The timeliness of seeking a warrant depends upon the nature of the underlying circumstances and concepts. When the activity is of a protracted and continuous nature, the passage of time diminishes in significance. Factors like the nature of the criminal activity under investigation and the nature of what is being sought have a bearing on where the line between stale and fresh information should be drawn in a particular case. State v. Multaler, 2001 WI App 149, 246 Wis. 2d 752, 632 N.W.2d 89, 00-1846. Warrants for administrative or regulatory searches modify the conventional understanding of probable cause for warrants as the essence of the search is that there is no probable cause to believe a search will yield evidence of a violation. Refusal of consent is not a constitutional requirement for issuing the warrant, although it may be a statutory violation. Suppression only applies to constitutional violations. State v. Jackowski, 2001 WI App 187, 247 Wis. 2d 430, 633 N.W.2d 649, 00-2851. There is a presumption that a warrantless search of a private residence is per se unreasonable. A warrantless search requires probable cause, not reasonable suspicion. Although flight from an officer may constitute reasonable suspicion, it does not rise to probable cause. For probable cause, there must be a fair probability that contraband or evidence will be found in a particular place. State v. Rodriguez, 2001 WI App 206, 247 Wis. 2d 734, 634 N.W.2d 844, 00-2546. The absence of an oath or affirmation supporting the issuance of a warrant is not a mere technicality or matter of formality. Absence of an oath subjects evidence seized under the defective warrant to suppression. State v. Tye, 2001 WI 124, 248 Wis. 2d 530, 636 N.W.2d 473, 99-3331. If a telephone warrant application has not been recorded and there is no evidence of intentional or reckless misconduct on the part of law enforcement officers, a reconstructed application may serve as an equivalent of the record of the original application and can protect the defendant’s right to a meaningful appeal and ability to challenge the admission of evidence. Courts should consider the time between the application and the reconstruction, the length of the reconstructed segment in relation to the entire warrant request, if there were any contemporaneous written documents used to reconstruct the record, the availability of witnesses used to reconstruct the record, and the complexity of the segment reconstructed. The issuing judge’s participation may be appropriate. State v. Raflik, 2001 WI 129, 248 Wis. 2d 593, 636 N.W.2d 690, 00-1086. Probable cause to arrest may be based on hearsay that is shown to be reliable and emanating from a credible source. Thus information from a confidential informant may supply probable cause if the police know the informant to be reliable. State v. McAttee, 2001 WI App 262, 248 Wis. 2d 865, 637 N.W.2d 774, 00-2803. An affidavit in support of a search warrant is not a research paper or legal brief that demands citations for every proposition. An investigator’s detailed listing of the investigator’s sources of information and accompanying credentials, combined with the investigator’s indication that his opinion was based upon his training and research provided a sufficient foundation for the opinion the investigator gave in support of the warrant. State v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, 252 Wis. 2d 54, 643 N.W.2d 437, 00-1846. Under Ellenbecker, 159 Wis. 2d 91 (1990), it was reasonable for an officer, who stopped a motorist whose vehicle and general appearance matched that of a criminal suspect, to make a report of the incident, even if the officer had already decided that the driver was not the suspect, and for that purpose it was reasonable to ask for the motorist’s name and identification. Once the motorist stated that the motorist had no identification, there was a reasonable ground for further detention. State v. Williams, 2002 WI App 306, 258 Wis. 2d 395, 655 N.W.2d 462, 02-0384. When the reasonableness of a no-knock entry is challenged, the state must present evidence of the circumstances at the time of warrant execution that would justify a no-knock entry. If the circumstances are described in the warrant application, the evidence might be testimony by an officer that nothing had come to the officer’s attention to lead them to believe that circumstances had changed. If the warrant application is silent or lacking in regard to circumstances that might render an announced entry dangerous or futile, the state may still justify a no-knock entry by showing that the officers possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion at the time of entry. State v. Whiting, 2003 WI App 101, 264 Wis. 2d 722, 663 N.W.2d 299, 02-1721. Otherwise innocent conduct can supply the required link in the chain to establish probable cause that a crime has or is about to be committed. Although an individual fact in a series may be innocent in itself, when considered as a whole, the facts may warrant further investigation. State v. Schaefer, 2003 WI App 164, 266 Wis. 2d 719, 668 N.W.2d 760, 01-2691. The existence of probable cause in the context of information provided by an anonymous tipster is determined by a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. As applied to assessing the reliability of an anonymous tip, a deficiency in one factor may be compensated for by some other indicia of reliability when considered in the context of the totality of the circumstances. A recognized indicia of the reliability of an anonymous tip is police corroboration of details, particularly details involving predicted behavior. Probable cause may exist even if the predicted behavior corroborated by the police is, when viewed in isolation, innocent behavior. Police themselves need not observe suspicious behavior. State v. Sherry, 2004 WI App 207, 277 Wis. 2d 194, 690 N.W.2d 435, 03-1531. That an officer arrested the defendant for a crime that does not exist did not make the arrest illegal. The pertinent question is whether the arrest was supported by probable cause to believe the defendant committed a crime that does exist. State v. Repenshek, 2004 WI App 229, 277 Wis. 2d 780, 691 N.W.2d 369, 03-3089. Under Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), an officer cannot be expected to question a magistrate’s probable-cause determination or judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient except when: 1) the magistrate in issuing the warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for a reckless disregard of the truth; 2) the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned the magistrate’s judicial role; 3) an affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; or 4) the warrant is so facially deficient that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. State v. Marquardt, 2005 WI 157, 286 Wis. 2d 204, 705 N.W.2d 878, 04-0958. The inquiry into whether a warrant affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable under Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), must be different from the inquiry into whether the facts in the warrant application are clearly insufficient to support a determination of probable cause. That the warrant application was insufficient to support the warrant-issuing judge’s probable cause determination does not mean that the affidavit in support of the warrant was lacking in indicia of probable cause within the meaning of Leon. State v. Marquardt, 2005 WI 157, 286 Wis. 2d 204, 705 N.W.2d 878, 04-0958. Eason, 2001 WI 98, added two requirements that must be met before the Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), good faith exception may apply. Under Eason, a “significant investigation” does not require a showing that the investigation yielded the probable cause that would have been necessary to support the search at issue. At the same time, a significant investigation for purposes of Eason refers to more than the number of officers or hours devoted to an investigation. State v. Marquardt, 2005 WI 157, 286 Wis. 2d 204, 705 N.W.2d 878, 04-0958. The good faith exception under Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), is a doctrine that applies to police officers who execute a search warrant in the mistaken belief that it is valid. Good faith is not a doctrine that absolves the neutral and detached judge or magistrate from a careful, critical, and independent analysis of the facts presented when exercising the responsibility of determining whether probable cause for a search warrant exists. State v. Sloan, 2007 WI App 146, 303 Wis. 2d 438, 736 N.W.2d 189, 06-1271. The use of a credit card issued to the defendant to purchase a membership to websites containing child pornography, together with customer records confirming the defendant’s home address, email address, and credit card information, resulted in the inference that there was a fair probability that the defendant had received or downloaded images. Details provided on the use of computers by individuals involved in child pornography found in the affidavit supporting the search of the defendant’s home strengthened this inference. State v. Gralinski, 2007 WI App 233, 306 Wis. 2d 101, 743 N.W.2d 448, 06-0929. An officer’s knowledge that a vehicle’s owner’s license is revoked will support reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop so long as the officer remains unaware of any facts that would suggest that the owner is not driving. State v. Newer, 2007 WI App 236, 306 Wis. 2d 193, 742 N.W.2d 923, 06-2388. If a search is conducted in “flagrant disregard” of the limitations in the warrant, all items seized, even items within the scope of the warrant are suppressed. When the search consisted of moving items in plain view in order to document them, the circuit court correctly concluded that the police conduct, while troubling, did not require suppression of all evidence seized during the search. State v. Pender, 2008 WI App 47, 308 Wis. 2d 428, 748 N.W.2d 471, 07-1019. If the location to be searched is not described with sufficient particularity to inform officers which unit in a multi-unit building they are to search, the particularity required by the 4th amendment has not been satisfied. To justify a search of the whole building, there must be probable cause in the supporting affidavit to search each unit in the building, or there must be probable cause to search the entire building. State v. Jackson, 2008 WI App 109, 313 Wis. 2d 162, 756 N.W.2d 623, 07-1362. A warrant contingent upon law enforcement officers identifying the precise unit of three townhouse units in which the defendant resided lacked the specificity that the 4th amendment was designed to protect against. State v. King, 2008 WI App 129, 313 Wis. 2d 673, 758 N.W.2d 131, 07-1420. An anticipatory search warrant is not appropriate when its execution is conditioned on verification of an address as opposed to being conditioned on certain evidence of a crime being located at a specified place at some point in the future. State v. King, 2008 WI App 129, 313 Wis. 2d 673, 758 N.W.2d 131, 07-1420. Mistakes on the face of a warrant were a technical irregularity under s. 968.22 and the warrant met the 4th amendment standard of reasonableness when, although the warrant identified the car to be searched incorrectly two times, the executing officer attached and incorporated a correct affidavit that correctly identified the car three times, describing the correct color, make, model, and style of the car along with the correct license plate, and the information was based on the executing officer’s personal knowledge from prior encounters. State v. Rogers, 2008 WI App 176, 315 Wis. 2d 60, 762 N.W.2d 795, 07-1850. A reviewing court must conclude that the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the warrant-issuing commissioner had a substantial basis for concluding that there was a fair probability that a search of the specified premises would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. When a confidential informant told a law enforcement officer what someone else had told him, the veracity of each person in the chain was relevant. State v. Romero, 2009 WI 32, 317 Wis. 2d 12, 765 N.W.2d 756, 07-1139. The Eason, 2001 WI 98, good faith exception to the exclusionary rule when a police officer relies in good faith upon a search warrant’s validity was applicable when an officer’s good faith belief that an open felony warrant existed was based on a computer search that revealed a commitment order the officer believed to be an arrest warrant. State v. Robinson, 2009 WI App 97, 320 Wis. 2d 689, 770 N.W.2d 721, 08-0266. When an application for a warrant contains both tainted and untainted evidence, the warrant is valid if the untainted evidence is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause to issue the warrant. There is a two-pronged approach to determine if untainted evidence provides an independent source: 1) the court determines whether, absent the illegal entry, the officer would have sought the search warrant; and 2) it asks if information illegally acquired influenced the magistrate’s decision to authorize the warrant. Absent an explicit finding by the trial court, a clear inference from the facts can compel the conclusion that law enforcement agents would have sought a warrant had they not obtained tainted evidence. State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 778 N.W.2d 1, 07-1378. The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply to a situation in which: 1) no facts existed that would justify an arrest without a warrant; 2) the civil arrest warrant issued by a circuit judge was void ab initio because it did not comply with any statute authorizing the court to issue a warrant and it was not supported by an oath or affirmation; and 3) the court issued the warrant without the benefit of verification of the facts or scrutiny of the procedure to ensure that the judge acted as a detached and neutral magistrate. Suppressing evidence obtained as a result of the unauthorized, defective warrant is necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. State v. Hess, 2010 WI 82, 327 Wis. 2d 524, 785 N.W.2d 568, 08-2231. But see State v. Kerr, 2018 WI 87, 383 Wis. 2d 306, 913 N.W.2d 787, 16-2455. An order authorizing law enforcement to install and monitor a global positioning system (GPS) tracking device on the defendant’s vehicle constituted a valid warrant and the officers’ execution of the warrant was reasonable when the GPS tracking device was attached to the vehicle while the car was parked in the defendant’s driveway and the car was subsequently electronically monitored for a period of 35 days without the defendant’s knowledge. State v. Sveum, 2010 WI 92, 328 Wis. 2d 369, 787 N.W.2d 317, 08-0658. See also State v. Pinder, 2018 WI 106, 384 Wis. 2d 416, 919 N.W.2d 568, 17-0208. Generally, searches are subject to the “one warrant, one search” rule. However, a search conducted pursuant to a lawful warrant may last as long, and be as thorough, as reasonably necessary to fully execute the warrant. Courts have recognized an exception to the one warrant, one search rule when a subsequent entry and search are a reasonable continuation of the earlier one. The reasonable continuation rule has two requirements: 1) the subsequent entry must be a continuation of the earlier search; and 2) the decision to conduct a second entry to continue the search must be reasonable under the circumstances. State v. Avery, 2011 WI App 124, 337 Wis. 2d 351, 804 N.W.2d 216, 10-0411. The technology used in conducting a global positioning system (GPS) search did not exceed the scope of the warrant allowing GPS tracking of the defendant’s vehicle. The affidavit and warrant’s language contemplated installation of a GPS device that would track the vehicle’s movements. That the device provided officers with real-time updates of those movements did not alter the kind of information to be obtained under the warrant or the nature of the intrusion allowed. Police efficiency does not equate with unconstitutionality. State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, 345 Wis. 2d 563, 826 N.W.2d 369, 10-1366. The particularity requirement under the 4th amendment provides that a warrant must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things that are authorized to be seized. While a description of the object into which a tracking device is to be placed is a factor in satisfying the particularity requirement in Sveum, 2010 WI 92, there is no reason why another way of identifying a cell phone, such as by its electronic serial number, cannot serve the same function as physically placing a tracking device on the defendant’s property. State v. Tate, 2014 WI 89, 357 Wis. 2d 172, 849 N.W.2d 798, 12-0336. The 4th amendment parameters of search and seizure law are not necessarily inapplicable to all searches for and seizures of electronic information. Law enforcement officers have long had to separate the documents as to which seizure was authorized from other documents. That necessity has not turned an otherwise valid warrant into a “general” warrant. The court saw no constitutional imperative that would change the result simply because the object of the search is electronic data from a specific electronic file, for a reasonably specific period of time, in the custody of a specific internet service provider. State v. Rindfleisch, 2014 WI App 121, 359 Wis. 2d 147, 857 N.W.2d 456, 13-0362. Whether probable cause exists to issue a warrant is an objective, not a subjective, test. Thus, a police officer’s failure to tell the warrant-issuing court the officer’s subjective viewpoint was irrelevant and was not a “critical omission” from the affidavit supporting the search warrant so as to constitute a Franks, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), violation. State v. Kilgore, 2016 WI App 47, 370 Wis. 2d 198, 882 N.W.2d 493, 15-0997. A tip from an electronic service provider (ESP) is properly viewed as one from an identified citizen informant, not an anonymous informant, which therefore establishes the personal reliability requirement in case law. Additionally, the affidavit in this case showed sufficient indicia of observational reliability of the ESP. State v. Silverstein, 2017 WI App 64, 378 Wis. 2d 42, 902 N.W.2d 550, 16-1464. Suppression of evidence under the exclusionary rule is not appropriate when there is no police misconduct because the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct. Neither judicial integrity nor judicial error is a standalone basis for suppression under the exclusionary rule. State v. Kerr, 2018 WI 87, 383 Wis. 2d 306, 913 N.W.2d 787, 16-2455. A warrant for global positioning system (GPS) tracking is not issued pursuant to a statute, but instead is issued pursuant to the court’s inherent authority, and thus must comply only with this section and the 4th amendment to the U.S. Constitution. State v. Pinder, 2018 WI 106, 384 Wis. 2d 416, 919 N.W.2d 568, 17-0208. The purpose of an oath or affirmation is to impress upon the swearing individual an appropriate sense of obligation to tell the truth. The constitutional guarantee that warrant applications be supported by oath or affirmation is satisfied when the facts and circumstances demonstrate that the affiant executes an affidavit in a form calculated to awaken the conscience and impress the mind with the duty to tell the truth. The constitution does not require that any specific language or procedure be employed in the administration of an oath or affirmation. The oath or affirmation requirement is an issue of substance, not form. State v. Moeser, 2022 WI 76, 405 Wis. 2d 1, 982 N.W.2d 45, 19-2184. An anonymous telephone tip that specified that a vehicle was driven by an unlicensed person did not create articulable and reasonable suspicion of illegality justifying an investigatory stop of the auto and driver. 68 Atty. Gen. 347.
When a defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that an affiant’s false statement, knowingly or recklessly made, was the basis of the probable cause finding, a hearing must be held. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978). The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule allowed the admission of evidence obtained by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant, issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, later found to be unsupported by probable cause. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984). Evidence seized in reliance on a police record incorrectly indicating an outstanding arrest warrant was not subject to suppression when the error was made by court clerk personnel. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 131 L. Ed. 2d 34 (1995). There is no blanket exception to the knock and announce requirement for executing warrants. To justify a no-knock entry, a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing will be dangerous or futile or will inhibit the effective investigation of a crime must exist. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997). When the three occupants of a vehicle in which drugs and cash were found in a legal search all failed to offer any information with respect to the ownership of the drugs or money, it was a reasonable inference that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the drugs. A reasonable officer could conclude that there was probable cause to believe one or more of the occupants possessed the drugs, either solely or jointly. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 124 S. Ct. 795, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003). A search warrant that did not describe the items to be seized at all was so obviously deficient that the search conducted pursuant to it was considered to be warrantless. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 124 S. Ct. 1284, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1068 (2004). Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest. An arresting officer’s state of mind, except for the facts that the arresting officer knows, is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause. A rule that the offense establishing probable cause must be closely related to, and based on the same conduct as, the offense identified by the arresting officer at the time of arrest is inconsistent with these principals. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 125 S. Ct. 588, 160 L. Ed. 2d 537 (2004). For a conditioned anticipatory warrant to comply with the 4th amendment’s requirement of probable cause, two prerequisites of probability must be satisfied. It must be true not only that if the triggering condition occurs there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place, but also that there is probable cause to believe the triggering condition will occur. The triggering condition for an anticipatory search warrant need not be set forth in the warrant itself. United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 126 S. Ct. 1494, 164 L. Ed. 2d 195 (2006). Valid warrants will issue to search the innocent, and people unfortunately bear the cost. Officers executing search warrants on occasion enter a house when residents are engaged in private activity, and the resulting frustration, embarrassment, and humiliation may be real, as was true here. When officers execute a valid warrant and act in a reasonable manner to protect themselves from harm, however, the 4th amendment is not violated. Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 127 S. Ct. 1989, 167 L. Ed. 2d 974 (2007). To determine if the “alert” of a drug-detection dog during a traffic stop provides probable cause to search a vehicle, the state need not present an exhaustive set of records. A probable-cause hearing focusing on a drug-sniffing dog’s alert should proceed much like any other probable-cause hearing. The question—similar to every inquiry into probable cause—is whether all the facts surrounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. A sniff is up to snuff when it meets that test. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61 (2013). 911 calls are not per se reliable. However, given the technological and regulatory developments in the 911 system, a reasonable officer could conclude that a false tipster would think twice before using such a system. A caller’s use of the 911 system in this case was one of the relevant circumstances that justified the officer’s reliance on the information reported in the 911 call. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 188 L. Ed. 2d 680 (2014). A mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold a seizure under the 4th amendment. In this case, an officer stopped a vehicle because one of its two brake lights was out, but a court later determined that a single working brake light was all the law required. Because the officer’s mistake about the brake-light law was reasonable, the stop in this case was lawful. Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 135 S. Ct. 530, 190 L. Ed. 2d 475 (2014). Pretrial detention can violate the 4th amendment not only when it precedes, but also when it follows, the start of legal process in a criminal case. The 4th amendment prohibits government officials from detaining a person in the absence of probable cause. That can happen when the police hold someone without any reason before the formal onset of a criminal proceeding. But it also can occur when legal process itself goes wrong—when, for example, a judge’s probable-cause determination is predicated solely on a police officer’s false statements. Legal process does not expunge a 4th amendment claim when the process received by the defendant failed to establish what that amendment makes essential for pretrial detention—probable cause to believe the defendant committed a crime. Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 137 S. Ct. 911, 197 L. Ed. 2d 312 (2017). The totality of the circumstances test requires courts to consider the whole picture and to determine whether a reasonable officer could conclude—considering all of the surrounding circumstances, including the plausibility of the explanation itself—that there was a substantial chance of criminal activity. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 138 S. Ct. 577, 199 L. Ed. 2d 453 (2018). I,11warrantless search and seizure An officer making an arrest at a suspect’s home pursuant to a warrant, after the suspect opens the door, can arrest for a narcotics violation based on narcotics in plain sight in the room. Schill v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 473, 184 N.W.2d 858 (1971). Police officers properly in an apartment where drugs are discovered may pat down the pockets of a stranger who walks in and may seize a large, hard object felt in order to protect themselves. State v. Chambers, 55 Wis. 2d 289, 198 N.W.2d 377 (1972). After stopping and frisking the defendant properly, discovering several cartridges, the police were justified in looking under the car seat and in the glove compartment for a gun. State v. Williamson, 58 Wis. 2d 514, 206 N.W.2d 613 (1973). When a valid arrest is made without a warrant, the officer may conduct a limited search of the premises. Leroux v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 671, 207 N.W.2d 589 (1973). When an officer, mistakenly believing in good faith that the occupants of a car had committed a crime, stopped the car and arrested the occupants, the arrest was illegal, but a shotgun in plain sight on the back seat could be seized and used in evidence. State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973). When officers stopped a car containing three men meeting the description of robbery suspects within seven minutes after the robbery and found a gun on one, they could properly search the car for other guns and money. State v. Russell, 60 Wis. 2d 712, 211 N.W.2d 637 (1973). Given a valid arrest, a search is not limited to weapons or evidence of a crime, nor need it be directed to or related to the purpose of the arrest, because one who has contraband or evidence of a crime on one’s person travels at the person’s own risk when the person is validly arrested for any reason, hence the reasonableness of a search incident to the arrest no longer depends on the purpose of the search in relation to the object of the arrest. State v. Mabra, 61 Wis. 2d 613, 213 N.W.2d 545 (1974). Under the “open fields” doctrine, evidence that a body was found 450 feet from the defendant’s house during random digging done at the direction of the sheriff acting without a warrant was properly admitted into evidence. Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 218 N.W.2d 252 (1974). Seizure by police of a large quantity of marijuana from the defendants’ 155-acre farm did not contravene their 4th amendment rights. State v. Gedko, 63 Wis. 2d 644, 218 N.W.2d 249 (1974). The search of the defendant’s wallet after the defendant’s arrest on unrelated charges that led to the discovery of a newspaper article about a crime that, after questioning, the defendant admitted to committing was proper in order to find weapons or contraband that might have been hidden there. State v. Mordeszewski, 68 Wis. 2d 649, 229 N.W.2d 642 (1975). The seizure by police officers of a box of cartridges from under the edge of a couch on which the defendant was resting at the time of the defendant’s arrest was proper under the plain-view doctrine, since if police had a prior justification to be present in a position to see an object in plain view and its discovery was inadvertent, the object may be seized, and the use of a flashlight by one of the officers did not defeat the inadvertence requirement. Sanders v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 242, 230 N.W.2d 845 (1975). A warrantless search of two persons for concealed weapons was reasonable when an armed robbery with a sawed-off shotgun had been committed a short time before by two men, one of whom matched the description given for one of the robbers. Penister v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 94, 246 N.W.2d 115 (1976). The doctrine of exigency is founded upon actions of the police that are considered reasonable. The element of reasonableness is supplied by a compelling need to assist the victim or apprehend those responsible, not the need to secure evidence. West v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 390, 246 N.W.2d 675 (1976). A warrantless search by a probation officer was constitutionally permissible when probable cause existed for the officer to attempt to determine whether the probationer had violated the terms of probation. State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d 647, 247 N.W.2d 696 (1976). The plain view doctrine does not apply if the observation is not made inadvertently or if the officer does not have the right to be in the place from which the observation is made. State v. Monahan, 76 Wis. 2d 387, 251 N.W.2d 421 (1977). Discussing the criteria used as justification for warrantless searches of students by teachers. L.L. v. Circuit Court, 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N.W.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1979). A warrantless entry under the emergency rule justified a subsequent entry that did not expand the scope or nature of the original entry. La Fournier v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 61, 280 N.W.2d 746 (1979). An investigatory stop-and-frisk for the sole purpose of discovering a suspect’s identity was lawful under the facts of the case. State v. Flynn, 92 Wis. 2d 427, 285 N.W.2d 710 (1979). Furnishing police with the bank records of a depositor who had victimized the bank was not an unlawful search and seizure. State v. Gilbertson, 95 Wis. 2d 102, 288 N.W.2d 877 (Ct. App. 1980). Evidence obtained during a mistaken arrest is admissible as long as the arresting officer acts in good faith and has reasonable articulable grounds to believe that the suspect is the intended arrestee. State v. Lee, 97 Wis. 2d 679, 294 N.W.2d 547 (Ct. App. 1980). A warrantless entry into the defendant’s home was validated by the emergency doctrine when the officer reasonably believed lives were threatened. State v. Kramer, 99 Wis. 2d 306, 298 N.W.2d 568 (1980). The warrantless search of a fisherman’s truck by state conservation wardens under statutory inspection authority was presumptively reasonable. State v. Erickson, 101 Wis. 2d 224, 303 N.W.2d 850 (Ct. App. 1981). Under Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978), the warrantless search of an entire building on the morning after a localized fire was reasonable as it was the continuation of the prior night’s investigation that had been interrupted by heat and nighttime circumstances. State v. Monosso, 103 Wis. 2d 368, 308 N.W.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1981). A warrantless entry into a home was validated by the emergency doctrine when an official’s reasonable actions were motivated solely by the perceived need to render immediate aid or assistance, not by the need or desire to obtain evidence. State v. Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d 443, 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983). Police having probable cause to believe a vehicle contains criminal evidence may search the vehicle without a warrant or exigent circumstances. State v. Tompkins, 144 Wis. 2d 116, 423 N.W.2d 823 (1988).
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wisconsinconstitution
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