Sport shooting ranges; actions related to safety. 895.08(1)(a)
“Clear and immediate public safety hazard" means an unsafe condition that originates from, or is at, a sport shooting range and that could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious injury to an individual.
“Local unit of government" means the governing body of a county, city, town, village, or the elected tribal governing body of a federally recognized American Indian tribe or band in this state.
Except as provided in par. (b)
, no law enforcement officer or court may require the owner or operator of a sport shooting range to cease or suspend any portion of its operation, the use of a particular firearm type at the sport shooting range, or the conduct of a particular activity at the sport shooting range because of an alleged or actual unsafe condition at, or originating from, the sport shooting range.
A court may, upon petition by a law enforcement officer, temporarily order the owner or operator of a sport shooting range to cease or suspend a portion of its operation, the use of a particular firearm type at the sport shooting range, or the conduct of a particular activity at the sport shooting range if it finds that there is probable cause to believe that the portion of the operation, the use of a particular firearm type at the sport shooting range, or the conduct of a particular activity at the sport shooting range constitutes a clear and immediate public safety hazard.
A court may, upon petition by a local unit of government or an individual, temporarily order the owner or operator of a sport shooting range to cease or suspend a portion of its operation, the use of a particular firearm type at the sport shooting range, or the conduct of a particular activity at the sport shooting range if the court finds, upon a preponderance of the evidence presented, that the portion of the sport shooting range's operation, the use of a particular firearm type at the sport shooting range, or the conduct of a particular activity at the sport shooting range constitutes a clear and immediate public safety hazard.
There is a rebuttable presumption that no portion of a sport shooting range's operation, use of a particular firearm type at the sport shooting range, or conduct of a particular activity at the sport shooting range constitutes a clear and immediate public safety hazard.
An owner or operator of a sport shooting range who has been ordered by a court under sub. (2)
to temporarily cease or suspend a portion of its operation, the use of a particular firearm type at the sport shooting range, or the conduct of a particular activity at the sport shooting range may arrange for an evaluation of the sport shooting range by an entity designated by the department of natural resources under s. 23.43
as qualified to evaluate the sport shooting range. The evaluation shall identify any deficiencies in public safety measures employed at the range as compared to general safe range design and operation practices and provide recommendations to rectify any deficiencies that exist. The entity's report on the findings of the evaluation shall be submitted to the court upon completion of the evaluation.
After receiving a report under par. (a)
that states that no deficiencies in public safety measures employed at the range as compared to general safe range design and operation practices exist, the court shall rescind the order issued under sub. (2)
and dismiss the proceedings.
After receiving a report under par. (a)
that identifies any deficiency in public safety measures employed at the range as compared to general safe range design and operation practices that poses a clear and immediate public safety hazard, the court shall allow the range owner or operator to provide proof that such deficiencies have been remedied. If the range owner or operator provides proof that the deficiencies have been remedied, the court shall rescind the order issued under sub. (2)
and dismiss the proceedings.
After receiving a report under par. (a)
that identifies any deficiency in public safety measures employed at the range as compared to general safe range design and operation practices that poses a clear and immediate public safety hazard and that cannot be remedied in the range's location, the court may order permanent cessation of a portion of the sport shooting range operation, use of a particular firearm type at the sport shooting range, or the conduct of a particular activity at the sport shooting range to which the deficiency applies.
If a court dismisses a petition on the grounds that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that a portion of a sport shooting range's operation constitutes a clear and immediate public safety hazard, or if the court rescinds an order issued under sub. (2)
on the grounds that a report filed under par. (a)
finds no deficiencies in public safety measures employed at the range as compared to general safe range design and operation practices that constitute a clear and immediate public safety hazard, the court may order the petitioner to pay the defending party's costs of litigation, including reasonable attorneys fees and consultant fees.
History: 2017 a. 179
Scrap metal or plastic bulk merchandise container theft; civil liability. 895.09(1)(1)
Any owner of nonferrous scrap, a metal article, or a proprietary article, as those terms are defined in s. 134.405 (1)
, who incurs injury or loss as a result of a violation of s. 134.405
or s. 943.20
may bring a civil action against the person who committed the violation.
If the person who incurs the loss prevails against a person who committed the violation, the court shall grant the prevailing party all of the following:
Any lost profits that are attributable to the violation and that were not taken into account in determining the amount of actual damages under par. (a)
Notwithstanding the limitations under s. 799.25
, costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorney fees.
If the court finds that the violation was committed for the purpose of commercial advantage, the court may award punitive damages to the person who incurs the loss.
Any awards provided under sub. (2) (a)
shall be reduced by the amount of any restitution collected for the same act under s. 800.093
The person who incurs the loss has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence that a violation of s. 134.405
History: 2007 a. 64
; 2011 a. 194
Tort actions in residential real estate transactions. 895.10(1)(1)
In this section, “residential real estate transaction" means a real estate transfer to which s. 709.01 (1)
In addition to any other remedies available under law, a transferee in a residential real estate transaction may maintain an action in tort against the real estate transferor for fraud committed, or an intentional misrepresentation made, by the transferor in the residential real estate transaction.
History: 2009 a. 4
Tenders of money and property. 895.14(1)(1)
Tender may be pleaded.
The payment or tender of payment of the whole sum due on any contract for the payment of money, although made after the money has become due and payable, may be pleaded to an action subsequently brought in like manner and with the like effect as if such tender or payment had been made at the time prescribed in the contract.
(2) Tender after action commenced.
A tender may be made after an action is brought on the contract of the whole sum then due, plus legal costs of suit incurred up to the time, at any time before the action is called for trial. The tender may be made to the plaintiff or attorney, and if not accepted the defendant may plead the same by answer or supplemental answer, in like manner as if it had been made before the commencement of the action, bringing into court the money so tendered for costs as well as for debt or damages.
(3) Proceedings on acceptance of tender.
If the tender is accepted the plaintiff or attorney shall, at the request of the defendant, sign a stipulation of discontinuance of the action for that reason and shall deliver it to the defendant; and also a certificate or notice thereof to the officer who has any process against the defendant, if requested. If costs are incurred for any service made by the officer after the tender is accepted and before the officer receives notice of the acceptance, the defendant shall pay the costs to the officer or the tender is invalid.
(4) Involuntary trespass.
A tender may be made in all cases of involuntary trespass before action is commenced. When in the opinion of the court or jury a sufficient amount was tendered to the party injured, agent or attorney for the trespass complained of, judgment shall be entered against the plaintiff for costs if the defendant kept the tender good by paying the money into court at the trial for the use of the plaintiff.
(5) Payment into court of tender; record of deposits. 895.14(5)(a)(a)
When tender of payment in full is made and pleaded, the defendant shall pay the tender in full into court before the trial of the action is commenced and notify the opposite party in writing, or be deprived of all benefit of the tender. When the sum tendered and paid into court is sufficient, the defendant shall recover the taxable costs of the action, if the tender was prior to the commencement of the action. The defendant shall recover taxable costs from the time of the tender, if the tender was after suit commenced.
When any party, pursuant to an order or to law, deposits any money or property with the clerk of court, the clerk shall record the deposit in the minute record describing the money or property and stating the date of the deposit, by whom made, under what order or for what purpose and shall deliver a certificate of these facts to the depositor, with the volume and page of the record endorsed on the certificate.
History: 1981 c. 67
; 1983 a. 192
; 1983 a. 302
; Stats. 1983 s. 895.14.
Remedies not merged.
When the violation of a right admits of both a civil and criminal remedy the right to prosecute the one is not merged in the other.
Limitation of surety's liability.
Any person may limit the amount of liability as a surety upon any bond or other obligation required by law or ordered by any court, judge, municipal judge or public official for any purpose. The amount of the limited liability may be recited in the body of the bond or stated in the justification of the surety. In an action brought upon the bond, no judgment may be recovered against the surety for a sum larger than the amount of the liability stated, together with the proportional share of the costs of the action. In an action brought on the bond, a surety may deposit in court the amount of the liability, whereupon the surety shall be discharged and released from any further liability under the bond.
History: 1979 c. 110
s. 60 (11)
; 1985 a. 332
Renewal of sureties upon becoming insufficient and effects thereof.
If any bail bond, recognizance, undertaking or other bond or undertaking given in any civil or criminal action or proceeding, becomes at any time insufficient, the court or judge thereof, municipal judge or any magistrate before whom such action or proceeding is pending, may, upon notice, require the plaintiff or defendant to give a new bond, recognizance or undertaking. Every person becoming surety on any such new bond, recognizance or undertaking is liable from the time the original was given, the same as if he or she had been the original surety. If any person fails to comply with the order made in the case the adverse party is entitled to any order, judgment, remedy or process to which he or she would have been entitled had no bond, recognizance or undertaking been given at any time.
History: 1977 c. 305
A precondition for this section to apply is that the bond must at one time have been sufficient. Bruer v. Town of Addison, 194 Wis. 2d 617
, 534 N.W.2d 634
(Ct. App. 1995).
Justification of individual sureties. 895.345(1)(1)
This section shall apply to any bond or undertaking in an amount of more than $1,000 whereon individuals are offered as sureties, which is authorized or required by any provision of the statutes to be given or furnished in or in connection with any civil action or proceeding in any court of record in this state, in connection with which bond or undertaking real property is offered as security.
Before any such bond or undertaking shall be approved, there shall be attached thereto and made a part of such bond or undertaking a statement under oath in duplicate by the surety that the surety is the sole owner of the property offered by the surety as security and containing the following additional information:
An accurate description by lot and block number, if part of a recorded and filed plat, or by metes and bounds of the real estate offered as security.
A statement that none of the properties offered constitute the homestead of the surety.
A statement of the total amount of the liens, unpaid taxes and other encumbrances against each property offered.
A statement as to the assessed value of each property offered, its market value and the value of the equity over and above all encumbrances, liens and unpaid taxes.
That the equity of the real property is equal to twice the penalty of the bond or undertaking.
This sworn statement shall be in addition to and notwithstanding other affidavits or statements of justification required or provided for elsewhere in the statutes in connection with such bonds and undertakings.
History: 1993 a. 486
; 1999 a. 96
This section does not apply to bonds of personal representatives. See s. 856.25
Bail, deposit in lieu of bond.
When any bond or undertaking is authorized in any civil or criminal action or proceeding, the would-be obligor may, in lieu thereof and with like legal effect, deposit with the proper court or officer cash or certified bank checks or U.S. bonds or bank certificates of deposit in an amount at least equal to the required security; and the receiver thereof shall give a receipt therefor and shall notify the payor bank of any deposits of bank certificates of deposit. Section 808.07
shall govern the procedure so far as applicable.
Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 784 (1975); 1977 c. 187
Expenses in actions against municipal and other officers. 895.35(1)(1)
Whenever in any city, town, village, school district, technical college district or county charges of any kind are filed or an action is brought against any officer thereof in the officer's official capacity, or to subject any such officer, whether or not the officer is being compensated on a salary basis, to a personal liability growing out of the performance of official duties, and such charges or such action is discontinued or dismissed or such matter is determined favorably to such officer, or such officer is reinstated, or in case such officer, without fault on the officer's part, is subjected to a personal liability as aforesaid, such city, town, village, school district, technical college district or county may pay all reasonable expenses which such officer necessarily expended by reason thereof. Such expenses may likewise be paid, even though decided adversely to such officer, where it appears from the certificate of the trial judge that the action involved the constitutionality of a statute, not theretofore construed, relating to the performance of the official duties of said officer.
“Protective services officer" means an emergency medical services practitioner, as defined in s. 256.01 (5)
, an emergency medical responder, as defined in s. 256.01 (4p)
, a fire fighter, or a law enforcement or correctional officer.
Notwithstanding sub. (1)
, the city, town, village, school district, technical college district, or county shall reimburse a protective services officer for reasonable attorney fees incurred by the officer in connection with a criminal proceeding arising from the officer's conduct in the performance of official duties unless, in relation to that conduct, any of the following applies:
The officer resigns for reasons other than retirement before the attorney fees are incurred.
The officer is suspended without pay for 10 or more working days.
If a collective bargaining agreement covering the protective services officer defines reasonable attorney fees for the purpose of subd. 1.
, that definition shall apply.
A county has the option to refuse payment of its sheriff's criminal defense attorney's fees. Bablitch & Bablitch v. Lincoln County, 82 Wis. 2d 574
, 263 N.W.2d 218
This section allows a municipality or county to pay an officer's attorney fees if it so elects. If the municipality refuses payment, the officer has no cause of action against the municipality under this section, even if the municipality had a practice of reimbursing attorney fees and costs incurred and it failed to pay because of political concerns. Murray v. City of Milwaukee, 2002 WI App 62
, 252 Wis. 2d 613
, 642 N.W.2d 541
A city may reimburse a commissioner of the city redevelopment authority for legal expenses incurred by the commissioner when charges are filed against the commissioner in his or her official capacity seeking the commissioner's removal from office for cause and the charges are found by the common council to be unsupported. Such reimbursement is discretionary. The city redevelopment authority lacks statutory authority to authorize reimbursement for such legal expenses. 63 Atty. Gen. 421.
A city council can, in limited circumstances, reimburse a council member for reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending an alleged violation of the open meeting law, but cannot reimburse the member for any forfeiture imposed. 66 Atty. Gen. 226.
This section applies to criminal charges brought against a former officer for alleged fraudulent filing of expense vouchers. 71 Atty. Gen. 4
Sections 895.35 and 895.46 apply to actions for open meetings law violations to the same extent they apply to other actions against public officers and employees, except that public officials cannot be reimbursed for forfeitures they are ordered to pay for violating open meetings law. 77 Atty. Gen. 177
Process against corporation or limited liability company officer.
No process against private property shall issue in an action or upon a judgment against a public corporation or limited liability company or an officer or manager in his or her official capacity, when the liability, if any, is that of the corporation or limited liability company nor shall any person be liable as garnishee of such public corporation or limited liability company.
History: 1993 a. 112
; 2005 a. 155
Abrogation of defenses in employee personal injury actions. 895.37(1)(1)
In any action to recover damages for a personal injury sustained within this state by an employee while engaged in the line of the employee's duty as an employee, or for death resulting from personal injury so sustained, in which recovery is sought upon the ground of want of ordinary care of the employer, or of any officer, agent, or servant of the employer, it shall not be a defense: