Chapter 340

340.01(74p)(a) (a) A pedestrian.

340.01(74p)(b) (b) A bicyclist.

340.01(74p)(c) (c) An operator of a moped, electric scooter, electric bicycle, or motor bicycle.

340.01(74p)(d) (d) An operator of, or passenger on, an animal-drawn vehicle, farm tractor, farm truck tractor, farm trailer, or implement of husbandry.

340.01(74p)(e) (e) A person riding upon in-line skates, a horse, or a play vehicle.

340.01(74p)(f) (f) A law enforcement officer, traffic officer, fire fighter, or emergency medical services practitioner, as defined in s. 256.01 (5), while performing his or her official duties.

340.01(74p)(g) (g) A person who is rendering medical or emergency assistance to another person.

340.01(74t) (74t) “Wholesaler” has the meaning given in s. 218.0101 (6).

340.01(75) (75) “Yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian” means the operator of a vehicle is required to reduce speed, or stop if necessary, to avoid endangering, colliding with or interfering in any way with pedestrian travel.

340.01 History History: 1971 c. 100 s. 23; 1971 c. 201, 211, 233, 277, 307; 1973 c. 86, 157, 182, 185, 272, 333, 335; 1973 c. 336 s. 79; 1975 c. 25, 120, 121, 136, 192, 199, 320, 326; 1975 c. 429 ss. 2m, 2r, 3, 4, 8, 9; 1977 c. 5; 1977 c. 29 ss. 1405 to 1410, 1654 (3); 1977 c. 30 s. 5; 1977 c. 43, 55, 57, 116, 193, 272, 288, 418; 1979 c. 36, 221; 1979 c. 333 s. 5; 1979 c. 345; 1981 c. 20, 159, 329; 1983 a. 27, 78, 124, 130, 175; 1983 a. 189 ss. 249, 329 (17m), (24); 1983 a. 223, 227, 243, 270, 457, 459; 1983 a. 512 s. 8; 1983 a. 538; 1985 a. 29, 65; 1985 a. 146 s. 8; 1985 a. 165, 187, 287; 1987 a. 259, 270, 349, 399; 1989 a. 31; 1989 a. 75 s. 1; 1989 a. 102; 1989 a. 105 ss. 13 to 30, 37, 41, 42; 1989 a. 134, 170; 1991 a. 39, 239, 269, 277, 316; 1993 a. 15, 16, 63, 159, 198, 213, 246, 260, 399, 436, 490; 1995 a. 27 s. 9145 (1); 1995 a. 36, 77, 113, 138, 225, 436, 448; 1997 a. 27, 164, 252, 277; 1999 a. 9, 31, 80, 85, 109, 140; 2001 a. 10, 16, 90, 102, 105, 109; 2003 a. 30, 33, 97, 192, 320, 321; 2005 a. 455; 2007 a. 11; 2007 a. 20 ss. 3190m, 3190p, 3220c; 2007 a. 27; 2007 a. 33 s. 8; 2007 a. 130, 175; 2009 a. 85, 97, 100, 122, 177, 311, 320; 2011 a. 32, 73, 101, 208, 265; 2013 a. 39, 67, 83, 103, 106, 165, 253, 325, 377; 2015 a. 15, 16, 55, 73, 104, 124, 165, 196, 232, 332; 2017 a. 12, 13, 364; 2017 a. 365 s. 110; 2019 a. 11, 34, 50, 68, 183; 2021 a. 115; 2021 a. 238 s. 45; 2021 a. 240 s. 30; 2021 a. 258; 2023 a. 159, 164.

340.01 Annotation Legislative Council Note, 1977: The definitions of “park and parking” in sub. (42m) and “stand or standing” in (59m) are derived from ss. 1-141 and 1-168, respectively, of the Uniform Vehicle Code (1968 revised edition; suppl. I, 1972). The principal difference between “parking” and “standing”, as defined, is that “standing” infers a temporary cessation of movement other than for purposes of and while actually engaged in receiving or discharging passengers while “parking” infers a protracted cessation of movement for purposes other than temporarily halting to load or unload property or passengers. See the note to s. 349.13 (1) for further explanation. [Bill 465-A]

340.01 Annotation Dry and liquid fertilizer applicators were implements of husbandry under sub. (24). Wisconsin Fertilizer Ass’n v. Karns, 52 Wis. 2d 309, 190 N.W.2d 513 (1971).

340.01 Annotation Petroleum bulk storage tanks are “buildings in use for business” under sub. (6). Billingsley v. Zickert, 72 Wis. 2d 156, 240 N.W.2d 375 (1976).

340.01 Annotation Where frontage roads were immediately adjacent and parallel to a paved highway, a single intersection with outside boundaries being the two outer boundaries of the frontage roads existed for sign placement purposes under subs. (22), (25), and (54). Weiss v. City of Milwaukee, 79 Wis. 2d 213, 255 N.W.2d 496 (1977).

340.01 Annotation Roads on the University of Wisconsin, Madison campus are not highways under sub. (22); they are “private roads or driveways” under sub. (46). The motor vehicle code does not apply to them. Henkel v. Phillips, 82 Wis. 2d 27, 260 N.W.2d 653 (1978).

340.01 Annotation “Highway” means the entire width between the boundary lines of a public road, the entire right-of-way. E.J.H. v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 439, 334 N.W.2d 77 (1983).

340.01 Annotation A segment of a “state trunk highway” under sub. (60) upgraded to freeway or expressway status remains a part of the state trunk highway system. Seefeldt v. DOT, 113 Wis. 2d 212, 336 N.W.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1983).

340.01 Annotation Because a truck tractor under sub. (73) is not a motor truck under sub. (34), it cannot be a farm truck under sub. (18). Britton v. DOT, 123 Wis. 2d 226, 365 N.W.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1985).

340.01 Annotation Trucks with permanently mounted potato boxes and special low ratio gearing used solely to collect and transport potatoes in harvest and planting seasons are “implements of husbandry” under sub. (24) and not “farm trucks” under sub. (18). State v. Okray Produce Co., 132 Wis. 2d 145, 389 N.W.2d 825 (Ct. App. 1986).

340.01 Annotation A piece of machinery specifically listed under sub. (52) constitutes road machinery regardless of its use. Schanke v. Wisconsin County Mutual Insurance Co., 177 Wis. 2d 746, 502 N.W.2d 866 (Ct. App. 1993).

340.01 Annotation The graded, but unfinished, bed of a highway lane under construction is not a “roadway” under sub. (54). Burg v. Cincinnati Casualty Insurance Co., 2002 WI 76, 254 Wis. 2d 36, 645 N.W.2d 880, 00-3258.

340.01 Annotation A “highway” is an area that the entire community has free access to travel on. A public parking lot is available to the entire community for vehicular travel, and as such, a city’s public parking lot is a “highway.” Ellerman v. City of Manitowoc, 2003 WI App 216, 267 Wis. 2d 480, 671 N.W.2d 366, 03-0322.

340.01 Annotation Sub. (9r) defines “conviction” as including having “violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of original jurisdiction.” By not appearing in court on the specified date, as directed, the defendant did not “comply with the law.” State v. Devries, 2011 WI App 78, 334 Wis. 2d 430, 801 N.W.2d 336, 09-3166.

340.01 Annotation Sub. (24) (b) provides an exception to the sub. (24) (a) definition of “implement of husbandry” under which it is not necessary to consider whether the vehicle in question otherwise qualifies as an implement of husbandry under sub. (24) (a). Unlike sub. (24) (a), sub. (24) (b) does not require a court to determine where the vehicle is principally used, if it is operated on a highway. A truck operated on highways that was used to haul and spread manure was a motor truck under sub. (24) (b) and was excluded from inclusion as an implement of husbandry under sub. (24) (a). State v. Marshland Acres, Inc., 2013 WI App 72, 348 Wis. 2d 29, 832 N.W.2d 157, 12-2367.

340.01 Annotation A “motor bicycle” as defined in sub. (30) is a “motor vehicle” as defined in sub. (35) and used in s. 343.63 (1), at least when the motor bicycle being operated is self-propelled, rather than pedaled. State v. Koeppen, 2014 WI App 94, 356 Wis. 2d 812, 854 N.W.2d 849, 13-2539.

340.01 Annotation A conviction, even though expunged, remains “an unvacated adjudication of guilt” under sub. (9r). Vacatur under s. 974.06 (3) (d) invalidates the conviction itself, whereas expunction under s. 973.015 merely deletes the evidence of the underlying conviction from court records. Expunction does not invalidate a conviction. State v. Braunschweig, 2018 WI 113, 384 Wis. 2d 742, 921 N.W.2d 199, 17-1261.

340.01 Annotation In this case, the defendant’s riding lawn mower was not an “all-terrain vehicle” under sub. (2g) because it did not satisfy the requirement of having a straddle seat. It was, however, a “motor vehicle” under sub. (35), and the defendant therefore was validly prosecuted for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated in violation of s. 346.63 (1) (a). State v. Shoeder, 2019 WI App 60, 389 Wis. 2d 244, 936 N.W.2d 172, 18-0997.

340.01 Annotation The inclusion of metabolites of cocaine in the definition in sub. (50m) (c) of a “restricted controlled substance” for purposes of prosecution under the Wisconsin motor vehicle code, s. 23.33 and chs. 340 to 349 and 351, is constitutional. Sub. (50m) is part of a statutory scheme that creates a strict liability, zero tolerance approach to driving a motor vehicle after illegally ingesting a restricted controlled substance, without regard to impairment, and the supreme court has held that approach to be constitutional. State v. VanderGalien, 2024 WI App 4, 410 Wis. 2d 517, 2 N.W.3d 774, 23-0458.

340.01 Annotation The vehicles of licensed private detectives are not authorized emergency vehicles under sub. (3). 61 Atty. Gen. 421.

340.01 Annotation Public parking lots are not “highways” under sub. (22). 65 Atty. Gen. 45.

340.01 Annotation A conviction that has been collaterally attacked meets the definition of “conviction” under sub. (9r) because a collateral attack does not overturn or vacate the conviction. Instead, it attempts to avoid the conviction’s force of law in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Thus, as long as the adjudication of guilt is unvacated, the conviction remains on DOT’s records and should be counted in determining whether to revoke the offender’s operating privilege. OAG 2-14.