Chapter 893

893.64 893.64 Actions upon accounts. In actions brought to recover the balance due upon a mutual and open account current the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued at the time of the last item proved in such account.

893.64 History History: 1979 c. 323.

893.64 Note Judicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.25 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]

893.64 Annotation There must be mutual debts or setoff before this section applies. Demos v. Carey, 50 Wis. 2d 262, 184 N.W.2d 117 (1971).

893.65 893.65 Bank bills not affected. This chapter does not apply to any action brought upon any bills, notes or other evidences of debt issued or put into circulation as money by a bank or other person.

893.65 History History: 1979 c. 323.

893.65 Note Judicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.29 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893 and revised to reflect Lusk v. Stoughton State Bank, 135 Wis. 311, 115 N.W. 813 (1908). [Bill 326-A]

893.66 893.66 Certified public accountants; limitations of actions.

893.66(1) (1) Except as provided in subs. (1m) to (4), an action to recover damages, based on tort, contract or other legal theory, against any certified public accountant licensed or certified under ch. 442 for an act or omission in the performance of professional accounting services shall be commenced within 6 years from the date of the act or omission or be barred.

893.66(1m) (1m) If a person sustains damages covered under sub. (1) during the period beginning on the first day of the 6th year and ending on the last day of the 6th year after the performance of the professional accounting services, the time for commencing the action for damages is extended one year after the date on which the damages occurred.

893.66(2) (2) If a person sustains damages covered under sub. (1) and the statute of limitations applicable to those damages bars commencement of the cause of action before the end of the period specified in sub. (1), then that statute of limitations applies.

893.66(3) (3) This section does not apply to actions subject to s. 551.509 (10) or 553.51 (4).

893.66(4) (4) This section does not apply to any person who commits fraud or concealment in the performance of professional accounting services.

893.66 History History: 1993 a. 310; 2001 a. 16; 2007 a. 196.

subch. VII of ch. 893 SUBCHAPTER VII

ACTIONS RELATING TO GOVERNMENTAL
DECISIONS OR ORGANIZATION

893.70 893.70 Action against certain officials. An action against a sheriff, coroner, medical examiner, town clerk, or constable upon a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his or her official capacity and in virtue of his or her office or by the omission of an official duty, including the nonpayment of money collected upon execution, shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred. This section does not apply to an action for an escape.

893.70 History History: 1979 c. 323.

893.70 Note Judicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.20 (1) renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]

893.71 893.71 County seat; contesting change. An action or proceeding to test the validity of a change of any county seat shall be commenced within 3 years after the date of the publication of the governor’s proclamation of such change or be barred. Every defense founded upon the invalidity of any such change must be interposed within 3 years after the date of the aforesaid publication, and the time of commencement of the action or proceeding to which any such defense is made shall be deemed the time when such defense is interposed.

893.71 History History: 1979 c. 323.

893.71 Note Judicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.20 (3) renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]

893.72 893.72 Actions contesting special assessment. An action to avoid any special assessment, or taxes levied pursuant to the special assessment, or to restrain the levy of the taxes or the sale of lands for the nonpayment of the taxes, shall be brought within one year from the notice thereof, and not thereafter. This limitation shall cure all defects in the proceedings, and defects of power on the part of the officers making the assessment, except in cases where the lands are not liable to the assessment, or the city, village or town has no power to make any such assessment, or the amount of the assessment has been paid or a redemption made.

893.72 History History: 1979 c. 323; 1993 a. 246.

893.72 Note Judicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.24 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]

893.72 Annotation The one-year bar under this section does not apply if the municipality did not have the power to make the assessment. State ex rel. Robinson v. Town of Bristol, 2003 WI App 97, 264 Wis. 2d 318, 667 N.W.2d 14, 02-1427.

893.73 893.73 Actions contesting governmental decisions.

893.73(1) (1) The following actions are barred unless brought within 180 days after the adoption of the order, resolution, ordinance or ordinance amendment contested:

893.73(1)(a) (a) An action to contest the validity of a county zoning ordinance or amendment, if s. 59.69 (14) applies to the action.

893.73(1)(b) (b) An action to review the validity of proceedings for division or dissolution of a town under s. 60.03.

893.73(2) (2) The following actions are barred unless brought within 90 days after the adoption of the order, annexation ordinance or final determination of the action contested:

893.73(2)(a) (a) An action under s. 60.73 contesting an act of a town board or the department of natural resources in the establishment of a town sanitary district.

893.73(2)(b) (b) An action to contest the validity of an annexation, if s. 66.0217 (11) applies to the action.

893.73 History History: 1979 c. 323; 1981 c. 346; 1983 a. 532; 1995 a. 201; 1999 a. 150 s. 672; 2003 a. 214.

893.73 Note NOTE: 2003 Wis. Act 214, which affected this section, contains extensive explanatory notes.

893.73 Note Judicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section has been created to consolidate into one provision of ch. 893 six types of actions presently outside of the chapter involving the contesting of governmental decisions. The actions have been broken down into 2 separate categories, those which must be commenced within 180 days of the adoption of the governmental decision and those that must be commenced within 90 days of the decision.

893.73 Note The previous 180-day period within which to contest a county zoning ordinance or amendment remains unchanged.

893.73 Note The one-year period in which to commence an action to contest the proceedings to constitute or divide a town has been shortened to 180 days (see note following s. 60.05 (4)). The previous 180-day time period to commence an action contesting the validity of the creation of a soil and water district remains unchanged (see note following s. 92.16).

893.73 Note The previous 20-day period to commence an action to set aside an action of a town board to establish a sanitary district has been increased to 90 days (see note following s. 60.304).

893.73 Note The previous 60-day period within which to commence an action to contest the validity of an annexation has been increased to 90 days (see note following s. 66.021 (10) (a)).

893.73 Note The 90-day period to commence an action contesting the validity of an order regarding a highway or highway records remains unchanged (see note following s. 80.34 (2)). [Bill 326-A]

893.73 Annotation Under sub. (2), “adoption” refers to a legislative body’s approval of an annexation ordinance. The statute of limitations begins to run on that date. Town of Sheboygan v. City of Sheboygan, 150 Wis. 2d 210, 441 N.W.2d 752 (Ct. App. 1989).

893.735 893.735 Action by prisoner contesting a governmental decision.

893.735(1) (1) In this section, “prisoner” has the meaning given in s. 801.02 (7) (a) 2.

893.735(2) (2) An action seeking a remedy available by certiorari made on behalf of a prisoner is barred unless commenced within 45 days after the cause of action accrues. The 45-day period shall begin on the date of the decision or disposition, except that the court may extend the period by as many days as the prisoner proves have elapsed between the decision or disposition and the prisoner’s actual notice of the decision or disposition. Subject to no contact requirements of a court or the department of corrections, a prisoner in administrative confinement, program segregation or adjustment segregation may communicate by 1st class mail, in accordance with department of corrections’ rules or with written policies of the custodian of the prisoner, with a 3rd party outside the institution regarding the action or special proceeding.

893.735(3) (3) In this section, an action seeking a remedy available by certiorari is commenced at the time that the prisoner files a petition seeking a writ of certiorari with a court.

893.735 History History: 1997 a. 133.

893.735 Annotation The words “on behalf of” in sub. (2) are not restricted to third-party conduct. The time limit applies to actions filed by a prisoner on behalf of himself or herself. State ex rel. Collins v. Cooke, 2000 WI App 101, 235 Wis. 2d 63, 611 N.W.2d 774, 99-1212.

893.735 Annotation Persons seeking certiorari review of probation revocation are prisoners subject to the 45-day filing deadline under sub. (2). State ex rel. Cramer v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 2000 WI 86, 236 Wis. 2d 473, 613 N.W.2d 591, 99-1089.

893.735 Annotation The definition of “prisoner” in s. 801.02 (7) (a) 2. does not include a Wisconsin inmate sent to an out-of-state county jail, and, therefore, the 45-day limit does not apply to the inmate. State ex rel. Frohwirth v. Wisconsin Parole Commission, 2000 WI App 139, 237 Wis. 2d 627, 614 N.W.2d 541, 99-2079.

893.735 Annotation When a prison inmate places a certiorari petition in the prison’s mailbox for forwarding to the circuit court, the 45-day limit under sub. (2) is tolled. However, other defects in filing may nonetheless result in rejection by the court. State ex rel. Shimkus v. Sondalle, 2000 WI App 262, 240 Wis. 2d 310, 622 N.W.2d 763, 00-0841.

893.735 Annotation To invoke the tolling of the 45-day limit under sub. (2), an inmate must present an affidavit or some other sufficient evidence of the date on which the petition was deposited in the institution mailbox. State ex rel. Shimkus v. Sondalle, 2000 WI App 262, 240 Wis. 2d 310, 622 N.W.2d 763, 00-0841.

893.735 Annotation A verified petition, being a sworn statement, that was unchallenged by the state was sufficient to establish the number of days between the date of the challenged decision and the prisoner’s receipt of it. There were no circumstances justifying not extending the 45-day limit pursuant to sub. (2). State ex rel. Johnson v. Litscher, 2001 WI App 47, 241 Wis. 2d 407, 625 N.W.2d 887, 00-1485.

893.735 Annotation That out-of-state inmates have a longer filing deadline for challenging parole revocation under Frohwirth, 2000 WI App 139, does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. State ex rel. Saffold v. Schwarz, 2001 WI App 56, 241 Wis. 2d 253, 625 N.W.2d 333, 99-2945.

893.735 Annotation The statute of limitations is tolled while a prisoner waits for the Department of Justice to provide the certification required by ss. 801.02 (7) (d) and 802.05 (3) (c). State ex rel. Locklear v. Schwarz, 2001 WI App 74, 242 Wis. 2d 327, 629 N.W.2d 30, 99-3211.

893.735 Annotation For purposes of sub. (2), tolling of the 45-day clock for prisoners to commence actions begins when the documents over which prisoners have control have been mailed, and all of the documents over which prisoners have no control have been requested by the prisoners. The time begins running again when those documents are within the prisoners’ control. State ex rel. Walker v. McCaughtry, 2001 WI App 110, 244 Wis. 2d 177, 629 N.W.2d 17, 00-1439.

893.735 Annotation To invoke the tolling of the 45-day limit under sub. (2), a prisoner must submit proper documents and comply with statutory fee or fee-waiver requirements. State ex rel. Tyler v. Bett, 2002 WI App 234, 257 Wis. 2d 606, 652 N.W.2d 800, 01-2808.

893.735 Annotation Petitioners were entitled to equitable relief when they timely asked counsel to file for certiorari, counsel promised to do so, and due to counsel’s failure to timely file they were denied certiorari review. The 45-day time limit for the filing of a writ of certiorari was equitably tolled as of the date that counsel promised to file for certiorari review. State ex rel. Griffin v. Smith, 2004 WI 36, 270 Wis. 2d 235, 677 N.W.2d 259, 01-2345.

893.735 Annotation The combined effects of subs. (2) and (3) and s. 801.02 (7) (c) is that the administrative-process documents expansively described in s. 801.02 (7) (c) are required to timely pursue a prepayment waiver, and they are also required under this section to timely commence a writ action. Mitchell v. Buesgen, 2024 WI App 14, 411 Wis. 2d 269, 4 N.W.3d 596, 22-1076.

893.74 893.74 School district; contesting validity. No appeal or other action attacking the legality of the formation of a school district, either directly or indirectly, may be commenced after the school district has exercised the rights and privileges of a school district for a period of 90 days.

893.74 History History: 1979 c. 323.

893.74 Note Judicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section has been created to place into ch. 893 the statute of limitations for an action attacking the legality of a formation of a school district (see note following s. 117.01 (7)). [Bill 326-A]

893.75 893.75 Limitation of action attacking municipal contracts. Whenever the proper officers of any city, village or town, however incorporated, enter into any contract in manner and form as prescribed by statute, and either party to the contract has procured or furnished materials or expended money under the terms of the contract, no action or proceedings may be maintained to test the validity of the contract unless the action or proceeding is commenced within 60 days after the date of the signing of the contract.

893.75 History History: 1979 c. 323; 1993 a. 246.

893.75 Note Judicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This action has been created to place into ch. 893 the statute of limitation for an action contesting the validity in a contract entered into by a city or village (see note following s. 66.13). [Bill 326-A]

893.76 893.76 Order to repair or remove building or restore site; contesting. An application under s. 66.0413 (1) (h) to a circuit court for an order restraining the inspector of buildings or other designated officer from razing and removing a building or part of a building and restoring a site to a dust-free and erosion-free condition shall be made within 30 days after service of the order issued under s. 66.0413 (1) (b) or be barred.

893.76 History History: 1979 c. 323; 1989 a. 347; 1991 a. 189; 1993 a. 213; 1999 a. 150.

893.76 Note Judicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section has been created to place into ch. 893 the statute of limitations for an application for an order restraining the razing or removing of a building (see note following s. 66.05 (3)). [Bill 326-A]

893.765 893.765 Order to remove wharves or piers in navigable waters; contesting. An application under s. 30.13 (5m) (c) to circuit court for a restraining order prohibiting the removal of a wharf or pier shall be made within 30 days after service of the order issued under s. 30.13 (5m) (a) or be barred.

893.765 History History: 1981 c. 252; 1999 a. 150 ss. 669, 672; 2001 a. 30 s. 108.

893.77 893.77 Validity of municipal obligation.

893.77(1) (1) An action to contest the validity of any municipal obligation which has been certified by an attorney in the manner provided in s. 67.025, for other than constitutional reasons, must be commenced within 30 days after the recording of such certificate as provided by s. 67.025. An action to contest the validity of any state or state authority obligation for other than constitutional reasons must be commenced within 30 days after the adoption of the authorizing resolution for such obligation.

893.77(2) (2) An action or proceeding to contest the validity of any municipal bond or other financing, other than an obligation certified as described in sub. (1), for other than constitutional reasons, must be commenced within 30 days after the date on which the issuer publishes in the issuer’s official newspaper, or, if none exists, in a newspaper having general circulation within the issuer’s boundaries, a class 1 notice, under ch. 985, authorized by the governing body of the issuer, and setting forth the name of the issuer, that the notice is given under this section, the amount of the bond issue or other financing and the anticipated date of closing of the bond or other financing and that a copy of proceedings had to date of the notice are on file and available for inspection in a designated office of the issuer. The notice may not be published until after the issuer has entered into a contract for sale of the bond or other financing.

893.77(3) (3) An action contesting bonds of a municipal power district organized under ch. 198, for other than constitutional reasons, shall be commenced within 30 days after the date of their issuance or be barred.

893.77 History History: 1971 c. 40 s. 93; 1971 c. 117, 211; 1973 c. 265; 1975 c. 221; 1979 c. 323; 1983 a. 192.

893.77 Note Judicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.23 renumbered for more logical placement in the restructured chapter. Section 893.77 (3) is created to place into ch. 893 of the statutes the statute of limitations for an action contesting the bonds of a municipal power district (see note following s. 198.18 (3)). [Bill 326-A]

subch. VIII of ch. 893 SUBCHAPTER VIII

CLAIMS AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL BODIES,
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES;
STATUTORY CHALLENGES

893.80 893.80 Claims against governmental bodies or officers, agents or employees; notice of injury; limitation of damages and suits.

893.80(1b) (1b) In this section, “agent” includes a volunteer. In this subsection, “volunteer” means a person who satisfies all of the following:

893.80(1b)(a) (a) The person provides services or performs duties for and with the express or implied consent of a volunteer fire company organized under ch. 181 or 213, political corporation, or governmental subdivision or agency thereof. A person satisfies the requirements under this paragraph even if the activities of the person with regard to the services and duties and the details and method by which the services are provided and the duties are performed are left to the discretion of the person.

893.80(1b)(b) (b) The person is subject to the right of control of the volunteer company, political corporation, or governmental subdivision or agency described in par. (a).

893.80(1b)(c) (c) The person is not paid a fee, salary, or other compensation by any person for the services or duties described in par. (a). In this paragraph, “compensation” does not include the reimbursement of expenses.

893.80(1d) (1d) Except as provided in subs. (1g), (1m), (1p) and (8), no action may be brought or maintained against any volunteer fire company organized under ch. 213, political corporation, governmental subdivision or agency thereof nor against any officer, official, agent or employee of the corporation, subdivision or agency for acts done in their official capacity or in the course of their agency or employment upon a claim or cause of action unless:

893.80(1d)(a) (a) Within 120 days after the happening of the event giving rise to the claim, written notice of the circumstances of the claim signed by the party, agent or attorney is served on the volunteer fire company, political corporation, governmental subdivision or agency and on the officer, official, agent or employee under s. 801.11. Failure to give the requisite notice shall not bar action on the claim if the fire company, corporation, subdivision or agency had actual notice of the claim and the claimant shows to the satisfaction of the court that the delay or failure to give the requisite notice has not been prejudicial to the defendant fire company, corporation, subdivision or agency or to the defendant officer, official, agent or employee; and

893.80(1d)(b) (b) A claim containing the address of the claimant and an itemized statement of the relief sought is presented to the appropriate clerk or person who performs the duties of a clerk or secretary for the defendant fire company, corporation, subdivision or agency and the claim is disallowed.

893.80(1g) (1g) Notice of disallowance of the claim submitted under sub. (1d) shall be served on the claimant by registered or certified mail and the receipt therefor, signed by the claimant, or the returned registered letter, shall be proof of service. Failure of the appropriate body to disallow a claim within 120 days after presentation of the written notice of the claim is a disallowance. No action on a claim under this section against any defendant fire company, corporation, subdivision or agency nor against any defendant officer, official, agent or employee, may be brought after 6 months from the date of service of the notice of disallowance, and the notice of disallowance shall contain a statement to that effect.

893.80(1m) (1m) With regard to a claim to recover damages for medical malpractice, the provisions of sub. (1d) do not apply. The time periods that apply for commencing an action under this section for damages for medical malpractice are the time periods under ss. 893.55 (1m), (2), and (3) and 893.56.

893.80(1p) (1p) No action may be brought or maintained with regard to a claim to recover damages against any political corporation, governmental subdivision or agency thereof for the negligent inspection of any property, premises, place of employment or construction site for the violation of any statute, rule, ordinance or health and safety code unless the alleged negligent act or omission occurred after November 30, 1976. In any such action, the time period under sub. (1d) (a) shall be one year after discovery of the negligent act or omission or the date on which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence the negligent act or omission should have been discovered.