Chapter 968

Dated ...., .... (year)

.... (Signature)

.... District Attorney

968.04(3)(b)4. 4. The complaint and summons may be on the same form. The summons shall be beneath the complaint. If separate forms are used, a copy of the complaint shall be attached to the summons.

968.04(4) (4) Service.

968.04(4)(a) (a) The warrant shall be directed to all law enforcement officers of the state. A warrant may be served anywhere in the state.

968.04(4)(b) (b) A warrant is served by arresting the defendant and informing the defendant as soon as practicable of the nature of the crime with which the defendant is charged.

968.04(4)(c) (c) An arrest may be made by a law enforcement officer without a warrant in the law enforcement officer’s possession when the law enforcement officer has knowledge that a warrant has been issued. In such case, the officer shall inform the defendant as soon as practicable of the nature of the crime with which the defendant is charged.

968.04(4)(d) (d) The law enforcement officer arresting a defendant shall endorse upon the warrant the time and place of the arrest and the law enforcement officer’s fees and mileage therefor.

968.04 History History: 1973 c. 12; 1975 c. 39, 41, 199; 1977 c. 449 ss. 480, 497; 1983 a. 535; Sup. Ct. Order, 141 Wis. 2d xiii (1987); 1987 a. 151; 1993 a. 486; 1997 a. 250; Sup. Ct. Order No. 19-01, 2019 WI 44, 386 Wis. 2d xvii.

968.04 Note Judicial Council Note, 1988: Sub. (1) (d) permits an arrest warrant or summons to be issued upon the basis of sworn recorded testimony received by telephone on request of the person seeking the warrant or summons unless good cause to the contrary appears. The telephone procedure permits faster processing of the application, while preserving a record of the basis for subsequent review. [Re Order effective Jan. 1, 1988]

968.04 Annotation To be constitutionally sufficient to support the issuance of an arrest warrant and to show probable cause, a complaint must contain the essential facts constituting the offense charged. A complaint was fatally defective in merely repeating the language of the statute allegedly violated. State v. Williams, 47 Wis. 2d 242, 177 N.W.2d 611 (1970).

968.04 Annotation A warrant was properly issued upon sworn testimony of a sheriff that an accomplice had confessed and implicated the defendant, since reliable hearsay is permitted and a confession is not inherently untrustworthy. Okrasinski v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 210, 186 N.W.2d 314 (1971).

968.04 Annotation When a complaint alleged that a reliable informant procured a sample of drugs from the defendant’s apartment, the inference that the informant observed the defendant’s possession of a controlled substance satisfied the Aguilar, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), test. Scott v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 504, 243 N.W.2d 215 (1976).

968.04 Annotation A criminal prosecution is properly and timely commenced by a John Doe complaint and arrest warrant that identify the defendant solely by a DNA profile, which meets the requirement of sub. (3) (a) 4. that if the defendant’s name is not known the person to be arrested must be identified by any description by which the person to be arrested can be identified with reasonable certainty. State v. Dabney, 2003 WI App 108, 264 Wis. 2d 843, 663 N.W.2d 366, 02-2445.

968.04 Annotation Applicable law allows electronic transmission of certain confidential case information among clerks of circuit court, county sheriff’s offices, and the Department of Justice through electronic interfaces involving the Department of Administration’s Office of Justice Assistance, specifically including electronic data messages about adult arrest warrants if either the warrant or the case in which it was issued has been ordered sealed by the court. OAG 2-10.

968.04 Note NOTE: See also the notes to article I, section 11, of the Wisconsin Constitution.

968.05 968.05 Corporations or limited liability companies: summons in criminal cases.

968.05(1) (1) When a corporation or limited liability company is charged with the commission of a criminal offense, the judge or district attorney shall issue a summons setting forth the nature of the offense and commanding the corporation or limited liability company to appear before a court at a specific time and place.

968.05(2) (2) The summons for the appearance of a corporation or limited liability company may be served as provided for service of a summons upon a corporation or limited liability company in a civil action. The summons shall be returnable not less than 10 days after service.

968.05 History History: 1993 a. 112.

968.05 Cross-reference Cross-reference: See s. 973.17 for a provision for default judgment against a corporation.

968.06 968.06 Indictment by grand jury. Upon indictment by a grand jury a complaint shall be issued, as provided by s. 968.02, upon the person named in the indictment and the person shall be entitled to a preliminary hearing under s. 970.03, and all proceedings thereafter shall be the same as if the person had been initially charged under s. 968.02 and had not been indicted by a grand jury.

968.06 History History: 1979 c. 291.

968.07 968.07 Arrest by a law enforcement officer.

968.07(1) (1) A law enforcement officer may arrest a person when:

968.07(1)(a) (a) The law enforcement officer has a warrant commanding that such person be arrested; or

968.07(1)(b) (b) The law enforcement officer believes, on reasonable grounds, that a warrant for the person’s arrest has been issued in this state; or

968.07(1)(c) (c) The law enforcement officer believes, on reasonable grounds, that a felony warrant for the person’s arrest has been issued in another state; or

968.07(1)(d) (d) There are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or has committed a crime.

968.07(1m) (1m) Notwithstanding sub. (1), a law enforcement officer shall arrest a person when required to do so under s. 813.12 (7), 813.122 (10), 813.125 (6), 813.128 (3g) (b), or 968.075 (2) (a) or (5) (e).

968.07(2) (2) A law enforcement officer making a lawful arrest may command the aid of any person, and such person shall have the same power as that of the law enforcement officer.

968.07(3) (3) If the alleged violator under s. 948.55 (2) or 948.60 (2) (c) is or was the parent or guardian of a child who is injured or dies as a result of an accidental shooting, no law enforcement officer may arrest the alleged violator until at least 7 days after the date of the shooting.

968.07 History History: 1991 a. 139; 1993 a. 486; 2005 a. 104; 2015 a. 352.

968.07 Annotation If the police have probable cause for arrest without a warrant, they may break down a door to effect the arrest after announcing their purpose in demanding admission. The remedy for excessive force is not dismissal of the criminal charge. Nadolinski v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 259, 174 N.W.2d 483 (1970).

968.07 Annotation An arrest based solely on evidence discovered after an illegal search is invalid. State ex rel. Furlong v. Waukesha County Court, 47 Wis. 2d 515, 177 N.W.2d 333 (1970).

968.07 Annotation While probable cause for an arrest without a warrant requires that an officer have more than a mere suspicion, the officer does not need the same quantum of evidence necessary for conviction, but information that would lead a reasonable officer to believe that guilt is more than a possibility, which information can be based in part on hearsay. State v. DiMaggio, 49 Wis. 2d 565, 182 N.W.2d 466 (1971).

968.07 Annotation An officer need not be in possession of a warrant to make a valid arrest. Schill v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 473, 184 N.W.2d 858 (1971).

968.07 Annotation An arrest was valid when a defendant, approached by an officer, voluntarily stated that he assumed they would be looking for him because he had been the last person to see the victim alive. Schenk v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 600, 187 N.W.2d 853 (1971).

968.07 Annotation Police have grounds to arrest without a warrant when they have information from a reliable informer that a crime is to be committed, when they check the information, and when the defendants attempt to escape when stopped. Molina v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 662, 193 N.W.2d 874 (1972).

968.07 Annotation A person is not under arrest and the officer is not attempting an arrest, so far as the right to use force is concerned, until the person knows or should know that the person restraining or attempting to restrain the person is an officer. Celmer v. Quarberg, 56 Wis. 2d 581, 203 N.W.2d 45 (1973).

968.07 Annotation An illegal execution of a valid arrest warrant is not sufficient to result in a loss of personal jurisdiction over the accused. State v. Monsoor, 56 Wis. 2d 689, 203 N.W.2d 20 (1973).

968.07 Annotation The fact that a witness had identified the defendant by photograph was sufficient to support an arrest, even though the witness was not allowed to identify the defendant at the trial. State v. Wallace, 59 Wis. 2d 66, 207 N.W.2d 855 (1973).

968.07 Annotation When an officer, mistakenly believing in good faith that the occupants of a car had committed a crime, stopped the car and arrested the occupants, the arrest was illegal, but a shotgun in plain sight on the back seat could be seized and used in evidence. State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973).

968.07 Annotation Enforcement officers may make constitutionally valid arrests without warrants under sub. (1) (d) if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime. Rinehart v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 760, 218 N.W.2d 323 (1974).

968.07 Annotation The police force is considered as a unit. If there is a police-channeled communication to the arresting officer who acts in good faith, the arrest is based on probable cause when facts exist within the police department. State v. Shears, 68 Wis. 2d 217, 229 N.W.2d 103 (1975).

968.07 Annotation When bags were heavy and contained brick-like objects obtained in an overnight trip and the defendant’s house was under surveillance, there was probable cause for arrest for possession of marijuana. State v. Phelps, 73 Wis. 2d 313, 243 N.W.2d 213 (1976).

968.07 Annotation The test under sub. (1) (d) is whether the arresting officer could have obtained a warrant on the basis of information known prior to the arrest. Police may rely on eyewitness reports of citizen informers. Loveday v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 503, 247 N.W.2d 116 (1976).

968.07 Annotation An officer may make a warrantless arrest for an ordinance violation if a statutory counterpart of the ordinance exists. City of Madison v. Two Crow, 88 Wis. 2d 156, 276 N.W.2d 359 (Ct. App. 1979).

968.07 Annotation Evidence obtained during a mistaken arrest is admissible as long as the arresting officer acts in good faith and has reasonable, articulable grounds to believe that the suspect is the intended arrestee. State v. Lee, 97 Wis. 2d 679, 294 N.W.2d 547 (Ct. App. 1980).

968.07 Annotation An arrest by an out-of-state police officer was a valid citizen’s arrest. State v. Slawek, 114 Wis. 2d 332, 338 N.W.2d 120 (Ct. App. 1983).

968.07 Annotation When a defendant’s mother admitted police into her home to talk to her son, the subsequent arrest of her son was valid. State v. Rodgers, 119 Wis. 2d 102, 349 N.W.2d 453 (1984).

968.07 Annotation Municipal police may arrest and detain a person for whom another municipality in another county has issued a civil arrest warrant. 61 Atty. Gen. 275.

968.07 Annotation A city police officer is a law enforcement officer and traffic officer within s. 345.22. 61 Atty. Gen. 419.

968.07 Note NOTE: See also the notes to article I, section 11, of the Wisconsin Constitution.

968.073 968.073 Recording custodial interrogations.

968.073(1) (1) In this section:

968.073(1)(a) (a) “Custodial interrogation” means an interrogation by a law enforcement officer or an agent of a law enforcement agency of a person suspected of committing a crime from the time the suspect is or should be informed of his or her rights to counsel and to remain silent until the questioning ends, during which the officer or agent asks a question that is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response and during which a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would believe that he or she is in custody or otherwise deprived of his or her freedom of action in any significant way.

968.073(1)(b) (b) “Law enforcement agency” has the meaning given in s. 165.83 (1) (b).

968.073(1)(c) (c) “Law enforcement officer” has the meaning given in s. 165.85 (2) (c).

968.073(2) (2) It is the policy of this state to make an audio or audio and visual recording of a custodial interrogation of a person suspected of committing a felony unless a condition under s. 972.115 (2) (a) 1. to 6. applies or good cause is shown for not making an audio or audio and visual recording of the interrogation.

968.073(3) (3) A law enforcement officer or agent of a law enforcement agency conducting a custodial interrogation is not required to inform the subject of the interrogation that the officer or agent is making an audio or audio and visual recording of the interrogation.

968.073 History History: 2005 a. 60.

968.073 Annotation Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin’s New Governance Experiment. Kruse. 2006 WLR 645.

968.075 968.075 Domestic abuse incidents; arrest and prosecution.

968.075(1) (1) Definitions. In this section:

968.075(1)(a) (a) “Domestic abuse” means any of the following engaged in by an adult person against his or her spouse or former spouse, against an adult with whom the person resides or formerly resided or against an adult with whom the person has a child in common:

968.075(1)(a)1. 1. Intentional infliction of physical pain, physical injury or illness.

968.075(1)(a)2. 2. Intentional impairment of physical condition.

968.075(1)(a)3. 3. A violation of s. 940.225 (1), (2) or (3).

968.075(1)(a)4. 4. A physical act that may cause the other person reasonably to fear imminent engagement in the conduct described under subd. 1., 2. or 3.

968.075(1)(b) (b) “Law enforcement agency” has the meaning specified in s. 165.83 (1) (b).

968.075(1)(d) (d) “Party” means a person involved in a domestic abuse incident.

968.075(1)(e) (e) “Predominant aggressor” means the most significant, but not necessarily the first, aggressor in a domestic abuse incident.

968.075(2) (2) Circumstances requiring arrest; presumption against certain arrests.

968.075(2)(a) (a) Notwithstanding s. 968.07 (1) and except as provided in pars. (am) and (b), a law enforcement officer shall arrest and take a person into custody if:

968.075(2)(a)1. 1. The officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or has committed domestic abuse and that the person’s actions constitute the commission of a crime; and

968.075(2)(a)2. 2. Any of the following apply:

968.075(2)(a)2.a. a. The officer has a reasonable basis for believing that continued domestic abuse against the alleged victim is likely.

968.075(2)(a)2.b. b. There is evidence of physical injury to the alleged victim.

968.075(2)(a)2.c. c. The person is the predominant aggressor.

968.075(2)(am) (am) Notwithstanding s. 968.07 (1), unless the person’s arrest is required under s. 813.12 (7), 813.122 (10), 813.125 (6), or 813.128 (3g) (b) or sub. (5) (e), if a law enforcement officer identifies the predominant aggressor, it is generally not appropriate for a law enforcement officer to arrest anyone under par. (a) other than the predominant aggressor.

968.075(2)(ar) (ar) In order to protect victims from continuing domestic abuse, a law enforcement officer shall consider all of the following in identifying the predominant aggressor:

968.075(2)(ar)1. 1. The history of domestic abuse between the parties, if it can be reasonably ascertained by the officer, and any information provided by witnesses regarding that history.

968.075(2)(ar)2. 2. Statements made by witnesses.

968.075(2)(ar)3. 3. The relative degree of injury inflicted on the parties.

968.075(2)(ar)4. 4. The extent to which each person present appears to fear any party.

968.075(2)(ar)5. 5. Whether any party is threatening or has threatened future harm against another party or another family or household member.

968.075(2)(ar)6. 6. Whether either party acted in self-defense or in defense of any other person under the circumstances described in s. 939.48.