The following powers of the sheriff are constitutionally protected: 1) the operation of the jail; 2) attendance on the courts; 3) maintaining law and order; and 4) preserving the peace. Even if a duty is related to one of these powers, however, that duty may still be regulated if it is a non-distinctive, mundane and commonplace, internal management, and administrative duty of a sheriff. The constitutional prerogative of the office of sheriff to maintain law and order and preserve the peace does not encompass the power to appoint or dismiss deputies. Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n v. Milwaukee County, 2016 WI App 56, 370 Wis. 2d 644, 883 N.W.2d 154, 15-1577.

A county board in a county under 500,000 can abolish the elective office of coroner and implement a medical examiner system to be effective at the end of incumbent coroner’s term. Language in 61 Atty. Gen. 355 inconsistent herewith is withdrawn. 63 Atty. Gen. 361.

An entity characterized as the “office of the district attorney” or “district attorney,” separate from the elected official, does not have authority to sue or be sued. Buchanan v. City of Kenosha, 57 F. Supp. 2d 675 (1999).

VII,1Impeachment; trial. Section 1. [As amended Nov. 1932] The court for the trial of impeachments shall be composed of the senate. The assembly shall have the power of impeaching all civil officers of this state for corrupt conduct in office, or for crimes and misdemeanors; but a majority of all the members elected shall concur in an impeachment. On the trial of an impeachment against the governor, the lieutenant governor shall not act as a member of the court. No judicial officer shall exercise his office, after he shall have been impeached, until his acquittal. Before the trial of an impeachment the members of the court shall take an oath or affirmation truly and impartially to try the impeachment according to evidence; and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, or removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, profit or trust under the state; but the party impeached shall be liable to indictment, trial and punishment according to law. [1929 J.R. 72, 1931 J.R. 58, vote Nov. 1932]

VII,2Court system. Section 2. [As amended April 1966 and April 1977] The judicial power of this state shall be vested in a unified court system consisting of one supreme court, a court of appeals, a circuit court, such trial courts of general uniform statewide jurisdiction as the legislature may create by law, and a municipal court if authorized by the legislature under section 14. [1963 J.R. 48, 1965 J.R. 50, vote April 1966; 1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977]

If s. 425.113 were to be interpreted so as to remove a court’s power to issue a body attachment for one who chooses to ignore its orders, that interpretation would cause the statute to be unconstitutional as a violation of the principle of separation of powers. Smith v. Burns, 65 Wis. 2d 638, 223 N.W.2d 562 (1974).

Courts have no inherent power to stay or suspend the execution of a sentence in the absence of statutory authority. A court’s refusal to impose a legislatively mandated sentence constitutes an abuse of discretion and usurpation of the legislative field. State v. Sittig, 75 Wis. 2d 497, 249 N.W.2d 770 (1977).

The Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission is authorized by s. 111.06 (1) (L) to determine whether conduct in violation of criminal law has occurred, which is not a delegation of judicial power in violation of this section nor does the administrative procedure violate article I, section 8. Layton School of Art & Design v. WERC, 82 Wis. 2d 324, 262 N.W.2d 218 (1978).

Judicial assistants are subject to the judiciary’s exclusive authority once appointed. Any collective bargaining agreement between a county and employees’ union that provides for possible “bumping” of the assistant by another employee and final and binding arbitration regarding disputes over bumping is an unconstitutional infringement on the court’s inherent powers. Barland v. Eau Claire County, 216 Wis. 2d 560, 575 N.W.2d 691 (1998), 96-1607.

Probation and probation revocation are within the powers shared by the branches of government. Legislative delegation of revocation to the executive branch does not unduly burden or substantially interfere with the judiciary’s constitutional function to impose criminal penalties. State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999), 97-2751.

A court’s inherent powers are those that must be used to enable the judiciary to accomplish its constitutional or statutory functions and include the power to maintain the dignity of the court, transact its business, or accomplish the purpose of its existence. Courts have inherent power to investigate claims that a party is engaging in fraudulent behavior or improperly influencing witnesses, and a court is within its authority to hold an evidentiary hearing on such matters. Schultz v. Sykes, 2001 WI App 255, 248 Wis. 2d 746, 638 N.W.2d 604, 00-0915.

The issuance of a search warrant is not an exercise of “[t]he judicial power,” as that phrase in employed in this section. Instead, issuance of a valid search warrant requires that the individual be authorized by law to issue the warrant, that the individual be neutral and detached, and that the warrant be issued only upon a showing of probable cause. Section 757.69 (1) (b), which allocates the power to issue search warrants to circuit court commissioners, does not impermissibly intrude upon “[t]he judicial power” granted to the courts by this section. State v. Williams, 2012 WI 59, 341 Wis. 2d 191, 814 N.W.2d 460, 10-1551.

The order of reference in this case impermissibly delegated to the referee judicial power vested by this section in Wisconsin’s unified court system. Constitutional judges can take no power from the legislature to subdelegate their judicial functions. Referees may share in judicial labor but cannot assume the place of the judge. In this case, the order of reference enabled the referee to hear and decide all motions filed, whether discovery or dispositive, subject to review by the circuit court under the standard of erroneous exercise of discretion, impermissibly reducing the function of the circuit court to that of a reviewing court. Insofar as the order of reference authorized the referee to supervise pretrial discovery disputes, the order did not contravene the state constitution’s vesting of judicial power in a unified court system. State ex rel. Universal Processing Services of Wisconsin, LLC v. Circuit Court, 2017 WI 26, 374 Wis. 2d 26, 892 N.W.2d 267, 16-0923.

Permitting an executive agency to review judges’ official actions for compliance with the victims’ rights laws would upend the constitutional structure of separated powers. An executive agency, acting pursuant to authority delegated by the legislature, may not review a court’s exercise of discretion, declare its application of the law to be in error, and then sanction the judge for making a decision the agency disfavors. Any other response would unconstitutionally permit an executive entity to substitute its judgment for that of the judge—effectively imposing an executive veto over discretionary judicial decision making and incentivizing judges to make decisions not in accordance with the law but in accordance with the demands of the executive branch in order to avoid a public rebuke reinforced with the imprimatur of a quasi-judicial board. Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Board, 2017 WI 67, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384, 16-0275.

While the court’s constitutional judicial discipline power does not expressly include authority to assess a forfeiture or impose an equitable remedy, allowing the legislature to create an executive board with the power to penalize or enjoin official judicial action would be anathema to the judicial independence preserved by the separation of governmental powers under the Wisconsin Constitution. Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Board, 2017 WI 67, 376 Wis. 2d 147, 897 N.W.2d 384, 16-0275.

Inherent authority of courts consists of only those powers that are necessary for the judiciary to accomplish its constitutionally mandated functions and preserve its role as a coequal branch of government. Wisconsin courts have generally exercised inherent authority in three areas: 1) to guard against actions that would impair the powers or efficacy of the courts or judicial system; 2) to regulate the bench and bar; and 3) to ensure the efficient and effective functioning of the court and to fairly administer justice. State v. Schwind, 2019 WI 48, 386 Wis. 2d 526, 926 N.W.2d 742, 17-0141.

Probation is a statutory creation, and the power to reduce or terminate a term of probation is not necessary for courts to accomplish their constitutionally mandated functions. Therefore, Wisconsin courts do not have the inherent authority to reduce or terminate a period of probation. State v. Schwind, 2019 WI 48, 386 Wis. 2d 526, 926 N.W.2d 742, 17-0141.

In mental hearings under former s. 51.02, 1973 stats., or alcohol or drug abuse hearings under former s. 51.09 (1), 1973 stats., the power to appoint an attorney at public expense, to determine indigency, and to fix compensation are judicial and must be exercised by the court or under its direction and cannot be limited by the county board or delegated to a private nonprofit corporation. 63 Atty. Gen. 323.

Unless acting in a clear absence of all jurisdiction, judges are immune from liability for judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978).