Chapter 801

801.05 Annotation Sub. (1) (d) plainly requires the circuit court to analyze a defendant’s contacts at the time the action is commenced. It was error for the circuit court to analyze the defendant’s contacts preceding the commencement of the action. FL Hunts, LLC v. Wheeler, 2010 WI App 10, 322 Wis. 2d 738, 780 N.W.2d 529, 08-2506.

801.05 Annotation Courts consider five factors when analyzing whether a defendant has substantial contacts under sub. (1) (d): 1) the quantity of the contacts; 2) the quality of the contacts; 3) the source of the contacts and their connection with the cause of action; 4) the state’s interest; and 5) the convenience of the parties. FL Hunts, LLC v. Wheeler, 2010 WI App 10, 322 Wis. 2d 738, 780 N.W.2d 529, 08-2506.

801.05 Annotation To determine whether an action relates to goods shipped from this state in a breach of contract action under sub. (5) (d), the court analyzes the contract’s provisions and the complaint’s allegations. Jurisdiction was not appropriate under sub. (5) (d) in this case because the action did not relate to the equipment the plaintiff provided the defendant. This case involved an employment contract, and not a sales contract, that made only one passing reference to equipment and lacked provisions traditionally included in sales contracts. FL Hunts, LLC v. Wheeler, 2010 WI App 10, 322 Wis. 2d 738, 780 N.W.2d 529, 08-2506.

801.05 Annotation Absent control by a parent corporation sufficient to cause a court to disregard the separate corporate identities of the parent and a subsidiary corporation, the activities of the subsidiary are insufficient to subject its nonresident parent corporation to general personal jurisdiction under sub. (1) (d). In assessing corporate separateness, Wisconsin courts have focused most directly on the amount of control that one corporation exercises or has the right to exercise over the other; whether both corporations employ independent decision-making; whether corporate formalities are observed; whether the corporations operate as one corporation; and whether observing the corporate separateness facilitates fraud. Rasmussen v. General Motors Corp., 2011 WI 52, 335 Wis. 2d 1, 803 N.W.2d 623, 07-0035.

801.05 Annotation The meaning of “to the defendant” in sub. (5) (d) includes shipping goods from Wisconsin to third parties at the defendant’s order or direction. Johnson Litho Graphics of Eau Claire, Ltd. v. Sarver, 2012 WI App 107, 344 Wis. 2d 374, 824 N.W.2d 127, 10-1441.

801.05 Annotation Two questions govern whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process: 1) whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts in Wisconsin; and 2) if so, whether the defendant’s contacts in Wisconsin comport with notions of fair play and substantial justice, in light of relevant factors. The plaintiff carries the initial burden of showing that the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts with the state, and, if so, the burden then shifts to the defendant to present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable. Johnson Litho Graphics of Eau Claire, Ltd. v. Sarver, 2012 WI App 107, 344 Wis. 2d 374, 824 N.W.2d 127, 10-1441.

801.05 Annotation To make the determination of fair play and substantial justice under the due process analysis, the court considers five factors: 1) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; 2) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; 3) the burden on the defendant; 4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and 5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. When there is a strong showing that the nonresident defendant purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of Wisconsin law, a lower showing of fairness suffices to permit personal jurisdiction. Johnson Litho Graphics of Eau Claire, Ltd. v. Sarver, 2012 WI App 107, 344 Wis. 2d 374, 824 N.W.2d 127, 10-1441.

801.05 Annotation The defendant did not purposefully establish minimum contacts in Wisconsin so as to permit the circuit court to exercise personal jurisdiction over it under the facts of this case. Defendant’s advertisements on its own website and third-party sites represented merely potential contacts with the state of Wisconsin. The facts did not suggest that the defendant targeted Wisconsin residents with its Internet advertisements any more than any other state’s residents, and the advertisements were accessible to everyone regardless of location. Carlson v. Fidelity Motor Group, LLC, 2015 WI App 16, 360 Wis. 2d 369, 860 N.W.2d 299, 14-0695.

801.05 Annotation An article published online is “processed” within the meaning of sub. (4) (b). The broad definition of “process” adopted by the supreme court in Kopke, 2001 WI 99, is broad enough to embrace the newspaper’s process of preparing and arranging news and blank spaces for advertising content for the market and subjecting it to information processing so that users in Wisconsin can access articles placed on its website. Salfinger v. Fairfax Media Ltd., 2016 WI App 17, 367 Wis. 2d 311, 876 N.W.2d 160, 15-0150.

801.05 Annotation The relationship between the defendant and the forum state must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself or herself creates with the forum state. The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently rejected attempts to satisfy the defendant-focused minimum contacts inquiry by demonstrating contacts between the plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum state. The minimum contacts analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there. Salfinger v. Fairfax Media Ltd., 2016 WI App 17, 367 Wis. 2d 311, 876 N.W.2d 160, 15-0150.

801.05 Annotation A Wisconsin court may not exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant whose only real connection to Wisconsin is in having published an article online that is ostensibly available to anyone in the world and that also provides for targeted advertising based upon the user’s location and interests. Salfinger v. Fairfax Media Ltd., 2016 WI App 17, 367 Wis. 2d 311, 876 N.W.2d 160, 15-0150.

801.05 Annotation A father’s acquiescence in his daughter’s desire to live with her mother in California did not confer jurisdiction over the father in California courts. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 S. Ct. 1690, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1978).

801.05 Annotation A state may not exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over a defendant having no forum contacts by attacking a contractual obligation of the defendant’s insurer licensed in the state. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S. Ct. 571, 62 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1980).

801.05 Annotation When an accident involving only Wisconsin residents occurred in Wisconsin, the fact that the decedent had been employed in Minnesota conferred jurisdiction on the Minnesota courts, and Minnesota insurance law was applicable. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 101 S. Ct. 633, 66 L. Ed. 2d 521 (1981).

801.05 Annotation Foreign subsidiaries of a U.S. parent corporation are not amenable to suit in state court on claims unrelated to any activity of the subsidiaries in the forum state. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 180 L. Ed. 2d 796 (2011).

801.05 Annotation The 14th amendment limits the personal jurisdiction of state courts. Because a state court’s assertion of jurisdiction exposes defendants to the state’s coercive power, it is subject to review for compatibility with the 14th amendment’s due process clause, which limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant. Specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction. For specific jurisdiction, a defendant’s general connections with the forum are not enough. A specific connection between the forum and specific claims at issue is required. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 582 U.S. 255, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 198 L. Ed. 2d 395 (2017).

801.05 Annotation When an out-of-state defendant placed an order in Wisconsin, but conducted no other activities in the state, the minimum contacts test was not satisfied. Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co., 597 F.2d 596 (1979).

801.05 Annotation A New York corporation was subject to the long-arm statute when agents of the corporation made two visits to the state in connection with business on which the claim was based. Wisconsin Electrical Manufacturing Co. v. Pennant Products, Inc., 619 F.2d 676 (1980).

801.05 Annotation The Wisconsin circuit court had exclusive jurisdiction over trust assets in Illinois, making removal to Wisconsin federal district court improper. Norton v. Bridges, 712 F.2d 1156 (1983).

801.05 Annotation “Processed” under sub. (4) (b) included a distributor’s purchase and sale of goods in the normal course of distribution of those goods. Nelson v. Park Industries, Inc., 717 F.2d 1120 (1983).

801.05 Annotation A buyer’s inspection of goods before shipment from the state was sufficient contact for jurisdiction. Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358 (1985).

801.05 Annotation An act or omission occurring outside the state with consequences in the state does not fit the tort provisions of sub. (3). Services within the state under sub. (5) do not include the purchase of insurance from a state company. Federated Rural Electric Insurance Corp. v. Inland Power & Light Co., 18 F.3d 389 (1994).

801.05 Annotation Specific personal jurisdiction requires that a defendant’s contacts with the forum state show that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state or purposefully directed the defendant’s activities at the state. This analysis focuses on the defendant’s contacts with the forum state itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there. Deliberate contact with the resident of a state is not the same thing as deliberate contact with the state itself. Lexington Insurance Co. v. Hotai Insurance Co., 938 F.3d 874 (2019).

801.05 Annotation Under Wisconsin law, showing that an officer has control over a corporation allows for attribution of the corporation’s activities to that officer. Yet, a corporation’s contacts with a forum must have existed by virtue of the officer’s control. Webber v. Armslist LLC, 70 F.4th 945 (2023).

801.05 Annotation Jurisdiction in an action for misrepresentation in the sale of a boat did not exist when the only contact was that the boat would be operated partly in Wisconsin and that the seller wrote a letter to the Wisconsin buyer confirming the already existing contract. McCalla v. A.J. Industries, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 544 (1973).

801.05 Annotation The fact that a Virginia corporation was a distributor for a Wisconsin corporation in Virginia was not enough to justify an action in Wisconsin. Watral v. Murphy Diesel Co., 358 F. Supp. 968 (1973).

801.05 Annotation A Texas company that ordered a turbine from a Wisconsin manufacturer and sent representatives to Wisconsin twice was subject to Wisconsin jurisdiction. Nordberg Division of Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. Hudson Engineering Corp., 361 F. Supp. 903 (1973).

801.05 Annotation An action for injuries sustained by the plaintiff while using a machine manufactured by the defendant in France and sold to the plaintiff’s employer was an action for personal injury based on breach of warranty and strict liability under subs. (4) and (5) (c). Davis v. Mercier-Freres, 368 F. Supp. 498 (1973).

801.05 Annotation Service upon a nonresident defendant’s father at the father’s residence was insufficient for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident, despite claimed actual notice, when no attempt was made to comply with s. 345.09. Chilcote v. Shertzer, 372 F. Supp. 86 (1974).

801.05 Annotation The court had jurisdiction over an insurer under sub. (1) (d) based on settlement negotiations conducted by an adjuster, and the insurer was estopped from asserting its no-action clause. Kirchen v. Orth, 390 F. Supp. 313 (1975).

801.05 Annotation The court had in-personam jurisdiction by virtue of sub. (5) (b) and (e) when the defendant made initial contact with the plaintiff, sent its president to Milwaukee to solicit the plaintiff’s participation in the transaction, delivered documentation of title to the subject property to the plaintiff in Milwaukee, accepted payment in Milwaukee, and executed a lease agreement in Milwaukee. Ridge Leasing Corp. v. Monarch Royalty, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 573 (1975).

801.05 Annotation To determine whether a particular nonresident is “doing business” within this state, the court must consider the party’s overall activities within the state, past and present, not at some fixed point in time. Modern Cycle Sales, Inc. v. Burkhardt-Larsen Co., 395 F. Supp. 587 (1975).

801.05 Annotation Actions of out-of-state police officials in continuously soliciting the plaintiff’s arrest by a “fugitive from justice notice” entered into a Federal Bureau of Investigation computer database, representing to Wisconsin authorities that extradition was desired and requesting that the plaintiff be arrested, was sufficient minimum contact with Wisconsin to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Maney v. Ratcliff, 399 F. Supp. 760 (1975).

801.05 Annotation Infrequent use of Wisconsin roads by an Idaho trucking corporation did not constitute “continuous and systematic” activity necessary to confer jurisdiction under this section. Ladwig v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 498 F. Supp. 161 (1980).

801.05 Annotation A foreign corporation is not subject to jurisdiction in Wisconsin when the sole basis for assertion of jurisdiction is unilateral activity of the resident plaintiff. Jadair, Inc. v. Walt Keeler Co., 508 F. Supp. 879 (1981).

801.05 Annotation In applying the test under sub. (1) (d), the court looks to the defendant’s general contacts with the forum state, not merely its contacts arising out of the specific transaction at issue. Jadair, Inc. v. Van Lott, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 1141 (1981).

801.05 Annotation The defendant’s attorney’s delivery of checks in the state was insufficient contact to confer jurisdiction under this section. Sed, Inc. v. Bohager/Goodhues, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 196 (1982).

801.05 Annotation Distinguishing contracts for services and contracts for goods. L.B. Sales Corp. v. Dial Manufacturing, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 290 (1984).

801.05 Annotation A single sale in the state was insufficient contact to confer personal jurisdiction. Uni-Bond, Ltd. v. Schultz, 607 F. Supp. 1361 (1985).

801.05 Annotation A parent-subsidiary relationship is sufficient to confer jurisdiction over the parent for long-arm purposes so long as the subsidiary carries on sufficient activities in the state. Hayeland v. Jaques, 847 F. Supp. 630 (1994).

801.05 Annotation This section is intended to reach to the fullest extent allowed under the due process clause. Fabry Glove & Mitten Co. v. Spitzer, 908 F. Supp. 625 (1995).

801.05 Annotation Foreseeability that the defendant’s actions in one state may cause injury in Wisconsin does not amount to causing a local act. The consequences of an act alone do not establish jurisdiction over the defendant under sub. (3). Nelson v. Bulso, 979 F. Supp. 1239 (1997).

801.05 Annotation In order for solicitation activities to trigger personal jurisdiction, the solicitor must anticipate receiving a financial benefit from the activity. Knot Just Beads v. Knot Just Beads, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 932 (2002).

801.05 Annotation The fiduciary shield doctrine, which denies personal jurisdiction over an individual whose presence and activity in a state are solely on behalf of an employer or other principal, is not a part of Wisconsin law. Norkol/Fibercore, Inc. v. Gubb, 279 F. Supp. 2d 993 (2003).

801.05 Annotation State May Not Assert Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction Over An Insurance Company’s Contractual Obligations to Defend and Indemnify Its Insured. Orton. 64 MLR 374 (1980).

801.05 Annotation Stacking the Deck: Wisconsin’s Application of Leflar’s Choice-Influencing Considerations to Torts Choice-of-Law Cases. White. 1985 WLR 401.

801.05 Annotation Wisconsin’s ‘Stream of Commerce’ Theory of Personal Jurisdiction. La Fave. Wis. Law. Nov. 2002.

801.06 801.06 Personal jurisdiction, grounds for without service of summons. A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter may, without a summons having been served upon a person, exercise jurisdiction in an action over a person with respect to any counterclaim asserted against that person in an action which the person has commenced in this state and also over any person who appears in the action and waives the defense of lack of jurisdiction over his or her person as provided in s. 802.06 (8). An appearance to contest the basis for in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction under s. 802.06 (2) (a) 3. without seeking any other relief does not constitute an appearance within the meaning of this section.

801.06 History History: Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 596 (1975); 1975 c. 218; 1993 a. 213.

801.07 801.07 Jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem, grounds for generally. A court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter may exercise jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem on the grounds stated in this section. A judgment in rem or quasi in rem may affect the interests of a defendant in the status, property or thing acted upon only if a summons has been served upon the defendant pursuant to s. 801.12. Jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem may be invoked in any of the following cases:

801.07(1) (1) When the subject of the action is real or personal property in this state and the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, therein, or the relief demanded consists wholly or partially in excluding the defendant from any interest or lien therein. This subsection shall apply when any such defendant is unknown.

801.07(2) (2) When the action is to foreclose, redeem from or satisfy a mortgage, claim or lien upon real estate within this state.

801.07(3) (3) When the defendant has property within this state which has been attached or has a debtor within the state who has been garnisheed. Jurisdiction under this subsection may be independent of or supplementary to jurisdiction acquired under subs. (1) and (2).

801.07(4) (4) When the action is to declare property within this state a public nuisance.

801.07(5) (5) When the action is an action affecting the family under s. 767.001 (1) (a) to (d) and when the residence requirements of s. 767.301 have been met, a court having subject matter jurisdiction may exercise jurisdiction quasi in rem to determine questions of status if the respondent has been served under s. 801.11 (1). Notwithstanding s. 801.11 (intro.), the court need not have grounds for personal jurisdiction under s. 801.05 in order to make a determination of the status of a marriage under this subsection.

801.07 History History: Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 597 (1975), 758; 1977 c. 418; 1979 c. 32 s. 92 (4); 1979 c. 352 s. 39; 1993 a. 213; 2001 a. 42; 2005 a. 443, s. 265.

801.07 Annotation This section requires that in rem actions under s. 161.555 [now s. 961.555] must be commenced against a person having an interest in property seized under s. 161.55 [now s. 961.55]. State v. One 1973 Cadillac, 95 Wis. 2d 641, 291 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1980).

801.07 Annotation For quasi in rem jurisdiction under sub. (5), minimum contacts between the defendant and the state are necessary. Mendez v. Hernandez-Mendez, 213 Wis. 2d 217, 570 N.W.2d 563 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-1731.

801.07 Annotation Sub. (3) applies when a settlement offer is made at least 20 days before trial. When a dispute is resolved by arbitration, there is no trial and sub. (3) does not apply. Lane v. Williams, 2000 WI App 263, 240 Wis. 2d 255, 621 N.W.2d 922, 00-0852.

801.07 Annotation It is apparent that the legislature intended to empower the courts with the authority to determine the status of a marriage even if personal jurisdiction over one of the parties is lacking. In adding the final sentence of sub. (5), the legislature chose not to remove the requirement of personal jurisdiction for determinations involving other property or status subject to jurisdiction under this section. Had the legislature intended to remove the requirement of personal jurisdiction for divorce decisions involving property, it could have written the amendment more expansively. Montalvo v. U.S. Title & Closing Services, LLC, 2013 WI App 8, 345 Wis. 2d 653, 827 N.W.2d 635, 12-0102.

801.07 Annotation Discussing the minimum contacts standard for quasi in rem jurisdiction. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977).

801.07 Annotation Posting a notice of eviction on an apartment door did not satisfy minimum requirements of due process. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 102 S. Ct. 1874, 72 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1982).

801.08 801.08 Objection to personal jurisdiction.

801.08(1) (1) All issues of fact and law raised by an objection to the court’s jurisdiction over the person or property as provided by s. 802.06 (2) shall be heard by the court without a jury in advance of any issue going to the merits of the case. If, after such a hearing on the objection, the court decides that it has jurisdiction, the case may proceed on the merits; if the court decides that it lacks jurisdiction, the defendant shall be given the relief required by such decision.

801.08(2) (2) Factual determinations made by the court in determining the question of personal jurisdiction over the defendant shall not be binding on the parties in the trial of the action on the merits.

801.08(3) (3) No guardian or guardian ad litem may, except as provided in this subsection, waive objection to jurisdiction over the person of the ward. If no objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the ward is raised pursuant to s. 802.06 (2), the service of an answer or motion by a guardian or guardian ad litem followed by a hearing or trial shall be equivalent to an appearance and waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the ward.

801.08 History History: Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 598 (1975); 1979 c. 110 s. 60 (7); Sup. Ct. Order, 101 Wis. 2d xi.

801.08 Note Judicial Council Note, 1981: The last sentence of sub. (1) has been repealed because it erroneously implied that non-final orders deciding jurisdictional questions were appealable as of right. This has not been true since ch. 187, Laws of 1977 repealed s. 817.33 (3) (f), Wis. Stats. (1975) and created s. 808.03 (1), Wis. Stats. (1977). Heaton v. Independent Mortuary Corp. 97 Wis. 2d 379, 294 N.W.2d 15 (1980). [Re Order effective July 1, 1981]

801.08 Annotation A jurisdiction dispute may not be resolved on motion. Merco Distributing Corp. v. O&R Engines, Inc., 71 Wis. 2d 792, 239 N.W.2d 97 (1976).

801.08 Annotation An order denying a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is appealable by permission under s. 808.03 (2). Heaton v. Independent Mortuary Corp., 97 Wis. 2d 379, 294 N.W.2d 15 (1980).

801.08 Annotation An order denying a motion to dismiss based on jurisdiction under sub. (1) is not a final order and is not appealable as of right under s. 808.03 (1). Grulkowski v. DOT, 97 Wis. 2d 615, 294 N.W.2d 43 (Ct. App. 1980).

801.08 Annotation The trial court erred in denying the plaintiff’s request for an evidentiary hearing. The plaintiff has no burden to prove jurisdictional facts prior to a hearing. Henderson v. Milex Products, Inc., 125 Wis. 2d 141, 370 N.W.2d 291 (Ct. App. 1985).

801.08 Annotation Conducting pretrial discovery does not constitute “going to the merits of the case” under sub. (1) and does not waive an objection raised under s. 802.06 (2). Honeycrest Farms, Inc. v. Brave Harvestore Systems, Inc., 200 Wis. 2d 256, 546 N.W.2d 192 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-1789.

801.09 801.09 Summons, contents of. The summons shall contain:

801.09(1) (1) The title of the cause, specifying the name of the court in which the action is brought, the name of the county designated by the plaintiff as the place of trial, the standardized description of the case classification type and associated code number as approved by the director of state courts and the names and addresses of the parties to the action, plaintiff and defendant.

801.09(2) (2) A direction to the defendant summoning and requiring defendant to serve upon the plaintiff’s attorney, whose address shall be stated in the summons, either an answer to the complaint if a copy of the complaint is served with the summons or a demand for a copy of the complaint. The summons shall further direct the defendant to serve the answer or demand for a copy of the complaint within the following periods:

801.09(2)(a) (a)

801.09(2)(a)1. 1. Except as provided in subds. 2. and 3., within 20 days, exclusive of the day of service, after the summons has been served personally upon the defendant or served by substitution personally upon another authorized to accept service of the summons for the defendant.

801.09(2)(a)2. 2. If the defendant is the state or an officer, agent, employee, or agency of the state, as to that defendant, within 45 days, exclusive of the day of service, after the summons has been served personally upon the defendant or served by substitution personally upon another authorized to accept service of the summons for the defendant.

801.09(2)(a)3. 3. Within 45 days, exclusive of the day of service, after the summons has been served personally upon the defendant or served by substitution personally upon another authorized to accept service of the summons for the defendant, if any of the following applies:

801.09(2)(a)3.a. a. A defendant in the action is an insurance company.

801.09(2)(a)3.b. b. Any cause of action raised in the complaint is founded in tort.

801.09(2)(b) (b) Within 40 days after a date stated in the summons, exclusive of such date, if no such personal or substituted personal service has been made, and service is made by publication. The date so stated in the summons shall be the date of the first required publication.

801.09(3) (3) A notice that in case of failure to serve an answer or demand for a copy of the complaint within the time fixed by sub. (2), judgment will be rendered against the defendant according to the demand of the complaint. The summons shall be subscribed with the handwritten signature of the plaintiff or attorney with the addition of the post-office address at which papers in the action may be served on the plaintiff by mail, plaintiff’s or attorney’s telephone number, and, if by an attorney, the attorney’s state bar number, if any. If the plaintiff is represented by a law firm, the summons shall contain the name and address of the firm and shall be subscribed with the handwritten signature and state bar number, if any, of one attorney who is a member or associate of such firm. When the complaint is not served with the summons and the only relief sought is the recovery of money, whether upon tort or contract, there may, at the option of the plaintiff, be added at the foot a brief note specifying the sum to be demanded by the complaint.

801.09(4) (4) There may be as many authenticated copies of the summons and the complaint issued to the plaintiff or counsel as are needed for the purpose of effecting service on the defendant. Authentication shall be accomplished by the clerk’s placing a filing stamp indicating the case number on each copy of the summons and the complaint.

801.09 History History: Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 598 (1975); Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d viii; 1975 c. 218; Sup. Ct. Order, 112 Wis. 2d xi; Sup. Ct. Order, 171 Wis. 2d xxv; 1993 a. 365, 486; 1997 a. 133, 187; 2001 a. 16; 2005 a. 442.

801.09 Cross-reference Cross-reference: See s. 802.06 (1) for a provision giving the state 45 days to serve an answer.

801.09 Note Judicial Council Note, 1983: Sub. (2) (a) is amended by applying the extended response time for state officers and agencies to state agents and employees as well. The extended time is intended to allow investigation of the claim by the department of justice to determine whether representation of the defendant by the department is warranted under s. 893.82 or 895.46, Stats. [Re Order effective July 1, 1983]

801.09 Annotation When a defective summons does not prejudice the defendant, non-compliance with sub. (2) (a) is not jurisdictional error. Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Omark-Prentice Hydraulics, Inc., 86 Wis. 2d 369, 272 N.W.2d 407 (Ct. App. 1978). See also Flanagan v. Stumble Inn LLC, 2023 WI App 31, 408 Wis. 2d 532, 992 N.W.2d 867, 22-0584.