Chapter 51

51.20 Annotation A person may be a proper subject for treatment even though a cure is unlikely. C.J. v. State, 120 Wis. 2d 355, 354 N.W.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1984).

51.20 Annotation The 45-day limit in sub. (13) (g) 2. applies only to an original commitment order and does not bar subsequent extensions of the order. M.J. v. Milwaukee County Combined Community Services Board, 122 Wis. 2d 525, 362 N.W.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1984).

51.20 Annotation The use of telephone testimony by physicians did not a violate the petitioner’s due process rights. W.J.C. v. County of Vilas, 124 Wis. 2d 238, 369 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App. 1985).

51.20 Annotation Hearings under sub. (12) are open unless the court grants the subject individual’s motion for closure. State ex rel. Wisconsin State Journal v. Circuit Court, 131 Wis. 2d 515, 389 N.W.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1986).

51.20 Annotation An individual’s counsel may not withdraw a jury demand without the individual’s consent. S.B. v. Racine County, 138 Wis. 2d 409, 406 N.W.2d 408 (1987).

51.20 Annotation Sub. (13) (c) 2. does not permit the committing court to specify a treatment method in addition to the facility. J.R.R. v. State, 145 Wis. 2d 431, 427 N.W.2d 137 (Ct. App. 1988).

51.20 Annotation “Others” is a general pronoun used in sub. (1) (a) 2. b.; the word identifies that great mass of humankind exclusive of the subject individual to be examined. The prepositional phrase “to them” refers back to and exactly echoes its antecedent, “others.” Hence, the clauses are concerned with danger to everyone but the subject “himself or herself.” A showing can be made that others are placed in a fearsome position by a disturbed person’s actions even if the person placed in that position has no subjective awareness of it. R.J. v. Winnebago County, 146 Wis. 2d 516, 431 N.W.2d 708 (Ct. App. 1988).

51.20 Annotation Under sub. (13) (g) 3., an individual has a right to a jury trial in proceedings to extend a commitment. G.O.T. v. Rock County, 151 Wis. 2d 629, 445 N.W.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1989).

51.20 Annotation There is a bright-line rule prohibiting a circuit court from accepting petitions drafted by persons not authorized to do so under sub. (4). State v. S.P.B., 159 Wis. 2d 393, 464 N.W.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1990).

51.20 Annotation The services of appointed counsel for non-indigent individuals in civil commitment hearing should be paid for by the county. State ex rel. Chiarkas v. Skow, 160 Wis. 2d 123, 465 N.W.2d 625 (1991).

51.20 Annotation The assurance of representation by adversary counsel under sub. (3) does not preclude self-representation when a waiver of counsel is knowingly and competently made. S.Y. v. Eau Claire County, 162 Wis. 2d 320, 469 N.W.2d 836 (1991).

51.20 Annotation The sub. (16) (c) provision for a hearing on a petition within 30 days of filing is directory and violation is not grounds for release. State v. R.R.E., 162 Wis. 2d 698, 470 N.W.2d 283 (1991).

51.20 Annotation When a recommitment hearing under sub. (13) (g) 3. is before the same judge who conducted the original commitment proceeding, a request for substitution under s. 801.58 is not allowed. State ex rel. Serocki v. Circuit Court, 163 Wis. 2d 152, 471 N.W.2d 49 (1991).

51.20 Annotation Sub. (15) does not authorize the appeal of a court commissioner’s order to the court of appeals; proper review is a new hearing by the circuit court. Dane County v. C.M.B., 165 Wis. 2d 703, 478 N.W.2d 385 (1992).

51.20 Annotation An involuntary commitment may not be ordered on summary judgment. Shirley J.C. v. Walworth County, 172 Wis. 2d 371, 493 N.W.2d 382 (Ct. App. 1992).

51.20 Annotation A probable cause determination made by a court commissioner under sub. (7) may be reviewed by the circuit court, but nothing gives the subject a right to review. Discussing factors to consider in deciding whether to grant review. Milwaukee County v. Louise M., 205 Wis. 2d 162, 555 N.W.2d 807 (1996), 95-0291.

51.20 Annotation The 14-day deadline under sub. (7) (c) is subject to reasonable extension when the need for the extension is caused solely by the conduct and manipulation of the detained subject. County of Milwaukee v. Edward S., 2001 WI App 169, 247 Wis. 2d 87, 633 N.W.2d 241, 00-1003.

51.20 Annotation By expressing the time requirement in sub. (7) (a) in terms of hours rather than days, the legislature manifested its intent that the clock start running immediately “after the individual arrives at the facility,” rather than the next day. The “exclude-the-first-day” rule of s. 990.001 (4) (a) and (d) does not apply in the context of this section under which 72 hours means 72 hours. Dodge County v. Ryan E.M., 2002 WI App 71, 252 Wis. 2d 490, 642 N.W.2d 592, 01-1175.

51.20 Annotation Sub. (1) (a) 2. e. is constitutional. It does not: 1) allow involuntary commitment upon a finding of mental illness alone and contains an ascertainable standard of commitment, and thus is not vague or overbroad; 2) create a class of persons who can be involuntarily committed upon a finding of mere mental or emotional harm, and thus does not violate equal protection; and 3) violate substantive due process because the constitution does not require proof of imminent physical harm prior to commitment for treatment. State v. Dennis H., 2002 WI 104, 255 Wis. 2d 359, 647 N.W.2d 851, 01-0374.

51.20 Annotation Sub. (1) (a) 2. e. may be used to involuntarily commit persons with dual diagnoses of mental illness and either drug dependency or developmental disability. The plain meaning of “these services” in sub. (1) (a) 2. e. includes medication. The ch. 55 exclusion in sub. (1) (a) 2. e. includes an individual who is already subject to an order for protective placement or services, if there is another placement or additional services available under ch. 55 that would be effective in reducing the probability of the requisite harm to less than a substantial probability. This exclusion may apply to an individual who is not yet subject to a ch. 55 order but who is eligible for one. Involuntary administration of medication under s. 55.14 may be one of the additional services that would satisfy this exclusion, if the guardian consents and depending on the individual’s circumstances. Dane County v. Kelly M., 2011 WI App 69, 333 Wis. 2d 719, 798 N.W.2d 697, 10-1486.

51.20 Annotation Rehabilitation is a necessary element of treatment under this chapter. Because there are no techniques that can be employed to bring about rehabilitation from Alzheimer’s disease, an individual with the disease cannot be rehabilitated. Accordingly, an Alzheimer’s patient is not a proper subject for treatment under this chapter. Fond du Lac County v. Helen E.F., 2012 WI 50, 340 Wis. 2d 500, 814 N.W.2d 179, 10-2061.

51.20 Annotation The availability of a non-unanimous six-person jury in a commitment trial under this section does not violate equal protection. Ch. 980 committees are subject to increased liberty restraints when compared to ch. 51 committees. The legislative decision to allow the added protection of a 12-person unanimous jury in ch. 980 commitment trials, but not in commitment trials under this chapter, is rationally related to different treatment needs and differing levels of dangerousness that this section and ch. 980 seek to address, as well as stricter rules concerning confinement in ch. 980. Milwaukee County v. Mary F.-R., 2013 WI 92, 351 Wis. 2d 273, 839 N.W.2d 581, 12-0958.

51.20 Annotation An articulated plan is not a necessary component of a suicide threat under sub. (1) (a) 2. a. Outagamie County v. Michael H., 2014 WI 127, 359 Wis. 2d 272, 856 N.W.2d 603, 13-1638.

51.20 Annotation The state has a compelling interest in providing care and assistance to those who suffer from a mental disorder. The state’s interest in caring for and assisting individuals who suffer from mental illness is particularly strong in the context of a prison because an inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat the inmate’s medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met. Sub. (1) (ar) is facially constitutional because it is reasonably related to the state’s legitimate interest in providing care and assistance to inmates suffering from mental illness. Winnebago County v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, 366 Wis. 2d 1, 878 N.W.2d 109, 14-1048.

51.20 Annotation “Treatment” in the context of a “proper subject of treatment” within the meaning of sub. (1) carries a specialized meaning. As set forth in s. 51.01 (17), “treatment” comprises “those psychological, educational, social, chemical, medical or somatic techniques designed to bring about rehabilitation of a mentally ill, alcoholic, drug dependent or developmentally disabled person.” Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, 375 Wis. 2d 542, 895 N.W.2d 783, 16-0046.

51.20 Annotation “Rehabilitation,” as used in s. 51.01 (17), addresses the control of symptoms. It comprises treatment going beyond custodial care to affect the disease and symptoms. But rehabilitation is not synonymous with cure. A symptom is an expression of the disorder at work within the patient. Rehabilitation refers to improving the patient’s condition through ameliorating endogenous factors such as symptoms and behaviors. If a treatment controls symptoms to such a degree that withdrawing it would subject the patient to a more restrictive treatment alternative, then the treatment controls enough symptoms to establish the patient has rehabilitative potential. Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, 375 Wis. 2d 542, 895 N.W.2d 783, 16-0046.

51.20 Annotation The grant of a statutory right to counsel under sub. (3) is a grant of a right to effective assistance of counsel. The applicable standard for evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is the two-prong standard announced in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). A movant must demonstrate that: 1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and 2) the movant was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. Winnebago County v. J.M., 2018 WI 37, 381 Wis. 2d 28, 911 N.W.2d 41, 16-0619.

51.20 Annotation A county comports with due process when confining a mentally ill person if the county shows by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and dangerous. Each extension hearing requires the county to prove the same elements with the same quantum of proof required for the initial commitment, including proof of current dangerousness. The alternate avenue of showing dangerousness under sub. (1) (am) does not change the elements or quantum or proof required. It merely acknowledges that an individual may still be dangerous despite the absence of recent acts, omissions, or behaviors exhibiting dangerousness outlined in sub. (1) (a) 2. a. to e. Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509, 17-1574. See also Waupaca County v. K.E.K., 2021 WI 9, 395 Wis. 2d 460, 954 N.W.2d 366, 18-1887.

51.20 Annotation For the purposes of personal jurisdiction, an extension hearing is a continuation of the original commitment proceeding and previous recommitment hearings. Waukesha County v. S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, 387 Wis. 2d 333, 929 N.W.2d 140, 17-1468.

51.20 Annotation The petition and notice requirements of subs. (1) and (2) do not apply to an extension petition. Procedures governing commitment extensions are located in subs. (10) to (13). Waukesha County v. S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, 387 Wis. 2d 333, 929 N.W.2d 140, 17-1468.

51.20 Annotation Circuit courts have the authority, pursuant to s. 806.02 (5), as incorporated by sub. (10) (c), to enter default judgment for failing to appear at properly-noticed extension hearings in which the court has jurisdiction over the person. Waukesha County v. S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, 387 Wis. 2d 333, 929 N.W.2d 140, 17-1468.

51.20 Annotation In a civil commitment case, due process requires the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is both mentally ill and dangerous. Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901, 17-2217.

51.20 Annotation Circuit courts in recommitment proceedings are to make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of sub. (1) (a) 2. on which the recommitment is based. Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277, 18-0145. See also Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, 402 Wis. 2d 1, 974 N.W.2d 733, 21-0006.

51.20 Annotation The issuance of a detention order under sub. (10) (d) extends the time to hold a recommitment hearing until seven days after the subject individual is detained. Marathon County v. R.J.O., 2020 WI App 20, 392 Wis. 2d 157, 943 N.W.2d 898, 18-1037.

51.20 Annotation Reliance on assumptions concerning a recommitment at some unidentified point in the past, and conclusory opinions parroting the statutory language without actually discussing dangerousness, are insufficient to prove dangerousness under sub. (1) (am) in an extension hearing. Each extension hearing requires proof of current dangerousness. Winnebago County v. S.H., 2020 WI App 46, 393 Wis. 2d 511, 947 N.W.2d 761, 19-2277.

51.20 Annotation Neither sub. (1) (am) nor the applicable case law requires an expert or circuit court to speculate on the precise course of an individual’s impending decompensation by identifying specific future dangerous acts or omissions the individual might theoretically undertake without treatment. Dangerousness in an extension proceeding can and often must be based on the individual’s precommitment behavior, coupled with an expert’s informed opinions and predictions; provided, of course, that there is a proper foundation for the latter. Winnebago County v. S.H., 2020 WI App 46, 393 Wis. 2d 511, 947 N.W.2d 761, 19-2277.

51.20 Annotation Sub. (1) (am) creates an alternative path to give counties a more realistic basis by which to prove current dangerousness when it is likely the committed individual would discontinue treatment if no longer committed. Thus, the state has a rational basis for treating those recommitted under sub. (1) (am) and those committed under sub. (1) (a) 2. e. differently. Waupaca County v. K.E.K., 2021 WI 9, 395 Wis. 2d 460, 954 N.W.2d 366, 18-1887.

51.20 Annotation Sub. (11) (a) does not limit the filing of a jury demand to only the first time that a final hearing is set. Rather, when a final hearing is rescheduled, sub. (11) (a) allows a jury demand to be filed up until 48 hours prior to the rescheduled final hearing. Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2021 WI 85, 399 Wis. 2d 471, 966 N.W.2d 590, 20-0370. See also Walworth County v. M.R.M., 2023 WI 59, 408 Wis. 2d 316, 992 N.W.2d 809, 22-0140.

51.20 Annotation The court in this case changed the special verdict question to read, “Is the subject dangerous to herself or to others if not recommitted?” The modified special verdict question failed to ask the jury to determine whether the individual was “currently” dangerous, instead directing the jury to consider future events—whether the individual would become dangerous in the future if she were not recommitted. Therefore, the question improperly stated the legal standard at issue, was misleading, and was inherently prejudicial to the individual. Outagamie County v. C.J.A., 2022 WI App 36, 404 Wis. 2d 1, 978 N.W.2d 493, 20-2032.

51.20 Annotation An examiner’s report prepared pursuant to sub. (9) (a) 5. need not be admitted into evidence for the circuit court to consider the report during initial commitment proceedings. The reports are not created for the parties’ benefit such that the parties must then seek to admit the evidence into the record. In a recommitment hearing, an examiner’s report must be received into evidence to be considered by the circuit court because this section does not provide an alternative statutory procedure for the court to review and consider the examiner’s report apart from admission of the report into the record under the rules of evidence in civil actions as provided under sub. (10) (c). Outagamie County v. L.X.D.-O., 2023 WI App 17, 407 Wis. 2d 441, 991 N.W.2d 518, 20-1806.

51.20 Annotation Under sub. (2), a court can entertain proceedings for involuntary commitment of a person admitted as a voluntary inpatient. 68 Atty. Gen. 97.

51.20 Annotation Sub. (14) requires a sheriff to transport the subject of a petition under this section at all stages of the proceedings, regardless of reimbursement. 68 Atty. Gen. 225.

51.20 Annotation An individual in the custody of a sheriff for transport to, from, and during an involuntary commitment hearing has rights to the least restrictive restraint appropriate. 71 Atty. Gen. 183.

51.20 Annotation Discussing the duties and obligations of a corporation counsel in involuntary civil commitment proceedings under this chapter. 79 Atty. Gen. 129.

51.20 Annotation Under sub. (14), the director of the county department under s. 51.42 or 51.437 may request the sheriff of the county in which an individual was placed under emergency detention to transport that individual to another designated inpatient facility prior to the initial court hearing under this chapter, and the sheriff must do so within a reasonable time. 80 Atty. Gen. 299.

51.20 Annotation A corporation counsel has discretion to refuse to file a petition for examination after receiving signed statements under oath that meet the requirements contained in sub. (1) if the corporation counsel determines that it is not in the interests of the public to file the petition. A good faith discretionary determination on the part of the corporation counsel that the filing of a petition for examination would not be in the interests of the public is not susceptible to challenge in a mandamus action. OAG 4-10.

51.20 Annotation The state cannot confine, without more, nondangerous persons capable of surviving safely in freedom alone or with help from family or friends. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1975).

51.20 Annotation Due process does not require states to use the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in civil commitment proceedings. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1979).

51.20 Annotation In signing a commitment application, a county employee was in essence acting as a witness in a judicial proceeding and as such was entitled to immunity. Martens v. Tremble, 481 F. Supp. 831 (1979).

51.20 Annotation Persons confined in a state hospital under this section and ss. 51.37, 971.14, 971.17, and 975.06 are being subjected to punishment within the meaning of the cruel and unusual punishment clause. Flakes v. Percy, 511 F. Supp. 1325 (1981).

51.20 Annotation Beyond Overt Violence: Wisconsin’s Progressive Civil Commitment Statute as a Marker of a New Era in Mental Health Law. Erickson, Vitacco, & Van Rybroek. 89 MLR 359 (2005).

51.20 Annotation The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Commitment Proceedings. Wesson. 1980 WLR 697.

51.22 51.22 Care and custody of persons.

51.22(1) (1) Except as provided in s. 51.20 (13) (a) 4. or 5., any person committed under this chapter shall be committed to the county department under s. 51.42 or 51.437 serving the person’s county of residence, and such county department shall authorize placement of the person in an appropriate facility for care, custody and treatment according to s. 51.42 (3) (as) 1r. or 51.437 (4rm) (a).

51.22(2) (2) Except for admissions that do not involve the department or a county department under s. 51.42 or 51.437 or a contract between a treatment facility and the department or a county department, admissions under ss. 51.10, 51.13, and 51.45 (10) shall be through the county department under s. 51.42 or 51.437 serving the person’s county of residence, or through the department if the person to be admitted is a nonresident of this state. Admissions through a county department under s. 51.42 or 51.437 shall be made in accordance with s. 51.42 (3) (as) 1r. or 51.437 (4rm) (a). Admissions through the department shall be made in accordance with sub. (3).

51.22(3) (3) Whenever an admission is made through the department, the department shall determine the need for inpatient care of the individual to be admitted. Unless a state-operated facility is used, the department may only authorize care in an inpatient facility which is operated by or under a purchase of service contract with a county department under s. 51.42 or 51.437 or an inpatient facility which is under a contractual agreement with the department. Except in the case of state treatment facilities, the department shall reimburse the facility for the actual cost of all authorized care and services from the appropriation under s. 20.435 (5) (da). For collections made under the authority of s. 46.10 (16), moneys shall be credited or remitted to the department no later than 60 days after the month in which collections are made. Such collections are also subject to s. 46.036 or special agreement. Collections made by the department under ss. 46.03 (18) and 46.10 shall be deposited in the general fund.

51.22(4) (4) If a patient is placed in a facility authorized by a county department under s. 51.42 or 51.437 and the placement is outside the jurisdiction of that county department under s. 51.42 or 51.437, the placement does not transfer the patient’s residence to the county of the facility’s location while such patient is under commitment or placement.

51.22(5) (5) The board to which a patient is committed shall provide the least restrictive treatment alternative appropriate to the patient’s needs, and movement through all appropriate and necessary treatment components to assure continuity of care.

51.22 History History: 1975 c. 430; 1977 c. 428; 1983 a. 27 s. 2202 (20); 1983 a. 474; 1985 a. 176; 1989 a. 31; 2001 a. 16; 2005 a. 387, 444; 2009 a. 28; 2015 a. 55.

51.22 Annotation The standard for determining whether the state has adequately protected a patient’s rights is whether professional judgment was in fact exercised. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 73 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1982).

51.30 51.30 Records.

51.30(1) (1) Definitions. In this section:

51.30(1)(ag) (ag) “Health care provider” has the meaning given in s. 146.81 (1) (a) to (p).

51.30(1)(am) (am) “Registration records” include all the records of the department, county departments under s. 51.42 or 51.437, treatment facilities, and other persons providing services to the department, county departments, or treatment facilities, that are created in the course of providing services to individuals for mental illness, developmental disabilities, alcoholism, or drug dependence.

51.30(1)(b) (b) “Treatment records” include the registration and all other records that are created in the course of providing services to individuals for mental illness, developmental disabilities, alcoholism, or drug dependence and that are maintained by the department; by county departments under s. 51.42 or 51.437 and their staffs; by treatment facilities; or by psychologists licensed under s. 455.04 (1) or (2) or licensed mental health professionals who are not affiliated with a county department or treatment facility. Treatment records do not include notes or records maintained for personal use by an individual providing treatment services for the department, a county department under s. 51.42 or 51.437, or a treatment facility, if the notes or records are not available to others.

51.30(2) (2) Informed consent. An informed consent for disclosure of information from court or treatment records to an individual, agency, or organization must be in writing and must contain the following: the name of the individual, agency, or organization to which the disclosure is to be made; the name of the subject individual whose treatment record is being disclosed; the purpose or need for the disclosure; the specific type of information to be disclosed; the time period during which the consent is effective; the date on which the consent is signed; and the signature of the individual or person legally authorized to give consent for the individual.

51.30(3) (3) Access to court records.

51.30(3)(a) (a) Except as provided in pars. (b), (bm), (c), and (d), the files and records of the court proceedings under this chapter shall be closed but shall be accessible to any individual who is the subject of a petition filed under this chapter.

51.30(3)(b) (b) An individual’s attorney or guardian ad litem and the corporation counsel shall have access to the files and records of the court proceedings under this chapter without the individual’s consent and without modification of the records in order to prepare for involuntary commitment or recommitment proceedings, reexaminations, appeals, or other actions relating to detention, admission, or commitment under this chapter or ch. 971, 975, or 980.

51.30(3)(bm) (bm) Authorized representatives of the department of corrections, the department of health services, the department of justice, or a district attorney shall have access to the files and records of court proceedings under this chapter for use in the prosecution of any proceeding or any evaluation conducted under ch. 980, if the files or records involve or relate to an individual who is the subject of the proceeding or evaluation. The court in which the proceeding under ch. 980 is pending may issue any protective orders that it determines are appropriate concerning information made available or disclosed under this paragraph. Any representative of the department of corrections, the department of health services, the department of justice, or a district attorney may disclose information obtained under this paragraph for any purpose consistent with any proceeding under ch. 980.

51.30(3)(c) (c) The files and records of court proceedings under this chapter may be released to other persons with the informed written consent of the individual, pursuant to lawful order of the court which maintains the records or under s. 51.20 (13) (cv) 4.

51.30(3)(d) (d) The department of corrections shall have access to the files and records of court proceedings under this chapter concerning an individual required to register under s. 301.45. The department of corrections may disclose information that it obtains under this paragraph as provided under s. 301.46.

51.30(4) (4) Access to registration and treatment records.

51.30(4)(a) (a) Confidentiality of records. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and ss. 118.125 (4), 610.70 (3) and (5), 905.03 and 905.04, all treatment records shall remain confidential and are privileged to the subject individual. Such records may be released only to the persons designated in this chapter or ss. 118.125 (4), 610.70 (3) and (5), 905.03 and 905.04, or to other designated persons with the informed written consent of the subject individual as provided in this section. This restriction applies to elected officials and to members of boards appointed under s. 51.42 (4) (a) or 51.437 (7) (a).

51.30(4)(b) (b) Access without informed written consent. Notwithstanding par. (a), treatment records of an individual may be released without informed written consent in the following circumstances, except as restricted under par. (c):

51.30(4)(b)1. 1. To an individual, organization or agency designated by the department or as required by law for the purposes of management audits, financial audits, or program monitoring and evaluation. Information obtained under this paragraph shall remain confidential and shall not be used in any way that discloses the names or other identifying information about the individual whose records are being released. The department shall promulgate rules to assure the confidentiality of such information.

51.30(4)(b)2. 2. To the department, the director of a county department under s. 51.42 or 51.437, or a qualified staff member designated by the director as is necessary for, and only to be used for, billing or collection purposes. Such information shall remain confidential. The department and county departments shall develop procedures to assure the confidentiality of such information.

51.30(4)(b)3. 3. For purposes of research as permitted in s. 51.61 (1) (j) and (4) if the research project has been approved by the department and the researcher has provided assurances that the information will be used only for the purposes for which it was provided to the researcher, the information will not be released to a person not connected with the study under consideration, and the final product of the research will not reveal information that may serve to identify the individual whose treatment records are being released under this subsection without the informed written consent of the individual. Such information shall remain confidential. In approving research projects under this subsection, the department shall impose any additional safeguards needed to prevent unwarranted disclosure of information.

51.30(4)(b)4. 4. Pursuant to lawful order of a court of record.

51.30(4)(b)5. 5. To qualified staff members of the department, to the director of the county department under s. 51.42 or 51.437 which is responsible for serving a subject individual or to qualified staff members designated by the director as is necessary to determine progress and adequacy of treatment, to determine whether the person should be transferred to a less restrictive or more appropriate treatment modality or facility or for the purposes of s. 51.14. Such information shall remain confidential. The department and county departments under s. 51.42 or 51.437 shall develop procedures to assure the confidentiality of such information.

51.30(4)(b)6. 6. Within the treatment facility where the subject individual is receiving treatment confidential information may be disclosed to individuals employed, individuals serving in bona fide training programs or individuals participating in supervised volunteer programs, at the facility when and to the extent that performance of their duties requires that they have access to such information.

51.30(4)(b)7. 7. Within the department to the extent necessary to coordinate treatment for mental illness, developmental disabilities, alcoholism or drug abuse of individuals who have been committed to or who are under the supervision of the department. The department shall promulgate rules to assure the confidentiality of such information.

51.30(4)(b)8. 8. For treatment of the individual in a medical emergency, to a health care provider who is otherwise unable to obtain the individual’s informed consent because of the individual’s condition or the nature of the medical emergency. Disclosure under this subdivision shall be limited to that part of the records necessary to meet the medical emergency.

51.30(4)(b)8g. 8g.

51.30(4)(b)8g.am. am. In this subdivision, “diagnostic test results” means the results of clinical testing of biological parameters, but does not mean the results of psychological or neuropsychological testing.

51.30(4)(b)8g.bm. bm. To a health care provider, or to any person acting under the supervision of the health care provider who is involved with an individual’s care, if necessary for the current treatment of the individual. Information that may be released under this subdivision is limited to the individual’s name, address, and date of birth; the name of the individual’s provider of services for mental illness, developmental disability, alcoholism, or drug dependence; the date of any of those services provided; the individual’s medications, allergies, diagnosis, diagnostic test results, and symptoms; and other relevant demographic information necessary for the current treatment of the individual.

51.30(4)(b)8m. 8m. To appropriate examiners and facilities in accordance with s. 54.36 (3), 971.17 (2) (e), (4) (c), and (7) (c). The recipient of any information from the records shall keep the information confidential except as necessary to comply with s. 971.17.

51.30(4)(b)8s. 8s. To appropriate persons in accordance with s. 980.031 (4) and to authorized representatives of the department of corrections, the department of health services, the department of justice, or a district attorney for use in the prosecution of any proceeding or any evaluation conducted under ch. 980, if the treatment records involve or relate to an individual who is the subject of the proceeding or evaluation. The court in which the proceeding under ch. 980 is pending may issue any protective orders that it determines are appropriate concerning information made available or disclosed under this subdivision. Any representative of the department of corrections, the department of health services, the department of justice, or a district attorney may disclose information obtained under this subdivision for any purpose consistent with any proceeding under ch. 980.

51.30(4)(b)9. 9. To a facility which is to receive an individual who is involuntarily committed under this chapter, ch. 48, 938, 971, or 975 upon transfer of the individual from one treatment facility to another. Release of records under this subdivision shall be limited to such treatment records as are required by law, a record or summary of all somatic treatments, and a discharge summary. The discharge summary may include a statement of the patient’s problem, the treatment goals, the type of treatment which has been provided, and recommendation for future treatment, but it may not include the patient’s complete treatment record. The department shall promulgate rules to implement this subdivision.