Chapter 218

218.0171(8)(b)6. 6. An itemization of any other damages claimed by the consumer.

218.0171(8)(c) (c) If any form specified in par. (a) is required under this section to be used by a consumer and the consumer has not provided all information required under par. (b) to the satisfaction of the manufacturer, the manufacturer may, within 30 days of receiving the form, request that the consumer provide additional information required under par. (b). If the manufacturer makes such a timely request for additional information, any time period under sub. (2) (c), (cg) 1. or 2., or (cm) 1. does not begin to elapse until the consumer provides this additional information.

218.0171 History History: 1983 a. 48; 1985 a. 205 ss. 1m to 6, 8; 1987 a. 105, 169, 323, 403; 1989 a. 31; 1999 a. 31 s. 287; Stats. 1999 s. 218.0171; 2001 a. 45; 2009 a. 2; 2011 a. 32; 2013 a. 101; 2015 a. 173.

218.0171 Cross-reference Cross-reference: See also ch. Trans 143, Wis. adm. code.

218.0171 Annotation An action to recover under sub. (1) (h) 2. was not defeated by the repair of reported nonconformities. Hartlaub v. Coachmen Industries, Inc., 143 Wis. 2d 791, 422 N.W.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1988).

218.0171 Annotation “Out of service” under sub. (1) (h) 2. includes periods during which the motor vehicle is incapable of providing service because of warranty nonconformity, regardless of whether the vehicle is in the owner’s possession and driveable. Vultaggio v. General Motors Corp., 145 Wis. 2d 874, 429 N.W.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1988).

218.0171 Annotation “Disbursements and reasonable attorney fees” under sub. (7) include post-trial disbursements and reasonable fees incurred. Chmill v. Friendly Ford-Mercury of Janesville, Inc., 154 Wis. 2d 407, 453 N.W.2d 197 (Ct. App. 1990).

218.0171 Annotation Sub. (2) (c) does not require that a vehicle continue to have a nonconformity for a consumer to demand a refund when the vehicle has been out of service at least 30 days; “having the nonconformity” is a general reference to the vehicle in question, rather than a refund prerequisite. Nick v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 160 Wis. 2d 373, 466 N.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1991).

218.0171 Annotation Under sub. (1) (a), the allowance for alternate transportation is limited to the cost in connection with the repair of the nonconforming vehicle. Nick v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 160 Wis. 2d 373, 466 N.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1991).

218.0171 Annotation If an owner gives notice and a single opportunity to repair, the owner cannot refuse additional attempts to repair within 30 days and sue under the Lemon Law. Carl v. Spickler Enterprises, Ltd., 165 Wis. 2d 611, 478 N.W.2d 48 (Ct. App. 1991).

218.0171 Annotation Although the plaintiff arguably granted the automaker an extension of the 30-day period under sub. (2) (c), the prohibition of waivers of claims under sub. (6) resulted in the automaker being liable for failing to satisfy the claim within the 30-day period. Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 188 Wis. 2d 1, 523 N.W.2d 197 (Ct. App. 1994).

218.0171 Annotation Affirmed on other grounds. 197 Wis. 2d 973, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996), 93-0208.

218.0171 Annotation Attorney time spent prior to the expiration of the 30-day period under sub. (2) (c) is recoverable under sub. (7). Hughes v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 188 Wis. 2d 1, 523 N.W.2d 197 (Ct. App. 1994).

218.0171 Annotation Affirmed on other grounds. 197 Wis. 2d 973, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996), 93-0208.

218.0171 Annotation A manufacturer is not liable for defects in dealer added accessories not manufactured or distributed by the manufacturer. Malone v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 190 Wis. 2d 436, 526 N.W.2d 841 (Ct. App. 1994).

218.0171 Annotation Pecuniary loss under sub. (7) includes the entire purchase price of the vehicle. Hughes v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 197 Wis. 2d 973, 542 N.W.2d 148 (1996), 93-0208.

218.0171 Annotation The 30-day time limit in sub. (2) (c) is not suspended or delayed by the parties’ disagreement over the amount of the refund. The manufacturer’s options are to, within the 30-day period, pay the amount demanded or pay the amount it deems appropriate and be subject to possible suit over the disputed amount. Church v. Chrysler Corp., 221 Wis. 2d 460, 585 N.W.2d 685 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-2065.

218.0171 Annotation It is proper to deduct the amount of a cash rebate in determining the refund amount. Church v. Chrysler Corp., 221 Wis. 2d 460, 585 N.W.2d 685 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-2065.

218.0171 Annotation A “new motor vehicle” under sub. (2) (a) does not include a previously-owned vehicle that is subject to the original manufacturer’s warranty and is less than one year removed from first delivery to a consumer. Schey v. Chrysler Corp., 228 Wis. 2d 483, 597 N.W.2d 457 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-1277.

218.0171 Annotation A vehicle used as a demonstrator was a “comparable new motor vehicle” under sub. (2) (b) when the defective vehicle had also been a demonstrator. Sub. (2) (b) applies when a reasonable attempt to repair has been established. An action seeking a remedy under sub. (7) for violation of sub. (2) (a) applies only to a customer who cannot establish a reasonable attempt to repair and is not entitled to the remedy under sub. (2) (b). Dussault v. Chrysler Corp., 229 Wis. 2d 296, 600 N.W.2d 6 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-0744.

218.0171 Annotation As used in sub. (7), “any damages” does not include personal injury damages. Gosse v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 2000 WI App 8, 232 Wis. 2d 163, 605 N.W.2d 896, 98-3499.

218.0171 Annotation A purchaser’s awareness of defects in a vehicle prior to delivery does not make the Lemon Law inapplicable. Dieter v. Chrysler Corp., 2000 WI 45, 234 Wis. 2d 670, 610 N.W.2d 832, 98-0958.

218.0171 Annotation A manufacturer of component parts who ships completed parts to an automobile manufacturer is not liable under this section. Harger v. Caterpillar, Inc., 2000 WI App 241, 239 Wis. 2d 551, 620 N.W.2d 477, 00-0536.

218.0171 Annotation This section is a stand alone statute that is not dependent upon or qualified by the Uniform Commercial Code. An obligation of good faith by all parties is rooted in the statute. There is no basis to argue that a party who acts in compliance with the statute acts in bad faith. Herzberg v. Ford Motor Co., 2001 WI App 65, 242 Wis. 2d 316, 626 N.W.2d 67, 00-1284.

218.0171 Annotation A person who purchases a vehicle at the conclusion of a lease term is no longer a consumer within the meaning of sub. (1) (b) 4. and is not entitled to any relief under the Lemon Law. Varda v. General Motors Corp., 2001 WI App 89, 242 Wis. 2d 756, 626 N.W.2d 346, 00-1720.

218.0171 Annotation A manufacturer did not fulfill its obligation to provide a comparable new motor vehicle under sub. (2) (b) by offering to replace a consumer’s nonconforming tow truck with a new cab and chassis but without a new tow unit, although the tow unit was not manufactured by the manufacturer. Kiss v. General Motors Corp., 2001 WI App 122, 246 Wis. 2d 364, 630 N.W.2d 742, 00-0626.

218.0171 Annotation Enforcement of an informal settlement decision under sub. (3) is not limited to remedies under ch. 788, applicable to arbitration. Acceptance of the decision by the consumer does not prevent the consumer from pursuing an action under sub. (7) to enforce the decision. Kiss v. General Motors Corp., 2001 WI App 122, 246 Wis. 2d 364, 630 N.W.2d 742, 00-0626.

218.0171 Annotation In order to receive a refund or replacement vehicle under sub. (2) (b), the consumer must offer to transfer title back to the manufacturer and, upon receipt of the refund or replacement, deliver the vehicle and its title to the manufacturer. A vehicle owner who transferred the vehicle back to the dealer eight months prior to seeking relief could not fulfill these requirements and was no longer a consumer who could assert a claim under this section. Smyser v. Western Star Trucks Corp., 2001 WI App 180, 247 Wis. 2d 281, 634 N.W.2d 134, 00-2482.

218.0171 Annotation Delivery of a refund check to a dealer and a fax to the consumer’s attorney is not delivery of the refund to the consumer for purposes of determining whether the refund is timely made under sub. (2) (c). Estate of Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 2001 WI App 234, 248 Wis. 2d 193, 635 N.W.2d 635, 00-2977.

218.0171 Annotation Sub. (2) (b) 3. does not apply when a Lemon Law action is filed. Instead, the sub. (7) pecuniary loss provisions apply. The current value of a vehicle lease is not the proper measure of damages under sub. (7). Estate of Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 2001 WI App 234, 248 Wis. 2d 193, 635 N.W.2d 635, 00-2977.

218.0171 Annotation For purposes of triggering the 30-day time limit under sub. (2) (c), the consumer must either demand that the manufacturer provide a new vehicle or demand that the manufacturer refund the purchase price. The choice cannot be left to the manufacturer, and the manufacturer cannot be offered a third choice. Berends v. Mack Truck, Inc., 2002 WI App 69, 252 Wis. 2d 371, 643 N.W.2d 158, 01-0911.

218.0171 Annotation A vehicle is not free from non-conformities simply because the consumer is able to drive it. Dobbratz Trucking & Excavating, Inc. v. PACCAR, Inc., 2002 WI App 138, 256 Wis. 2d 205, 647 N.W.2d 315, 01-1091.

218.0171 Annotation This section makes the vehicle manufacturer liable for nonconformities to the engine even though the engine is not covered in the manufacturer’s express warranty. Schonscheck v. Paccar, Inc., 2003 WI App 79, 261 Wis. 2d 769, 661 N.W.2d 476, 02-1413.

218.0171 Annotation A consumer who demands a replacement vehicle under this section impliedly offers to transfer title to the old vehicle as required under sub. (2) (c). Garcia v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 2004 WI 93, 273 Wis. 2d 612, 682 N.W.2d 365, 02-2260.

218.0171 Annotation A consumer has a duty to act in good faith in pursuing a Lemon Law claim. Under sub. (2) (b) 2. b., the phrase “refund to any holder of a perfected security interest as [its] interest may appear” requires the payor transferring the correct sum to the secured lender in a separate check, not giving a lump-sum check to the consumer and leaving the consumer to sort it out with the lender. If a consumer intentionally thwarted the manufacturer’s attempt to make a refund by failing to provide necessary information about the consumer’s auto loan, the consumer is not entitled to the Lemon Law’s statutory remedies. Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2008 WI App 70, 312 Wis. 2d 210, 751 N.W.2d 859, 07-0681.

218.0171 Annotation When the purchaser objected to signing documents as a condition to receiving a replacement vehicle and the manufacturer agreed to waive the signing requirement, it did not support a finding that the purchaser was required to sign prohibited documents in order to obtain the replacement vehicle, and no violation of this section occurred. BCR Trucking, LLC v. PACCAR, Inc., 2009 WI App 36, 316 Wis. 2d 465, 765 N.W.2d 828, 08-1196.

218.0171 Annotation When a consumer who is leasing a motor vehicle brings an action against the manufacturer of the vehicle under sub. (7) then exercises an option to purchase the vehicle under the terms of the lease, the consumer is not entitled to damages for the price of the voluntary purchase because the purchase is not caused by any violation of this section by the manufacturer. Furthermore, a consumer’s refund under sub. (2) (b) 2. b. or 3. a. is subject to a reasonable allowance for use. Because sub. (7) is read in conjunction with the rest of this section, the amount of pecuniary loss under sub. (7) must incorporate a reasonable allowance for use before the pecuniary loss is doubled. Tammi v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc., 2009 WI 83, 320 Wis. 2d 45, 768 N.W.2d 783, 08-1913.

218.0171 Annotation A dealer is not a “manufacturer” under sub. (1) (c) that is liable for the failure of the component parts it installed. Despite the assertion that a dealer essentially assembled a motorcycle when it installed accessories, the Lemon Law provision specifically excludes a “motor vehicle dealer” from the definition of “manufacturer.” Goudy v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 2010 WI App 55, 324 Wis. 2d 441, 782 N.W.2d 114, 09-0617.

218.0171 Annotation The plain language of sub. (7) supports the conclusion that a plaintiff may maintain an action for equitable relief under sub. (7). In order to obtain relief under sub. (7), however, the plaintiff must prove a violation of some part of this section. Kilian v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2011 WI 65, 335 Wis. 2d 566, 799 N.W.2d 815, 09-0538.

218.0171 Annotation Under sub. (2) (cm) 3., a lender who continues to enforce a lease after the consumer returns the vehicle and receives a refund from the manufacturer may be held to violate the plain language of this section prohibiting any person from doing so. Kilian v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2011 WI 65, 335 Wis. 2d 566, 799 N.W.2d 815, 09-0538.

218.0171 Annotation A prevailing party in an equitable action under sub. (7) is entitled to costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorney fees, but in this case the prevailing party was not entitled to an award for pecuniary loss. The legislature did not intend that consumers who have already received a proper refund should also recover twice the amount they paid under the lease as pecuniary loss. Such a result would provide a windfall without advancing a central purpose of sub. (7)—discouraging manufacturers from withholding legitimate refunds. Kilian v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2011 WI 65, 335 Wis. 2d 566, 799 N.W.2d 815, 09-0538.

218.0171 Annotation A manufacturer may avoid Lemon Law penalties for failing to provide a refund within the 30-day period under sub. (2) (c) if it proves that the consumer intentionally prevented the manufacturer from providing a refund within the 30-day statutory period. The manufacturer must meet the middle burden of proof of “clear and convincing” evidence in proving its affirmative defense that a consumer intentionally prevented it from providing a refund within the 30-day statutory period under the Lemon Law. Marquez v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 2012 WI 57, 341 Wis. 2d 119, 815 N.W.2d 314, 10-0826.

218.0171 Annotation This section requires that a plaintiff prove two elements in order to recover: 1) that the car is a lemon; and 2) that the manufacturer failed to provide a comparable replacement within the provided timeframe. It was not inconsistent for the defendant to defend both elements of the plaintiff’s claim. Because the defendant’s defenses were not inconsistent, the defendant was not required to either assert 1) that the car was not a lemon, or 2) that the car was a lemon but that it provided a comparable replacement under the election of remedies doctrine. Porter v. Ford Motor Co., 2015 WI App 39, 362 Wis. 2d 505, 865 N.W.2d 207, 14-0975.

218.0171 Annotation Sub. (2) (a) does not say that the vehicle is available for repair only if it is actually taken to the manufacturer or an authorized dealer. The Lemon Law protects consumers who go to a repair facility authorized by the manufacturer whether the facility is a manufacturer’s authorized motor vehicle dealer or not. Burzlaff v. Thoroughbred Motorsports, Inc., 758 F.3d 841 (2014).

218.0171 Annotation The Lemon Law does not state that a manufacturer satisfies its refund obligations by tendering a check to the consumer for the consumer’s part of the refund along with an assurance that it will pay off the lienholder directly. Rather, sub. (2) (b) 2. b. requires that the manufacturer must tender a check to the consumer and actually pay off the lien. In this case, the purchaser did return the vehicle, but the manufacturer did not send out a refund and pay off the lien, but insisted that the purchaser either “accept” the refund, which the purchaser was not required to do, or come and retrieve the vehicle. James Michael Leasing Co. v. PACCAR, Inc., 772 F.3d 2d 815 (2014).

218.0171 Annotation “Days” under sub. (1) (h) includes weekends and holidays. Kletzien v. Ford Motor Co., 668 F. Supp. 1225 (1987).

218.0171 Annotation When, at the plaintiffs’ home in Wisconsin, a Minnesota motor vehicle dealer accepted a down payment and entered into a binding purchase contract that obligated the plaintiffs to take delivery of a new vehicle and to pay the remainder of the purchase price at the time of delivery, the purchase occurred in Wisconsin. Because the plaintiffs purchased the vehicle in Wisconsin, this section applied. Begalke v. Sterling Truck Corp., 437 F. Supp. 2d 847 (2006).

218.0171 Annotation The argument that the word “transfer” in sub. (1) (d) refers to transfer of title to a motor vehicle, as opposed to transfer of the vehicle itself, is unconvincing for the simple reason that it contains no mention of the word “title.” Consideration of ch. 342 does not change the result. At least as between the parties themselves, a transfer of ownership takes place before a new title to a vehicle is issued. “Accept transfer of,” as used in sub. (1) (d), refers to transfer of possession of the vehicle. Since it is undisputed that the plaintiffs traveled to the dealership in Illinois to take possession of the vehicle, they did not accept transfer of the vehicle in Wisconsin. Lamont v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 806 (2008).

218.0171 Annotation Remedies for motor vehicle purchasers. Nicks. WBB Mar. 1985.

218.0171 Annotation Lemon law II. Nicks. WBB July 1987.

218.0171 Annotation A New Twist On Lemon Law. Nicks. Wis. Law. Oct. 1991.

218.0171 Annotation Fill ’Er Up: Supreme Court Orders High Octane Relief Under Wisconsin’s Lemon Law. Nicks. Wis. Law. June 1996.

218.0171 Annotation Updating Wisconsin’s Lemon Law. Nicks. Wis. Law. Oct. 1999.

218.0171 Annotation Lemon Law Update. Nicks. Wis. Law. Nov. 2000.

218.0171 Annotation Accessories Under the Lemon Law. Nicks. Wis. Law. Mar. 2002.

218.0171 Annotation Practice Tips: Lemon Law Practice Pointers. Nicks. Wis. Law. Nov. 2003.

218.0172 218.0172 Motor vehicle adjustment programs.

218.0172(1) (1) Definitions. In this section:

218.0172(1)(a) (a) “Adjustment program” means an extended policy program under which a manufacturer undertakes to pay for all or any part of the cost of repairing, or to reimburse purchasers for all or any part of the cost of repairing, any condition that may substantially affect motor vehicle durability, reliability or performance. “Adjustment program” does not include service provided under a written warranty provided to a consumer, service provided under a safety or emission-related recall program or individual adjustments made by a manufacturer on a case-by-case basis.

218.0172(1)(b) (b) “Consumer” has the meaning given in s. 218.0171 (1) (b).

218.0172(1)(c) (c) “Manufacturer” has the meaning given in s. 218.0171 (1) (c).

218.0172(1)(d) (d) “Motor vehicle” has the meaning given in s. 218.0171 (1) (d).

218.0172(1)(e) (e) “Motor vehicle dealer” means a motor vehicle dealer, as defined in s. 218.0101 (23) (a), that sells new motor vehicles.

218.0172(2) (2) Disclosure requirements.

218.0172(2)(a) (a) A manufacturer shall do all of the following:

218.0172(2)(a)1. 1. Establish a procedure to inform a consumer of any adjustment program applicable to the consumer’s motor vehicle and, upon request, furnish the consumer with any document issued by the manufacturer relating to any adjustment program.

218.0172(2)(a)2. 2. Notify, by 1st class mail, a consumer who is eligible under an adjustment program of the condition in the motor vehicle that is covered by the adjustment program and the principal terms and conditions of the adjustment program within 90 days after the date on which the adjustment program is adopted.

218.0172(2)(a)3. 3. Notify its motor vehicle dealers, in writing, of all the terms and conditions of an adjustment program within 30 days after the date on which the program is adopted.

218.0172(2)(a)4. 4. If a consumer is a purchaser or lessor of a new motor vehicle, notify the consumer, in writing, of the consumer’s rights and remedies under this section. The notice shall include a statement in substantially the following language: “Sometimes.... (manufacturer’s name) offers a special adjustment program to pay all or part of the cost of certain repairs beyond the terms of the warranty. Check with your motor vehicle dealer to determine whether any adjustment program is applicable to your motor vehicle.”

218.0172(2)(b) (b) If a motor vehicle dealer has been informed of an adjustment program under par. (a) 3., the motor vehicle dealer shall disclose to a consumer seeking repairs for a condition covered by the adjustment program the terms and conditions of the adjustment program.

218.0172(3) (3) Adjustment program reimbursement.

218.0172(3)(a) (a) A manufacturer who establishes an adjustment program shall implement procedures to assure reimbursement of each consumer eligible under an adjustment program who incurs expenses for repair of a condition subject to the program before acquiring knowledge of the program. Reimbursement shall be consistent with the terms and conditions of the particular adjustment program.

218.0172(3)(b) (b) A consumer shall make a claim for reimbursement under par. (a) in writing to the manufacturer within 2 years after the date of the consumer’s payment for repair of the condition. The manufacturer shall notify the consumer within 21 business days, as defined in s. 421.301 (6), after receiving a claim for reimbursement if the claim will be allowed or denied. If the claim is denied, the specific reasons for the denial shall be stated in writing.

218.0172(4) (4) Remedies. In addition to pursuing any other remedy, a consumer may bring an action to recover damages caused by a violation of this section. A court shall award a consumer who prevails in such an action twice the amount of any pecuniary loss, together with costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney fees, notwithstanding s. 814.04 (1), and any equitable relief the court determines appropriate.

218.0172 History History: 1999 a. 31 s. 288; Stats. 1999 s. 218.0172.

218.0172 Annotation The trial court mistakenly believed that repair of a defect was required to state a claim under this section. The definition of an “adjustment program” requires the repair of a condition, which can necessarily include a defective condition, but does not require that the condition at issue constitutes a defect. A manufacturer’s attempt to limit its adjustment program only to police vehicles conflicts with the plain language of this section. Wisconsin consumers have the right to seek redress from the Wisconsin judicial system when a manufacturer violates a statute enacted by the legislature. Cuellar v. Ford Motor Co., 2006 WI App 210, 296 Wis. 2d 545, 723 N.W.2d 747, 05-2003.

subch. II of ch. 218 SUBCHAPTER II

ADJUSTMENT SERVICE COMPANIES

218.02 218.02 Adjustment service companies.

218.02(1) (1) Definitions. As used in this section:

218.02(1)(a) (a) “Adjustment service company,” hereinafter called company, shall mean a corporation, limited liability company, association, partnership or individual engaged as principal in the business of prorating the income of a debtor to the debtor’s creditor or creditors, or of assuming the obligations of any debtor by purchasing the accounts the debtor may have with the debtor’s several creditors, in return for which the principal receives a service charge or other consideration.

218.02(1)(d) (d) “Division” means the division of banking.

218.02(1)(e) (e) “Nationwide multistate licensing system and registry” has the meaning given in s. 224.35 (1g) (b).

218.02(1)(f) (f) “Unique identifier” has the meaning given in s. 224.35 (1g) (e).

218.02(2) (2) Licenses; applications; fees; bond.

218.02(2)(a) (a)

218.02(2)(a)1. 1. Each adjustment service company shall apply to the division for a license to engage in such business. Application for a separate license for each office of a company to be operated under this section shall be made in a form and manner acceptable to the division. The division may issue more than one license to the same licensee. Except as provided in subd. 3., an application for a license under this section shall include the following:

218.02(2)(a)1.a. a. In the case of an individual, the individual’s social security number.

218.02(2)(a)1.b. b. In the case of a person that is not an individual, the person’s federal employer identification number.