The evidentiary search of a person not named in a search warrant, but present during the search of a residence reasonably suspected of being a drug house, was reasonable. State v. Jeter, 160 Wis. 2d 333, 466 N.W.2d 211 (Ct. App. 1991). A warrantless search of an apartment for evidence of occupancy when the police reasonably believed the tenant had vacated and the occupants were not legitimately on the premises was not unreasonable. The defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment or in property kept there. State v. Whitrock, 161 Wis. 2d 960, 468 N.W.2d 696 (1991). When a convicted defendant is awaiting sentencing for a drug related offense and probation is a sentencing option, the judge may order, without a warrant, probable cause, or individualized suspicion, that the defendant submit to urinalysis to determine if drugs are present. State v. Guzman, 166 Wis. 2d 577, 480 N.W.2d 446 (1992). A blood test not taken in compliance with the implied consent law is admissible if the taking of the sample meets 4th amendment reasonableness standards. Under Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), the drawing of a blood sample against a person’s will is reasonable when: 1) drawn incident to an arrest; 2) there is a clear indication that the desired evidence will be found in the blood sample; and 3) exigent circumstances exist. State v. Krause, 168 Wis. 2d 578, 484 N.W.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1992). But see Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013); Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2016). The question of whether the forcible extraction of a blood sample is a reasonable search by 4th amendment standards is not limited to whether the force is necessary to accomplish a legitimate police objective. Instead, whether the force used is excessive is determined by an evaluation of whether the officers’ actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the officers. The court judges the reasonableness of a questioned action by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s 4th amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests and from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. State v. Krause, 168 Wis. 2d 578, 484 N.W.2d 347 (Ct. App. 1992). The exception allowing the warrantless search of automobiles is not extended to a camper trailer unhitched from a towing vehicle. State v. Durbin, 170 Wis. 2d 475, 489 N.W.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1992). A warrantless search of a commercial premises without the owner’s consent when a licensing ordinance provided that the licensed premises “shall be open to inspection at any time” was illegal. State v. Schwegler, 170 Wis. 2d 487, 490 N.W.2d 292 (Ct. App. 1992). The frisk of a person not named in a search warrant during the execution of the warrant was reasonable when the occupants of the residence were very likely to be involved in drug trafficking. Drugs felt in a pocket during the frisk were lawfully seized when the officer had probable cause to believe there was a connection between what was felt and criminal activity. State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86, 492 N.W.2d 311 (1992). A warrantless protective sweep of a residence incident to an arrest requires the police to have a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that the residence harbors an individual posing a danger to the officers. State v. Kruse, 175 Wis. 2d 89, 499 N.W.2d 185 (Ct. App. 1993). Discussing the six-factor analysis for use in determining the reasonableness of an investigatory stop. State v. King, 175 Wis. 2d 146, 499 N.W.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1993). The rule that a judicial determination of probable cause to support a warrantless arrest must be made within 48 hours applies to Wisconsin. The failure to comply did not require suppression of evidence not obtained because of the delay when probable cause to arrest was present. State v. Koch, 175 Wis. 2d 684, 499 N.W.2d 152 (1993). Students have no reasonable privacy expectation in lockers when a school adopts a written policy retaining ownership and possessory control of the lockers. Isiah B. v. State, 176 Wis. 2d 639, 500 N.W.2d 637 (1993). An officer’s step onto the threshold of the defendant’s home constituted an entry subject to constitutional protection. State v. Johnson, 177 Wis. 2d 224, 501 N.W.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1993). A defendant under lawful arrest has a diminished privacy interest in personal property inventoried by jail authorities, and a warrantless search of the property when there is probable cause to believe it contains evidence is valid. State v. Jones, 181 Wis. 2d 194, 510 N.W.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1993). See also State v. Betterley, 183 Wis. 2d 165, 515 N.W.2d 911 (Ct. App. 1994). A warrantless entry by uniformed officers to make arrests after undercover agents gained permissive entrance to the premises was justified under the consent exception and no exigent circumstances were required. State v. Johnston, 184 Wis. 2d 794, 518 N.W.2d 759 (1994). A non-parolee living with a parolee has a legitimate expectation of privacy in shared living quarters, but a warrantless search authorized as a condition of parole can reasonably extend to all areas in which the parolee and non-parolee enjoy common authority. Evidence found in such a search may be used against the non-parolee. State v. West, 185 Wis. 2d 68, 517 N.W.2d 482 (1994). The failure to conduct a probable cause hearing within 48 hours of arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and not grounds for dismissal with prejudice or voiding of a subsequent conviction unless the delay prejudiced the defendant’s right to present a defense. State v. Golden, 185 Wis. 2d 763, 519 N.W.2d 659 (Ct. App. 1994). A determination that an area is within a defendant’s immediate control at the time of arrest does not give police authority to generally search the premises. Only a limited search is justified. State v. Angiolo, 186 Wis. 2d 488, 520 N.W.2d 923 (Ct. App. 1994). The plain view exception applies if the following criteria are met: 1) the officer has prior justification for being present; 2) the evidence is in plain view and its discovery inadvertent; and 3) the seized item and facts known by the officer at the time of seizure provide probable cause to believe there is a connection between a crime and the evidence. State v. Angiolo, 186 Wis. 2d 488, 520 N.W.2d 923 (Ct. App. 1994). Unlike private homes, warrantless inspections of commercial premises are not necessarily unreasonable. A warrantless inspection of a dairy farm under authority of ss. 93.08, 93.15 (2), and 97.12 (1) and related administrative rules made without prior notice and without the owner being present was not unconstitutional. Because the administrative rules govern operations, equipment, and processes not typically conducted in residential areas, the rules and statutes sufficiently preclude making warrantless searches of residences. Lundeen v. DATCP, 189 Wis. 2d 255, 525 N.W.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1994). An arrest warrant was not legal authority to enter and search the home of a third party based on an officer’s simple belief that the subject of the warrant might be there. The mere fact that the subject could leave was not an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless search when the warrant was a pick-up warrant for failure to pay a traffic fine. State v. Kiper, 193 Wis. 2d 69, 532 N.W.2d 698 (1995). Suppression of evidence is not required when a law enforcement officer obtains evidence outside the officer’s jurisdiction. Any jurisdictional transgression violates the appropriate jurisdiction’s authority, not the defendant’s rights. State v. Mieritz, 193 Wis. 2d 571, 534 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1995). A warrantless search of a vehicle was constitutional when the defendant fled the vehicle to avoid arrest. The defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. State v. Roberts, 196 Wis. 2d 445, 538 N.W.2d 825 (Ct. App. 1995), 94-2583. To find a pat-down search to be reasonable requires the officer to have a reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed, looking at the totality of the circumstances. The officer’s perception of the area as a high-crime area, the time of day, and the suspect’s nervousness are all factors that may be considered. State v. Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d 200, 539 N.W.2d 887 (1995), 93-2089. All occupants of a vehicle in a police-initiated stop are seized and have standing to challenge the lawfulness of the seizure. To establish lawfulness, the state must establish that the police possess reasonable, articulable suspicion to seize someone in the vehicle. State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996), 95-1595. A probation officer may conduct a warrantless search. That the underlying conviction is subsequently overturned does not retroactively invalidate the search. State v. Angiolo, 207 Wis. 2d 561, 558 N.W.2d 701 (Ct. App. 1996), 96-0099. An initial traffic stop is not unlawfully extended by asking the defendant if the defendant has drugs or weapons and requesting permission to search. When there is justification for the initial stop, it is the extension of the stop beyond the point reasonably justified by the stop and not the type of questions asked that render a stop unconstitutional. State v. Gaulrapp, 207 Wis. 2d 600, 558 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1996), 96-1094. An officer has the right to remain at an arrested person’s elbow at all times. When an officer accompanied a juvenile in the officer’s custody into the juvenile’s house, leaving the juvenile’s “elbow” to enter a bedroom where incriminating evidence was found, monitoring of the juvenile stopped and an unconstitutional search occurred. State v. Dull, 211 Wis. 2d 652, 565 N.W.2d 575 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-1744. A threat to the safety of the suspect or others is an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless entry of a residence. The mere presence of firearms does not create exigent circumstances. When conducting the unannounced warrantless entry creates the potential danger, that conduct cannot justify the warrantless entry. State v. Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d 460, 569 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2052. The likelihood that evidence will be destroyed is an exigent circumstance justifying the warrantless entry of a residence. The mere presence of contraband does not create exigent circumstances. State v. Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d 460, 569 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2052. Detaining a person at the person’s home and transporting the person about one mile to the scene of an accident in which the person was involved was an investigative stop and not an arrest, moved the person within the vicinity of the stop within the meaning of s. 968.24, and was a reasonable part of an ongoing accident investigation. State v. Quartana, 213 Wis. 2d 440, 570 N.W.2d 618 (Ct. App. 1997), 97-0695. But see State v. Cundy, 2023 WI App 41, 409 Wis. 2d 34, 995 N.W.2d 266, 22-0540. The warrantless search of the defendant’s purse when it was being returned to the defendant while still in custody was authorized when the search would have been authorized at the time of the arrest and when the return of the purse could have given the defendant access to a weapon or evidence. State v. Wade, 215 Wis. 2d 684, 573 N.W.2d 228 (Ct. App. 1997), 97-0193. When a third party lacks actual common authority to consent to a search of a defendant’s residence, the police may rely on the third party’s apparent authority, if that reliance is reasonable. There is no presumption of common authority to consent to a search, and the police must make sufficient inquiry to establish apparent authority. State v. Kieffer, 217 Wis. 2d 531, 577 N.W.2d 352 (1998), 96-0008. A warrantless entry may be justified when police engage in a bona fide community caretaker activity, although the ultimate test is reasonableness, considering the degree of public interest and exigency of the situation, the circumstances surrounding the search, whether an automobile is involved, and whether there are alternatives to entry. State v. Paterson, 220 Wis. 2d 526, 583 N.W.2d 190 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-2066. See also State v. Ferguson, 2001 WI App 102, 244 Wis. 2d 17, 629 N.W.2d 788, 00-0038; State v. Ziedonis, 2005 WI App 249, 287 Wis. 2d 831, 707 N.W.2d 565, 04-2888. But see Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1596, 209 L. Ed. 2d 604 (2021). Reasonable suspicion required in a Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), investigative search is a common sense test of what under the circumstances a reasonable police officer would reasonably suspect in light of the officer’s experience. Police in an area known for drug dealing were justified to stop a driver when at nearly the same time they observed a person approach then turn from the driver’s parked car when the person seemed to notice the police and the driver immediately exited the parking lot the driver was in. State v. Amos, 220 Wis. 2d 793, 584 N.W.2d 170 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-3044. There is an expectation of privacy in commercial property that is applicable to administrative inspections. Because administrative inspections are not supported by probable cause, they will not be reasonable if, instead of being conducted to enforce a regulatory scheme, they are conducted as a pretext to obtain evidence of criminal activity. State v. Mendoza, 220 Wis. 2d 803, 584 N.W.2d 174 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-0952. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a hospital emergency or operating room. An officer who was present, with the consent of hospital staff, in an operating room during an operation and collected, as evidence, cocaine removed from an unconscious defendant’s intestine did not conduct a search and did not make an unreasonable search. State v. Thompson, 222 Wis. 2d 179, 585 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-2744. A warrant authorizing the search of a particularly described premises may permit the search of vehicles owned or controlled by the owner of, and found on, the premises. State v. O’Brien, 223 Wis. 2d 303, 588 N.W.2d 8 (1999), 96-3028. The “emergency doctrine” justifies a warrantless search when an officer is actually motivated by a perceived need to render aid and a reasonable person under the circumstances would have thought an emergency existed. State v. Richter, 224 Wis. 2d 814, 592 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-1332. Reasonable suspicion justifying an investigative stop may be based on an anonymous tip that does not predict future behavior. The key concern is the tipster’s veracity. Officers’ corroboration of readily observable information supports a finding that because the tipster is correct about innocent activities, the tipster is probably correct about the ultimate fact of criminal activity. State v. Williams, 225 Wis. 2d 159, 591 N.W.2d 823 (1999), 96-1821. Being in a high crime area, making brief contact with a car, and hanging around a neighborhood, each standing alone would not create reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), stop. When these events occurred in sequence and were considered with the officer’s training and experience, the reputation of the neighborhood, and the time of day, there was enough to create reasonable suspicion. State v. Allen, 226 Wis. 2d 66, 593 N.W.2d 504 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-1690. A picture of a mushroom on the defendant’s wallet, the defendant’s appearance of nervousness, and the lateness of the hour were insufficient factors to extend a stop. State v. Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-2525. See also State v. Gammons, 2001 WI App 36, 241 Wis. 2d 296, 625 N.W.2d 623, 00-0377; State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, 311 Wis. 2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748, 06-0974. The owner of a commercial property has a reasonable expectation of privacy in those areas immediately surrounding the property only if affirmative steps have been taken to exclude the public. State v. Yakes, 226 Wis. 2d 425, 595 N.W.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-0470. A home’s backyard and back door threshold were within the home’s curtilage; an officer’s warrantless entry was unlawful and evidence seized as a result of the entry was subject to suppression. State v. Wilson, 229 Wis. 2d 256, 600 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-3131. When the two other occupants of a vehicle had already been searched without any drugs being found, a search of the third occupant based solely on the odor of marijuana was made with probable cause and was reasonable. State v. Mata, 230 Wis. 2d 567, 602 N.W.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-2895. A probation officer may search a probationer’s residence without a warrant if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the terms of probation are being violated, but the officer may not conduct a warrantless search as a subterfuge to further a criminal investigation to help the police evade the usual warrant and probable cause requirements. State v. Hajicek, 230 Wis. 2d 697, 602 N.W.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-3485. The risk that evidence will be destroyed is an exigent circumstance that may justify a warrantless search. When suspects are aware of the presence of the police, that risk increases. The seriousness of the offense as determined by the overall penalty structure for all potentially chargeable offenses also affects whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless search. State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24, 233 Wis. 2d 280, 607 N.W.2d 621, 97-1121. A frisk of a motor vehicle passenger that occurred 25 minutes after the initial stop that was a precautionary measure, not based on the conduct or attributes of the person frisked, was unreasonable. State v. Mohr, 2000 WI App 111, 235 Wis. 2d 220, 613 N.W.2d 186, 99-2226. There are four well-recognized categories of exigent circumstances that have been held to authorize a law enforcement officer’s warrantless entry into a home: 1) hot pursuit of a suspect; 2) a threat to the safety of a suspect or others; 3) a risk that evidence will be destroyed; and 4) a likelihood that the suspect will flee. The state bears the burden of proving the existence of exigent circumstances. State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29, 98-1332. “Hot pursuit,” defined as immediate or continuous pursuit of a suspect from a crime scene, is an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless search. An officer is not required to personally observe the crime or fleeing suspect. State v. Richter, 2000 WI 58, 235 Wis. 2d 524, 612 N.W.2d 29, 98-1332. But see State v. Wilson, 2022 WI 77, 404 Wis. 2d 623, 982 N.W.2d 67, 20-1014. When a vehicle passenger has been seized pursuant to a lawful traffic stop, the seizure does not become unreasonable because an officer asks the passenger for identification. The passenger is free to refuse to answer, and refusal will not justify prosecution nor give rise to reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. However, if the passenger chooses to answer falsely, the passenger can be charged with obstruction. State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72, 98-0931. The property of a passenger in a motor vehicle may be searched when the police have validly arrested the driver but do not have a reasonable basis to detain or probable cause to arrest the passenger. State v. Pallone, 2000 WI 77, 236 Wis. 2d 162, 613 N.W.2d 568, 98-0896. The search of a crawl space in a ceiling, which was located in an area where police had heard much activity, was large enough to hide a person, and was secured by screws that had to be removed with a screwdriver, was a reasonable “protective sweep” to search for persons who would pose a threat to the police as they executed an arrest warrant for a murder suspect. State v. Blanco, 2000 WI App 119, 237 Wis. 2d 395, 614 N.W.2d 512, 98-3153. A police officer performing a Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), stop and requesting identification could perform a limited search for identifying papers when the information received by the officer was not confirmed by police records, the intrusion on the suspect was minimal, the officer observed that the suspect’s pockets were bulging, and the officer had experience with persons who claimed to have no identification when in fact they did. State v. Black, 2000 WI App 175, 238 Wis. 2d 203, 617 N.W.2d 210, 99-1686. A warrantless blood draw is permissible when: 1) the blood is taken to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person lawfully arrested; 2) there is a clear indication evidence of intoxication will be produced; 3) the method used is reasonable and performed in a reasonable manner; and 4) the arrestee presents no reasonable objection. State v. Thorstad, 2000 WI App 199, 238 Wis. 2d 666, 618 N.W.2d 240, 99-1765. But see Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2016). That a driver stopped at a stop sign for a few seconds longer than normal, that it was late in the evening, and that there was little traffic did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the driver was committing an unlawful act. State v. Fields, 2000 WI App 218, 239 Wis. 2d 38, 619 N.W.2d 279, 00-0694. A warrantless entry need not be subjectively motivated solely by a perceived need to render aid and assistance in order for the “emergency doctrine” to apply. A dual motivation of investigating a potential crime and rendering aid and assistance may be present. State v. Rome, 2000 WI App 243, 239 Wis. 2d 491, 620 N.W.2d 225, 00-0796. Whether a search is a probation search, which may be conducted without a warrant, or a police search, which may not, is a question of constitutional fact to be reviewed in a two-step review of historical and constitutional fact. A determination of reasonableness of the search must also be made. A search is reasonable if the probation officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the probationer has contraband. Cooperation with police officers does not change a probation search into a police search. State v. Hajicek, 2001 WI 3, 240 Wis. 2d 349, 620 N.W.2d 781, 98-3485. In light of the reduced expectation of privacy that applies to property in an automobile, the search of a vehicle passenger’s jacket based upon the driver’s consent to the search of the vehicle was reasonable. State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, 241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891, 99-0070. Before the government may invade the sanctity of the home, it must demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. Reluctance to find an exigency is especially appropriate when the underlying offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor. State v. Kryzaniak, 2001 WI App 44, 241 Wis. 2d 358, 624 N.W.2d 389, 00-1149. Under J.L, 529 U.S. 266 (2000), an anonymous tip giving rise to reasonable suspicion must bear indicia of reliability. That the tipster’s anonymity is placed at risk indicates that the informant is genuinely concerned and not a fallacious prankster. Corroborated aspects of the tip also lend credibility. The corroborated actions of the suspect must be inherently criminal in and of themselves. State v. Williams, 2001 WI 21, 241 Wis. 2d 631, 623 N.W.2d 106, 96-1821. An anonymous tip regarding erratic driving from another driver calling from a cell phone contained sufficient indicia of reliability to justify an investigative stop when the informant was exposed to possible identification, and therefore possible arrest if the tip proved false; the tip reported contemporaneous and verifiable observations regarding the driving, location, and vehicle; and the officer verified many of the details in the tip. That the tip reasonably suggested intoxicated driving created an exigency strongly in favor of immediate police investigation without the necessity that the officer personally observe erratic driving. State v. Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22, 241 Wis. 2d 729, 623 N.W.2d 516, 98-3541. When a caller identifies himself or herself by name, placing the caller’s anonymity at risk, and the totality of the circumstances establishes a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, the police may execute a lawful investigative stop. Whether the caller gave correct identifying information or the police ultimately could have verified the information, the caller, by providing the information, risked that the caller’s identity would be discovered and cannot be considered anonymous. State v. Sisk, 2001 WI App 182, 247 Wis. 2d 443, 634 N.W.2d 877, 00-2614. The state constitution does not provide greater protection under the automobile exception for warrantless searches than the 4th amendment. The warrantless search of a vehicle is allowed when there is probable cause to search the vehicle and the vehicle is mobile. The exception apples to vehicles that are not in public places. There is no requirement that obtaining a warrant be impracticable. State v. Marquardt, 2001 WI App 219, 247 Wis. 2d 765, 635 N.W.2d 188, 01-0065. Whether exigent circumstances existed justifying a warrantless entry to prevent destruction of evidence after the defendant saw, and retreated from, a plain-clothes officer was not a question of whether the defendant knew that the detective was a police officer, but whether it was reasonable for the officer to believe that the officer had been identified and that the suspect would destroy evidence as a consequence. State v. Garrett, 2001 WI App 240, 248 Wis. 2d 61, 635 N.W.2d 615, 00-3183. For the warrantless search of an area made incident to the making of an arrest to be justified as a protective sweep to protect the safety of police officers where the area searched is not in the immediate vicinity of where the arrest is made, there must be articulable facts that would warrant a reasonably prudent officer to believe that the area harbors an individual posing a danger to the officers. State v. Garrett, 2001 WI App 240, 248 Wis. 2d 61, 635 N.W.2d 615, 00-3183. The need to transport a person in a police vehicle is not an exigency that justifies a search for weapons. More specific and articulable facts must be shown to support a Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), frisk. While a routine pat-down of a person before a police officer places the person in a squad car is wholly reasonable, evidence gleaned from the search will only be admissible if there are particularized issues of safety concerns about the defendant. State v. Hart, 2001 WI App 283, 249 Wis. 2d 329, 639 N.W.2d 213, 00-1444. Although no traffic violation occurred, a traffic stop to make contact with the defendant was reasonable when police had reasonable suspicion that the defendant had previously been involved in a crime, and the defendant had intentionally avoided police attempts to engage the defendant in voluntary conversation. State v. Olson, 2001 WI App 284, 249 Wis. 2d 391, 639 N.W.2d 207, 00-3383. A warrantless blood draw by a physician in a jail setting may be unreasonable if it invites an unjustified element of personal risk of pain and infection. Absent evidence of those risks, a blood draw under those circumstances was reasonable. State v. Daggett, 2002 WI App 32, 250 Wis. 2d 112, 640 N.W.2d 546, 01-1417. Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), applies to confrontations between the police and citizens in public places only. For private residences and hotels, in the absence of a warrant, the police must have probable cause and exigent circumstances or consent to justify an entry. Reasonable suspicion is not a prerequisite to an officer’s seeking consent to enter a private dwelling. If the police have lawfully entered a dwelling with valid consent and have a reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed, a Terry pat down for weapons is permissible. State v. Stout, 2002 WI App 41, 250 Wis. 2d 768, 641 N.W.2d 474, 01-0904. A warrantless search of a home is presumptively unreasonable, but exigent circumstances that militate against delay in getting a warrant can justify immediate entry and search. Whether the officers acted reasonably in entering the house without a warrant is measured against what a reasonable police officer would reasonably believe under the circumstances. State v. Londo, 2002 WI App 90, 252 Wis. 2d 731, 643 N.W.2d 869, 01-1015. Canine sniffs are not searches within the meaning of the 4th amendment, and police are not required to have probable cause or reasonable suspicion before walking a dog around a vehicle for the purpose of detecting drugs in the vehicle’s interior. A dog’s alert on an object provides probable cause to search that object, provided that the dog is trained in narcotics detection and has demonstrated a sufficient level of reliability in detecting drugs in the past and the officer with the dog is familiar with how it reacts when it smells contraband. State v. Miller, 2002 WI App 150, 256 Wis. 2d 80, 647 N.W.2d 348, 01-1993. But see State v. Campbell, 2024 WI App 17, 411 Wis. 2d 439, 5 N.W.3d 870, 20-1813. Evidence from a warrantless nonconsensual blood draw is admissible when: 1) the blood is drawn to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person lawfully arrested for drunk-driving; 2) there is a clear indication that the blood draw will produce evidence of intoxication; 3) the method used to take the blood sample is reasonable and is performed reasonably; and 4) the arrestee presents no reasonable objection to the blood draw. In the absence of an arrest, probable cause to believe blood currently contains evidence of a drunk-driving-related violation satisfies the first and second prongs. State v. Erickson, 2003 WI App 43, 260 Wis. 2d 279, 659 N.W.2d 407, 01-3367. But see Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2016). When an unlocked vehicle was not: 1) involved in an accident; 2) interrupting the flow of traffic; 3) disabled or damaged; 4) violating parking ordinances; or 5) in any way jeopardizing the public safety or the efficient movement of vehicular traffic, it was unreasonable to impound and tow the vehicle to ensure that the vehicle and any property inside it would not be stolen when there were reasonable alternatives to protect the vehicle. Evidence seized in an “inventory search” of the vehicle was inadmissible. State v. Clark, 2003 WI App 121, 265 Wis. 2d 557, 666 N.W.2d 112, 02-2195. Before the government may invade the sanctity of the home without a warrant, the government must demonstrate not only probable cause but also exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness. When a police officer placed the officer’s foot in a doorway to prevent the defendant from closing the door, the act constituted an entry into the home. A warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the suspect’s blood alcohol level might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant. State v. Larson, 2003 WI App 150, 266 Wis. 2d 236, 668 N.W.2d 338, 02-2881. To perform a protective search for weapons, an officer must have reasonable suspicion that an individual may be armed and dangerous. A court may consider an officer’s belief that the officer’s or another’s safety is threatened in finding reasonable suspicion, but such a belief is not a prerequisite to a valid search. There is no per se rule justifying a search any time an individual places the individual’s hands in the individual’s pockets contrary to police orders. The individual’s hand movements must be considered under the totality of the circumstances of the case. State v. Kyles, 2004 WI 15, 269 Wis. 2d 1, 675 N.W.2d 449, 02-1540. The propriety of a warrantless search of a person’s garbage outside the person’s home comes under a two-part test: 1) whether the person by the person’s conduct has exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy; and 2) whether that expectation is justifiable in that it is one that society will recognize as reasonable. Consideration of curtilage or open fields appropriately falls within an expectation-of-privacy analysis and is not a separate factor. In this case, the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage placed in a dumpster not set out for collection located down a private driveway marked “Private Property.” State v. Sigarroa, 2004 WI App 16, 269 Wis. 2d 234, 674 N.W.2d 894, 03-0703. When the police are lawfully on the suspect’s premises by virtue of a valid search warrant, they may make a warrantless arrest of the suspect prior to the search if the arrest is supported by probable cause. State v. Cash, 2004 WI App 63, 271 Wis. 2d 451, 677 N.W.2d 709, 03-1614. A law enforcement officer acted reasonably when during a routine traffic stop the officer requested the passengers, as well as the driver, to exit the vehicle and individually asked them questions outside the scope of the initial traffic stop after the officer had become aware of specific and articulable facts giving rise to the reasonable suspicion that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed. State v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, 274 Wis. 2d 540, 683 N.W.2d 1, 02-2216. Whether a warrantless home entry is justified based on the need to render assistance or prevent harm is judged by an objective test of whether a police officer under the circumstances known to the officer at the time of entry reasonably believes that delay in procuring a warrant would gravely endanger life. In addition to the circumstances known to the police at the time of entry, a court may consider the subjective beliefs of police officers involved, but only insofar as such evidence assists the court in determining objective reasonableness. State v. Leutenegger, 2004 WI App 127, 275 Wis. 2d 512, 685 N.W.2d 536, 03-0133. Although a known citizen informer did not observe the defendant drive the defendant’s truck in a manner consistent with someone who was under the influence of an intoxicant, the tip was reliable when it was based on the informer’s first-hand observation that the defendant was drunk and was independently verified by the arresting officer. State v. Powers, 2004 WI App 143, 275 Wis. 2d 456, 685 N.W.2d 869, 03-2450. The anonymous caller in this case provided predictive information that, if true, demonstrated a special familiarity with the defendant’s affairs that the general public would have had no way of knowing. When the officer verified this predictive information, it was reasonable for the officer to believe that a person with access to such information also had access to reliable information about the defendant’s illegal activities providing reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle. State v. Sherry, 2004 WI App 207, 277 Wis. 2d 194, 690 N.W.2d 435, 03-1531. Under Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), a person who did not submit to an officer’s show of police authority was not seized within the meaning of the 4th amendment. Until a submission occurs, Hodari D. holds that a person is not seized for purposes of the 4th amendment, and therefore the person may not assert a 4th amendment violation that evidence resulting from the encounter with the police is the fruit of an illegal seizure. State v. Young, 2004 WI App 227, 277 Wis. 2d 715, 690 N.W.2d 866, 03-2968.
/constitution/wi
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wisconsinconstitution
/constitution/wi/000229/000027/000065
section
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