Chapter 767

767.61 Annotation The law does not require a party to a prospective divorce to take advantage of an opportunity to acquire property that would increase the value of the marital estate. Noble v. Noble, 2005 WI App 227, 287 Wis. 2d 699, 706 N.W.2d 166, 04-2933.

767.61 Annotation Since it was anticipated, based on testimony, that the payor spouse would sell or refinance real estate to make an equalization payment in the property division, there was no reason for the court to have considered the tax consequences of the payor’s withdrawing the money from the payor’s IRA to make the payment. That the payor ultimately chose to raise funds through a method that resulted in significant penalties to the payor was the payor’s erroneous exercise of discretion, not the trial court’s. Scheuer v. Scheuer, 2006 WI App 38, 290 Wis. 2d 250, 711 N.W.2d 698, 04-3162.

767.61 Annotation To require a party to share in the debts created by a spouse’s unjustified depletion of marital assets would constitute a failure to consider the total contribution of each of the parties to the marital estate. This chapter makes recompense available when one spouse has mismanaged or dissipated assets. Depending on the circumstances of the case, one spouse’s failure to pay tax debts can be considered the mismanagement or dissipation of assets and therefore marital waste. Covelli v. Covelli, 2006 WI App 121, 293 Wis. 2d 707, 718 N.W.2d 260, 05-1960.

767.61 Annotation Although a circuit court may consider substantial gifted assets when dividing the marital estate, it may not divide the marital estate to work a de facto splitting of those assets when there is no hardship. While substantial assets not subject to division by the court is a factor to be considered in departing from equal division of property under sub. (3), sub. (3) begins with the presumption that the marital estate should be evenly divided. Absent some special circumstances demonstrating that some unfairness would result from equal division, the presumption should stand. Grumbeck v. Grumbeck, 2006 WI App 215, 296 Wis. 2d 611, 723 N.W.2d 778, 05-2512.

767.61 Annotation The court did not err in awarding maintenance out of the proceeds of a covenant not to compete that arose from the sale of shares already to be a gift, and not subject to property division under sub. (2). The payments were in exchange for a service to be performed; refraining from doing business in a way that would be harmful to the purchasers. Grumbeck v. Grumbeck, 2006 WI App 215, 296 Wis. 2d 611, 723 N.W.2d 778, 05-2512.

767.61 Annotation The burden of proving that property is non-divisible lies with the party arguing that this property is exempt from division who must establish: 1) the original gifted or inherited status of the property; and 2) that the character and identity of the property has been preserved. The identity inquiry addresses whether the gifted or inherited asset has been preserved in some present identifiable form and is more a matter of tracing the asset. The character inquiry examines whether the owning spouse intended to donate non-divisible property to the marriage and is more clearly denoted as donative intent. Wright v. Wright, 2008 WI App 21, 307 Wis. 2d 156, 747 N.W.2d 690, 06-2111.

767.61 Annotation Retained earnings from a separate asset are usually considered to be a marital asset. However, in the instant case, the trial court found that the current retained earnings of disputed stock were not income generated, but rather were insurance proceeds from the loss of an asset. When insurance proceeds compensate for the loss of a gifted asset, they are non-divisible. When insurance proceeds compensate for the loss of income, they are divisible. Wright v. Wright, 2008 WI App 21, 307 Wis. 2d 156, 747 N.W.2d 690, 06-2111.

767.61 Annotation Commingling of separate and marital property does not automatically taint the gifted asset. When it was undisputed that nothing had ever been withdrawn from a gifted account, it was very easy to trace the original gifted asset, despite the addition of a divisible dividend within the account, and the divisible dividend did not taint the status of the original gift. However, other unaccounted for deposits resulted in the transmutation of the account into a divisible account. Wright v. Wright, 2008 WI App 21, 307 Wis. 2d 156, 747 N.W.2d 690, 06-2111.

767.61 Annotation Tracing and transmutation principles may be applied to cases that do not involve gifted or inherited property. Tracing can identify such property as originally indivisible, but proof of donative intent can establish that the property’s identity and character changed, and it was transmuted into divisible joint property. In particular, when separate property presumed to be indivisible is transmuted through a joint tenancy, it is effectively transferred to marital property, and tracing does not cause the property to revert back to its original separate property identity. Steinmann v. Steinmann, 2008 WI 43, 309 Wis. 2d 29, 749 N.W.2d 145, 05-1588.

767.61 Annotation Tracing is nothing more than the exercise of following an asset trail. If an asset, or component part of an asset, can be traced to a source, the court relies on other principles and rules to determine whether the traced asset is divisible or non-divisible. That the existence of subsequently purchased property can be traced to income generated by non-divisible property does not mean that the purchased property is non-divisible. Rather, once property is transferred from separate property to joint ownership, the property becomes part of the marital estate subject to division even if it is inherited property generally deemed indivisible. Steinmann v. Steinmann, 2008 WI 43, 309 Wis. 2d 29, 749 N.W.2d 145, 05-1588.

767.61 Annotation There were no reasonable grounds for reversing the circuit court’s decision not to allocate debts based on future tax liability, the exact amount of which was a matter of speculation, based on the lower court’s conclusion that the IRS is best qualified to determine what amount a divorcing couple owes the IRS. Steinmann v. Steinmann, 2008 WI 43, 309 Wis. 2d 29, 749 N.W.2d 145, 05-1588.

767.61 Annotation It was within the trial court’s discretion whether to include as part of the marital estate subject to division stock options earned during the marriage that the trial court viewed as having no value at the time of divorce because the cost to exercise the options was greater than the price of the stock. The trial court erroneously exercised its discretion by excluding the options from division because it erroneously viewed their potential value as being almost solely a function of what the owner spouse would do in the spouse’s business after the divorce, despite their decline in value having been caused largely by the broader economy, and largely ignored the fact that the options were earned while the parties were married. Heppner v. Heppner, 2009 WI App 90, 319 Wis. 2d 237, 768 N.W.2d 261, 08-2020.

767.61 Annotation When valuing a business interest that is part of the marital estate for purposes of property division, a circuit court shall include the entire value of the salable professional goodwill attendant to the business interest. The circuit court did not double count the value of professional goodwill when it included the goodwill in the divisible marital estate, and then based a maintenance award on the professional spouse’s expected future earnings. As with income from an income earning asset, income from a professional practice is separate from the value of the practice as it exists at the time of the property division and is properly considered in determining maintenance. McReath v. McReath, 2011 WI 66, 335 Wis. 2d 643, 800 N.W.2d 399, 09-0639.

767.61 Annotation A retirement fund must be divided even if unvested at the time of divorce. When dividing an unvested fund, the rule is that the trial court must consider all the circumstances and evaluate the probability that the party who has a contingent right to a pension will eventually enjoy that pension. A court may not simply assign a value of zero to all contingent interests. Derleth v. Cordova, 2013 WI App 142, 352 Wis. 2d 51, 841 N.W.2d 552, 12-2018.

767.61 Annotation Federal law precludes a state court from dividing military nondisability retirement pay pursuant to state community property laws. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S. Ct. 2728, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589 (1981).

767.61 Annotation An insured’s beneficiary designation under servicemen’s group life insurance policy prevailed over a constructive trust imposed by a state court. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 102 S. Ct. 49, 70 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1981).

767.61 Annotation Federal statute provides that a state may treat as community property, and divide at divorce, a military veteran’s retirement pay but exempts from this grant of permission any amount that the federal government deducts “as a result of a waiver” of retirement pay that the veteran must make “in order to receive” disability benefits. A state cannot treat as community property, and divide at divorce, the waived portion of the veteran’s retirement pay, even when the waiver occurs long after the divorce order and results in reduced payments to the receiving spouse. Howell v. Howell, 581 U.S. 214, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 197 L. Ed. 2d 781 (2017). See also Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S. Ct. 2023, 104 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1989).

767.61 Annotation To receive military disability benefits, federal law requires a retired veteran must give up an equivalent amount of retirement pay. In Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989), the U.S. Supreme Court held that federal law forbade states from treating the waived portion as community property divisible at divorce. In this case, a state court awarded to a veteran’s spouse a portion of the veteran’s total retirement pay upon their divorce. Long after the divorce, the veteran waived a share of the retirement pay in order to receive disability benefits. Under Mansell, the state could not subsequently increase, pro rata, the amount the divorced spouse receives each month from the veteran’s retirement pay in order to indemnify the divorced spouse for the loss caused by the veteran’s waiver. Howell v. Howell, 581 U.S. 214, 137 S. Ct. 1400, 197 L. Ed. 2d 781 (2017).

767.61 Annotation The federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 did not preempt a Wisconsin court order awarding a spouse one-half of a beneficiary’s interest in a pension. Savings & Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Employees v. Gago, 717 F.2d 1038 (1983).

767.61 Annotation Dilemma v. Paradox: Valuation of an Advanced Degree upon Dissolution of a Marriage. Loeb & McCann. 66 MLR 495 (1983).

767.61 Annotation The Recognition and Valuation of Professional Goodwill in the Marital Estate. Wall. 66 MLR 697 (1983).

767.61 Annotation Enhanced Value of a Closely Held Corporation at the Time of Divorce: What Role Will Wisconsin’s Marital Property Act Play? Podell. 69 MLR 82 (1985).

767.61 Annotation No-Fault Divorce: Tax Consequences of Support, Maintenance and Property Settlement. Case. WBB Dec. 1977.

767.61 Annotation Prenuptial and Postnuptial Agreements. Loeb. WBB Mar. 1981.

767.61 Annotation Drafting enforceable marital agreements. Garczynski. WBB Sept. 1986.

767.61 Annotation The Marital Property Act does not change Wisconsin’s divorce law. Weisberger. WBB May 1987.

767.61 Annotation Transmutation: Finding Extra Property to Divide in Divorce. Kessler. Wis. Law. Aug. 1990.

767.61 Annotation Divorce Provisions in Opt-In Marital Property Agreements. Rasmussen. Wis. Law. Apr. 1994.

767.61 Annotation A Decade Post-Button v. Button: Drafting Prenuptial Agreements. Garczynski. Wis. Law. July 1999.

767.61 Annotation A Primer on Dividing a Military Pension. Halling & Drefahl. Wis. Law. Aug. 1999.

767.61 Annotation When Lovebirds Split: Dividing the Retirement Nest Egg at Divorce — Properly Dividing Pension Benefits. Patel. Wis. Law. Oct. 2006.

767.61 Annotation When Lovebirds Split: Dividing the Retirement Nest Egg at Divorce — Dividing Wisconsin Retirement System Benefits. Dennison. Wis. Law. Oct. 2006.

767.61 Annotation Business Owners in Divorce: A Basic Overview. Krimmer. Wis. Law. June 2008.

767.61 Annotation Valuing Retirement Benefits in Divorce. Dennison. Wis. Law. June 2012.

767.61 Annotation Valuing a Business in Divorce. Herman & Swartzberg. Wis. Law. Jan. 2014.

767.63 767.63 Disposed assets may be subject to division. In an action affecting the family, except an action to affirm marriage under s. 767.001 (1) (a), any asset with a fair market value of $500 or more that would be considered part of the estate of either or both of the parties if owned by either or both of them at the time of the action and that was transferred for inadequate consideration, wasted, given away, or otherwise unaccounted for by one of the parties within one year prior to the filing of the petition or the length of the marriage, whichever is shorter, is rebuttably presumed to be property subject to division under s. 767.61 and is subject to the disclosure requirement of s. 767.127. Transfers that resulted in an exchange of assets of substantially equivalent value need not be specifically disclosed if those assets are otherwise identified in the statement of net worth.

767.63 History History: 1977 c. 105; 1979 c. 32 ss. 50, 92 (4); 1979 c. 352 s. 39; Stats. 1979 s. 767.275; 2005 a. 443 s. 124; Stats. 2005 s. 767.63.

767.63 Annotation Marital Waste: Within the Eye of the Beholding Court. Gehrig. Wis. Law. May 2015.

subch. VIII of ch. 767 SUBCHAPTER VIII

ENFORCEMENT

767.70 767.70 Child support enforcement: notice and service of process.

767.70(1) (1) When satisfied. In an action under s. 767.001 (1) (i) to enforce or modify a judgment or order with respect to child support, due process requirements related to notice and service of process are satisfied if the court finds all of the following:

767.70(1)(a) (a) That a diligent effort was made to ascertain the location of the respondent.

767.70(1)(b) (b) That written notice of the action to the respondent has been delivered to the most recent residential address or employer address provided by the respondent under s. 767.58 (2) to the county child support agency under s. 59.53 (5).

767.70(2) (2) Rules on locating respondent. The department shall promulgate rules specifying the process that the department will use under sub. (1) (a) to ascertain the location of the respondent. Notwithstanding sub. (1) (b), the process specified in the rules shall utilize all reasonable means to which the department has access, including electronic means, interfaces with other programs, and information provided by the postmaster, for determining the current address of the respondent.

767.70 History History: 1997 a. 191; 2005 a. 443 s. 21; Stats. 2005 s. 767.70.

767.70 Note NOTE: 2005 Wis. Act 443 contains explanatory notes.

767.70 Cross-reference Cross-reference: See also ch. DWD 142, Wis. adm. code.

767.71 767.71 Reconciling percentage-expressed support orders.

767.71(1) (1) Request for determination.

767.71(1)(a) (a) In this section, “support order” means an order for child support under this chapter or s. 948.22 (7), an order for family support under this chapter, 2019 stats., or a stipulation approved by the court for child support under this chapter.

767.71(1)(b) (b) If a support order is or has been expressed as a percentage of parental income, a party, including the state or a county child support agency under s. 59.53 (5) if the state is a real party in interest under s. 767.205 (2) (a), may request a determination under this section of the amount due under the order. The court may determine the amount due and, if ordered by the court, the county child support agency shall reconcile the amount due with payments actually made to determine if an arrearage exists.

767.71(2) (2) Notice and affidavit.

767.71(2)(a) (a) The party seeking the determination under this section shall file with the court a notice of reconciliation of account and a supporting affidavit. No later than 3 business days after filing, the party seeking the determination shall serve the notice and affidavit on all other parties, including the child support agency if the state is a real party in interest, by sending the notice and affidavit by regular mail to the last-known address provided under s. 767.58 (2), pursuant to s. 767.70.

767.71(2)(b) (b) The notice of reconciliation of account shall include all of the following:

767.71(2)(b)1. 1. The period of time for which the reconciliation is sought.

767.71(2)(b)2. 2. A statement that, unless a party requests a hearing no later than 20 business days after the date of the notice, the court may enter an order determining the amount due under the percentage-expressed order and may enter a repayment order that applies if the reconciliation of the amount due with payments made results in an arrearage.

767.71(2)(b)3. 3. The mailing address to which the request for a hearing must be delivered or mailed to schedule a hearing under sub. (3).

767.71(2)(c) (c) The supporting affidavit shall state the facts supporting a reasonable basis for determining the payer’s income during the period of time for which the reconciliation is sought.

767.71(3) (3) If hearing held.

767.71(3)(a) (a) Within 10 business days after receiving a timely request for a hearing, the court shall set the matter for hearing. The court shall send notice of the date, time, and location of the hearing to the parties by regular mail at their last-known addresses.

767.71(3)(b) (b) At the hearing, the court may establish the appropriate charge under the percentage order by determining the amount of the payer’s income that is subject to the percentage-expressed order during the period for which reconciliation is sought and applying the ordered percentage to that amount. The court may enter a repayment order that becomes effective if the reconciliation of the amount due with payments made results in an arrearage.

767.71(4) (4) If no hearing. If no party requests a hearing, the court shall review the supporting affidavit within 60 days of filing. If the court finds that the affidavit contains a reasonable basis for determining the payer’s income during the period for which reconciliation is sought, the court may enter an order determining the amount due under the percentage-expressed order and may enter a repayment order that becomes effective if the reconciliation of the amount due with payments made results in an arrearage. The court shall send the order to the parties by regular mail to their last-known addresses.

767.71(5) (5) Enforcement. Any arrearage that exists as a result of the reconciliation of the amount due with payments made may be enforced under ch. 49 or this chapter.

767.71 History History: 2005 a. 443; 2021 a. 35.

767.73 767.73 Delinquent child or family support; suspension of operating privilege.

767.73(1) (1) Authority to suspend.

767.73(1)(a) (a) In this subsection, “support payment” means a payment ordered for support under s. 767.521, support under s. 767.501, child support or family support under s. 767.225, family support under s. 767.531, 2019 stats., revised child or family support under s. 767.59, or child support under s. 767.511, 767.804 (3), 767.805 (4), 767.85, 767.863 (3), 767.89, or 948.22 (7) or ch. 769.

767.73(1)(b) (b) If a person fails to pay a support payment that is 90 or more days past due and the court finds that the person has the ability to pay the amount ordered, the court may suspend the person’s operating privilege, as defined in s. 340.01 (40), until the person pays all arrearages in full or makes payment arrangements that are satisfactory to the court, except that the suspension period may not exceed 2 years. If otherwise eligible, the person is eligible for an occupational license under s. 343.10 at any time.

767.73(2) (2) Notice of suspension to department of transportation. If a court orders suspension of a person’s operating privilege under sub. (1) (b), the court shall notify the department of transportation, in the form and manner prescribed by the department. The notice to the department shall include the name and last-known address of the person against whom the support order was entered, certification by the court that the person has been notified of the entry of the support order and that there are arrearages in support payments that are 90 or more days past due, and the place where the arrearages may be paid. The notice shall also state that the person’s operating privilege remains suspended until the person pays all arrearages in full or makes payment arrangements that are satisfactory to the court, except that the suspension period may not exceed 2 years.

767.73(3) (3) Notice of payment to department. If the person subsequently pays the full amount of the arrearages or makes payment arrangements that are satisfactory to the court, the court shall immediately notify the department of transportation of the payment in the form and manner prescribed by the department.

767.73(4) (4) Application to past arrearages. This section applies to support arrearages existing on or after October 1, 1996, regardless of when the arrearages accrued or when the order or judgment requiring the payment of support was entered.

767.73(5) (5) Relationship to other remedies. The remedy permitted under this section is in addition to any other remedies authorized by law.

767.73 History History: 1995 a. 401; 1997 a. 84, 191; 1999 a. 9, 32; 2005 a. 443 ss. 139, 140, 141, 236; Stats. 2005 s. 767.73; 2019 a. 95; 2021 a. 35.

767.75 767.75 Assignment of income for payment obligations.

767.75(1) (1) Definitions. In this section:

767.75(1)(a) (a) “Employer” includes the state and its political subdivisions.

767.75(1)(b) (b) “Payment order” means an order for child support under this chapter, for maintenance payments under s. 767.225 or 767.56, for family support under this chapter, 2019 stats., for costs ordered under s. 767.804 (3), 767.805 (4), or 767.89 (3), for support by a spouse under s. 767.001 (1) (f), or for maintenance payments under s. 767.001 (1) (g); an order for or obligation to pay the annual receiving and disbursing fee under s. 767.57 (1e) (a); an order for a revision in a judgment or order with respect to child support, maintenance, or family support payments under s. 767.59; a stipulation approved by the court for child support under this chapter; and an order for child or spousal support entered under s. 948.22 (7).

767.75(1f) (1f) Payment order as assignment of income. A payment order constitutes an assignment of all commissions, earnings, salaries, wages, pension benefits, income continuation insurance benefits under s. 40.62, duty disability benefits under s. 40.65, benefits under ch. 102 or 108, lottery prizes that are payable in installments, and other money due or to be due in the future to the department or its designee. The assignment shall be for a fixed sum regardless of whether the court-ordered obligation on which the assignment is based is expressed in the court order as a percentage of the payer’s income, and shall be for an amount sufficient to ensure payment under the order, obligation, or stipulation and to pay any arrearages due at a periodic rate not to exceed 50 percent of the amount of support due under the order, obligation, or stipulation so long as the addition of the amount toward arrearages does not leave the party at an income below the poverty line established under 42 USC 9902 (2).

767.75(1m) (1m) Obligation continuing. If a party’s current obligation to pay maintenance, child support, spousal support, or family support terminates but the party has an arrearage in the payment of one or more of those payments or in the payment of the annual receiving and disbursing fee, any assignment under sub. (1f) continues in effect, in an amount up to the amount of the assignment before the party’s current obligation terminated, until the arrearage is paid in full.

767.75(2h) (2h) Delayed withholding; failure to pay. If a court-ordered assignment, including the assignment specified under sub. (1f) for the payment of any arrearages due, does not require immediately effective withholding and a payer fails to make a required maintenance, child support, spousal support, family support, or annual receiving and disbursing fee payment within 10 days after its due date, within 20 days after the payment’s due date the court or county child support agency under s. 59.53 (5) shall cause the assignment to go into effect by providing notice of the assignment in the manner provided under sub. (2r) and shall send a notice by regular mail to the last-known address of the payer. The notice sent to the payer shall inform the payer that an assignment is in effect and that the payer may, within a 10-day period after the notice is mailed, by motion request a hearing on the issue of whether the assignment should remain in effect. The court shall hold a hearing requested under this subsection within 10 working days after the date of receipt of the request. If at the hearing the payer establishes that the assignment is not proper because of a mistake of fact, the court may direct that the assignment be withdrawn. Either party may, within 15 working days after the date of a decision by a circuit court commissioner under this subsection, seek review of the decision by the court with jurisdiction over the action.

767.75(2m) (2m) Unpaid receiving and disbursing fees; assignment.

767.75(2m)(a) (a)

767.75(2m)(a)1. 1. An obligation to pay unpaid fees under s. 767.57 (1e) (b) 1m. constitutes an assignment of all commissions, earnings, salaries, wages, pension benefits, income continuation insurance benefits under s. 40.62, duty disability benefits under s. 40.65, benefits under ch. 102 or 108, lottery prizes that are payable in installments, and other money due or to be due in the future to the department or its designee.

767.75(2m)(a)2. 2. An obligation to pay unpaid fees under s. 767.57 (1e) (b) 2m. constitutes an assignment of all commissions, earnings, salaries, wages, pension benefits, income continuation insurance benefits under s. 40.62, duty disability benefits under s. 40.65, benefits under ch. 102 or 108, lottery prizes that are payable in installments, and other money due or to be due in the future to the clerk of court to whom the fees are owed, or to his or her successor.

767.75(2m)(b) (b) The county child support agency under s. 59.53 (5) may cause an assignment under par. (a) to go into effect by providing notice of the assignment in the manner provided under sub. (2r) and sending a notice by regular mail to the last-known address of the payer. The notice sent to the payer shall inform the payer that an assignment is in effect and that the payer may, within a 10-day period after the notice is mailed, by motion request a hearing on the issue of whether the assignment should remain in effect. The court shall hold a hearing requested under this paragraph within 10 working days after the date of receipt of the request. If at the hearing the payer establishes that the assignment is not proper because of a mistake of fact, the court may direct that the assignment be withdrawn. The payer or the county child support agency may, within 15 working days after the date of a decision by a circuit court commissioner under this paragraph, seek review of the decision by the court with jurisdiction over the action.

767.75(2r) (2r) Notice of assignment to income source. Upon entry of each order for child support, maintenance, family support, support by a spouse, or the annual receiving and disbursing fee, and upon approval of each stipulation for child support, unless the court finds that income withholding is likely to cause the payer irreparable harm or unless s. 767.76 applies, the court or county child support agency under s. 59.53 (5) shall provide notice of the assignment by regular mail or by facsimile machine, as defined in s. 134.72 (1) (a), or other electronic means to the last-known address of the person from whom the payer receives or will receive money. The notice shall provide that the amount withheld may not exceed the maximum amount that is subject to garnishment under 15 USC 1673 (b) (2). If the department or its designee does not receive the money from the person notified, the court or county child support agency under s. 59.53 (5) shall provide notice of the assignment to any other person from whom the payer receives or will receive money. Notice under this subsection may be a notice of the court, a copy of the executed assignment, or a copy of that part of the court order directing payment.

767.75(3h) (3h) Duties of person receiving assignment notice. A person who receives notice of assignment under this section or s. 767.225 (1) (L) or 767.513 (3) or similar laws of another state shall withhold the amount specified in the notice from any money that person pays to the payer later than one week after receipt of notice of assignment. Within 5 days after the day the person pays money to the payer, the person shall send the amount withheld to the department or its designee or, in the case of an amount ordered withheld for health care expenses, to the appropriate health care insurer, provider, or plan. With each payment sent to the department or its designee, the person from whom the payer receives money shall report to the department or its designee the payer’s gross income or other gross amount from which the payment was withheld. Except as provided in sub. (3m), for each payment sent to the department or its designee, the person from whom the payer receives money shall receive an amount equal to the person’s necessary disbursements, not to exceed $3, which shall be deducted from the money to be paid to the payer. Section 241.09 does not apply to assignments under this section.

767.75(3m) (3m) Assignment of unemployment compensation benefits. Benefits under ch. 108 may be assigned and withheld only in the manner provided in s. 108.13 (4). Any order to withhold benefits under ch. 108 shall be for a fixed sum regardless of whether the court-ordered obligation on which the withholding order is based is expressed in the court order as a percentage of the payer’s income. When money is to be withheld from these benefits, no fee may be deducted from the amount withheld and no fine may be levied for failure to withhold the money.