When potential jurors had seen news reports about the defendant’s alleged crime, the judge’s refusal to question those prospective jurors about the specific content of those reports did not violate the right to an impartial jury. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 114 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1991). A criminal defendant is prohibited from engaging in purposeful discrimination on the basis of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges of potential jurors. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 120 L. Ed. 2d 33 (1992). The 5th and 14th amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 125 S. Ct. 2007, 161 L. Ed. 2d 953 (2005). See also Wilber v. Hepp, 16 F.4th 1232 (2021). Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), established a three-step process for the constitutional review of allegedly race-based peremptory strikes: 1) the defendant must make out a prima facie case by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose; 2) once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the state to explain adequately the racial exclusion by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes; and 3) if a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 162 L. Ed. 2d 129 (2005). See also Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 162 L. Ed. 2d 196 (2005). It was not intended that the first Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), step be so onerous that a defendant would have to persuade the judge on the basis of all the facts, some of which are impossible for the defendant to know with certainty, that the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination. Instead, a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 162 L. Ed. 2d 129 (2005). The right to exercise peremptory challenges in state court is determined by state law. The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that peremptory challenges are not of federal constitutional dimension. States may withhold peremptory challenges altogether without impairing the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury and a fair trial. If a defendant is tried before a qualified jury composed of individuals not challengeable for cause, the loss of a peremptory challenge due to a state court’s good-faith error is not a matter of federal constitutional concern. Just as state law controls the existence and exercise of peremptory challenges, so state law determines the consequences of an erroneous denial of such a challenge. Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 173 L. Ed. 2d 320 (2009). When a juror makes a clear statement that indicates the juror relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the 6th amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial guarantee. For the inquiry to proceed, there must be a showing that one or more jurors made statements exhibiting overt racial bias that cast serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations and resulting verdict. To qualify, the statement must tend to show that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict. Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. 206, 137 S. Ct. 855, 197 L. Ed. 2d 107 (2017). The constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose. When all of the relevant facts and circumstances taken together establish that a peremptory strike of a prospective juror was motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent, a Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), violation has occurred. Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 204 L. Ed. 2d 638 (2019). If the issue of jury bias surfaces during or before trial, it is the trial judge’s responsibility to conduct an adequate investigation, given the unsatisfactory character of an inquiry into jury bias after the trial is over and the defendant convicted. The question is whether, given the indications of jury bias, the judge’s inquiry was adequate. Adequacy is a function of the probability of bias; the greater that probability, the more searching the inquiry needed to make reasonably sure that an unbiased jury is impaneled. Oswald v. Bertrand, 374 F.3d 475 (2004). The 6th amendment to the U.S. Constitution doesn’t apply to fact finding that doesn’t increase a prisoner’s original sentence. A denial of parole doesn’t increase a sentence; it’s a decision not to shorten the portion of the sentence that is served in prison. Heredia v. Blythe, 638 F. Supp. 3d 984 (2022). Criminal Law—Jury—Unanimous Jury Verdict Is Not Constitutionally Required in State Criminal Cases. Johnson. 1973 WLR 926.
State v. Louis: A Missed Opportunity to Clarify when Law Enforcement Officials May Serve as Petit Jurors in Criminal Trials. Anderson. 1992 WLR 751.
speedy and public trial
A defendant must demand a trial before requesting dismissal for lack of a speedy trial. When delay is caused by numerous proceedings in federal court, dismissal will be denied in the absence of any showing of prejudice. State v. Kwitek, 53 Wis. 2d 563, 193 N.W.2d 682 (1972). A delay of five weeks because witnesses were hospitalized, when the defendant was out on bail, did not amount to a failure to receive a speedy trial. Taylor v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 168, 197 N.W.2d 805 (1972). Failure to demand a speedy trial weighs less heavily against a defendant unrepresented by counsel. Because the defendant believed the charge had been dropped, it could not be said that a speedier trial would have prevented anxiety and concern about the pending charges. Hipp v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 621, 250 N.W.2d 299 (1977). The speedy trial provisions of the constitution are designed to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, anxiety and concern by the accused, impairment of defenses, and the elimination of the possibility that concurrent sentences will be imposed. Green v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 631, 250 N.W.2d 305 (1977). The controlling case concerning the right to a speedy trial is Barker, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). A 15 month delay was not prejudicial under the facts of the case. Scarbrough v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 87, 250 N.W.2d 354 (1977). A delay of 84 days between the defendant’s first court appearance and trial on misdemeanor traffic charges was not so inordinate as to raise a presumption of prejudice. State v. Mullis, 81 Wis. 2d 454, 260 N.W.2d 696 (1978). Mandatory closure of a hearing solely at the request of the complaining witness over the objection of the defendant violates the right to a public trial. State ex rel. Stevens v. Circuit Court, 141 Wis. 2d 239, 414 N.W.2d 832 (1987). The speedy trial right attaches when the complaint and warrant are issued. A pretrial determination that the right has been violated may be made only when evidence shows extraordinary circumstances justifying dismissal with prejudice. State v. Lemay, 155 Wis. 2d 202, 455 N.W.2d 233 (1990). The right to a speedy trial extends from the time of arrest or criminal charging up through the sentencing phase of prosecution. A defendant must show substantial and demonstrable prejudice for a postconviction violation of this right to be found. State v. Allen, 179 Wis. 2d 67, 505 N.W.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1993). Whether there has been a violation of the right to a speedy trial depends on a balancing test considering: 1) the length of delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the defendant’s assertion of the right; and 4) prejudice to the defendant. State v. Borhegyi, 222 Wis. 2d 506, 588 N.W.2d 89 (Ct. App. 1998), 98-0567. The speedy trial clause does not apply to the period before a defendant is indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused. The statute of limitations is the primary protection against stale charges. A delay between the commission of a crime and the subsequent arrest of a defendant may violate due process if actual prejudice has been suffered as a result of the delay and the government caused the delay for an improper purpose. State v. Blanck, 2001 WI App 288, 249 Wis. 2d 364, 638 N.W.2d 910, 01-0282. The length of delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism to a speedy trial determination. Until there is some delay that is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry. In determining the reasons for a delay, the initial inquiry is who caused the delay. Delay reasonably attributed to the ordinary demands of the judicial system is neither chargeable to the state or defendant. A missing witness presents a valid reason for delay. The state is charged with institutional delay such as when the trial court took responsibility for a delay because it had taken a motion for access to the records off its calendar. State v. Williams, 2004 WI App 56, 270 Wis. 2d 761, 677 N.W.2d 691, 03-0603. When filed charges are dismissed without prejudice and a second complaint subsequently filed, the time period between the dismissal and the filing of the second complaint is not included in determining whether the constitutional right to a speedy trial is violated. The right to a speedy trial is not primarily intended to prevent prejudice to the defense caused by passage of time. That interest is protected primarily by the due process clause and by statutes of limitation. The right is to minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges. Once charges are dismissed, the speedy trial guarantee is no longer applicable. State v. Urdahl, 2005 WI App 191, 286 Wis. 2d 476, 704 N.W.2d 324, 04-3014. The defendant’s right to a public trial was violated when the courthouse doors were locked at 4:30 P.M., pursuant to county policy, and the public was denied access to the courtroom while the defendant presented the defendant’s case and the state presented its rebuttal. State v. Vanness, 2007 WI App 195, 304 Wis. 2d 692, 738 N.W.2d 154, 06-2535. Although a presumption of openness exists, the right to a public trial is not absolute. The closure of a trial is trivial and does not implicate the 6th amendment if the closure does not implicate the values served by the 6th amendment: 1) to ensure a fair trial; 2) to remind the prosecutor and judge of their responsibility to the accused and the importance of their functions; 3) to encourage witnesses to come forward; and 4) to discourage perjury. A circuit court’s exclusion of every family member except the defendant’s mother, who did not understand English, plainly implicated the values served by the right to a public trial. State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612, 07-0005. Closure of a criminal trial is justified when four conditions are met: 1) the party who wishes to close the proceedings must show an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced by a public trial; 2) the closure must be narrowly tailored to protect that interest; 3) alternatives to closure must be considered by the trial court; and 4) the court must make findings sufficient to support the closure. Generally, the best course of action is for the trial judge to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of closure, but it was not necessary under the facts of this case. State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612, 07-0005. Although a 14-month delay was presumptively prejudicial, that did not end the court’s analysis. The defendant in this case was not actually prejudiced by the delay because the defendant was already serving more than two life sentences for a conviction in a homicide case. The delay did not cause the defendant’s pretrial incarceration; the defendant’s homicide sentence would have kept the defendant in prison anyway. State v. Lock, 2013 WI App 80, 348 Wis. 2d 334, 833 N.W.2d 189, 12-1514. There was no violation of the right to a speedy trial when the entirety of the delay in bringing the defendant to trial occurred to accommodate the defendant and the defense. State v. Provost, 2020 WI App 21, 392 Wis. 2d 262, 944 N.W.2d 23, 18-1268. A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. In determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of the defendant’s right, courts should consider four factors: 1) the length of delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the defendant’s assertion of the right; and 4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972). Any closure of a suppression hearing must advance an overriding interest likely to be prejudiced. Closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest. The court must consider alternatives and make a finding adequate to support closure. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1984). The time during which defendants are neither under indictment nor subjected to any official restraint does not weigh toward the defendants’ speedy trial claims. United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 106 S. Ct. 648, 88 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1986). The speedy-trial right is amorphous, slippery, and necessarily relative. There is a balancing test in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed. Some of the factors that courts should weigh include length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant. The attorney is the defendant’s agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and delay caused by the defendant’s counsel is charged against the defendant. The same principle applies whether counsel is privately retained or publicly assigned. Assigned counsel’s failure to move the case forward does not warrant attribution of delay to the state. However, delay resulting from a systemic breakdown in the public defender system could be charged to the state. Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 173 L. Ed. 2d 231 (2009). The speedy trial guarantee protects the accused from arrest or indictment through trial, but does not apply once a defendant has been found guilty at trial or has pleaded guilty to criminal charges. For inordinate delay in sentencing, although the speedy trial clause does not govern, a defendant may have other recourse, including, in appropriate circumstances, tailored relief under the due process clauses of the 5th and 14th amendments. Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437, 136 S. Ct. 1609, 194 L. Ed. 2d 723 (2016). A violation of the right to a public trial is a structural error. In the case of a structural error when there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to automatic reversal regardless of the error’s actual effect on the outcome. When a defendant raises a public-trial violation via an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), prejudice is not shown automatically. Instead, the burden is on the defendant to show either a reasonable probability of a different outcome in the defendant’s case or to show that the particular public-trial violation was so serious as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 198 L. Ed. 2d 420 (2017). Following a guilty plea, the defendant could not raise a speedy trial issue. United States v. Gaertner, 583 F.2d 308 (1978). Constitutional Law—Closure of Trials—The Press and the Public Have a First Amendment Right of Access to Attend Criminal Trials, Which Cannot Be Closed Absent an Overriding Interest. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980). Morris. 64 MLR 717 (1981). miscellaneous
A defendant may waive the right to be present at a proceeding when the court orders the defendant’s case consolidated with another. It is not error at the start of a trial to revoke bail and remand the defendant to the custody of the sheriff. Beverly v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 725, 177 N.W.2d 870 (1970). A prisoner held in Dodge County, who escaped from a hospital in another county while being treated there, could be tried for the escape in Dodge County. Dolan v. State, 48 Wis. 2d 696, 180 N.W.2d 623 (1970). A defendant is not prejudiced when the court amends the charge against the defendant to charge a lesser included offense without informing the defendant of the nature of the amended charge or allowing the defendant to plead to it. Moore v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 1, 197 N.W.2d 820 (1972). It is not a violation of a defendant’s rights if the defendant is prosecuted by information and not by grand jury indictment. State v. Lehtola, 55 Wis. 2d 494, 198 N.W.2d 354 (1972). A defendant is not entitled to be present at a conference in chambers if only questions of law or preliminary matters of procedure are discussed. Leroux v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 671, 207 N.W.2d 589 (1973). Participation of the state in promulgating adverse publicity is relevant in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in not granting a venue change. Briggs v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 313, 251 N.W.2d 12 (1977). If a defendant acquiesces in counsel’s decision that the defendant not testify, the defendant’s right to testify is waived. State v. Albright, 96 Wis. 2d 122, 291 N.W.2d 487 (1980). When the defendant was not relying on an alibi defense and did not file a notice of alibi, the court did not abuse its discretion in barring alibi testimony. State v. Burroughs, 117 Wis. 2d 293, 344 N.W.2d 149 (1984). Constitutional error is harmless if the court can declare its belief that it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there is no reasonable possibility the error contributed to the conviction. State v. Brecht, 143 Wis. 2d 297, 421 N.W.2d 96 (1988). Two factors determine the sufficiency of a criminal charge: 1) whether it states an offense to which the defendant can plead; and 2) whether disposition will bar future prosecution for the same offense. Discussing additional factors. State v. Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d 244, 426 N.W.2d 91 (Ct. App. 1988). A judge’s bias against counsel must be severe to translate into unconstitutional partiality against a litigant. State v. Hollingsworth, 160 Wis. 2d 883, 467 N.W.2d 555 (Ct. App. 1991). Rules for pleadings in criminal obscenity cases are the same as for all other criminal cases. If a pleading fails to set forth all elements of a crime but includes correct citations, all elements are sufficiently alleged. State v. Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d 530, 468 N.W.2d 676 (1991). Notice of the nature and cause of the accusations is a key factor in determining whether an amendment at trial prejudices a defendant. The inquiry is whether the new charge is so related to the transaction and facts adduced at the preliminary hearing that a defendant cannot be surprised by the new charge since the preparation for the new charge would be no different than the preparation for the old charge. State v. Neudorff, 170 Wis. 2d 608, 489 N.W.2d 689 (Ct. App. 1992). A criminal defendant’s right to testify is fundamental. In order to determine whether a criminal defendant is waiving the right to testify, a circuit court should conduct an on-the-record colloquy with the defendant outside the presence of the jury consisting of a basic inquiry to ensure that the defendant is aware of the defendant’s right to testify, and the defendant has discussed this right with counsel. State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485, 01-1476. Following an unchallenged colloquy wherein the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived the defendant’s right to testify, the defendant’s failure to seek an offer of proof at the time of trial or in the postconviction motion operated as a waiver of the right to have decided the issue of whether the waiver to testify could be withdrawn. State v. Winters, 2009 WI App 48, 317 Wis. 2d 401, 766 N.W.2d 754, 08-0910. When a trial court fails to satisfy the Weed, 2003 WI 85, mandate to conduct an on-the-record colloquy to determine if the defendant knowingly waived the right to testify, an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the waiver was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made is the proper procedural response. The state carries the burden to show that the defendant’s waiver was knowing and voluntary and must do so by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Garcia, 2010 WI App 26, 323 Wis. 2d 531, 779 N.W.2d 718, 09-0516. Weed, 2003 WI 85, does not address the situation here, in which a defendant prevented the trial court from conducting the on-the-record colloquy it required. By refusing to come to court so the trial court could personally explain what Weed requires must be explained, the defendant made it, as a practical matter consistent with safety, impossible for the trial court to explain the defendant’s right to testify and determine whether the decision to not testify was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Vaughn, 2012 WI App 129, 344 Wis. 2d 764, 823 N.W.2d 543, 12-0094. Harmless error review applies to the circuit court’s alleged denial of a defendant’s right to testify because its effect on the outcome of the trial is capable of assessment. State v. Nelson, 2014 WI 70, 355 Wis. 2d 722, 849 N.W.2d 317, 12-2140. A criminal defendant’s right to testify may, in appropriate cases, be subject to forfeiture when conduct incompatible with the assertion of the right is at issue. A forfeiture determination may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes it is designed to serve. Stated differently, a complete denial of the right to testify must be reasonable under the circumstances of the case. State v. Anthony, 2015 WI 20, 361 Wis. 2d 116, 860 N.W.2d 10, 13-0467. Two distinct interests formed the basis of the circuit court’s complete denial of the defendant’s right to testify in this case: 1) the circuit court’s ability to control the presentation of evidence so as to ensure the fairness and reliability of the criminal trial process; and 2) the preservation of dignity, order, and decorum in the courtroom. State v. Anthony, 2015 WI 20, 361 Wis. 2d 116, 860 N.W.2d 10, 13-0467. When, as here, a defendant repeatedly promises to disobey a circuit court’s evidentiary ruling, the effect of which would seriously threaten the fairness and reliability of the criminal trial process, a circuit court has a legitimate interest in placing reasonable limitations on a defendant’s right to testify. And, when a defendant displays disruptive conduct, as was the case here, a circuit court has a legitimate interest in placing reasonable limitations on the right to testify. State v. Anthony, 2015 WI 20, 361 Wis. 2d 116, 860 N.W.2d 10, 13-0467. In order to satisfy the requirements of the U.S. and Wisconsin Constitutions, the charges in the complaint and information must be sufficiently stated to allow the defendant to plead and prepare a defense. In child sexual assault cases, courts may apply the seven factors outlined in Fawcett, 145 Wis. 2d 244 (1988), and may consider any other relevant factors necessary to determine whether the complaint and information states an offense to which the defendant can plead and prepare a defense. No single factor is dispositive, and not every Fawcett factor will necessarily be present in all cases. State v. Kempainen, 2015 WI 32, 361 Wis. 2d 450, 862 N.W.2d 587, 13-1531. The fundamental right to testify on one’s own behalf at a criminal trial does not exist at the responsibility phase of bifurcated not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect proceedings because the responsibility phase is not a part of a criminal trial. State v. Lagrone, 2016 WI 26, 368 Wis. 2d 1, 878 N.W.2d 636, 13-1424. A law providing state-wide venue for certain sex crimes would be unconstitutional. 60 Atty. Gen. 450.
The absolute prohibition of paralegal-conducted jail interviews is an unjustifiable restriction of inmates’ due process rights of access to the courts. Restrictions on such interviews must be justified by a compelling and overwhelming state interest. 64 Atty. Gen. 152.
The trial court’s wholesale exclusion of the defendant’s proffered expert and lay testimony regarding post-traumatic stress disorder from the guilt phase of a murder trial without valid justification violated the defendant’s right to present a defense and to testify on the defendant’s own behalf. Morgan v. Krenke, 72 F. Supp. 2d 980 (1999). I,8Prosecutions; double jeopardy; self-incrimination; bail; habeas corpus. Section 8. [As amended Nov. 1870, April 1981, and April 2023] I,8(1)(1) No person may be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law, and no person for the same offense may be put twice in jeopardy of punishment, nor may be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself. I,8(2)(2) All persons, before conviction, shall be eligible for release under reasonable conditions designed to assure their appearance in court, protect members of the community from serious harm as defined by the legislature by law, or prevent the intimidation of witnesses. Monetary conditions of release may be imposed at or after the initial appearance only upon a finding that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the conditions are necessary to assure appearance in court, or if the person is accused of a violent crime as defined by the legislature by law, only upon a finding that there is a reasonable basis to believe that the conditions are necessary based on the totality of the circumstances, taking into account whether the accused has a previous conviction for a violent crime as defined by the legislature by law, the probability that the accused will fail to appear in court, the need to protect members of the community from serious harm as defined by the legislature by law, the need to prevent the intimidation of witnesses, and the potential affirmative defenses of the accused. The legislature may authorize, by law, courts to revoke a person’s release for a violation of a condition of release. I,8(3)(3) The legislature may by law authorize, but may not require, circuit courts to deny release for a period not to exceed 10 days prior to the hearing required under this subsection to a person who is accused of committing a murder punishable by life imprisonment or a sexual assault punishable by a maximum imprisonment of 20 years, or who is accused of committing or attempting to commit a felony involving serious bodily harm to another or the threat of serious bodily harm to another and who has a previous conviction for committing or attempting to commit a felony involving serious bodily harm to another or the threat of serious bodily harm to another. The legislature may authorize by law, but may not require, circuit courts to continue to deny release to those accused persons for an additional period not to exceed 60 days following the hearing required under this subsection, if there is a requirement that there be a finding by the court based on clear and convincing evidence presented at a hearing that the accused committed the felony and a requirement that there be a finding by the court that available conditions of release will not adequately protect members of the community from serious bodily harm or prevent intimidation of witnesses. Any law enacted under this subsection shall be specific, limited and reasonable. In determining the 10-day and 60-day periods, the court shall omit any period of time found by the court to result from a delay caused by the defendant or a continuance granted which was initiated by the defendant. I,8(4)(4) The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it. [1869 J.R. 7, 1870 J.R. 3, 1870 c. 118, vote Nov. 1870; 1979 J.R. 76, 1981 J.R. 8, vote April 1981; 2021 J.R. 6, 2023 J.R. 2, vote April 2023] double jeopardy
When, after a plea bargain, the state filed an amended complaint to which the defendant pled guilty, but the court refused to accept the plea and reinstated the complaint then later reinstated the amended complaint, the defendant could not claim double jeopardy. Salters v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 708, 191 N.W.2d 19 (1971). The defense of double jeopardy is nonjurisdictional and is waived by a guilty plea intelligently and voluntarily entered. Nelson v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 769, 193 N.W.2d 704 (1972). A person is not put in double jeopardy because of convictions in separate trials of resisting an officer and of battery to an officer, even though the acts charged arose from the same incident. State v. Elbaum, 54 Wis. 2d 213, 194 N.W.2d 660 (1972). When a defendant is tried for one offense and convicted of a lesser included offense, the defendant is not placed in double jeopardy. Dunn v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 192, 197 N.W.2d 749 (1972). A defendant is not subjected to double jeopardy when brought to trial a second time after a mistrial is declared. State v. Elkinton, 56 Wis. 2d 497, 202 N.W.2d 28 (1972). A defendant is not subjected to double jeopardy by being charged with both theft and burglary. An acquittal on one charge does not amount to collateral estoppel on the other. Hebel v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 325, 210 N.W.2d 695 (1973). A defendant convicted of false imprisonment and rape committed in Waukesha County was not subjected to double jeopardy by a second conviction for false imprisonment of the same victim in Milwaukee County because the facts supported two separate prosecutions. Baldwin v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 521, 215 N.W.2d 541 (1974). When a trial is terminated prior to a determination of guilt or innocence, the double jeopardy clause does not prevent a retrial if there is a “manifest necessity” to terminate the proceedings because the indictment or information is fatally defective and the trial court lacks jurisdiction to try the case. State v. Russo, 70 Wis. 2d 169, 233 N.W.2d 485 (1975). A defendant convicted of fleeing an officer in Portage County was not put in double jeopardy by a second conviction for fleeing a Wood County officer when the defendant crossed the county line during a chase. State v. Van Meter, 72 Wis. 2d 754, 242 N.W.2d 206 (1976). When the perjured testimony of a key state witness was not offered by the prosecution for the purpose of provoking a mistrial and thus avoiding a probable acquittal, a retrial after the conviction was vacated did not place the defendant in double jeopardy. Day v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 588, 251 N.W.2d 811 (1977). Neither the double jeopardy clause nor the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes parole revocation on the grounds of a parolee’s conduct related to an alleged crime for which the parolee is charged and acquitted. State ex rel. Flowers v. DHSS, 81 Wis. 2d 376, 260 N.W.2d 727 (1978).
/constitution/wi
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wisconsinconstitution
/constitution/wi/000229/000017/000015
section
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