A police officer’s act of opening a vehicle’s passenger door in order to effectively communicate with a driver otherwise inaccessible due to the malfunctioning driver’s door and window when the defendant appeared to be cooperating and moving toward the passenger seat, and seemed to be trying to open the passenger door, did not constitute an unreasonable search. The officer’s actions, viewed objectively, would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe the action taken was appropriate. State v. Smith, 2018 WI 2, 379 Wis. 2d 86, 905 N.W.2d 353, 15-0756. Despite the defendant passing field sobriety tests and the officer apparently concluding that the defendant was not impaired due to alcohol, the officer, quite reasonably, believed there was “something else going on,” though the officer did not know if it was a medical issue or a drug issue. From the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable inference of wrongful conduct—that the defendant had driven while under the influence of a drug or drugs—could be objectively discerned, and thus the officer had the right to continue the temporary detention of the defendant for further investigation. State v. Rose, 2018 WI App 5, 379 Wis. 2d 664, 907 N.W.2d 463, 16-2257. Under Payton, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), police may enter a residence pursuant to an arrest warrant if the facts and circumstances present the police with a reasonable belief that: 1) the subject of the arrest warrant resides in the home; and 2) the subject of the arrest warrant is present in the home at the time entry is effected. State v. Delap, 2018 WI 64, 382 Wis. 2d 92, 913 N.W.2d 175, 16-2196. A search occurs when a convicted recidivist sex offender who has completed the offender’s sentence is required to attach a monitoring device to the offender’s body to track the offender’s movements. The reasonableness of a search depends upon the totality of the circumstances, including the nature and purpose of the search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy expectations. Under the totality of the circumstances, given the diminished nature of a defendant’s privacy interest and the state’s particularly strong interest in reducing recidivism through the information collected by the tracking device, the global positioning system tracking requirement for convicted sex offenders is reasonable under the 4th amendment. Kaufman v. Walker, 2018 WI App 37, 382 Wis. 2d 774, 915 N.W.2d 193, 17-0085. The 4th amendment’s special needs doctrine applies to s. 301.48. The global positioning system (GPS) tracking program effectively serves the recognized special needs of deterring future crimes and gathering information needed to solve them. The state’s interest in accomplishing these special needs in the context of sex crimes outweighs sex offenders’ diminished privacy expectations. Kaufman v. Walker, 2018 WI App 37, 382 Wis. 2d 774, 915 N.W.2d 193, 17-0085. Under Birchfield, 579 U.S. 438 (2016), it is impermissible to impose criminal penalties for refusing to submit to a warrantless blood draw. A lengthier jail sentence is a criminal penalty. Therefore, the circuit court in this case violated Birchfield by explicitly subjecting the defendant to a more severe criminal penalty because the defendant refused to provide a blood sample absent a warrant. State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, 383 Wis. 2d 147, 914 N.W.2d 120, 16-2483. The expectation of privacy in digital files is governed by the same standards as the expectation of privacy in physical property. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in digital files that are publicly shared on a peer-to-peer network, including when law enforcement uses non-publicly available softwear and geolocation services based on a publicly available internet protocol (IP) address to discover the files and locate the defendant. State v. Baric, 2018 WI App 63, 384 Wis. 2d 359, 919 N.W.2d 221, 17-0185. Whether consent is verbal or inferred from one’s actions, consent must be unequivocal and specific. Leading an officer to the threshold of an apartment and then entering the apartment and closing the door does not imply consent for the officer to enter the apartment. The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the 4th amendment is that of objective reasonableness—what the typical reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect. State v. Reed, 2018 WI 109, 384 Wis. 2d 469, 920 N.W.2d 56, 16-1609. Generalized concerns for safety and risk of flight are not enough to give rise to exigent circumstances. The test is whether there are objective facts known to the officer that would reasonably lead the officer to believe that the delay caused by obtaining a warrant would gravely endanger life or greatly enhance the likelihood of the subject’s escape. State v. Reed, 2018 WI 109, 384 Wis. 2d 469, 920 N.W.2d 56, 16-1609. The 4th amendment tolerates certain investigations that are outside the scope of the mission of a traffic stop, so long as the investigations do not measurably extend the duration of the stop. When the officer questioned the defendant on whether the defendant had a valid concealed carry permit, although the questioning and a permit check were outside the mission of the traffic stop, they did not violate the 4th amendment because they did not measurably extend the duration of the stop and were conducted concurrently with mission-related activities. State v. Wright, 2019 WI 45, 386 Wis. 2d 495, 926 N.W.2d 157, 17-2006. See also State v. Brown, 2020 WI 63, 392 Wis. 2d 454, 945 N.W.2d 584, 17-0774. An anonymous informant is considered reliable if police are able to corroborate details in the informant’s tip. In this case, the record contained no information indicating the informant’s identity or whether the informant had provided reliable information to police in the past, but, because the tips were corroborated, the court did not discount them entirely in its analysis. Accordingly, the corroborated tips of the unnamed informant in this case could be considered in the analysis of the totality of the circumstances, giving them such weight as they were due. State v. Anderson, 2019 WI 97, 389 Wis. 2d 106, 935 N.W.2d 285, 17-1104. In this case, the immediate and continuous pursuit was a hot pursuit satisfying the 4th amendment exception to the warrant requirement. The measured speed at which the pursuit occurred in no way lessened its “hot” nature. State v. Ionescu, 2019 WI App 68, 389 Wis. 2d 586, 937 N.W.2d 90, 18-1620. The reasonableness approach, and not the categorical approach, is the correct interpretation of Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009). When the totality of the circumstances objectively demonstrated that the officer had reasonable suspicion that a bag in the passenger compartment of the vehicle might contain relevant evidence of operating while intoxicated (OWI), the search was permissible under the 4th amendment. State v. Coffee, 2020 WI 53, 391 Wis. 2d 831, 943 N.W.2d 845, 18-1209. In this case, the deputies were not performing a bona fide community caretaker function when they seized the defendant’s vehicle without a warrant. The defendant was parked on the side of a road after having been stopped for speeding, was alone in the vehicle, and had been driving with a suspended operator’s license. Although the defendant told the deputies who were issuing the traffic citations that the defendant could have a licensed driver retrieve the vehicle, the deputies told the defendant department policy required them to take the vehicle to an impound lot. A standardized policy may provide some evidence that the police performed their community caretaker role reasonably, but it cannot establish the predicate—that they were acting as community caretakers. Because the seizure in this case violated the 4th amendment, so did the ensuing inventory search. State v. Brooks, 2020 WI 60, 392 Wis. 2d 402, 944 N.W.2d 832, 18-1774. The U.S. Supreme Court in Mitchell, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019), indicated that a court’s exigent-circumstances analysis should consider whether law enforcement could have taken steps en route to a medical facility without significantly increasing the delay in procuring the blood sample. A court is not at liberty to begin the exigency analysis for a warrantless blood draw at a point following a suspect’s refusal to provide a blood sample when the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated the analysis begins earlier. State v. Hay, 2020 WI App 35, 392 Wis. 2d 845, 946 N.W.2d 190, 18-2240. Following Mitchell, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019), the four factors that the state bears the burden to show that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless blood draw are: 1) law enforcement has probable cause to believe that the driver has committed a “drunk-driving offense”; 2) the driver is, at pertinent times, unconscious or in a stupor; 3) the driver’s unconscious state or stupor requires that the driver be taken to a hospital or similar facility; and 4) the driver is taken to the hospital or similar facility before law enforcement has a “reasonable opportunity” to administer a standard evidentiary breath test. The burden is on the defendant to show that the defendant’s blood would not have been drawn if police had not been seeking blood alcohol concentration information and to show that law enforcement could not have reasonably judged that a warrant application would interfere with other pressing needs or duties. State v. Richards, 2020 WI App 48, 393 Wis. 2d 772, 948 N.W.2d 359, 17-0043. See also State v. Mitchell, 2022 WI App 31, 404 Wis. 2d 103, 978 N.W.2d 231, 19-1942. Because the natural dissipation of alcohol over time presents a risk that evidence will be destroyed, the passage of time may help support an exigent circumstances determination in a given case. Here, there had already been a significant delay, which occurred through no fault of the police. An objectively reasonable officer would have been concerned that additional delay to obtain a warrant, beyond the five hours that had already elapsed, would have further undermined the probative value of a test, possibly even rendering it inadmissible if an expert was not able to support its probative value. State v. Dieter, 2020 WI App 49, 393 Wis. 2d 796, 948 N.W.2d 431, 18-2269. The reasonable suspicion test for executing a traffic stop is not an exercise in evaluating individual details in isolation. It is the whole picture, evaluated together, that serves as the proper analytical framework. State v. Genous, 2021 WI 50, 397 Wis. 2d 293, 961 N.W.2d 41, 19-0435. A reasonable person being repetitively questioned while the officer retains the person’s driver’s license would not feel free to drive away and thereby terminate the encounter. In this case, it was the officer’s conduct of retaining the driver’s licenses, while repeatedly asking questions that the defendant and the passenger had already answered, that coerced the defendant to remain in the jurisdiction. Also, the officer’s questioning was intended to require them to remain in the jurisdiction so that time would pass and a drug-sniff dog would appear to sniff for drugs. Accordingly, the defendant was seized during the second round of repetitive questions while the officer retained the defendant’s driver’s license. State v. VanBeek, 2021 WI 51, 397 Wis. 2d 311, 960 N.W.2d 32, 19-0447. Although the time it takes to ask a question is measurable, the fact that an inquiry is made does not, in and of itself, create the type of unreasonable burden to make an extension of a traffic stop unlawful for 4th amendment purposes. That notion is true whether the question occurs in the “middle” of a stop versus at the very end of one. State v. Crone, 2021 WI App 29, 398 Wis. 2d 244, 961 N.W.2d 97, 18-1764. Checking for bond conditions is not an ordinary inquiry incidental to the mission of a traffic stop. Officers may check bond conditions while simultaneously performing other mission-related tasks, but they may not prolong a stop to inquire into a motorist’s bond conditions without reasonable suspicion that the motorist is violating a bond condition. State v. Davis, 2021 WI App 65, 399 Wis. 2d 354, 965 N.W.2d 84, 20-0731. The supreme court has stated that, based on the reasonable suspicion of the offense of operating while intoxicated, an officer may request a driver to perform various field sobriety tests. That statement does not require that an officer observe facts suggesting intoxication when administering field sobriety tests upon reasonable suspicion of operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration. State v. Adell, 2021 WI App 72, 399 Wis. 2d 399, 966 N.W.2d 115, 20-2135. If, during a valid traffic stop, an officer becomes aware of additional suspicious factors that are sufficient to give rise to an articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is committing an offense or offenses separate and distinct from the acts that prompted the officer’s intervention in the first place, the stop may be extended and a new investigation begun. The validity of the extension is tested in the same manner, and under the same criteria, as the initial stop. In this case, the deputy lawfully extended the traffic stop because the totality of the facts as they unfolded established reasonable suspicion to investigate the offense of operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration, and the deputy lawfully administered field sobriety tests in furtherance of that investigation because those tests would be likely to support or dispel the deputy’s suspicion. State v. Adell, 2021 WI App 72, 399 Wis. 2d 399, 966 N.W.2d 115, 20-2135. The emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement does not require that officers personally observe indications of an ongoing medical emergency. Reliable and corroborated information from an informant may justify a warrantless search of a home under the emergency aid exception. State v. Ware, 2021 WI App 83, 400 Wis. 2d 118, 968 N.W.2d 752, 20-1559. Courts apply a two-part test in determining whether the emergency aid exception applies. Under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that: 1) there is an immediate need to provide aid or assistance to a person due to actual or threatened physical injury; and 2) immediate entry into an area in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy is necessary in order to provide that aid or assistance. State v. Ware, 2021 WI App 83, 400 Wis. 2d 118, 968 N.W.2d 752, 20-1559. The results of a hospital blood test that were subpoenaed after the circuit court suppressed evidence from an unlawful blood draw were admissible under the independent source doctrine. The state’s decision to subpoena the hospital for the defendant’s medical records was not prompted by the deputy’s unlawful conduct because the state had reasonable grounds to suspect the defendant of operating while intoxicated prior to the deputy’s warrantless blood draw. The fact that the state subpoenaed those records only after the circuit court suppressed the deputy’s unlawful blood draw did not change the independent nature of the state’s suspicions that the defendant’s blood-alcohol concentration was over the legal limit. Furthermore, the evidence discovered through the state’s subpoena—the hospital’s diagnostic blood test—was untainted by the deputy’s unlawful conduct, thus suppressing it would not serve the exclusionary rule’s purpose. State v. Van Linn, 2022 WI 16, 401 Wis. 2d 1, 971 N.W.2d 478, 19-1317. Police lack reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop if there are not specific, articulable facts, and all rational inferences that may be drawn from those facts, to suspect that criminal activity is afoot. When a deputy observed an individual wearing black clothing and riding a bicycle, crossing and then leaving publicly-accessible school grounds in the early hours of a Sunday morning, while the state was under the Department of Health Services’ Safer at Home order due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the state failed to clear the “low bar” of reasonable suspicion and instead relied on what could be described, at most, as “a mere hunch” of the deputy. That is, the evidence regarding events leading up to the stop failed to establish articulable facts and rational inferences from those facts that could have led a reasonable officer to suspect that the defendant had engaged in criminal activity, was currently doing so, or was about to do so. State v. Meddaugh, 2022 WI App 12, 401 Wis. 2d 134, 972 N.W.2d 181, 21-0939. Lacking a warrant or exigent circumstances, officers had no lawful basis to open the defendant’s hotel room door—even just the few inches they initially could—and peer inside or even speak to the defendant through that opening. Absent the officer’s unlawful opening of the defendant’s door and utilization of that opening, there was no reason to believe the defendant ever would have even gotten out of bed much less been in a position to visibly turn away from the officers at the door. Under the facts of this case, the officers’ forced entry into the room—leading to the discovery of the gun—cannot be legitimized by the defendant’s turning away from the door because the officer’s observation of that action was not lawfully grounded. State v. Bourgeois, 2022 WI App 18, 401 Wis. 2d 489, 973 N.W.2d 818, 20-1808. In this case, the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was involved in criminal activity when, in the course of responding within one minute after receiving a ShotSpotter report of gunfire in a residential neighborhood, the officers saw a single suspect near the scene make furtive movements suggesting concealment of a handgun. Looking at the whole picture, as the officers were required to do, they made a well-informed and reasonable inference that the defendant might be the shooter. State v. Nimmer, 2022 WI 47, 402 Wis. 2d 416, 975 N.W.2d 598, 20-0878. The search-incident-to-arrest exception permits police to search items not actually located on the person but also in the area within the arrestee’s reach. The scope of a search incident to arrest is confined to the area from within which the suspect might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A search may precede an arrest so long as the officer had probable cause to arrest prior to the search. State v. Meisenhelder, 2022 WI App 37, 404 Wis. 2d 75, 978 N.W.2d 551, 21-0708. A “knock and talk” investigation is not a search but instead is an investigative technique premised on the implicit license that a visitor, or neighbor, would have with regard to entering one’s constitutionally-protected curtilage. In limited scenarios, the implicit license may extend to an alternative approach to the house or back entryway depending on the facts of a case. However, in this case, the officers’ warrantless entry into the defendant’s fenced-in backyard was not a valid knock and talk investigation and therefore violated the 4th amendment. The backyard was surrounded by a tall, solid wooden fence, and, even though the gate to the backyard was open, it was blocked by a large garbage can. It is hard to believe that a private citizen in the alley would consider the fence, together with the garbage can impeding the opening in the fence, as an invitation to approach the side door of the unattached garage. State v. Wilson, 2022 WI 77, 404 Wis. 2d 623, 982 N.W.2d 67, 20-1014. The 4th amendment requires a police officer to have particularized reasonable suspicion that a crime or non-criminal traffic violation took place before performing a traffic stop. Reasonable suspicion must be founded on concrete, particularized facts warranting suspicion of a specific individual, not inchoate and unparticularized suspicions or hunches. In this case, a stop based on the generic description of a Harley-Davidson motorcycle recently seen driving erratically in the area fell short of that threshold. State v. Richey, 2022 WI 106, 405 Wis. 2d 132, 983 N.W.2d 617, 21-0142. In this case, the defendant, a detective with the county sheriff’s department, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the defendant’s Dropbox account. Although it was established using the defendant’s county email address, the defendant paid to create the private account, the account was password protected and accessible through the defendant’s private devices, and the account was not stored on county property. In addition, although the defendant’s account was held by Dropbox, an independent entity, the defendant did not grant a third party access to the password or the account when the defendant used the account to share specific documents with third parties. Thus, law enforcement engaged in a search of the defendant’s account within the meaning of the 4th amendment. State v. Bowers, 2023 WI App 4, 405 Wis. 2d 716, 985 N.W.2d 123, 21-1767. A Dropbox account is most reasonably comparable to a modern-day version of a container used to store personal documents and effects. It is well established that individuals generally have a reasonable expectation of privacy in locked or closed containers, which are comparable to password-protected Internet-based accounts. State v. Bowers, 2023 WI App 4, 405 Wis. 2d 716, 985 N.W.2d 123, 21-1767. In this case, the officer seized the defendant at the defendant’s home under the 4th amendment when the officer denied the defendant’s request to terminate the encounter while standing in the doorway of the defendant’s home. There is no reasonable suspicion exception to the warrant requirement under the 4th amendment for a person’s seizure in the person’s home or curtilage. State v. Cundy, 2023 WI App 41, 409 Wis. 2d 34, 995 N.W.2d 266, 22-0540. A canine sniff of the exterior of a vehicle is not a search within the 4th amendment. The occupant of a vehicle has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the air space surrounding a vehicle that the occupant is occupying in a public place. However, an individual has a property interest in the interior of a vehicle under the common-law trespassory test, and a canine entry into the vehicle constitutes a search within the meaning of the 4th amendment. State v. Campbell, 2024 WI App 17, 411 Wis. 2d 439, 5 N.W.3d 870, 20-1813. Under the so called “instinct exception” to the 4th amendment’s warrant requirement, canine searches that naturally extend into a vehicle during a traffic stop are constitutional if the canine conducts the search “instinctively” and without an officer’s direction, assistance, or encouragement. Even if the instinct exception were to be recognized in this state, the exception did not apply to the canine’s searches in this case. The canine did not instinctively enter the defendant’s vehicle because the officer had full control of the canine and implicitly encouraged it to enter through the driver’s side door. State v. Campbell, 2024 WI App 17, 411 Wis. 2d 439, 5 N.W.3d 870, 20-1813. When a driver was stopped because of expired license plates, a police order to get out of the car was reasonable and a subsequent “pat down” based on an observed bulge under the driver’s jacket resulted in the legal seizure of an unlicensed revolver. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S. Ct. 330, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977). A burning building clearly presents an exigency rendering a warrantless entry reasonable, and fire officials need no warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the fire after it is extinguished. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1978). The warrantless installation of a pen register, that recorded telephone numbers called but not the contents of the calls, did not violate the 4th amendment. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1979). An officer who accompanied an arrestee to the arrestee’s residence to obtain identification properly seized contraband in plain view. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 102 S. Ct. 812, 70 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1982). Officers who have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have probable cause to believe contraband is concealed somewhere within it may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle as thorough as could be authorized by warrant. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982). When an officer, after stopping a defendant’s car at a routine driver’s license checkpoint, saw a tied-off party balloon in plain sight, the officer had probable cause to believe the balloon contained an illicit substance. Hence, a warrantless seizure of the balloon was legal. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983). A warrantless search by arson investigators of the defendant’s fire-damaged home that was not a continuation of an earlier search was unconstitutional. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 104 S. Ct. 641, 78 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1984). When a damaged shipping package was examined by company employees who discovered white powder, a subsequent warrantless field test by police was constitutional. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984). The warrantless, nighttime entry of the defendant’s home for arrest for a civil, nonjailable traffic offense was not justified under the “hot pursuit” doctrine or the preservation of evidence doctrine. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S. Ct. 2091, 80 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1984). School officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student. The legality of the search depends on the reasonableness, under all circumstances, of the search. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S. Ct. 733, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1985). When officers were entitled to seize packages in a vehicle and could have searched them immediately without a warrant, a warrantless search of the packages three days later was reasonable. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 105 S. Ct. 881, 83 L. Ed. 2d 890 (1985). The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when an officer reasonably relies upon a statute allowing a warrantless administrative search that was subsequently ruled unconstitutional. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 107 S. Ct. 1160, 94 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1987). A protective sweep of a residence in conjunction with an arrest is permissible if police reasonably believe that the area harbors an individual posing a danger to officers or others. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990). For a seizure of a person to occur, there must either be an application of force, however slight, or when force is absent, submission to an officer’s “show of authority.” California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991). A determination of probable cause made within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest generally meets the promptness requirement. If a hearing is held more than 48 hours following the arrest, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate an emergency or extraordinary circumstances. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991). There shall be one rule governing all automobile searches. The police may search the car and all containers within it without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained in either. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991). If during a lawful weapons pat down an officer feels an object whose contours or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of privacy beyond that already authorized. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993). Persons observed through a window in a home where they were not overnight guests but were present for a short period to engage in a primarily commercial illegal drug transaction, had no expectation of privacy in the home and the observation of those persons was not a constitutionally prohibited search. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 119 S. Ct. 469, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1998). When there is probable cause to search a vehicle for contraband, officers may examine containers in the vehicle without a showing of individualized probable cause for each container. The container may be searched whether or not its owner is present as a passenger, or otherwise, because it may contain contraband that the officers reasonably believe is in the car. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999). Police need not obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle is forfeitable contraband. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 119 S. Ct. 1555, 143 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1999). The exception to the requirement of a warrant for automobiles does not require a separate finding of exigency, in addition to a finding of probable cause. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 119 S. Ct. 2013, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999). When there is probable cause to search a motor vehicle, the search is not unreasonable if the search is based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, although a warrant was not obtained. No separate finding of exigent circumstances is required. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 119 S. Ct. 2013, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999). An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun, without more, is insufficient to justify a police officer’s stop and frisk of a person. The tip must bear indicia of reliability. Reasonable suspicion requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of criminal activity, not just in its tendency to identify a person. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S. Ct. 1375, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2000). Stopping vehicles at highway checkpoints without any individualized suspicion to interdict illegal drugs was an unreasonable seizure under the 4th amendment because the primary purpose was to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, unlike checkpoints to check for drunk driving or illegal immigrants. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S. Ct. 447, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2000). The police acted reasonably when, with probable cause to believe that the defendant had hidden drugs in his home, they prevented the man from entering the home for about two hours until a search warrant could be obtained. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 121 S. Ct. 946, 148 L. Ed. 2d 838 (2001). A state hospital could not test maternity patients for cocaine and then turn the results over to law enforcement authorities without patient consent. The interest of using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine does not justify a departure from the rule that a nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a warrant. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2001). If an officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed even a very minor criminal offense that does not breach the peace, the officer may, without violating the 4th amendment, arrest the offender without the need to balance the circumstances involved in the particular situation. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001). Obtaining, by sense-enhancing technology like infrared imaging, information regarding the interior of a home that could otherwise not be obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area is a search presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001). A warrantless search of a probationer’s residence founded on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and authorized as a condition of probation was reasonable. Such a search is not restricted to monitoring whether the probationer is complying with probation restrictions. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S. Ct. 587, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2001). Police officers may approach bus riders at random to ask questions and to request consent to search luggage without advising the passengers of their right to not cooperate. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2002). A school district policy of requiring all participants in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing was a reasonable means of furthering the district’s interest in preventing drug use among students and was not an unreasonable search. Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 153 L. Ed. 2d 735 (2002). A highway checkpoint where police stopped motorists to ask them for information about a recent hit-and-run was reasonable. The arrest of a drunk driver arrested when his vehicle swerved nearly hitting an officer at the checkpoint was constitutional. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 124 S. Ct. 885, 157 L. Ed. 2d 843 (2004). When a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile, the 4th amendment allows the officer to search the passenger compartment of that vehicle as a contemporaneous incident of arrest whether the officer makes contact with the occupant while the occupant is inside the vehicle, or when the officer first makes contact with the arrestee after the latter has exited the vehicle. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 124 S. Ct. 2127, 158 L. Ed. 2d 905 (2004). The principles of Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), permit a state to require a suspect to disclose his or her name in the course of a Terry stop and allow imposing criminal penalties for failing to do so. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed 2d 292 (2004). The 4th amendment does not require reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop. The use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog that does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2004). Police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. An action is reasonable under the 4th amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s state of mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006). Warrantless arrests for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the U.S. Constitution, and while states are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the 4th amendment’s protections. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 170 L. Ed. 2d 559 (2008). In a traffic-stop setting, the first Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), condition—a lawful investigatory stop—is met whenever it is lawful for police to detain an automobile and its occupants pending inquiry into a vehicular violation. The police need not have, in addition, cause to believe any occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal activity. To justify a patdown of the driver or a passenger during a traffic stop, however, the police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S. Ct. 781, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009). Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), does not authorize a vehicle search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest after the arrestee has been secured and cannot access the interior of the vehicle. Police are authorized to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search. Consistent with Thornton, 541 U.S. 615 (2004), circumstances unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485 (2009).
/constitution/wi
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wisconsinconstitution
/constitution/wi/000229/000027/000253
section
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