Chapter 990

990.001 Annotation Generally, legislative enactments are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. The purpose of the presumption of constitutionality does not appear to have any relation to whether the statute predates or postdates the constitutional provision. State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328, 01-0350.

990.001 Annotation Chapter 35 codifies the rules of publishing and interpreting public documents, including the statutes. Section 35.18 (3) explains how the numbers and sections of statutory provisions are designated. Storm v. Legion Insurance Company, 2003 WI 120, 265 Wis. 2d 169, 665 N.W.2d 353, 01-1139.

990.001 Annotation Scope, context, and purpose are perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning interpretation of an unambiguous statute as long as the scope, context, and purpose are ascertainable from the text and structure of the statute itself, rather than extrinsic sources, such as legislative history. Many words have multiple dictionary definitions; the applicable definition depends upon the context in which the word is used. Kalal v. Dane County, 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110, 02-2490.

990.001 Annotation It is a basic rule of construction to attribute the same definition to a word each time it is used in the same statute or administrative rule. DaimlerChrysler v. LIRC, 2007 WI 15, 299 Wis. 2d 1, 727 N.W.2d 311, 05-0544.

990.001 Annotation Previous cases construing a statute become a part of the understanding of a statute’s plain meaning. Once a construction has been given to a statute, the construction becomes a part of the statute. Meyers v. Bayer AG, 2007 WI 99, 303 Wis. 2d 295, 735 N.W.2d 448, 03-2840.

990.001 Annotation The statutes contain thousands upon thousands of nouns, very few of which are preceded by the word “real” because “real” is implied in the general understanding of most nouns. State v. Van Buren, 2008 WI App 26, 307 Wis. 2d 447, 746 N.W.2d 545, 06-3025.

990.001 Annotation While terms of a statute are to be interpreted to avoid superfluousness if possible, the rule is not absolute. If the legislature has created redundancies, it is not up to the court to create functions for such parts. The legislature sometimes uses more words than necessary without intending to add meaning. Wisconsin Realtors Ass’n v. Town of West Point, 2008 WI App 40, 309 Wis. 2d 199, 747 N.W.2d 681, 06-2761.

990.001 Annotation Sub. (6) provides that a title to a statute is not part of the statute. A title may not be used to alter the meaning of a statute or create an ambiguity where no ambiguity existed. Noffke v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, 315 Wis. 2d 350, 760 N.W.2d 156, 06-1866.

990.001 Annotation The legislature has a history of using “and” when the context shows it means “or.” “And” in statutes is not always interpreted as a conjunctive term. It is a familiar rule of construction that the words “or” and “and” are often used incorrectly, and that when a strict reading would render the sense dubious one may be read in place of the other, in deference to the meaning of the context. State v. Freer, 2010 WI App 9, 323 Wis. 2d 29, 779 N.W.2d 12, 08-2233.

990.001 Annotation The Legislative Reference Bureau’s analysis of a bill is printed with and displayed on the bill when it is introduced in the legislature; as such, it is indicative of legislative intent. State v. Freer, 2010 WI App 9, 323 Wis. 2d 29, 779 N.W.2d 12, 08-2233.

990.001 Annotation Whenever the application of a common law doctrine or rule would undermine the manifest purposes of a statutory cause of action, the conflict between the statute’s manifest purpose and the common law defense “leaves no doubt of the legislature’s intent.” In a case of such apparent incompatibility, the legislature necessarily intended that the common law defense would not be applied to bar claims under the statute. MBS-Certified Public Accountants, LLC v. Wisconsin Bell Inc., 2012 WI 15, 338 Wis. 2d 647, 809 N.W.2d 857, 08-1830.

990.001 Annotation There is no absolute rule against construing two different terms within a statute to have the same meaning. Cramer v. Eau Claire County, 2013 WI App 67, 348 Wis. 2d 154, 833 N.W.2d 172, 12-1796.

990.001 Annotation The Saturday extension rule in sub. (4) (c) applies to the listed acts, including service on a government entity, regardless whether the act is accomplished in person, by mail, or by some other means. The statutory language does condition the Saturday extension rule on whether service can be accomplished on a Saturday. Madison Metropolitan School District v. Evers, 2014 WI App 109, 357 Wis. 2d 550, 855 N.W.2d 458, 14-0394.

990.001 Annotation Under Kalal, statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, the court ordinarily stops the inquiry. However, if the supreme court has addressed the interpretation of a statute or predecessor statute, that controlling authority must be followed or distinguished. Hart v. Artisan & Truckers Casualty Co., 2017 WI App 45, 377 Wis. 2d 177, 900 N.W.2d 610, 16-1196.

990.001 Annotation When a specific exception is made, it implies that no other exceptions are intended. State v. Dorsey, 2018 WI 10, 379 Wis. 2d 386, 906 N.W.2d 158, 15-0648.

990.001 Annotation The general rule is that the word “shall” is presumed mandatory when it appears in a statute. This presumption, however, is subject to rebuttal. Occasionally, the court has construed shall as a directive, rather than a mandate. State v. Cox, 2018 WI 67, 382 Wis. 2d 338, 913 N.W.2d 780, 16-1745.

990.001 Annotation As a general rule, a phrase modified by the word “any” indicates broad application and means “of whatever kind and without restriction.” Lipscomb v. Abele, 2018 WI App 58, 384 Wis. 2d 1, 918 N.W.2d 434, 17-1023.

990.001 Annotation The use of the definite article “the” in front of the second use of a phrase makes clear that it is referencing the antecedent phase already mentioned. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Great Lakes Quick Lube LP v. Theisen, 2018 WI App 70, 384 Wis. 2d 580, 920 N.W.2d 356, 18-0333.

990.001 Annotation Sub. (4) (d) does not apply to the computation of a sanction imposed under s. 938.355 (6) (d) 1. State v. A.A., 2020 WI App 11, 391 Wis. 2d 416, 941 N.W.2d 260, 18-1497.

990.001 Annotation The word “each” is synonymous with “every.” Southwest Airlines Co. v. DOR, 2021 WI 54, 397 Wis. 2d 431, 960 N.W.2d 384, 19-0818.

990.001 Annotation Sub. (9) embodies the fundamental common law principle that an agent’s actions are the principal’s actions for purposes of fulfilling a principal’s statutory duty. Sub. (9) imposes no personal liability on an agent for authorized acts taken on behalf of its principal. Townsend v. ChartSwap, LLC, 2021 WI 86, 399 Wis. 2d 599, 967 N.W.2d 21, 19-2034.

990.001 Annotation In analyzing legislative intent, if it is determined that offenses are identical in law and fact, the presumption is that the legislative body did not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes. Conversely, if under the Blockburger, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), test the charged offenses are different in law or fact, a presumption arises that the legislature did intend to permit cumulative punishments. To overcome either presumption requires proof of clear legislative intent to the contrary, with the state bearing the burden under the first presumption and the defendant under the second. State v. Wise, 2021 WI App 87, 400 Wis. 2d 174, 968 N.W.2d 705, 20-1756.

990.001 Annotation A required tax payment may be made on the next secular day when July 31 is on Saturday and office hours are unofficial. 60 Atty. Gen. 411.

990.001 Annotation Computing time in tort statutes of limitation. Ghiardi. 64 MLR 575 (1981).

990.001 Annotation Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices Scalia and Breyer and the Use of Legislative History by the Wisconsin State Courts. Dortzbach. 80 MLR 161 (1997).

990.001 Annotation Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes. Suhr. 100 MLR 969 (2017).

990.001 Annotation Researching legislative intent in Wisconsin: A suggested procedure. Nispel. WBB Apr. 1983.

990.001 Annotation Computing Time in Statutes of Limitation. Ghiardi. Wis. Law. Mar. 1993.

990.01 990.01 Construction of laws; words and phrases. In the construction of Wisconsin laws the words and phrases which follow shall be construed as indicated unless such construction would produce a result inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature:

990.01(1) (1) General rule. All words and phrases shall be construed according to common and approved usage; but technical words and phrases and others that have a peculiar meaning in the law shall be construed according to such meaning.

990.01(2) (2) Acquire. “Acquire,” when used in connection with a grant of power to any person, includes the acquisition by purchase, grant, gift or bequest. It includes the power to condemn only in the cases specified in s. 32.02 and subject to the limitations under s. 32.015.

990.01(3) (3) Adult. “Adult” means a person who has attained the age of 18 years, except that for purposes of investigating or prosecuting a person who is alleged to have violated any state or federal criminal law or any civil law or municipal ordinance, “adult” means a person who has attained the age of 17 years.

990.01(4) (4) Bequest and bequeath. “Bequest” includes a devise; “bequeath” includes devise.

990.01(5) (5) Chiropractor. “Chiropractor” means a person holding a license issued by the chiropractic examining board.

990.01(5g) (5g) Communicable disease. “Communicable disease” means any disease that the department of health services determines, by rule, to be communicable in fact.

990.01(5r) (5r) Controlled access highway. “Controlled access highway” means a highway on which abutting property owners have no right or only a limited right of direct access and on which the type and location of all access connections are determined and controlled by the highway authorities.

990.01(6) (6) County board. “County board” means the county board of supervisors.

990.01(6m) (6m) Dentist. “Dentist” means a person who is licensed as a dentist under subch. I of ch. 447 or who holds a dentist compact privilege under subch. II of ch. 447.

990.01(7a) (7a) Express highway or expressway. An express highway or expressway is a divided arterial highway for through traffic with “full” or “partial” control of access and generally with grade separations at intersections. “Full” control of access means that the authority to control access is exercised to give preference to through traffic by providing access connections with selected public roads only and by prohibiting crossings at grade or direct private driveway connections. “Partial” control of access means that the authority to control access is exercised to give preference to through traffic to a degree that, in addition to access connections with selected public roads, there may be some crossings at grade and some private driveway connections.

990.01(7g) (7g) Fire chief. “Fire chief” or “chief of a fire department” includes the chief of a department under s. 60.553, 61.66, or 62.13 (2e).

990.01(7m) (7m) Fire department. “Fire department” includes a department under s. 60.553, 61.66, or 62.13 (2e).

990.01(7r) (7r) Fire fighter. “Fire fighter” includes a person serving under s. 60.553, 61.66, or 62.13 (2e).

990.01(8) (8) Folio. “Folio” means 100 words or figures. Any fraction of a folio shall be paid for as a full folio.

990.01(9) (9) Following. “Following,” when used by way of reference to any statute section, means the section next following that in which the reference is made.

990.01(9a) (9a) Freeway. “Freeway” means a highway with full control of access and with all crossroads separated in grade from the pavements for through traffic.

990.01(10) (10) Grantor and grantee. “Grantor” includes every person from or by whom any freehold estate or interest passes in or by any deed; and “grantee” includes every person to whom any such estate or interest passes in like manner.

990.01(11) (11) Heretofore and hereafter. “Heretofore” means any time previous to the day on which the statute containing it takes effect; “hereafter” means the time after the statute containing such word takes effect.

990.01(12) (12) Highway. “Highway” includes all public ways and thoroughfares and all bridges upon the same.

990.01(13) (13) Homestead.

990.01(13)(a) (a) The word “homestead” means the dwelling and so much of the land surrounding it as is reasonably necessary for use of the dwelling as a home, but not less than one-fourth acre, if available, and not exceeding 40 acres.

990.01(13)(b) (b) Any amendment of a homestead statute shall not affect liens of creditors attaching nor rights of devisees or heirs of persons dying prior to the effective date of the amendment.

990.01(14) (14) Homestead exemption. “Exempt homestead” means the dwelling, including a building, condominium, mobile home, manufactured home, house trailer or cooperative or an unincorporated cooperative association, and so much of the land surrounding it as is reasonably necessary for its use as a home, but not less than 0.25 acre, if available, and not exceeding 40 acres, within the limitation as to value under s. 815.20, except as to liens attaching or rights of devisees or heirs of persons dying before the effective date of any increase of that limitation as to value.

990.01(15) (15) Inhabitant. “Inhabitant” means a resident.

990.01(17) (17) Issue. “Issue,” as applied to descent of estate, includes all the lawful descendants of the ancestor.

990.01(17m) (17m) Judge. “Judge” does not include a municipal judge, except as provided in ch. 755.

990.01(18) (18) Land. “Land” includes lands, tenements and hereditaments and all rights thereto and interests therein.

990.01(19) (19) Legacy, legatee. “Legacy” includes a devise; “legatee” includes a devisee.

990.01(19g) (19g) Licensed practical nurse. “Licensed practical nurse” includes a licensed practical/vocational nurse who holds a multistate license, as defined in s. 441.51 (2) (h), issued in a party state, as defined in s. 441.51 (2) (k).

990.01(19j) (19j) Live birth.

990.01(19j)(a) (a) In this subsection, “breathes” means draws air into and expels it out of the lungs one or more times.

990.01(19j)(b) (b) “Live birth” means the complete expulsion or extraction from his or her mother, of a human being, at any stage of development, who, after the expulsion or extraction, breathes or has a beating heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite movement of voluntary muscles, regardless of whether the umbilical cord has been cut, and regardless of whether the expulsion or extraction occurs as a result of natural or induced labor, a cesarean section, or an abortion, as defined in s. 253.10 (2) (a).

990.01(19m) (19m) Marital child. “Marital child” means either of the following:

990.01(19m)(a) (a) A child who is conceived or born while his or her parents are lawfully intermarried.

990.01(19m)(b) (b) A nonmarital child who is adopted or whose parents subsequently intermarry under s. 767.803.

990.01(20) (20) Minor. “Minor” means a person who has not attained the age of 18 years, except that for purposes of investigating or prosecuting a person who is alleged to have violated a state or federal criminal law or any civil law or municipal ordinance, “minor” does not include a person who has attained the age of 17 years.

990.01(21) (21) Month. “Month” means a calendar month unless otherwise expressed.

990.01(21m) (21m) Motorcycle. “Motorcycle” has the meaning given in s. 340.01 (32).

990.01(22) (22) Municipality. “Municipality” includes cities and villages; it may be construed to include towns.

990.01(22m) (22m) Naturopathic doctor. “Naturopathic doctor” means a naturopathic doctor licensed under s. 466.04 (1). Except where expressly provided, “naturopathic doctor” does not include a limited-scope naturopathic doctor licensed under s. 466.04 (2).

990.01(23) (23) Nighttime. “Nighttime,” used in any statute, ordinance, indictment or information, means the time between one hour after sunset on one day and one hour before sunrise on the following day; and the time of sunset and sunrise shall be ascertained according to the mean solar time of the ninetieth meridian west from Greenwich, commonly known as central time, as given in any almanac.

990.01(23m) (23m) Nonmarital child. “Nonmarital child” means a child who is neither conceived nor born while his or her parents are lawfully intermarried, who is not adopted and whose parents do not subsequently intermarry under s. 767.803.

990.01(23q) (23q) Nurse. “Nurse,” “nurse licensed under ch. 441,” and any reference to an individual who is licensed under ch. 441 include a registered nurse or licensed practical/vocational nurse who holds a multistate license, as defined in s. 441.51 (2) (h), issued in a party state, as defined in s. 441.51 (2) (k).

990.01(24) (24) Oath. “Oath” includes affirmation in all cases where by law an affirmation may be substituted for an oath. If any oath or affirmation is required to be taken such oath or affirmation shall be taken before and administered by some officer authorized by the laws of this state to administer oaths, at the place where the same is required to be taken or administered, unless otherwise expressly directed, and, when necessary, duly certified by such officer. If an oath is administered it shall end with the words “so help me God”. In actions and proceedings in the courts, a person may take an oath or affirmation in communication with the administering officer by telephone or audiovisual means.

990.01(25) (25) Officers. “Officers” when applied to corporations include directors and trustees.

990.01(25g) (25g) Optical disc. “Optical disc” means a rotating circular plate on which information or images are placed in storage, and which is recorded and read by laser beams focused on the plate.

990.01(25r) (25r) Optical imaging. “Optical imaging” means transferring to a format employing an optical disc.

990.01(26) (26) Person. “Person” includes all partnerships, associations and bodies politic or corporate.

990.01(27) (27) Personal property. “Personal property” includes money, goods, chattels, things in action, evidences of debt and energy.

990.01(27m) (27m) Personal representative. “Personal representative” means a person, however denominated, who is authorized to administer a decedent’s estate.

990.01(27s) (27s) Physician assistant. “Physician assistant” means a person who is licensed as a physician assistant under subch. IX of ch. 448 or who holds a compact privilege under subch. XIII of ch. 448.

990.01 Note NOTE: The cross-reference to subch. IX of ch. 448 was changed from subch. VIII of ch. 448 by the legislative reference bureau under s. 13.92 (1) (bm) 2. to reflect the renumbering under s. 13.92 (1) (bm) 2. of subch. VIII of ch. 448.

990.01(28) (28) Physician, surgeon or osteopath. “Physician,” “surgeon” or “osteopath” means a person holding a license or certificate of registration from the medical examining board.

990.01(28g) (28g) Police chief. “Police chief” or “chief of a police department” includes the chief of a department under s. 60.553, 61.66, or 62.13 (2e).

990.01(28m) (28m) Police department. “Police department” includes a department under s. 60.553, 61.66, or 62.13 (2e).

990.01(28r) (28r) Police officer. “Police officer” includes a person serving under s. 60.553, 61.66, or 62.13 (2e).

990.01(29) (29) Population. “Population” means that shown by the most recent regular or special federal census.

990.01(30) (30) Preceding. “Preceding,” when used by way of reference to any statute section, means the section next preceding that in which the reference is made.

990.01(30m) (30m) Promulgate. “Promulgate,” when used in connection with a rule, as defined under s. 227.01 (13), means to repeal; renumber; consolidate, renumber and amend; renumber and amend; amend; repeal and recreate; or create.

990.01(31) (31) Property. “Property” includes real and personal property.