Chapter 973

973.014(1g)(b) (b) When sentencing a person to life imprisonment under par. (a), the court shall inform the person of the provisions of s. 302.114 (3) and the procedure for petitioning under s. 302.114 (5) for release to extended supervision.

973.014(1g)(c) (c) A person sentenced to life imprisonment under par. (a) is not eligible for release on parole.

973.014(2) (2) When a court sentences a person to life imprisonment under s. 939.62 (2m) (c), the court shall provide that the sentence is without the possibility of parole or extended supervision.

973.014 History History: 1987 a. 412; 1989 a. 31; 1993 a. 289; 1995 a. 48; 1997 a. 283, 326; 1999 a. 32.

973.014 Annotation The constitutionality of this section is upheld. State v. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 749, 482 N.W.2d 883 (1992).

973.014 Annotation The denial of presentence confinement credit when parole was established under sub. (2) [now sub. (1) (b)] was constitutional. State v. Chapman, 175 Wis. 2d 231, 499 N.W.2d 222 (Ct. App. 1993).

973.014 Annotation Sub. (1) (b) allows a circuit court to impose a parole eligibility date beyond a defendant’s expected lifetime. State v. Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 565 N.W.2d 506 (1997), 95-0207.

973.014 Annotation A trial court sentencing a defendant under sub. (1) (b), exercising its discretion, may or may not give credit for presentence incarceration. State v. Seeley, 212 Wis. 2d 75, 567 N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-1939.

973.014 Annotation Parole eligibility is not a statutorily or constitutionally necessary component of a valid plea colloquy in a case in which a life sentence is imposed. State v. Byrge, 225 Wis. 2d 702, 594 N.W.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1999), 97-3217.

973.014 Annotation The U.S. Supreme Court in Miller, 576 U.S. 460 (2012), did not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to sentence a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole in homicide cases, but required sentencing courts to take into account how children are different and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison. Thus, it is not unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile to life imprisonment without the possibility of supervised release for intentional homicide under sub. (1g) (a) 3. if the circumstances warrant it. State v. Barbeau, 2016 WI App 51, 370 Wis. 2d 736, 883 N.W.2d 520, 14-2876.

973.014 Annotation The mandatory minimum of 20 years’ imprisonment provided by sub. (1g) (a) 1. as applied to children does not violate the prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the U.S. and Wisconsin constitutions. State v. Barbeau, 2016 WI App 51, 370 Wis. 2d 736, 883 N.W.2d 520, 14-2876.

973.015 973.015 Special disposition.

973.015(1m) (1m) 

973.015(1m)(a) (a)

973.015(1m)(a)1. 1. Subject to subd. 2. and except as provided in subd. 3., when a person is under the age of 25 at the time of the commission of an offense for which the person has been found guilty in a court for violation of a law for which the maximum period of imprisonment is 6 years or less, the court may order at the time of sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful completion of the sentence if the court determines the person will benefit and society will not be harmed by this disposition. This subsection does not apply to information maintained by the department of transportation regarding a conviction that is required to be included in a record kept under s. 343.23 (2) (a).

973.015(1m)(a)2. 2. The court shall order at the time of sentencing that the record be expunged upon successful completion of the sentence if the offense was a violation of s. 942.08 (2) (b), (c), or (d) or (3), and the person was under the age of 18 when he or she committed it.

973.015(1m)(a)3. 3. No court may order that a record of a conviction for any of the following be expunged:

973.015(1m)(a)3.a. a. A Class H felony, if the person has, in his or her lifetime, been convicted of a prior felony offense, or if the felony is a violent offense, as defined in s. 301.048 (2) (bm), or is a violation of s. 940.32, 948.03 (2), (3), or (5) (a) 1., 2., 3., or 4., or 948.095.

973.015(1m)(a)3.b. b. A Class I felony, if the person has, in his or her lifetime, been convicted of a prior felony offense, or if the felony is a violent offense, as defined in s. 301.048 (2) (bm), or is a violation of s. 948.23 (1) (a).

973.015(1m)(b) (b) A person has successfully completed the sentence if the person has not been convicted of a subsequent offense and, if on probation, the probation has not been revoked and the probationer has satisfied the conditions of probation. Upon successful completion of the sentence the detaining or probationary authority shall issue a certificate of discharge which shall be forwarded to the court of record and which shall have the effect of expunging the record. If the person has been imprisoned, the detaining authority shall also forward a copy of the certificate of discharge to the department.

973.015(2m) (2m) At any time after a person has been convicted, adjudicated delinquent, or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect for a violation of s. 944.30, a court may, upon the motion of the person, vacate the conviction, adjudication, or finding, or may order that the record of the violation of s. 944.30 be expunged, if all of the following apply:

973.015(2m)(a) (a) The person was a victim of trafficking for the purposes of a commercial sex act, as defined in s. 940.302 (1) (a), under s. 940.302 or 948.051 or under 22 USC 7101 to 7112.

973.015(2m)(b) (b) The person committed the violation of s. 944.30 as a result of being a victim of trafficking for the purposes of a commercial sex act.

973.015(2m)(c) (c) The person submitted a motion that complies with s. 971.30, that contains a statement of facts and, if applicable, the reason the person did not previously raise an affirmative defense under s. 939.46 or allege that the violation was committed as a result of being a victim of trafficking for the purposes of a commercial sex act, and that may include any of the following:

973.015(2m)(c)1. 1. Certified records of federal or state court proceedings.

973.015(2m)(c)2. 2. Certified records of approval notices, law enforcement certifications, or similar documents generated from federal immigration proceedings.

973.015(2m)(c)3. 3. Official documentation from a federal, state, or local government agency.

973.015(2m)(c)4. 4. Other relevant and probative evidence of sufficient credibility in support of the motion.

973.015(2m)(d) (d) The person made the motion with due diligence subject to reasonable concern for the safety of himself or herself, family members, or other victims of trafficking for the purposes of a commercial sex act or subject to other reasons consistent with the safety of persons.

973.015(2m)(e) (e) A copy of the motion has been served on the office of the district attorney that prosecuted the case that resulted in the conviction, adjudication, or finding except that failure to serve a copy does not deprive the court of jurisdiction and is not grounds for dismissal of the motion.

973.015(2m)(f) (f) The court in which the motion was made notified the appropriate district attorney’s office of the motion and has given the district attorney’s office an opportunity to respond to the motion.

973.015(2m)(g) (g) The court determines that the person will benefit and society will not be harmed by a disposition.

973.015(3) (3) A special disposition under this section is not a basis for a claim under s. 775.05.

973.015 History History: 1975 c. 39; 1975 c. 189 s. 105; 1975 c. 199; 1983 a. 519; 1991 a. 189; 2003 a. 33, 50, 320; 2009 a. 28; 2011 a. 268; 2013 a. 362; 2015 a. 80, 366.

973.015 Annotation An expunged conviction is not admissible to attack a witness’s credibility. State v. Anderson, 160 Wis. 2d 435, 466 N.W.2d 681 (Ct. App. 1991).

973.015 Annotation This section does not require law enforcement agencies or prosecutors to destroy records relating to an expunged conviction, nor does it prohibit courts from considering the facts underlying an expunged conviction in sentencing in another case. State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341, 00-1718. See also State v. Braunschweig, 2018 WI 113, 384 Wis. 2d 742, 921 N.W.2d 199, 17-1261.

973.015 Annotation A reasonable reading of this section is that the legislature included the words “at the time of sentencing” in sub. (1m) (a) 2. to limit the point in time at which the circuit court is to make a decision about expunction and that the phrase “at the time of sentencing” means at the proceeding at which the circuit court announces the sanction. State v. Matasek, 2014 WI 27, 353 Wis. 2d 601, 846 N.W.2d 811, 12-1582.

973.015 Annotation This section does not apply to civil forfeiture violations. The language of sub. (1) (a) [now sub. (1m) (a) 1.] indicates that law violations for which expunction is available relate to laws that include some “period of imprisonment.” Thus, when there is no period of imprisonment associated with a law, that law is not one to which this section applies. Kenosha County v. Frett, 2014 WI App 127, 359 Wis. 2d 246, 858 N.W.2d 397, 14-0006.

973.015 Annotation The only requirements sub. (2) [now sub. (1m) (b)] places on an individual defendant to successfully complete probation are that: 1) the defendant has not been convicted of a subsequent offense; 2) the defendant’s probation has not been revoked; and 3) the defendant has satisfied all the conditions of probation. If a probationer satisfies these three criteria, the probationer has earned expungement and is automatically entitled to expungement of the underlying charge. State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811, 13-1163.

973.015 Annotation This section places no burden upon a person who successfully completes probation to petition the circuit court within a certain period of time in order to effectuate the expungement. The detaining or probationary authority must forward the certificate of discharge to the court of record upon the individual defendant’s successful completion of the defendant’s sentence and at that point the process of expungement is self-executing. State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811, 13-1163.

973.015 Annotation Nothing in this section grants the circuit court the authority to revisit an expungement decision. State v. Hemp, 2014 WI 129, 359 Wis. 2d 320, 856 N.W.2d 811, 13-1163.

973.015 Annotation The sentencing court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it considered the fact that the defendant had previously successfully completed supervision in a case in which the record of conviction had been expunged. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, allows consideration of all facts underlying an expunged record of conviction, not just the facts underlying the crime itself provided those facts are not obtained from expunged court records. It does not require interrelated facts between the crime underlying a prior expunged record of conviction and the facts underlying a current criminal conviction. Because the references to the defendant’s expunged record of conviction in the presentence investigation report and at sentencing were obtained from sources other than expunged court records, they were permitted under Leitner. State v. Allen, 2017 WI 7, 373 Wis. 2d 98, 890 N.W.2d 245, 14-2840.

973.015 Annotation In assessing whether to grant expungement, the sentencing court should set forth in the record the facts it considered and the rationale underlying its decision for deciding whether to grant or deny expungement. In exercising discretion, the sentencing court must do something more than simply state whether a defendant will benefit from expungement and that society will or will not be harmed. State v. Helmbrecht, 2017 WI App 5, 373 Wis. 2d 203, 891 N.W.2d 412, 15-2300.

973.015 Annotation “At the time of sentencing” in sub. (1m) (a) 1. means only at the time when sentence is imposed and does not also encompass post-sentencing motions for sentence modification. State v. Arberry, 2018 WI 7, 379 Wis. 2d 254, 905 N.W.2d 832, 16-0866.

973.015 Annotation The relief of vacating and setting a judgment aside under s. 974.06 (3) (d) is designed to address defects with respect to a conviction or sentence, not to provide a second chance or a fresh start as is intended by this section, the expunction statute. Vacatur invalidates the conviction itself, whereas expunction merely deletes the evidence of the underlying conviction from court records. Expunction does not invalidate a conviction. State v. Braunschweig, 2018 WI 113, 384 Wis. 2d 742, 921 N.W.2d 199, 17-1261.

973.015 Annotation The phrase “conditions of probation” in sub. (1m) (b) means conditions set by both the Department of Corrections and the sentencing court, and the provision does not give a circuit court discretionary authority to declare that an individual has “satisfied” the individual’s conditions of probation if the record demonstrates that the individual has violated one or more conditions of probation, including department-imposed conditions. State v. Lickes, 2021 WI 60, 397 Wis. 2d 586, 960 N.W.2d 855, 19-1272.

973.015 Annotation “Expunge” under this section means to strike or obliterate from the record all references to the defendant’s name and identity. 67 Atty. Gen. 301.

973.015 Annotation Circuit courts do not possess inherent powers to expunge or destroy conviction records. 70 Atty. Gen. 115.

973.015 Annotation A Path to Protection: Collateral Crime Vacatur for Wisconsin’s Victims of Sex Trafficking. Mullins. 2019 WLR 1551.

973.017 973.017 Bifurcated sentences; use of guidelines; consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors.

973.017(1) (1) Definition. In this section, “sentencing decision” means a decision as to whether to impose a bifurcated sentence under s. 973.01 or place a person on probation and a decision as to the length of a bifurcated sentence, including the length of each component of the bifurcated sentence, the amount of a fine, and the length of a term of probation.

973.017(2) (2) General requirement. When a court makes a sentencing decision concerning a person convicted of a criminal offense committed on or after February 1, 2003, the court shall consider all of the following:

973.017(2)(ad) (ad) The protection of the public.

973.017(2)(ag) (ag) The gravity of the offense.

973.017(2)(ak) (ak) The rehabilitative needs of the defendant.

973.017(2)(b) (b) Any applicable mitigating factors and any applicable aggravating factors, including the aggravating factors specified in subs. (3) to (8).

973.017(3) (3) Aggravating factors; generally. When making a sentencing decision for any crime, the court shall consider all of the following as aggravating factors:

973.017(3)(a) (a) The fact that the person committed the crime while his or her usual appearance was concealed, disguised, or altered, with the intent to make it less likely that he or she would be identified with the crime.

973.017(3)(b) (b) The fact that the person committed the crime using information that was disclosed to him or her under s. 301.46.

973.017(3)(c) (c) The fact that the person committed the crime for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal gang, as defined in s. 939.22 (9), with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by criminal gang members, as defined in s. 939.22 (9g).

973.017(3)(d) (d) The fact that the person committed the felony while wearing a vest or other garment designed, redesigned, or adapted to prevent bullets from penetrating the garment.

973.017(3)(e) (e)

973.017(3)(e)1. 1. Subject to subd. 2., the fact that the person committed the felony with the intent to influence the policy of a governmental unit or to punish a governmental unit for a prior policy decision, if any of the following circumstances also applies to the felony committed by the person:

973.017(3)(e)1.a. a. The person caused bodily harm, great bodily harm, or death to another.

973.017(3)(e)1.b. b. The person caused damage to the property of another and the total property damaged is reduced in value by $25,000 or more. For the purposes of this subd. 1. b., property is reduced in value by the amount that it would cost either to repair or to replace it, whichever is less.

973.017(3)(e)1.c. c. The person used force or violence or the threat of force or violence.

973.017(3)(e)2. 2.

973.017(3)(e)2.a. a. In this subdivision, “labor dispute” includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure, or conditions of employment or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.

973.017(3)(e)2.b. b. Subdivision 1. does not apply to conduct arising out of or in connection with a labor dispute.

973.017(4) (4) Aggravating factors; serious sex crimes committed while infected with certain diseases.

973.017(4)(a) (a) In this subsection:

973.017(4)(a)1. 1. “HIV” means any strain of human immunodeficiency virus, which causes acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.

973.017(4)(a)1m. 1m. “HIV test” has the meaning given in s. 252.01 (2m).

973.017(4)(a)2. 2. “Serious sex crime” means a violation of s. 940.225 (1) or (2), 948.02 (1) or (2), 948.025, 948.085.

973.017(4)(a)3. 3. “Sexually transmitted disease” means syphilis, gonorrhea, hepatitis B, hepatitis C, or chlamydia.

973.017(4)(a)4. 4. “Significantly exposed” means sustaining a contact that carries a potential for transmission of a sexually transmitted disease or HIV by one or more of the following:

973.017(4)(a)4.a. a. Transmission, into a body orifice or onto mucous membrane, of blood; semen; vaginal secretions; cerebrospinal, synovial, pleural, peritoneal, pericardial, or amniotic fluid; or other body fluid that is visibly contaminated with blood.

973.017(4)(a)4.b. b. Exchange, during the accidental or intentional infliction of a penetrating wound, including a needle puncture, of blood; semen; vaginal secretions; cerebrospinal, synovial, pleural, peritoneal, pericardial, or amniotic fluid; or other body fluid that is visibly contaminated with blood.

973.017(4)(a)4.c. c. Exchange, into an eye, an open wound, an oozing lesion, or other place where a significant breakdown in the epidermal barrier has occurred, of blood; semen; vaginal secretions; cerebrospinal, synovial, pleural, peritoneal, pericardial, or amniotic fluid; or other body fluid that is visibly contaminated with blood.

973.017(4)(b) (b) When making a sentencing decision concerning a person convicted of a serious sex crime, the court shall consider as an aggravating factor the fact that the serious sex crime was committed under all of the following circumstances:

973.017(4)(b)1. 1. At the time that he or she committed the serious sex crime, the person convicted of committing the serious sex crime had a sexually transmitted disease or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome or had had a positive HIV test.

973.017(4)(b)2. 2. At the time that he or she committed the serious sex crime, the person convicted of committing the serious sex crime knew that he or she had a sexually transmitted disease or acquired immunodeficiency syndrome or that he or she had had a positive HIV test.

973.017(4)(b)3. 3. The victim of the serious sex crime was significantly exposed to HIV or to the sexually transmitted disease, whichever is applicable, by the acts constituting the serious sex crime.

973.017(5) (5) Aggravating factors; violent felony committed against elder person.

973.017(5)(a) (a) In this subsection:

973.017(5)(a)1. 1. “Elder person” means any individual who is 62 years of age or older.

973.017(5)(a)2. 2. “Violent felony” means any felony under s. 940.19 (2), (4), (5), or (6), 940.225 (1), (2), or (3), 940.23, or 943.32.

973.017(5)(b) (b) When making a sentencing decision concerning a person convicted of a violent felony, the court shall consider as an aggravating factor the fact that the victim of the violent felony was an elder person. This paragraph applies even if the person mistakenly believed that the victim had not attained the age of 62 years.

973.017(6) (6) Aggravating factors; child sexual assault or child abuse by certain persons.