone does not constitute good cause for failing to disclose under sub. (7m). State v. DeLao, 2002 WI 49, 252 Wis. 2d 289, 643 N.W.2d 480, 00-1638.

971.23 Annotation A prosecutor has no duty to list a rebuttal witness if it is anticipated before trial that the witness will be called. The defense takes its chances when offering a theory of defense, and the state can keep knowledge of its legitimate rebuttal witnesses from the defendant without violating sub. (1) (d). State v. Konkol, 2002 WI App 174, 256 Wis. 2d 725, 649 N.W.2d 300, 01-2126.

971.23 Annotation A witness’s probationary status was relevant and should have been disclosed by the prosecution under sub. (7). That the defendant disclosed to the jury that the witness had been convicted of a crime did not obviate the requirement that the status be disclosed. A witness’s probationary status is relevant because it and the fear of possible revocation are pertinent to the material issue of whether the witness has ulterior motives to shape the witness’s testimony. State v. White, 2004 WI App 78, 271 Wis. 2d 742, 680 N.W.2d 362, 03-1132.

971.23 Annotation Due process does not require the disclosure of material exculpatory impeachment information before a defendant enters into a plea bargain. However, a defendant making a statutory discovery demand may be entitled to material exculpatory impeachment evidence before entering into a plea bargain if the plea bargain is entered into within the time frame when the prosecutor would have been statutorily required to disclose the information. A defendant may withdraw a guilty plea on nonconstitutional grounds after demonstrating that withdrawal is necessary to avoid a manifest injustice. State v. Harris, 2004 WI 64, 272 Wis. 2d 80, 680 N.W.2d 737, 02-2433.

971.23 Annotation Sub. (7m) (a) does not prevent the prosecution, whose evidence is excluded for violation of this section, from moving for dismissal without prejudice and refiling the charges and introducing the same evidence in a subsequent proceeding if there is no violation of this section in the subsequent proceeding. State v. Miller, 2004 WI App 117, 274 Wis. 2d 471, 683 N.W.2d 485, 03-1747.

971.23 Annotation Of necessity, the defense of alibi involves presence of the defendant at a place other than the scene of the crime at the time the crime was committed. Since an alibi derives its potency as a defense from the fact that it involves the physical impossibility of the accused’s guilt, a purported alibi that leaves it possible for the accused to be the guilty person is no alibi at all. In this case, testimony did not constitute an alibi because it placed the defendant in the same hallway as the crime scene and did not indicate that it was physically impossible for the defendant to have committed the offense, but placed the defendant in the immediate vicinity of the crime. Therefore, notice of an alibi witness under sub. (8) was not required. State v. Harp, 2005 WI App 250, 288 Wis. 2d 441, 707 N.W.2d 304, 04-3240.

971.23 Annotation The test of whether evidence should be disclosed is not whether in fact the prosecutor knows of its existence but, rather, whether by the exercise of due diligence the prosecutor should have discovered it. State v. Harris, 2008 WI 15, 307 Wis. 2d 555, 745 N.W.2d 397, 06-0882.

971.23 Annotation The circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in failing to advise the jury that the state had failed to make timely disclosure of reports to the defendant under the criminal discovery statute, even though the state’s failure to abide by the criminal discovery statute was not prejudicial error. However, this error was also subject to the harmless error test and was also not prejudicial. State v. Harris, 2008 WI 15, 307 Wis. 2d 555, 745 N.W.2d 397, 06-0882.

971.23 Annotation A defendant has no statutory subpoena right to obtain and copy police investigation reports and nonprivileged materials prior to a preliminary examination. Section 972.11 does not allow a criminal defendant access to the civil subpoena duces tecum power embodied in s. 805.07 (2). State v. Schaefer, 2008 WI 25, 308 Wis. 2d 279, 746 N.W.2d 457, 06-1826.

971.23 Annotation Whether evidence could have been admitted in the state’s case is not the test of admissibility of rebuttal evidence. The evidence may well have been admissible or “appropriate” in the plaintiff/state’s case-in-chief, but only became necessary at rebuttal. State v. Sandoval, 2009 WI App 61, 318 Wis. 2d 126, 767 N.W.2d 291, 08-0482.

971.23 Annotation The circuit court properly exercised its discretion under sub. (6) in granting the state’s motion for a protective order allowing the defense access at a state facility to a computer hard drive allegedly containing child pornography evidence, but prohibiting the defense from obtaining a copy of the hard drive. In light of the serious harms associated with child pornography and the ease with which electronically-stored files are widely disseminated, the court reasonably exercised its direction in granting the motion. State v. Bowser, 2009 WI App 114, 321 Wis. 2d 221, 772 N.W.2d 666, 08-0206.

971.23 Annotation Sub. (8) (a), by its plain language, only bars a prosecutor from commenting on missing alibi witnesses whom the defendant has named in the notice of alibi. State v. Saunders, 2011 WI App 156, 338 Wis. 2d 160, 807 N.W.2d 679, 10-2393.

971.23 Annotation Fingerprint evidence excluded from the case-in-chief due to a discovery sanction under sub. (7m) may later be used to challenge the defendant’s testimony in rebuttal. Under Konkol, 2002 WI App 174, bona fide rebuttal evidence is admissible despite the absence of any disclosure by the state. The test for excluding testimony for impeachment purposes when the defendant takes the stand is untrustworthiness. Here, expert witness and fingerprint evidence were excluded by the trial court due to a statutory discovery violation, not due to the untrustworthiness or unreliability of the evidence. State v. Novy, 2012 WI App 10, 338 Wis. 2d 439, 809 N.W.2d 889, 11-0407.

971.23 Annotation While sub. (5) gives a defendant the right to inspect reports of the results of blood tests, it does not provide for inspection or testing if the blood itself is not going to be introduced into evidence. No statute or case law requires production of the sample, and consequently, no duty devolves upon the district attorney to preserve or maintain a quantity of a blood sample in order that a defendant may retest the blood. State v. Weissinger, 2014 WI App 73, 355 Wis. 2d 546, 851 N.W.2d 780, 13-0218.

971.23 Annotation Affirmed on other grounds. 2015 WI 42, 362 Wis. 2d 1, 863 N.W.2d 592, 13-0218.

971.23 Annotation A witness list was not provided within a reasonable time when submission by the district attorney violated two court orders setting the time for submitting the list. Those court orders established a “reasonable time before trial” for the parties to list their witnesses. The burden was on the district attorney’s office to show that it had good cause for this violation, not on the defendant to show that the defendant was prejudiced. There is no exception for a district attorney’s discovery violation so that the significant consequences of the court’s order will not be borne by the “blameless public.” State v. Prieto, 2016 WI App 15, 366 Wis. 2d 794, 876 N.W.2d 154, 15-0279.

971.23 Annotation The state unconstitutionally excluded the defendant’s alibi testimony for failure to comply with this section, but the error was harmless. Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913 (1982).

971.23 Annotation Criminal Discovery—Comparison of Federal Discovery and the ABA Standards With the New Statutory Provisions in Wisconsin. 1971 WLR 614.

971.26 971.26 Formal defects. No indictment, information, complaint or warrant shall be invalid, nor shall the trial, judgment or other proceedings be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in matters of form which do not prejudice the defendant.

971.26 Annotation The fact that the information alleged the wrong date for the offense was not prejudicial when the complaint stated the correct date and there was no evidence that the defendant was misled. A charge of the violation of s. “946.42 (2) (a) (c)” was a technical defect of language when both paragraphs applied. Burkhalter v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 413, 190 N.W.2d 502 (1971).

971.26 Annotation The failure to cite in the information and certificate of conviction the correct statutory subsections violated was immaterial when the defendant could not show that the defendant was misled. Craig v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 489, 198 N.W.2d 609 (1972).

971.26 Annotation A lack of prejudice to the defendant, notwithstanding technical defects in the information, was made patent by defense counsel’s concession that the defendant knew precisely what crime the defendant was charged with having committed, and the absence in the record of any such claim asserted during the case, which was vigorously tried. Clark v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 194, 214 N.W.2d 450 (1974).

971.26 Annotation Failure to allege lack of consent was not a fatal jurisdictional defect of an information charging burglary. Schleiss v. State, 71 Wis. 2d 733, 239 N.W.2d 68 (1976).

971.26 Annotation No statute authorizes a clerk of court’s office to correct a clerical error in the sentence portion of a judgment of conviction. The circuit court, and not the clerk’s office, must determine the merits of a request for a change in the sentence portion of a written judgment because of an alleged clerical error. State v. Prihoda, 2000 WI 123, 239 Wis. 2d 244, 618 N.W.2d 857, 98-2263.

971.26 Annotation Section 971.08 (2), requiring vacation of judgment and permission to withdraw a plea in the event of improper notice of the consequences of the plea on immigration and naturalization is subject to harmless error analysis under this section and s. 805.18. Douangmala, 2002 WI 62, was objectively wrong because it failed to properly consider this section and s. 805.18 and is thus overruled. The mandatory “shall” in s. 971.08 (2) did not control when both of the harmless error savings statutes also use the mandatory “shall” language. This section and ss. 805.18 and 971.08 (2) are most comprehensibly harmonized by applying harmless error analysis. All of the relevant statutes use “shall,” and, accordingly, none is “more mandatory” than any other. State v. Reyes Fuerte, 2017 WI 104, 378 Wis. 2d 504, 904 N.W.2d 773, 15-2041.

971.27 971.27 Lost information, complaint or indictment. In the case of the loss or destruction of an information or complaint, the district attorney may file a copy, and the prosecution shall proceed without delay from that cause. In the case of the loss or destruction of an indictment, an information may be filed.

971.28 971.28 Pleading judgment. In pleading a judgment or other determination of or proceeding before any court or officer, it shall be sufficient to state that the judgment or determination was duly rendered or made or the proceeding duly had.

971.29 971.29 Amending the charge.

971.29(1) (1) A complaint or information may be amended at any time prior to arraignment without leave of the court.

971.29(2) (2) At the trial, the court may allow amendment of the complaint, indictment or information to conform to the proof where such amendment is not prejudicial to the defendant. After verdict the pleading shall be deemed amended to conform to the proof if no objection to the relevance of the evidence was timely raised upon the trial.

971.29(3) (3) Upon allowing an amendment to the complaint or indictment or information, the court may direct other amendments thereby rendered necessary and may proceed with or postpone the trial.

971.29 Annotation When there is evidence that a jury could believe proved guilt, the trial court cannot sua sponte set aside the verdict, amend the information, and find the defendant guilty on a lesser charge. State v. Helnik, 47 Wis. 2d 720, 177 N.W.2d 881 (1970).

971.29 Annotation Since theft is an included crime of robbery, the amendment of the information from robbery to theft did not materially prejudice the defendant. All of the elements of theft are included in the elements of robbery. Of necessity, then, the defendant had notice and opportunity to prepare a defense to the elements of theft as well as to the additional elements that comprise the crime of robbery. Moore v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 1, 197 N.W.2d 820 (1972).

971.29 Annotation Sub. (2), in regard to amendments after verdict, applies only to technical variances in the complaint, not material to the merits of the action. It may not be used to substitute a new charge. State v. Duda, 60 Wis. 2d 431, 210 N.W.2d 763 (1973).

971.29 Annotation The refusal of a proposed amendment of an information has no effect on the original information. An amendment to charge a violation of a substantive section as well as a separate penalty section is not prejudicial to a defendant. Wagner v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 722, 211 N.W.2d 449 (1973).

971.29 Annotation Sub. (1) does not prohibit amendment of the information with leave of the court after arraignment, but before trial, provided that the defendant’s rights are not prejudiced. Whitaker v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 368, 265 N.W.2d 575 (1978).

971.29 Annotation Notice of the nature and cause of the accusations is a key factor in determining whether an amendment at trial has prejudiced a defendant. The inquiry is whether the new charge is so related to the transaction and facts adduced at the preliminary hearing that a defendant cannot be surprised by the new charge since the preparation for the new charge would be no different than the preparation for the old charge. State v. Neudorff, 170 Wis. 2d 608, 489 N.W.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1992).

971.29 Annotation Failure of the state to obtain court permission to file a post-arraignment amended information did not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Webster, 196 Wis. 2d 308, 538 N.W.2d 810 (Ct. App. 1995), 93-3217.

971.29 Annotation That the court’s jurisdiction is invoked by the commencement of a case and that the legislature has granted prosecutors sole discretion to amend a charge only prior to arraignment means that the prosecutor’s unchecked discretion stops at the point of arraignment. State v. Conger, 2010 WI 56, 325 Wis. 2d 664, 797 N.W.2d 341, 08-0755.

971.29 Annotation The trial court cannot after trial amend a charge of sexual intercourse with a child to one of contributing to the delinquency of a minor since the offenses require proof of different facts and the defendant is entitled to notice of the charge against the defendant. LaFond v. Quatsoe, 325 F. Supp. 1010 (1971).

971.30 971.30 Motion defined.

971.30(1) (1) ‘‘Motion” means an application for an order.

971.30(2) (2) Unless otherwise provided or ordered by the court, all motions shall meet the following criteria:

971.30(2)(a) (a) Be in writing.

971.30(2)(b) (b) Contain a caption setting forth the name of the court, the venue, the title of the action, the file number, a denomination of the party seeking the order or relief and a brief description of the type of order or relief sought.

971.30(2)(c) (c) State with particularity the grounds for the motion and the order or relief sought.

971.30 History History: Sup. Ct. Order, 171 Wis. 2d xix (1992).

971.31 971.31 Motions before trial.

971.31(1) (1) Any motion which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be made before trial.

971.31(2) (2) Except as provided in sub. (5), defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the proceedings, insufficiency of the complaint, information or indictment, invalidity in whole or in part of the statute on which the prosecution is founded, or the use of illegal means to secure evidence shall be raised before trial by motion or be deemed waived. The court may, however, entertain such motion at the trial, in which case the defendant waives any jeopardy that may have attached. The motion to suppress evidence shall be so entertained with waiver of jeopardy when it appears that the defendant is surprised by the state’s possession of such evidence.