74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4 (1985)

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 9 (1985)
  One commentator found that:

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 9 (1985)
  Wisconsin has consistently held to the common law doctrine that the defendant is not entitled to inspect the evidence and other information which the prosecution has gathered. The statement of the supreme court whenever the issue was raised has been, "One accused of crime enjoys no right to an inspection of evidence relied upon by the public authorities for his conviction."

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 9 (1985)
49 Marq. L. Rev. 736, 746 (1965-66), with the following footnote to the quoted material:

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 9 (1985)
State ex rel. Spencer v. Freedy, 198 Wis. 388, 392; 223 N.W. 861, 862 (1929). This same statement is repeated in State ex rel. Schroeder v. Page, 206 Wis. 611, 240 N.W. 173 (1932); Steensland v. Hoppmann, 213 Wis. 593, 252 N.W. 146 (1934); State v. Herman, 219 Wis. 267, 262 N.W. 718 (1935). A similar statement is found in Santry v. State, 67 Wis. 65, 30 N.W. 226 (1886).

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 9 (1985)
Now we could add State v. Miller, 35 Wis. 2d 454, 474, 151 N.W.2d 157 (1967).

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 9 (1985)
  The commentator found Wisconsin to be a conservative adherent to this common law restriction (49 Marq. L. Rev. at 749) and supposed that any statutory departure would be strictly construed (49 Marq. L. Rev. at 748).

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 9-10 (1985)
  The United States Supreme Court has created a qualification to this general rule. It requires prosecutors to divulge evidence that is material either to guilt or to punishment as a matter of constitutional "due process." Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963). However, even so, in this state the defense does not have access to the prosecutor's file prior to the preliminary examination unless it can show a particularized need. Matter of State ex rel. Lynch v. County Ct., 82 Wis. 2d 454, 468, 262 N.W.2d 773 (1978). The prosecutor may deny inspection, and if it is eventually established that evidence was wrongfully withheld, the remedy is a new trial. 82 Wis. 2d at 468.

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 10 (1985)
  In my opinion, logic compels the conclusion that if at common law a defendant could not have access to a prosecutor's file in his own case prior to trial, neither could the general public. Certainly the defendant's interest in his own file exceeds that of the general public. The defendant's interest is to know the accusations and evidence for and against him so he can evaluate his exposure and prepare his defense. Yet the defendant was denied access under the common law. It would be perverse to then allow access by everyone but the defendant by way of the public records law. Also it is obvious that the clear limitations on discovery could be circumvented easily if the same information could be obtained by the defendant by way of a public records request.

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 10 (1985)
  In my opinion, this logic amplifies the meaning of the more general statements at common law acknowledging limitations on access to documentary evidence in prosecutors' files. I believe that at common law any right of access under the public records law could not surpass the defendant's rights to discovery. Given the very limited purposes for which and circumstances under which a defendant could have any discovery of a prosecutor's file under common law, it must follow that the common law limitations on access are a complete bar to access to the prosecutor's file.

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 10 (1985)
  This issue has been considered with mixed results in the appellate courts of New York. One view is that material that is exempt from discovery in the context of litigation is exempt from disclosure under their public records law. A leading case is Westchester Rockland, Etc. v. Mosczydlowski, 396 N.Y.S.2d 857, 58 A.D.2d 234 (1977). Contrapuntal is the decision in Lawler, Matusky & Skelly Engineers v. Abrams, 443 N.Y.S.2d 973, 111 Misc. 2d 356 (1981).

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 10-11 (1985)
  In my opinion the logic in favor of transferring common law limitations on discovery in criminal cases to the public records law is more persuasive. Therefore, it is my opinion that there is a general common law limitation against access to prosecutor's files prior to completion of a trial.

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 11 (1985)
  The overriding interests that justify this limitation on the public's general "right to know" will often coincide with the interests recognized as justifying the secrecy of John Doe proceedings, to wit:

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 11 (1985)
  (1)   keeping a John Doe target from fleeing, or an arrested defendant from knowledge which might cause him to flee;

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 11 (1985)
  (2)   preventing defendants from collecting perjured testimony for the trial;

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 11 (1985)
  (3)   preventing those interested in thwarting the inquiry and tampering with prospective testimony or secreting evidence;

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 11 (1985)
  (4)   freeing witnesses from the threat of immediate retaliation; and

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 11 (1985)
  (5)   preventing testimony which may be mistaken or untrue or irrelevant from becoming public.

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 11 (1985)
In re Wis. Family Counseling Services v. State, 95 Wis. 2d 670, 677, 291 N.W.2d 63 (Ct. App. 1980).

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 11 (1985)
  One could also add the concern for pretrial publicity.

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 11 (1985)
  Also present to support the secrecy of prosecutors' files, although not available to justify the blanket exemption by itself, is the doctrine of attorney work product which protects papers prepared by an attorney with respect to particular pending or imminent litigation. Youmans, 28 Wis. 2d at 684. The United States Supreme Court has held recently that the protection of attorney's work product continues even after the litigation is over. FTC v. Grolier, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 2209, 2215 (1983).

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 11 (1985)
  As stated in section 19.31, "it is declared to be the public policy of this state that all persons are entitled to the greatest possible information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those officers and employes who represent them." See Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 433-38, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979). The public interest to be served is not so much the "curiosity" interest in what accusations have been made and what evidence has been gathered against an individual. The public interest underlying the public records law is the interest in monitoring and evaluating how public officials discharge their responsibilities.

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 12 (1985)
  With respect to the performance of a prosecutor in a particular case, this evaluation will be much more knowledgeable and objective once the trial is over. It would likely unnecessarily interfere with the administration of justice if the public were allowed to look over the prosecutor's shoulder and proclaim what it sees while a prosecutor is preparing or presenting a case. At least, it is my opinion that the public's right to know and the interest in effective administration of the criminal justice system are harmonized and adequately served if prosecutors' files are exempt from disclosure during the investigative, pretrial and trial stages.

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 12 (1985)
  The next question then is whether prosecutors' files are open to public inspection after the trial. Employing the logic used above, it is appropriate to explore the extent to which a defendant has access to the state's file following the trial. We find once again that a defendant's rights are very limited.

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 12 (1985)
  The common law in this state is that subsequent to a trial a defendant has no right to inspect relevant portions of the state's files to determine whether they contained evidence in any way useful or helpful to him. Access would be constitutionally required only if there were a specific allegation that the prosecution had suppressed evidence which due process would require it to disclose. Britton v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 109, 118-19, 170 N.W.2d 785 (1969). Again, following the rationale used above, if a defendant has only a severely limited right to inspect the state's file for the defendant's case, it necessarily follows that the public at large cannot have a greater right by way of the public records law.

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 12 (1985)
  I am aware that our state statutes do now provide for an expanded right of discovery in criminal cases. Section 971.23 was created by chapter 255, Laws of 1969. The first paragraph of the accompanying Note states:

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 12-13 (1985)
NOTE: This section is the first Wisconsin statute attempting to afford pretrial discovery to both the State and the defendant. Based primarily upon F.R.Cr.P. 16, it is believed that the section represents an improvement in the existing pretrial procedures while protecting the basic rights of the parties. Limited pretrial discovery should increase the efficient administration of criminal justice in this state by speeding up the disposition of cases, improving the performance of counsel, eliminating the increasing number of pretrial motions and increasing the number of guilty pleas. The section contemplates that most of the discovery provisions are to be implemented without the necessity for motions or court hearings.

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 13 (1985)
  This statutory liberalization of the common law regarding discovery in criminal cases does not affect the companion common law regarding access to public records. If the common law in the latter area is to be modified, that too requires a specific statutory modification.

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 13 (1985)
  What then of the public's right to have access to public records so it may monitor and evaluate the conduct and performance of public prosecutors? Surely they are not exempt from scrutiny and, indeed, the elected district attorneys should not be. The answer is that there is typically enough information available without access to the prosecutor's file. It starts in the police station. We know that the daily arrest log is absolutely open to public inspection. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417. This makes "possible public oversight of the charging discretion of the prosecutor." 89 Wis. 2d at 437. From checking court records, one may determine whether charges have been pressed and what they are. With few exceptions such as provided in section 970.03(4), criminal pretrial hearings are open to the public. The trial is always open to the public. Documents relating to the litigation are available for public inspection if they have been filed or admitted in evidence and are not subject to a specific protective order of the court. These all can be evaluated by the press and the electorate. If the information is deemed inadequate, or an explanation is desired, the district attorney can be confronted directly. The sufficiency of his response may be evaluated and taken into account at the next election. The burden is on the district attorney to keep the public sufficiently informed so confidence in his performance is maintained. Lack of confidence will presumably result in failure to be reelected. It is this risk and burden a district attorney must bear in exchange for having his prosecutorial files closed to general public inspection.

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 13-14 (1985)
  It must be emphasized that this opinion has considered only those files which relate directly to a possible, pending or completed prosecution. Administrative files and other non-case related records in a prosecutor's office are public records fully subject to the provisions in subchapter II of chapter 19. As such there is a presumption in favor of public access and nondisclosure will have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

74 Op. Att'y Gen. 4, 14 (1985)
BCL:RWL
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