Chapter 904

904.04 Annotation The exception to the general rule barring other-acts evidence is expanded in sexual assault cases, particularly those involving children. However the evidence must still meet the requirements of the three-step analytical framework articulated in Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768 (1998). State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d 606, 98-0130. See also State v. Marinez, 2011 WI 12, 331 Wis. 2d 568, 797 N.W.2d 399, 09-0567.

904.04 Annotation A “plan” in sub. (2) means a design or scheme to accomplish some particular purpose. Evidence showing a plan establishes a definite prior design that includes the doing of the acts charged. Similarity of facts is not enough to admit other-acts evidence. State v. Cofield, 2000 WI App 196, 238 Wis. 2d 467, 618 N.W.2d 214, 99-1387.

904.04 Annotation Evidence of criminal acts by an accused that were intended to obstruct or avoid punishment was not evidence of “other acts” admissible under sub. (2) but was admissible to prove consciousness of guilt of the principal criminal charge. State v. Bauer, 2000 WI App 206, 238 Wis. 2d 687, 617 N.W.2d 902, 99-2589.

904.04 Annotation For other-acts evidence to be admissible it must relate to a fact or proposition that is of consequence and have probative value. The measure of probative value in assessing relevance is the similarity between the charged offense and the other act. In a sexual assault case, the age of the victim is an important condition in determining similarity. State v. Meehan, 2001 WI App 119, 244 Wis. 2d 121, 630 N.W.2d 722, 97-3807.

904.04 Annotation When other-acts evidence was erroneously allowed, additional testimony about that act was not harmless error. State v. Meehan, 2001 WI App 119, 244 Wis. 2d 121, 630 N.W.2d 722, 97-3807.

904.04 Annotation A trial court ruling that other-acts evidence is admissible does not force a defendant to enter into a Wallerman, 203 Wis. 2d 158 (1996), stipulation. By entering into a Wallerman stipulation to prevent the admission of the other-acts evidence a defendant waives the right to appeal the other acts ruling. Generally there can be no prejudicial error from a ruling that evidence is admissible if the evidence is not actually admitted. State v. Frank, 2002 WI App 31, 250 Wis. 2d 95, 640 N.W.2d 198, 01-1252.

904.04 Annotation A defendant may, subject to the court’s discretion, introduce expert testimony to show that the defendant lacks the character traits of a sexual offender and is unlikely to have committed the assault in question. If the expert will testify, either explicitly or implicitly, on facts surrounding the crime charged, the court may compel the defendant to undergo a compulsory examination conducted by an expert selected by the state. State v. Davis, 2002 WI 75, 254 Wis. 2d 1, 645 N.W.2d 913, 00-2916.

904.04 Annotation The state and the court are not required to agree to Wallerman, 203 Wis. 2d 158 (1996), stipulations. A Wallerman stipulation in a child sexual assault case is directly contrary to the greater latitude rule for the admission of other-acts evidence in child sexual assault cases. The state must prove all elements of a crime, even elements the defendant does not dispute. Accordingly, evidence relevant to undisputed elements is admissible. State v. Veach, 2002 WI 110, 255 Wis. 2d 390, 648 N.W.2d 447, 98-2387.

904.04 Annotation Sub. (2) will not be interpreted to admit all past conduct involving an element of the present crime. State v. Barreau, 2002 WI App 198, 257 Wis. 2d 203, 651 N.W.2d 12, 01-1828.

904.04 Annotation A circuit court does not commit reversible error if it fails to provide a detailed Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768 (1998), analysis for admitting other-acts evidence. An appellate court is required to perform an independent review of the record for permissible bases for admitting other-acts evidence if the circuit court fails to adequately provide the Sullivan analysis, or alternatively states an impermissible basis for the admission of such evidence. State v. Hunt, 2003 WI 81, 263 Wis. 2d 1, 666 N.W.2d 771, 01-0272.

904.04 Annotation Inability of a victim to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of a similar uncharged crime takes the jury into the realm of conjecture or speculation and is not admissible as other-acts evidence of a crime committed by an unknown third person under Scheidell, 227 Wis. 2d 285 (1999). When there is a series of similar crimes, the fact that the state is unable to prove that the defendant committed all of the crimes does not tend to establish that the defendant did not commit any of the crimes. State v. Wright, 2003 WI App 252, 268 Wis. 2d 694, 673 N.W.2d 386, 03-0238.

904.04 Annotation Alsteen, 108 Wis. 2d 723 (1982), does not stand for the proposition that other-acts evidence can never be probative of the issue of consent or that the other-acts evidence is not probative of the issue of the victim’s credibility. When other-acts evidence of non-consent relates not only to sexual contact but also to a defendant’s modus operandi encompassing conduct inextricably connected to strikingly similar alleged criminal conduct, the evidence of non-consent may be admissible to establish motive, intent, preparation, plan, and absence of mistake or accident. State v. Ziebart, 2003 WI App 258, 268 Wis. 2d 468, 673 N.W.2d 369, 03-0795.

904.04 Annotation During a commitment proceeding under ch. 980, sub. (2) does not apply to evidence offered to prove that the respondent has a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the respondent will commit acts of sexual violence in the future. State v. Franklin, 2004 WI 38, 270 Wis. 2d 271, 677 N.W.2d 276, 00-2426.

904.04 Annotation It is well established that evidence of flight has probative value as to guilt. Flight evidence is not inadmissible other acts evidence and is not inadmissible anytime a defendant points to an unrelated crime in rebuttal. Rather, when a defendant points to an unrelated crime to explain flight, the trial court must determine whether to admit the evidence by weighing the risk of unfair prejudice with its probative value. State v. Quiroz, 2009 WI App 120, 320 Wis. 2d 706, 772 N.W.2d 710, 08-1473.

904.04 Annotation Sub. (2) does not apply in ch. 980 commitment proceedings. The Franklin, 2004 WI 38, court discerned an unambiguous legislative intent to restrict the application of sub. (2) to analyzing evidence used to prove past acts. The substantial probability of future conduct is the relevant question in ch. 980 proceedings. The nature of ch. 980 hearings demands the jury consider evidence that would normally be barred in a traditional criminal trial. Although Franklin did not discuss the due process implications of its decision, the inapplicability of sub. (2) is consistent with the demands of due process under both the U.S. and Wisconsin Constitutions. State v. Kaminski, 2009 WI App 175, 322 Wis. 2d 653, 777 N.W.2d 654, 08-2439.

904.04 Annotation When determining relevance of other acts evidence the trial court is to consider: 1) whether the other acts evidence relates to a fact or proposition that is of consequence to the determination of the action; and 2) whether the evidence has probative value, that is, whether the other acts evidence has a tendency to make the consequential fact or proposition more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. This is a common sense determination based less on legal precedent than life experiences. Dalka v. Wisconsin Central, Ltd., 2012 WI App 22, 339 Wis. 2d 361, 811 N.W.2d 834, 11-0398.

904.04 Annotation Proffered evidence of other acts of a third party must do more than simply afford a possible ground of suspicion against another person; it must connect that person to the crime—either directly or inferentially. The identity exception to other-acts evidence under sub. (2) requires that similarities exist between the other act and the offense for which the defendant is being tried. The threshold measure for similarity in the admission of other-acts evidence with regard to identity is nearness of time, place, and circumstance of the other act to the crime alleged. State v. Vollbrecht, 2012 WI App 90, 344 Wis. 2d 69, 820 N.W.2d 443, 11-0425.

904.04 Annotation While the defendant put the defendant’s character and credibility at issue by testifying and thus invited rebuttal testimony from the state, testimony that the defendant always stuttered when he lied went too far. The witness presented herself as a human lie detector. The jury is the lie detector in the courtroom. No witness, expert or otherwise, should be permitted to give an opinion that another mentally and physically competent witness is telling the truth. State v. Echols, 2013 WI App 58, 348 Wis. 2d 81, 831 N.W.2d 768, 12-0422.

904.04 Annotation The measure of probative value in assessing relevance is the similarity between the charged offense and the other act. Similarity is demonstrated by showing the nearness of time, place, and circumstance between the other act and the charged crime. It is within a circuit court’s discretion to determine whether other-acts evidence is too remote. However, events that are dissimilar or that do not occur near in time may still be relevant to one another. There is no precise point at which a prior act is considered too remote, and remoteness must be considered on a case-by-case basis. State v. Hurley, 2015 WI 35, 361 Wis. 2d 529, 861 N.W.2d 174, 13-0558.

904.04 Annotation For the types of cases enumerated under sub. (2) (b) 1., circuit courts should admit evidence of other acts with greater latitude under a Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768 (1998), analysis to facilitate its use for a permissible purpose. State v. Dorsey, 2018 WI 10, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 906 N.W.2d 158, 15-0648.

904.04 Annotation Sub. (2) (b) 2. is constitutional. The test for whether admitting other acts evidence to prove conduct violates due process is whether the introduction of the evidence is so extremely unfair that its admission violates fundamental concepts of justice. Given Wisconsin’s history of greater latitude in admitting other acts evidence in sexual assault cases, and the restrictions imposed by sub. (2) (b) 2., admitting other acts evidence under this section does not violate fundamental concepts of justice. State v. Gee, 2019 WI App 31, 388 Wis. 2d 68, 931 N.W.2d 287, 18-1069.

904.04 Annotation In this case, the other acts evidence of sexual assault was offered for the admissible purpose of proving that the defendant’s motive was to intentionally touch the victim for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. Context and background, while not expressly listed in sub. (2) (a), can also be acceptable purposes. State v. Gutierrez, 2020 WI 52, 391 Wis. 2d 799, 943 N.W.2d 870, 17-2364.

904.04 Annotation Outside of certain constitutional commands, a circuit court’s day-to-day decisions applying the rules of evidence will only rarely contain a constitutional dimension. Evidentiary questions of the type raised in this case—whether evidence is relevant or prejudicial under an other-acts inquiry—are therefore almost always properly reviewed for an erroneous exercise of discretion. State v. Johnson, 2021 WI 61, 397 Wis. 2d 633, 961 N.W.2d 18, 18-2318.

904.04 Annotation Whether evidence about the defendant’s “sex drive” was considered to be character evidence generally or evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, the prosecutor should not have been allowed to present evidence that the defendant was a sexual person. The “sex drive” evidence was not relevant for any permissible purpose. The only conceivable purpose of introducing it was to ask the jury to make a strained inference that, because the defendant was allegedly a very sexual person who sought sex from his girlfriend on a daily basis, the defendant was the type of person who would sexually assault a child. This is the propensity inference that is forbidden by subs. (1) and (2) alike. State v. Stroik, 2022 WI App 11, 401 Wis. 2d 150, 972 N.W.2d 640, 21-0447.

904.04 Annotation It is proper to exclude evidence offered under McMorris, 58 Wis. 2d 144 (1973), when it is too remote, or if the application of the s. 904.03 balancing test shows the evidence should be excluded. Excluding McMorris evidence that is irrelevant does not violate a defendant’s right to present a defense. State v. Ochoa, 2022 WI App 35, 404 Wis. 2d 261, 978 N.W.2d 501, 20-1981.

904.04 Annotation Pictures depicting violence were offered to prove the defendant’s fascination with death and mutilation, and that trait is undeniably probative of motive, intent, or plan to commit a vicious murder. Dressler v. McCaughtry, 238 F.3d 908 (2001).

904.04 Annotation Help Me Doc! Theories of Admissibility of Other Act Evidence in Medical Malpractice Cases. Gardner. 87 MLR 981 (2004).

904.05 904.05 Methods of proving character.

904.05(1) (1) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct.

904.05(2) (2) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of the person’s conduct.

904.05 History History: Sup. Ct. Order, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R80 (1973); 1991 a. 32.

904.05 Annotation A detective’s opinion of a drug addict’s reputation for truth and veracity did not qualify to prove reputation in the community because it was based on 12 varying opinions of persons who knew the addict, from which a community reputation could not be ascertained. Edwards v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 105, 181 N.W.2d 383 (1970).

904.05 Annotation When a defendant’s character evidence is by expert opinion and the prosecution’s attack on the basis of the opinion is answered evasively or equivocally, then the trial court may allow the prosecution to present evidence of specific incidents of conduct. King v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 26, 248 N.W.2d 458 (1977).

904.05 Annotation In order for specific acts of violence to be admissible, character or a trait of character of a person must be an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense. In a homicide case in which a claim of self-defense is raised, character evidence may be admissible as evidence of a defendant’s state of mind so long as the defendant had knowledge of the prior acts at the time of the offense. State v. Jackson, 2014 WI 4, 352 Wis. 2d 249, 841 N.W.2d 791, 11-2698.

904.05 Annotation Evidence—Self-Defense—Prior Acts of the Victim. Paulson. 1974 WLR 266.

904.06 904.06 Habit; routine practice.

904.06(1) (1) Admissibility. Except as provided in s. 972.11 (2), evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice.

904.06(2) (2) Method of proof. Habit or routine practice may be proved by testimony in the form of an opinion or by specific instances of conduct sufficient in number to warrant a finding that the habit existed or that the practice was routine.

904.06 History History: Sup. Ct. Order, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R83 (1973); 1975 c. 184.

904.06 Annotation Although a specific instance of conduct occurs only once, the evidence may be admissible under sub. (2). French v. Sorano, 74 Wis. 2d 460, 247 N.W.2d 182 (1976).

904.06 Annotation Discussing use of specific instances evidence. State v. Evans, 187 Wis. 2d 66, 522 N.W.2d 554 (Ct. App. 1994).

904.06 Annotation Habit evidence must be distinguished from character evidence. Character is a generalized description of a person’s disposition or of the disposition in respect to a general trait. Habit is more specific denoting one’s regular response to a repeated situation. However, habit need not be “semi-automatic” or “virtually unconscious.” Steinberg v. Arcilla, 194 Wis. 2d 759, 535 N.W.2d 444 (Ct. App. 1995).

904.06 Annotation The greater latitude given under Davidson, 2000 WI 91, for allowing other acts evidence in child sexual assault cases because of the difficulty sexually abused children experience in testifying and the difficulty prosecutors have in obtaining admissible evidence in such cases was properly applied when the victim, although an adult, functioned at the level of an 18-month-old, having an inability to recount what happened. This greater latitude is not restricted to allowing evidence of prior sexual assaults and was properly applied to allow evidence of pornography viewed by the defendant that helped to demonstrate motive. State v. Normington, 2008 WI App 8, 306 Wis. 2d 727, 744 N.W.2d 867, 07-0382.

904.07 904.07 Subsequent remedial measures. When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This section does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment or proving a violation of s. 101.11.

904.07 History History: Sup. Ct. Order, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R87 (1973).

904.07 Annotation Evidence of subsequent remedial measures by the mass producer of a defective product is admissible in a products liability case if the underlying policy of this section not to discourage corrective steps is not applicable. Chart v. General Motors Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 91, 258 N.W.2d 680 (1977).

904.07 Annotation Evidence of a remedial change was inadmissible when the defendant did not challenge the feasibility of the change. Krueger v. Tappan Co., 104 Wis. 2d 199, 311 N.W.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1981).

904.07 Annotation Although this section precludes admission of evidence of measures taken after an event if the evidence is used to prove negligence or culpable conduct, evidence of post-event remedial measures may be introduced in a case in which there are allegations of both negligence and strict liability. When a plaintiff asserts both strict liability and negligence and the evidence is not admissible under this section on the negligence theory but is admissible to prove strict liability, the defendant can request that the circuit court give an instruction limiting the evidence to the allegations of strict liability. D.L. v. Huebner, 110 Wis. 2d 581, 329 N.W.2d 890 (1983).

904.07 Annotation Evidence of subsequent remedial measures can be admitted under the impeachment exception when the evidence is presented to impeach specific witness testimony. Vanderventer v. Hyundai Motor America, 2022 WI App 56, 405 Wis. 2d 481, 983 N.W.2d 1, 20-1052.

904.08 904.08 Compromise and offers to compromise. Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This section does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, proving accord and satisfaction, novation or release, or proving an effort to compromise or obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.

904.08 History History: Sup. Ct. Order, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R90 (1973); 1987 a. 355; Sup. Ct. Order No. 93-03, 179 Wis. 2d xv (1993); 1993 a. 490.

904.08 Annotation While this section does not exclude evidence of compromise settlements to prove bias or prejudice of witnesses, it does exclude evidence of details such as the amount of the settlement. Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976).

904.08 Annotation The plaintiff’s letter suggesting a compromise between codefendants was not admissible to prove the liability of a defendant. Production Credit Ass’n of Green Bay v. Rosner, 78 Wis. 2d 543, 255 N.W.2d 79 (1977).

904.08 Annotation When a letter from a bank to the defendant was an unconditional demand for possession of collateral and payment under a lease and was prepared without prior negotiations, compromise, or agreement, the letter was not barred by this section. Heritage Bank of Milwaukee v. Packerland Packing Co., 82 Wis. 2d 225, 262 N.W.2d 109 (1978).

904.08 Annotation Bias or prejudice of a witness can be a permissible basis to admit settlement-related evidence. This can be satisfied by showing that a witness changed the witness’s testimony or that the posture of a settling party is significantly different as a result of the settlement. In this case, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it determined that witness bias was a significant risk in light of the dramatically altered posture of the case following settlement with two central tortfeasors, and the court admitted the fact of settlement into evidence and supported that limited admission with a cautionary and clarifying instruction to the jury. Allsop Venture Partners III v. Murphy Desmond SC, 2023 WI 43, 407 Wis. 2d 387, 991 N.W.2d 320, 20-0806.

904.085 904.085 Communications in mediation.

904.085(1) (1) Purpose. The purpose of this section is to encourage the candor and cooperation of disputing parties, to the end that disputes may be quickly, fairly and voluntarily settled.

904.085(2) (2) Definitions. In this section:

904.085(2)(a) (a) “Mediation” means mediation under s. 93.50 (3), conciliation under s. 111.54, mediation under s. 111.11, 111.70 (4) (cg) or (cm) 3. or 111.87, mediation under s. 115.797, negotiation under s. 289.33 (9), mediation under ch. 655 or s. 767.405, or any similar statutory, contractual or court-referred process facilitating the voluntary resolution of disputes. “Mediation” does not include binding arbitration or appraisal.

904.085(2)(b) (b) “Mediator” means the neutral facilitator in mediation, its agents and employees.

904.085(2)(c) (c) “Party” means a participant in mediation, personally or by an attorney, guardian, guardian ad litem or other representative, regardless of whether such person is a party to an action or proceeding whose resolution is attempted through mediation.

904.085(3) (3) Inadmissibility.

904.085(3)(a) (a) Except as provided under sub. (4), no oral or written communication relating to a dispute in mediation made or presented in mediation by the mediator or a party is admissible in evidence or subject to discovery or compulsory process in any judicial or administrative proceeding. Any communication that is not admissible in evidence or not subject to discovery or compulsory process under this paragraph is not a public record under subch. II of ch. 19.

904.085(3)(b) (b) Except as provided under sub. (4), no mediator may be subpoenaed or otherwise compelled to disclose any oral or written communication relating to a dispute in mediation made or presented in mediation by the mediator or a party or to render an opinion about the parties, the dispute whose resolution is attempted by mediation or any other aspect of the mediation.

904.085(4) (4) Exceptions.

904.085(4)(a) (a) Subsection (3) does not apply to any written agreement, stipulation or settlement made between 2 or more parties during or pursuant to mediation.

904.085(4)(b) (b) Subsection (3) does not apply if the parties stipulate that the mediator may investigate the parties under s. 767.405 (14) (c).

904.085(4)(c) (c) Subsection (3) (a) does not prohibit the admission of evidence otherwise discovered, although the evidence was presented in the course of mediation.

904.085(4)(d) (d) A mediator reporting child or unborn child abuse under s. 48.981, reporting a threat of violence in or targeted at a school under s. 175.32, or reporting nonidentifying information for statistical, research, or educational purposes does not violate this section.

904.085(4)(e) (e) In an action or proceeding distinct from the dispute whose settlement is attempted through mediation, the court may admit evidence otherwise barred by this section if, after an in camera hearing, it determines that admission is necessary to prevent a manifest injustice of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the importance of protecting the principle of confidentiality in mediation proceedings generally.

904.085 History History: Sup. Ct. Order No. 93-03, 179 Wis. 2d xv (1993); 1995 a. 227; 1997 a. 59, 164, 292; 2005 a. 443 s. 265; Sup. Ct. Order No. 09-12, 2010 WI 31, 323 Wis. 2d xvii; 2011 a. 32; 2017 a. 143.

904.085 Note Judicial Council Note, 1993: This section creates a rule of inadmissibility for communications presented in mediation. This rule can be waived by stipulation of the parties only in narrow circumstances [see sub. (4) (b)] because the possibility of being called as a witness impairs the mediator in the performance of the neutral facilitation role. The purpose of the rule is to encourage the parties to explore facilitated settlement of disputes without fear that their claims or defenses will be compromised if mediation fails and the dispute is later litigated.

904.085 Annotation The focus of sub. (3) (a) is on the courts and on judicial proceedings. It directs the courts not to admit certain communications into evidence and excludes those same communications from discovery. The statute is applied when the communications are sought to be introduced or discovered in court, not when they are originally made during mediation. Dyer v. Blackhawk Leather LLC, 2008 WI App 128, 313 Wis. 2d 803, 758 N.W.2d 167, 07-1400.

904.085 Annotation “Otherwise discovered” in sub. (4) (c) means discovered outside of mediation, not discovered outside the bounds of formal civil discovery. By its terms, sub. (4) (c) is intended to prevent a party from making pre-existing, unprivileged information privileged, simply by communicating in the course of a mediation. Dyer v. Blackhawk Leather LLC, 2008 WI App 128, 313 Wis. 2d 803, 758 N.W.2d 167, 07-1400.

904.085 Annotation Sounding the Depths of Wisconsin’s Mediation Privilege. La Fave. Wis. Law. July/Aug. 2016.

904.09 904.09 Payment of medical and similar expenses. Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible to prove liability for the injury.

904.09 History History: Sup. Ct. Order, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R93 (1973).

904.10 904.10 Offer to plead guilty; no contest; withdrawn plea of guilty. Evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of no contest, or of an offer to the court or prosecuting attorney to plead guilty or no contest to the crime charged or any other crime, or in civil forfeiture actions, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer or one liable for the person’s conduct. Evidence of statements made in court or to the prosecuting attorney in connection with any of the foregoing pleas or offers is not admissible.

904.10 History History: Sup. Ct. Order, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R94 (1973); 1991 a. 32.

904.10 Annotation When an accused entered into a plea agreement and subsequently testified at the trials of other defendants, and when the accused later withdrew the guilty plea and was tried, prior trial testimony was properly admitted for impeachment purposes. State v. Nash, 123 Wis. 2d 154, 366 N.W.2d 146 (Ct. App. 1985).

904.10 Annotation Statements made during a guilty plea hearing are inadmissible for any purpose, including impeachment, at a subsequent trial. State v. Mason, 132 Wis. 2d 427, 393 N.W.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1986).

904.10 Annotation A defendant’s agreement to sign a written confession, after being told by the district attorney that the state would stand silent regarding sentencing if the defendant gave a truthful statement, was not the result of plea negotiations but negotiations for a confession, and therefore was not inadmissible under this section. State v. Nicholson, 187 Wis. 2d 688, 523 N.W.2d 573 (Ct. App. 1994).

904.10 Annotation This section does not apply to offers of compromise made to the police. State v. Pischke, 198 Wis. 2d 257, 542 N.W.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1995), 95-0183.

904.10 Annotation A no contest plea in a criminal case cannot be used collaterally as an admission in future civil litigation. Kustelski v. Taylor, 2003 WI App 194, 266 Wis. 2d 940, 669 N.W.2d 780, 02-2786.

904.10 Annotation Section 908.01 (4) (b) deals with admissions by a party as a general rule, but admissions incidental to an offer to plead are a special kind of party admission: they are impossible to segregate from the offer itself because the offer is implicit in the reasons advanced therefor. This section trumps s. 908.01 (4) (b) because it excludes only this particular category of party admissions and therefore is more specialized than the latter statute. State v. Norwood, 2005 WI App 218, 287 Wis. 2d 679, 706 N.W.2d 683, 04-1073.

904.10 Annotation This section prohibits the use of incriminating testimony a defendant gave in order to keep the possibility of a plea bargain open. The state’s assertion that this section does not apply when, as here, a prosecutor offers to allow the defendant to plead guilty, failed. Not only does this ignore the basic principle that a defendant can plead guilty with or without the prosecutor’s consent, but it would require adding the words “to allow” to the statute. State v. Myrick, 2014 WI 55, 354 Wis. 2d 828, 848 N.W.2d 743, 12-2513.

904.11 904.11 Liability insurance. Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully. This section does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness.

904.11 History History: Sup. Ct. Order, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R97 (1973); 1991 a. 32.

904.11 Annotation This section excludes evidence of insurance to pay punitive damages. City of West Allis v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 2001 WI App 226, 248 Wis. 2d 10, 635 N.W.2d 873, 99-2944.