Chapter 343

343.305(9)(am) (am) If a person driving or operating or on duty time with respect to a commercial motor vehicle refuses a test under sub. (3) (am), the law enforcement officer shall immediately issue an out-of-service order to the person for the 24 hours after the refusal and notify the department in the manner prescribed by the department, and prepare a notice of intent to revoke, by court order under sub. (10), the person’s operating privilege. The officer shall issue a copy of the notice of intent to revoke the privilege to the person and submit or mail a copy to the circuit court for the county in which the refusal is made or to the municipal court in the municipality in which the refusal is made if the person’s refusal was in violation of a municipal ordinance and the municipality has a municipal court. The officer shall also mail a copy of the notice of intent to revoke to the attorney for that municipality or to the district attorney for that county, as appropriate, and to the department. Neither party is entitled to pretrial discovery in any refusal hearing, except that, if the defendant moves within 30 days after the initial appearance in person or by an attorney and shows cause therefor, the court may order that the defendant be allowed to inspect documents, including lists of names and addresses of witnesses, if available, and to test under s. 804.09, under such conditions as the court prescribes, any devices used by the plaintiff to determine whether a violation has been committed. The notice of intent to revoke the person’s operating privilege shall contain substantially all of the following information:

343.305(9)(am)1. 1. That the officer has issued an out-of-service order to the person for the 24 hours after the refusal, specifying the date and time of issuance.

343.305(9)(am)2. 2. That the officer complied with sub. (4).

343.305(9)(am)3. 3. That the person refused a request under sub. (3) (am).

343.305(9)(am)4. 4. That the person may request a hearing on the revocation within 10 days by mailing or delivering a written request to the court whose address is specified in the notice. If no request for a hearing is received within the 10-day period, the revocation period commences 30 days after the notice is issued.

343.305(9)(am)5. 5. That the issues of the hearing are limited to:

343.305(9)(am)5.a. a. Whether the officer detected any presence of alcohol, controlled substance, controlled substance analog or other drug, or a combination thereof, on the person or had reason to believe that the person was violating or had violated s. 346.63 (7).

343.305(9)(am)5.b. b. Whether the officer complied with sub. (4).

343.305(9)(am)5.c. c. Whether the person refused to permit the test. The person shall not be considered to have refused the test if it is shown by a preponderance of evidence that the refusal was due to a physical inability to submit to the test due to a physical disability or disease unrelated to the use of alcohol, controlled substances, controlled substance analogs or other drugs.

343.305(9)(am)6. 6. That if it is determined that the person refused the test there will be an order for the person to comply with assessment and a driver safety plan.

343.305(9)(b) (b) The use of the notice under par. (a) or (am) by a law enforcement officer in connection with the enforcement of this section is adequate process to give the appropriate court jurisdiction over the person.

343.305(9)(c) (c) If a law enforcement officer informs the circuit or municipal court that a person has refused to submit to a test under sub. (3) (a), (am), or (ar), the court shall be prepared to hold any requested hearing to determine if the refusal was proper. The scope of the hearing shall be limited to the issues outlined in par. (a) 5. or (am) 5. Section 967.055 applies to any hearing under this subsection.

343.305(9)(d) (d) At the close of the hearing, or within 5 days thereafter, the court shall determine the issues under par. (a) 5. or (am) 5. If all issues are determined adversely to the person, the court shall proceed under sub. (10). If one or more of the issues is determined favorably to the person, the court shall order that no action be taken on the operating privilege on account of the person’s refusal to take the test in question. This section does not preclude the prosecution of the person for violation of s. 346.63 (1), (2m), (5) or (7) or a local ordinance in conformity therewith, or s. 346.63 (2) or (6), 940.09 (1) or 940.25.

343.305(10) (10) Refusals; court-ordered revocation.

343.305(10)(a) (a) If the court determines under sub. (9) (d) that a person improperly refused to take a test or if the person does not request a hearing within 10 days after the person has been served with the notice of intent to revoke the person’s operating privilege, the court shall proceed under this subsection. If no hearing was requested, the revocation period shall begin 30 days after the date of the refusal. If a hearing was requested, the revocation period shall commence 30 days after the date of refusal or immediately upon a final determination that the refusal was improper, whichever is later.

343.305(10)(b) (b)

343.305(10)(b)1. 1. Except as provided in subds. 3. and 4., the court shall revoke the person’s operating privilege under this paragraph according to the number of previous suspensions, revocations or convictions that would be counted under s. 343.307 (2). Suspensions, revocations and convictions arising out of the same incident shall be counted as one. If a person has a conviction, suspension or revocation for any offense that is counted under s. 343.307 (2), that conviction, suspension or revocation shall count as a prior conviction, suspension or revocation under this subdivision.

343.305(10)(b)2. 2. Except as provided in subd. 3., 4. or 4m., for the first improper refusal, the court shall revoke the person’s operating privilege for one year. After the first 30 days of the revocation period, the person is eligible for an occupational license under s. 343.10.

343.305(10)(b)3. 3. Except as provided in subd. 4m., if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus the total number of other convictions, suspensions, and revocations counted under s. 343.307 (2) within a 10-year period, equals 2, the court shall revoke the person’s operating privilege for 2 years. After the first 90 days of the revocation period or, if the total number of convictions, suspensions, and revocations counted under this subdivision within any 5-year period equals 2 or more, after one year of the revocation period has elapsed, the person is eligible for an occupational license under s. 343.10 if he or she has completed the assessment and is complying with the driver safety plan.

343.305(10)(b)4. 4. Except as provided in subd. 4m., if the number of convictions under ss. 940.09 (1) and 940.25 in the person’s lifetime, plus the total number of other convictions, suspensions, and revocations counted under s. 343.307 (2), equals 3 or more, the court shall revoke the person’s operating privilege for 3 years. After the first 120 days of the revocation period or, if the total number of convictions, suspensions, and revocations counted under this subdivision within any 5-year period equals 2 or more, after one year of the revocation period has elapsed, the person is eligible for an occupational license under s. 343.10 if he or she has completed the assessment and is complying with the driver safety plan.

343.305(10)(b)4m. 4m. If there was a minor passenger under 16 years of age in the motor vehicle at the time of the incident that gave rise to the improper refusal, the applicable minimum and maximum revocation periods under subd. 2., 3. or 4. for the improper refusal are doubled.

343.305(10)(b)5. 5. The time period under this paragraph shall be measured from the dates of the refusals or violations which resulted in revocations or convictions.

343.305(10)(c) (c)

343.305(10)(c)1. 1. Except as provided in subd. 1. a. or b., the court shall order the person to submit to and comply with an assessment by an approved public treatment facility as defined in s. 51.45 (2) (c) for examination of the person’s use of alcohol, controlled substances or controlled substance analogs and development of a driver safety plan for the person. The court shall notify the person and the department of transportation of the assessment order. The court shall also notify the person that noncompliance with assessment or the driver safety plan will result in license suspension until the person is in compliance. The assessment order shall:

343.305(10)(c)1.a. a. If the person is a resident, refer the person to an approved public treatment facility in the county in which the person resides. The facility named in the order may provide for assessment of the person in another approved public treatment facility. The order shall provide that if the person is temporarily residing in another state, the facility named in the order may refer the person to an appropriate treatment facility in that state for assessment and development of a driver safety plan for the person satisfying the requirements of that state.

343.305(10)(c)1.b. b. If the person is a nonresident, refer the person to an approved public treatment facility in this state. The order shall provide that the facility named in the order may refer the person to an appropriate treatment facility in the state in which the person resides for assessment and development of a driver safety plan for the person satisfying the requirements of that state.

343.305(10)(c)1.c. c. Require a person who is referred to a treatment facility in another state under subd. 1. a. or b. to furnish the department written verification of his or her compliance from the agency which administers the assessment and driver safety plan program. The person shall provide initial verification of compliance within 60 days after the date of his or her conviction. The requirement to furnish verification of compliance may be satisfied by receipt by the department of such verification from the agency which administers the assessment and driver safety plan program.

343.305(10)(c)2. 2. The department of health services shall establish standards for assessment procedures and the driver safety plan programs by rule. The department of health services shall establish by rule conflict of interest guidelines for providers.

343.305(10)(c)3. 3. Prior to developing a plan which specifies treatment, the facility shall make a finding that treatment is necessary and appropriate services are available. The facility shall submit a report of the assessment and the driver safety plan within 14 days to the county department under s. 51.42, the plan provider, the department of transportation and the person, except that upon request by the facility and the person, the county department may extend the period for assessment for not more than 20 additional workdays. The county department shall notify the department of transportation regarding any such extension.

343.305(10)(d) (d) The assessment report shall order compliance with a driver safety plan. The report shall inform the person of the fee provisions under s. 46.03 (18) (f). The driver safety plan may include a component that makes the person aware of the effect of his or her offense on a victim and a victim’s family. The driver safety plan may include treatment for the person’s misuse, abuse or dependence on alcohol, controlled substances or controlled substance analogs, attendance at a school under s. 345.60, or both. If the plan requires inpatient treatment, the treatment shall not exceed 30 days. A driver safety plan under this paragraph shall include a termination date consistent with the plan which shall not extend beyond one year. The county department under s. 51.42 shall assure notification of the department of transportation and the person of the person’s compliance or noncompliance with assessment and treatment. The school under s. 345.60 shall notify the department, the county department under s. 51.42 and the person of the person’s compliance or noncompliance with the requirements of the school. Nonpayment of the assessment fee or, if the person has the ability to pay, nonpayment of the driver safety plan fee is noncompliance with the court order. If the department is notified of noncompliance, other than for nonpayment of the assessment fee or driver safety plan fee, it shall revoke the person’s operating privilege until the county department under s. 51.42 or the school under s. 345.60 notifies the department that the person is in compliance with assessment or the driver safety plan. If the department is notified that a person has not paid the assessment fee, or that a person with the ability to pay has not paid the driver safety plan fee, the department shall suspend the person’s operating privilege for a period of 2 years or until it receives notice that the person has paid the fee, whichever occurs first. The department shall notify the person of the suspension or revocation, the reason for the suspension or revocation and the person’s right to a review. A person may request a review of a revocation based upon failure to comply with a driver safety plan within 10 days of notification. The review shall be handled by the subunit of the department of transportation designated by the secretary. The issues at the review are limited to whether the driver safety plan, if challenged, is appropriate and whether the person is in compliance with the assessment order or the driver safety plan. The review shall be conducted within 10 days after a request is received. If the driver safety plan is determined to be inappropriate, the department shall order a reassessment and if the person is otherwise eligible, the department shall reinstate the person’s operating privilege. If the person is determined to be in compliance with the assessment or driver safety plan, and if the person is otherwise eligible, the department shall reinstate the person’s operating privilege. If there is no decision within the 10-day period, the department shall issue an order reinstating the person’s operating privilege until the review is completed, unless the delay is at the request of the person seeking the review.

343.305(10)(e) (e) Notwithstanding par. (c), if the court finds that the person is already covered by an assessment or is participating in a driver safety plan or has had evidence presented to it by a county department under s. 51.42 that the person has recently completed assessment, a driver safety plan or both, the court is not required to make an order under par. (c). This paragraph does not prohibit the court from making an order under par. (c), if it deems such an order advisable.

343.305(10)(em) (em) One penalty for improperly refusing to submit to a test for intoxication regarding a person arrested for a violation of s. 346.63 (2m) or (7) or a local ordinance in conformity therewith is revocation of the person’s operating privilege for 6 months. If there was a minor passenger under 16 years of age in the motor vehicle at the time of the incident that gave rise to the improper refusal, the revocation period is 12 months. After the first 15 days of the revocation period, the person is eligible for an occupational license under s. 343.10. Any such improper refusal or revocation for the refusal does not count as a prior refusal or a prior revocation under this section or ss. 343.30 (1q), 343.307 and 346.65 (2). The person shall not be required to submit to and comply with any assessment or driver safety plan under pars. (c) and (d).

343.305(10)(f) (f) The department may make any order which the court is authorized or required to make under this subsection if the court fails to do so.

343.305(10)(g) (g) The court or department shall provide that the period of suspension or revocation imposed under this subsection or under sub. (7) shall be reduced by any period of suspension or revocation previously served under s. 343.30 (1p) or (1q) if both suspensions or revocations arose out of the same incident or occurrence. The court or department shall order that the period of suspension or revocation imposed under this subsection or sub. (7) run concurrently with any time remaining on a suspension or revocation imposed under s. 343.30 (1p) or (1q) arising out of the same incident or occurrence.

343.305(10g) (10g) Suspensions and revocations; extensions. For any suspension or revocation the court orders under sub. (10), the court shall extend the suspension or revocation period by the number of days to which the court sentences the person to imprisonment in a jail or prison.

343.305(10m) (10m) Refusals; ignition interlock of a motor vehicle. The requirements and procedures for installation of an ignition interlock device under s. 343.301 apply when an operating privilege is revoked under sub. (10).

343.305(11) (11) Rules. The department shall promulgate rules under ch. 227 necessary to administer this section. The rules shall include provisions relating to the expeditious exchange of information under this section between the department and law enforcement agencies, circuit courts, municipal courts, attorneys who represent municipalities, district attorneys, and driver licensing agencies of other jurisdictions. The rules may not affect any provisions relating to court procedure.

343.305 History History: 1987 a. 3, 27, 399; 1989 a. 7, 31, 56, 105, 359; 1991 a. 39, 251, 277; 1993 a. 16, 105, 315, 317, 491; 1995 a. 27 ss. 6412cnL, 9126 (19); 1995 a. 113, 269, 425, 426, 436, 448; 1997 a. 35, 84, 107, 191, 237, 290; 1999 a. 9, 32, 109; 2001 a. 16 ss. 3421m to 3423j, 4060gk, 4060hw, 4060hy; 2001 a. 104; 2003 a. 97, 199; 2005 a. 332, 413; 2007 a. 20 ss. 3303 to 3315, 9121 (6) (a); 2007 a. 136; 2009 a. 100, 103, 163; 2011 a. 120, 242; 2013 a. 36, 224; 2017 a. 331; 2019 a. 68.

343.305 Cross-reference Cross-reference: See also chs. DHS 62 and Trans 107 and 113, Wis. adm. code.

343.305 Annotation Administration of a blood or breathalyzer test does not violate a defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Driver, 59 Wis. 2d 35, 207 N.W.2d 850 (1973).

343.305 Annotation The implied consent law must be liberally construed to effectuate its policies since it was intended to facilitate the taking of tests for intoxication and not to inhibit the ability of the state to remove drunken drivers from the highway. Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 219 N.W.2d 286 (1974).

343.305 Annotation Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), warnings are not required when an arrested driver is asked to submit to a test for intoxication under the implied consent statute. State v. Bunders, 68 Wis. 2d 129, 227 N.W.2d 727 (1975).

343.305 Annotation There is no right to counsel prior to submitting to an intoxication test. A driver is obliged to promptly take or refuse the test. State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 289 N.W.2d 828 (1980).

343.305 Annotation The state need not prove that notices were sent to state officers under sub. (3) (b) [now sub. (9) (a)]. State v. Polinski, 96 Wis. 2d 43, 291 N.W.2d 465 (1980).

343.305 Annotation When an officer initially requested a breath test, it was not an irrevocable election preventing the officer from requesting a urine test instead. The driver’s refusal to submit urine justified revocation of his driver’s license. State v. Pawlow, 98 Wis. 2d 703, 298 N.W.2d 220 (Ct. App. 1980).

343.305 Annotation The state need not affirmatively prove compliance with administrative code procedures as a foundation for admission of a breathalyzer test. City of New Berlin v. Wertz, 105 Wis. 2d 670, 314 N.W.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1981).

343.305 Annotation When a driver pled guilty to the underlying operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant charge, a charge of refusing a test under former s. 343.305, 1979 stats., was properly dismissed as unnecessary. State v. Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d 347, 335 N.W.2d 354 (1983).

343.305 Annotation A breathalyzer approved in the administrative code has a prima facie presumption of accuracy. State v. Dwinell, 119 Wis. 2d 305, 349 N.W.2d 739 (Ct. App. 1984).

343.305 Annotation When blood alcohol content is tested under statutory procedures, the results of the test are mandatorily admissible. The physical sample tested is not evidence intended, required, or even susceptible of being produced by state under s. 971.23. State v. Ehlen, 119 Wis. 2d 451, 351 N.W.2d 503 (1984).

343.305 Annotation A judge’s erroneous exclusion of a defendant’s explanation for a refusal to take a blood test was not harmless error. State v. Bolstad, 124 Wis. 2d 576, 370 N.W.2d 257 (1985).

343.305 Annotation At a revocation hearing under sub. (3) (b) 5. [now sub. (9) (a) 5.], the state need not establish to a reasonable certainty that the defendant was the actual driver of the vehicle stopped by the police. The probable cause standard satisfies due process. State v. Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 381 N.W.2d 300 (1986).

343.305 Annotation In sub. (2) (c) [now sub. (3) (b)], “not capable of withdrawing consent” must be construed narrowly and applied infrequently. State v. Disch, 129 Wis. 2d 225, 385 N.W.2d 140 (1986).

343.305 Annotation Under the facts of this case, the state’s refusal to provide an alternative blood alcohol test did not violate due process. State v. McCrossen, 129 Wis. 2d 277, 385 N.W.2d 161 (1986).

343.305 Annotation A mental disorder cannot justify a test refusal unless it is severe enough that the driver is deemed under sub. (3) (b) not to have refused at all. State v. Hagaman, 133 Wis. 2d 381, 395 N.W.2d 617 (Ct. App. 1986).

343.305 Annotation The implied consent law does not prevent the state from obtaining chemical test evidence by alternative constitutional means. State v. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d 39, 403 N.W.2d 427 (1987).

343.305 Annotation Appeal of an oral revocation order under sub. (10) may not be taken under s. 808.03 (1). State v. Borowski, 164 Wis. 2d 730, 476 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1991).

343.305 Annotation Evidence of refusal was not admissible when the defendant was not fully informed of the consequences in accordance with former sub. (4). State v. Algaier, 165 Wis. 2d 515, 478 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1991).

343.305 Annotation Substantial compliance with the requirements of former sub. (4) when the defendant was actually informed of all rights and penalties relating to him was sufficient. State v. Piskula, 168 Wis. 2d 135, 483 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1992). See also Village of Oregon v. Bryant, 188 Wis. 2d 680, 524 N.W.2d 635 (1994).

343.305 Annotation The sub. (9) (a) requirement that a notice of intent to revoke be prepared and served immediately is directory and not mandatory. State v. Moline, 170 Wis. 2d 531, 489 N.W.2d 667 (Ct. App. 1992).

343.305 Annotation An accused’s request under sub. (5) (a) for the accused’s own test only requires the arresting agency to make the accused available to obtain the test, not to take an active part in obtaining the test. State v. Vincent, 171 Wis. 2d 124, 490 N.W.2d 761 (Ct. App. 1992).

343.305 Annotation When an officer knew the defendant was licensed as a commercial operator and the ensuing revocation revoked all operating privileges, the commercial operator warnings, under former sub. (4) were required. State v. Geraldson, 176 Wis. 2d 487, 500 N.W.2d 415 (Ct. App. 1993).

343.305 Annotation Overstatement of the potential penalties for refusal to submit to a chemical test was substantial compliance with former sub. (4) and not grounds for reversing a revocation for refusal. State v. Sutton, 177 Wis. 2d 709, 503 N.W.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1993).

343.305 Annotation There was no error in informing a driver of all warnings under former sub. (4), including those applying to only commercial operators and those applying to only noncommercial operators, regardless of the driver’s status. Village of Elm Grove v. Landowski, 181 Wis. 2d 137, 510 N.W.2d 752 (Ct. App. 1993).

343.305 Annotation Sub. (5) (b) requires a person drawing blood “under the direction of a physician” to have general authorization from the physician rather than a specific order in each case. State v. Penzkofer, 184 Wis. 2d 262, 516 N.W.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1994).

343.305 Annotation The state’s burden of persuasion at a suppression hearing is significantly greater than at a refusal hearing. Consequently, a defendant is not precluded from relitigating the issue of probable cause at a suppression hearing. State v. Wille, 185 Wis. 2d 673 518 N.W.2d 325 (Ct. App. 1994).

343.305 Annotation Once a suspect has refused a second alternate blood alcohol test, there is no continuing obligation to accommodate future requests for an alternate test. State v. Stary, 187 Wis. 2d 266, 522 N.W.2d 32 (Ct. App. 1994).

343.305 Annotation Refusal to submit to a field sobriety test was properly admitted as evidence to determine probable cause for arrest for intoxicated operation of a motor vehicle. State v. Babbit, 188 Wis. 2d 349, 525 N.W.2d 102 (Ct. App. 1994).

343.305 Annotation A suspect must be properly informed under the implied consent law before evidence of a refusal may be admitted at a subsequent trial, but the state is not prevented from using the evidence if a revocation hearing is not held. State v. Donner, 192 Wis. 2d 305, 531 N.W.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1995).

343.305 Annotation A driver’s “subjective confusion” over the right not to take the chemical test is not grounds for challenging the propriety of the warnings given prior to administering the test. There is a three-part standard to be applied in determining the adequacy of the warnings. County of Ozaukee v. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d 269, 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1995), 95-1074. But see Washburn County v. Smith, 2008 WI 23, 308 Wis. 2d 65, 746 N.W.2d 243, 06-3163.

343.305 Annotation The implied consent law does not expressly require a suspect’s written consent to the blood alcohol test. A consent form will be liberally construed to determine whether it misinforms the suspect of the law. State v. Spring, 204 Wis. 2d 343, 555 N.W.2d 384 (Ct. App. 1996), 96-3565.

343.305 Annotation Criminal prosecution for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol content subsequent to an administrative suspension of a driver’s operating privileges in the same case does not constitute multiple punishment and does not constitute double jeopardy. State v. McMaster, 206 Wis. 2d 30, 556 N.W.2d 673 (1996), 95-1159.

343.305 Annotation A finding in an administrative review under sub. (8) that there was no probable cause for an arrest does not preclude the consideration of the same issue in a criminal proceeding. State v. Kasian, 207 Wis. 2d 611, 558 N.W.2d 687 (Ct. App. 1996), 96-1603.

343.305 Annotation When an officer exceeds the duty to give warnings prior to administering the test and gives erroneous information, it is the defendant’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the erroneous information caused the defendant’s refusal. State v. Ludwigson, 212 Wis. 2d 871, 569 N.W.2d 762 (Ct. App. 1997), 97-0417.

343.305 Annotation Willingness to submit to a blood alcohol test, subsequent to an earlier refusal, does not cure the refusal. State v. Rydeski, 214 Wis. 2d 101, 571 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1997), 97-0169.

343.305 Annotation A verbal refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test is not required to find a refusal. Conduct may serve as the basis for finding a refusal. State v. Rydeski, 214 Wis. 2d 101, 571 N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1997), 97-0169.

343.305 Annotation The chief of the Department of Transportation chemical test section is given authority to determine the procedures for evaluation of breath testing instruments. The consideration of modifications made to a new model of a previously tested machine and determination that the two models were analytically the same was sufficient testing. State v. Busch, 217 Wis. 2d 429, 576 N.W.2d 904 (1998), 96-2822.

343.305 Annotation When a defendant submitted to a blood test prior to being placed under arrest, the test was not made pursuant to this section. As such, there was no right to an alternative test under sub. (5). State v. Thurk, 224 Wis. 2d 662, 592 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-0251.

343.305 Annotation There is no constitutional duty to inform suspected drunk drivers that the right to counsel does not attach to the implied consent statute. State v. Reitter, 227 Wis. 2d 213, 595 N.W.2d 646 (1999), 98-0915.

343.305 Annotation A warrantless blood draw is permissible when: 1) the blood is taken to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person lawfully arrested; 2) there is a clear indication that evidence of intoxication will be produced; 3) the method used is reasonable and performed in a reasonable manner; and 4) the arrestee presents no reasonable objection. State v. Thorstad, 2000 WI App 199, 238 Wis. 2d 666, 618 N.W.2d 240, 99-1765. But see Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2016).

343.305 Annotation Although a notice of intent to revoke operating privileges under sub. (9) (a) did not contain “substantially all” of the statutorily required information, it provided meaningful notice and opportunity to be heard. As such the error was technical and required a finding of prejudice for dismissal of the action. State v. Gautschi, 2000 WI App 274, 240 Wis. 2d 83, 622 N.W.2d 24, 99-3065.

343.305 Annotation The notice under sub. (4) regarding the consequences for failing to submit to a blood alcohol does not violate due process. It does not mislead accused persons regarding taking or refusing the blood alcohol test. State v. Nord, 2001 WI App 48, 241 Wis. 2d 387, 625 N.W.2d 302, 00-1529.

343.305 Annotation In giving the warnings required under sub. (4), an officer is required to utilize methods that, according to the circumstances at the time, are reasonable and will convey the warnings. Whether the accused driver comprehends the warnings is not part of the inquiry. A driver’s hearing impairment must be taken into account and accommodated as is reasonably possible under the circumstances. State v. Piddington, 2001 WI 24, 241 Wis. 2d 754, 623 N.W.2d 528, 99-1250.

343.305 Annotation Drivers have no right to refuse a chemical test and need not consent to a test. When there is a refusal, the implied consent law does not preclude police from pursuing other constitutional avenues for collecting evidence. State v. Gibson, 2001 WI App 71, 242 Wis. 2d 267, 626 N.W.2d 73, 00-2399.

343.305 Annotation That a person agreed to a breath test but not a blood test did not render police insistence on a blood test unreasonable. State v. Wodenjak, 2001 WI App 216, 247 Wis. 2d 554, 634 N.W.2d 867, 00-3419.

343.305 Annotation By consenting to the taking of a blood sample, the defendant also consented to the chemical analysis of the sample. These are not separate events for warrant requirement purposes. State v. VanLaarhoven, 2001 WI App 275, 248 Wis. 2d 881, 637 N.W.2d 411, 01-0222. But see State v. Randall, 2019 WI 80, 387 Wis. 2d 744, 930 N.W.2d 223, 17-1518.

343.305 Annotation A warrantless blood draw by a physician in a jail setting may be unreasonable if it invites an unjustified element of personal risk of pain and infection. Absent evidence of those risks, a blood draw under those circumstances was reasonable. State v. Daggett, 2002 WI App 32, 250 Wis. 2d 112, 640 N.W.2d 546, 01-1417.

343.305 Annotation The circuits court’s improper denial of a hearing requested under sub. (8) as the result of its miscalculation of time that resulted in a suspension without a hearing was not a fundamental error entitling the defendant to dismissal of the conviction against him when the court, on realizing the error, conducted a hearing and found that the defendant’s refusal was improper and a license suspension was in order. State v. Carlson, 2002 WI App 44, 250 Wis. 2d 562, 641 N.W.2d 451, 01-1088.

343.305 Annotation Sub. (9) (a) does not provide the exclusive option when faced with an arrestee who refuses to submit to a chemical test. An officer may acknowledge the refusal, complete the sub. (9) (a) intent to revoke form, and then proceed with an involuntary blood test, using reasonable force to withdraw blood from a noncompliant suspect. The officer may necessarily inform a suspect that such a procedure is a possibility upon the suspect’s refusal. State v. Marshall, 2002 WI App 73, 251 Wis. 2d 408, 642 N.W.2d 571, 01-1403.

343.305 Annotation When the arresting officer makes no specific threats beyond what arises under this section, the threat of lost driving privileges does not constitute a coercive measure that invalidates a defendant’s consent for 4th amendment purposes. An arresting officer, by reading the informing the accused form, simply states the truth: refusal to submit to a chemical test will result in driving privileges being revoked. Officers are entitled to make true statements. Village of Little Chute v. Walitalo, 2002 WI App 211, 256 Wis. 2d 1032, 650 N.W.2d 891, 01-3060. See also State v. Wintlend, 2002 WI App 314, 258 Wis. 2d 875, 655 N.W.2d 745, 02-0965.