The U.S. Supreme Court in Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), declined to adopt a federal constitutional competency standard and specifically recognized an individual trial court’s authority to make competency determinations. Nothing in Edwards establishes severe mental illness as the only circumstance in which a trial judge may deny the right of self-representation. The Wisconsin standards established by Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194 (1997), are not contrary to Edwards. Whether a defendant is competent to proceed pro se is uniquely a question for the trial court to determine. State v. Jackson, 2015 WI App 45, 363 Wis. 2d 484, 867 N.W.2d 814, 13-2859. Trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to inform the defendant that his no-contest plea to substantial battery was certain to result in his deportation and permanent exclusion from the United States. Because federal immigration law is not “succinct, clear, and explicit” in providing that the defendant’s substantial battery constituted a crime involving moral turpitude, the defendant’s attorney needed to do no more than advise him that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. State v. Ortiz-Mondragon, 2015 WI 73, 364 Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 717, 13-2435. Any language in Mendez, 2014 WI App 57, that suggests that Padilla, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), requires an attorney to advise an alien client that a conviction for a deportable offense will necessarily result in deportation is withdrawn. An attorney is required to “give correct advice” about the possible immigration consequences of a conviction. The attorney in this case satisfied that requirement by correctly advising the client that his guilty plea carried a “strong chance” of deportation. Executive action, including the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion, can block the deportation of deportable aliens. State v. Shata, 2015 WI 74, 364 Wis. 2d 63, 868 N.W.2d 93, 13-1437. Counsel’s trial strategy decisions, even those appearing unwise in hindsight, will not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel so long as they are reasonably founded on the facts and law under the circumstances existing at the time the decision was made. It was not unreasonable for defendant’s counsel to allow an investigator to testify that the victim was telling the truth when counsel’s goal was to demonstrate that the investigator’s investigation was limited due to the investgator’s bias. State v. Smith, 2016 WI App 8, 366 Wis. 2d 613, 874 N.W.2d 610, 14-2653. Under Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485 (1983), trial counsel’s decisions must be based upon facts and law upon which an ordinarily prudent lawyer would have then relied. This standard implies deliberateness, caution, and circumspection, and counsel’s decision must evince reasonableness under the circumstances. When counsel articulated no tactical reason implying deliberateness, caution, and circumspection for failing to call a witness and the record was devoid of any factual basis for a strategy that supported that failure, defense counsel’s performance was deficient. State v. Honig, 2016 WI App 10, 366 Wis. 2d 681, 874 N.W.2d 589, 14-2968. The 6th amendment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel does not require defense counsel to inform a defendant about the possibility of civil commitment under ch. 980 when the defendant enters a plea to a sexually violent offense. State v. LeMere, 2016 WI 41, 368 Wis. 2d 624, 879 N.W.2d 580, 13-2433. Physical separation between a defendant and the defendant’s attorney during a plea hearing, absent more, will not be analyzed as a complete denial of the right to counsel under Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). Such a claim may instead be analyzed under the framework set forth in Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). State v. Anderson, 2017 WI App 17, 374 Wis. 2d 372, 896 N.W.2d 364, 15-2611. Failure to raise arguments that require the resolution of unsettled legal questions generally does not render a lawyer’s services outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance sufficient to satisfy the 6th amendment. State v. Lemberger, 2017 WI 39, 374 Wis. 2d 617, 893 N.W.2d 232, 15-1452. The standard to use in forfeiture of trial counsel cases established under Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721 (1996), is upheld. There are two situations when a defendant loses the right to counsel: 1) a defendant may knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive the right to counsel; and 2) a defendant may forfeit the right to counsel. The triggering event for forfeiture is when the court becomes convinced that the orderly and efficient progression of the case is being frustrated. State v. Suriano, 2017 WI 42, 374 Wis. 2d 683, 893 N.W.2d 543, 15-0959. Scenarios triggering forfeiture of the right to trial counsel include: 1) a defendant’s manipulative and disruptive behavior; 2) withdrawal of multiple attorneys based on a defendant’s consistent refusal to cooperate with any of them and constant complaints about the attorneys’ performance; 3) a defendant whose attitude is defiant and whose choices repeatedly result in delay, interfering with the process of justice; and 4) physical or verbal abuse directed at counsel or the court. State v. Suriano, 2017 WI 42, 374 Wis. 2d 683, 893 N.W.2d 543, 15-0959. The contention that a defendant cannot forfeit the right to counsel unless the defendant’s actions were done with an intent or purpose to delay is rejected. Contrary language in Coleman, 2002 WI App 100, and any other case requiring proof of intentional, purposeful delay is overruled. State v. Suriano, 2017 WI 42, 374 Wis. 2d 683, 893 N.W.2d 543, 15-0959. Shata, 2015 WI 74, and Ortiz-Mondragon, 2015 WI 73, stand for the proposition that, when the law is not “succinct, clear, and explicit,” counsel is not deficient by accurately warning a client of the “risk of adverse immigration consequences.” Defendant’s counsel had no constitutional duty to give specific, direct advice on how pleading guilty would affect the defendant’s possibilities for readmission beyond the accurate, generalized warnings that were given. State v. Villegas, 2018 WI App 9, 380 Wis. 2d 246, 908 N.W.2d 198, 15-2162. Circuit courts reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel following multiple-count trials may conclude that deficient performance prejudiced only one of the multiple convictions. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), clearly contemplates such a result and does not require reversal on all counts when the prejudice proven affected only a single count. State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89, 16-0897. The Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), prejudice test is distinct from a sufficiency of the evidence test. A defendant need not prove the outcome would more likely than not be different in order to establish prejudice in ineffective assistance cases. The defendant must prove there is a reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the error. State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89, 16-0897. Counsel must either reasonably investigate the law and facts or make a reasonable strategic decision that makes any further investigation unnecessary. The court reviews the reasonableness of trial counsel’s decisions not with the benefit of hindsight, but in the context of the circumstances as they existed at the time counsel made the decisions. The court must consider the law and the facts as they existed when trial counsel’s conduct occurred. State v. Pico, 2018 WI 66, 382 Wis. 2d 273, 914 N.W.2d 95, 15-1799. To prove prejudice in a case alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. In the context of a plea withdrawal, a defendant must establish, through objective factual assertions, a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pled and would have gone to trial but for counsel’s ineffective performance. State v. Jeninga, 2019 WI App 14, 386 Wis. 2d 336, 925 N.W.2d 574, 18-0826. A court’s conclusion that counsel violated the rules of professional conduct because counsel failed to meet the demands of SCR 20:1.4 (a) (2) cannot mean, ipso facto, that counsel performed deficiently within the meaning of Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). State v. Cooper, 2019 WI 73, 387 Wis. 2d 439, 929 N.W.2d 192, 16-0375. When an alleged deficiency in counsel concerns the plea process, Hill, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), says the prejudice component specifically requires that the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel’s errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. A probability sufficient to undermine confidence exists when there is a “substantial,” not just “conceivable,” likelihood of a different result. When defendant’s counsel stated that, if the court were to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea, he still might decide to enter a plea, there is not a substantial likelihood of a different result, and, therefore, there is no prejudice shown. State v. Cooper, 2019 WI 73, 387 Wis. 2d 439, 929 N.W.2d 192, 16-0375. The Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509 (1992)/Rothering, 205 Wis. 2d 675 (1996), framework remains the correct methodology for determining the appropriate forum for a criminal defendant to file a claim relating to the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel after conviction. Both Knight and Rothering premise their decisions on the forum in which the alleged ineffectiveness took place. Applying this framework, the circuit court is the appropriate forum for a claim that postconviction counsel is ineffective for failing to assert an ineffective trial counsel claim. State ex rel. Warren v. Meisner, 2020 WI 55, 392 Wis. 2d 1, 944 N.W.2d 588, 19-0567. To satisfy the first prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must establish, based on the totality of the circumstances, that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Courts afford great deference to trial counsel’s conduct, presuming that it falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. In this case, counsel did not provide ineffective assistance in failing to inform the defendant about legal precedent that does not provide the defendant with a defense. State v. Savage, 2020 WI 93, 395 Wis. 2d 1, 951 N.W.2d 838, 19-0090. Strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable only to the extent that reasonable professional judgment supports the limitations on the investigation. Here, trial counsel was aware of the victim’s prior allegedly false statement about the victim’s cousin. Counsel understood that prior false allegations were admissible pursuant to an exception to the rape shield law, and in any event, that exception was not an unsettled or obscure area of the law. Trial counsel’s unsupported assumption that evidence of the prior allegation would be inadmissible was therefore not a reasonable strategic decision and was not entitled to any deference. As such, trial counsel did not provide a reasonable strategic reason not to seek and introduce evidence of the victim’s prior allegedly false statement regarding the victim’s cousin. Accordingly, although counsel’s overall strategy was reasonable, counsel’s implementation of it was not, and counsel’s omissions constituted deficient performance. State v. Stroik, 2022 WI App 11, 401 Wis. 2d 150, 972 N.W.2d 640, 21-0447. When a defendant raises a postconviction challenge to a guilty or no contest plea, the court has adopted a default procedure and an alternate procedure. The default procedure, articulated in Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303 (1996), places the burden on the defendant to prove a plea’s deficiency. The alternate procedure, articulated in Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246 (1986), applies when the defendant makes a pointed showing of an error in the plea colloquy by reference to the plea colloquy transcript. Under the Bangert procedure, after the defendant identifies a deficiency, the burden shifts to the state to prove the conviction’s sufficiency. If a defendant collaterally attacking a prior operating while intoxicated/prohibited alcohol concentration conviction cannot point to a defect in the relevant transcript, the burden-shifting procedure under Bangert does not apply. Instead, the defendant must carry the burden to demonstrate that a violation occurred. State v. Clark, 2022 WI 21, 401 Wis. 2d 344, 972 N.W.2d 533, 20-1058. A defendant is entitled to a Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797 (1979), hearing only when the defendant’s motion alleges sufficient facts, which if true, would entitle the defendant to relief. However, if the motion does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the defendant to relief, or if it presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the circuit court has the discretion to grant or deny a hearing. In this case, the defendant’s counsel did not perform deficiently by withdrawing a request for a self-defense instruction, and the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by denying the defendant’s motion without an evidentiary hearing. State v. Ruffin, 2022 WI 34, 401 Wis. 2d 619, 974 N.W.2d 432, 19-1046. See also State v. Spencer, 2022 WI 56, 403 Wis. 2d 86, 976 N.W.2d 383, 18-0942; State v. Jackson, 2023 WI 3, 405 Wis. 2d 458, 983 N.W.2d 608, 20-2119. In this case, the defendant’s 6th amendment right to counsel was not violated because the defendant’s co-inmate was not acting as a state agent when the inmate recorded the inmate’s conversations with the defendant. State v. Arrington, 2022 WI 53, 402 Wis. 2d 675, 976 N.W.2d 453, 19-2065. The 6th amendment right to counsel attaches at all critical stages of the criminal process. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized as critical stages those steps of a criminal proceeding that involve some adversarial confrontation. Wisconsin courts have determined that voir dire, jury instructions, and jury deliberations constitute critical stages at which the right to counsel attaches. In this case, the judge’s ex parte meeting with a juror regarding the juror’s health did not constitute a critical stage of the proceedings because the meeting: 1) occurred prior to deliberations; and 2) involved only a discussion of the juror’s health and ability to proceed. Both the timing and substance of the communications dictated that counsel’s absence did not result in a constitutional violation. State v. Spencer, 2022 WI 56, 403 Wis. 2d 86, 976 N.W.2d 383, 18-0942. Defense counsel waiving opening statement is an acceptable trial strategy. In this case, trial counsel did not know how or even whether the defendant would testify, so it was perfectly reasonable for counsel to waive the opening statement and avoid making promises to the jury counsel could not keep. Trial counsel was not ineffective for choosing to waive opening statement. State v. Hineman, 2023 WI 1, 405 Wis. 2d 233, 983 N.W.2d 652, 20-0226. To succeed on a claim under McCoy, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018), a defendant must show that: 1) the defendant expressly asserted that the objective of the defense was to maintain innocence of the charged criminal acts; and 2) the lawyer did not abide by that objective and overrode it by conceding guilt. In this case, the defendant’s constitutional right to maintain innocence as the objective of the defendant’s defense to a sexual assault charge was not violated when trial counsel told the jury that the alleged sexual contact had occurred but that it was accidental and with no intent to get sexual gratification. State v. Tung, 2023 WI App 33, 408 Wis. 2d 544, 993 N.W.2d 706, 21-1705. A preliminary hearing to determine probable cause for detention pending further proceedings is not a “critical stage” in a prosecution requiring appointed counsel. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975). When the defendant’s right to counsel was violated by a corporeal identification conducted in court without counsel, the prosecution could not introduce identification evidence even though the identification had an independent source. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 98 S. Ct. 458, 54 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1977). The right to counsel was not violated when a permissible jury instruction, intended for the defendant’s benefit, was given over defense counsel’s objections. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 98 S. Ct. 1091, 55 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1978). An indigent defendant is not entitled to appointed counsel when charged with an offense for which imprisonment is authorized but not imposed. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S. Ct. 1158, 59 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1979). In order to demonstrate a violation of the right to counsel, the defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected the counsel’s performance. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980). The government violated the defendant’s right to counsel by placing a paid informant in the same cell who deliberately elicited incriminating statements. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S. Ct. 2183, 65 L. Ed. 2d 115 (1980). Since a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to counsel to pursue a discretionary state appeal, the defendant could not be deprived of effective counsel by counsel’s failure to timely file an application for certiorari. Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 102 S. Ct. 1300, 71 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1982). Without surrounding circumstances making it unlikely that the defendant received effective assistance of counsel, a claim of ineffective assistance must be supported by demonstrating specific errors made by trial counsel. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show a probability, sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Indigent inmates held in administrative segregation during the investigation of a prison murder were not entitled to counsel prior to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings against them. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 104 S. Ct. 2292, 81 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1984). An accused’s postrequest responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of an initial request for counsel. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 105 S. Ct. 490, 83 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1984). The right to assistance of counsel wasn’t violated when an attorney refused to cooperate with the defendant in presenting perjured testimony at trial. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 106 S. Ct. 988, 89 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1986). Because an individual has no underlying constitutional right to appointed counsel in state collateral postconviction proceedings, the individual may not insist upon implementation of Anders, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), procedures. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 95 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1987). Though the trial court must recognize the presumption that a defendant is entitled to the defendant’s counsel of choice, the presumption is overcome by actual conflict and a serious potential for actual conflict. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1988). The right to counsel was not violated by the court’s instruction to the defendant that he not confer with his attorney during a 15 minute recess between the defendant’s direct and cross-examination. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 109 S. Ct. 594, 102 L. Ed. 2d 624 (1989). The 6th amendment right to counsel is offense specific. An accused’s invocation of this right during a judicial proceeding did not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel under Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), arising from the 5th amendment guarantees against self incrimination in regard to police questioning concerning a separate offense. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1991). An uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid because no prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment upon a subsequent conviction. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 128 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1994). To void a conviction due to a 6th amendment violation when a trial court has failed to inquire into a potential conflict of interest that the court knew or should have known of, the defendant must establish that the conflict adversely affected counsel’s performance. Failure of the trial court to inquire into the conflict did not reduce the defendant’s burden of proof. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 122 S. Ct. 1237, 152 L. Ed. 2d 291 (2002). The 6th amendment right to counsel of choice commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided, to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel the accused believes to be best. When that right is violated because the deprivation of counsel is erroneous, no additional showing of prejudice is required to make the violation complete, and the violation is not subject to harmless-error analysis. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 165 L. Ed. 2d 409 (2006). The U.S. Constitution does not forbid a state to insist that the defendant proceed to trial with counsel when the state court found the defendant mentally competent to stand trial if represented by counsel but not mentally competent to conduct that trial himself. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 128 S. Ct. 2379, 171 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2008). The right to counsel applies at the first appearance before a judicial officer at which a defendant is told of the formal accusation against the defendant and restrictions are imposed on the defendant’s liberty. Attachment of the right does not require that a public prosecutor as distinct from a police officer be aware of that initial proceeding or involved in its conduct. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 171 L. Ed. 2d 366 (2008). A defendant’s incriminating statement to a jailhouse informant, concededly elicited in violation of the 6th amendment right to counsel, was admissible at trial to impeach the defendant’s conflicting statement. Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 173 L. Ed. 2d 801 (2009). Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), which provided that if police initiate interrogation after the defendant’s assertion of the right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid, is overruled. Courts are not required to presume that such a waiver is invalid under those circumstances. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 173 L. Ed. 2d 955 (2009). Counsel has an obligation to advise a defendant that a guilty plea will result in the defendant’s deportation from this country. Advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the 6th amendment right to counsel. When the deportation consequence is truly clear, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010). As a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused. When defense counsel allowed an offer to expire without advising the defendant or allowing the defendant to consider it, defense counsel did not render the effective assistance the constitution requires. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 182 L. Ed. 2d 379 (2012). When ineffective advice led to rejection of a plea offer and caused the defendant to stand trial, rather than to waive the right to trial, the defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court, that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that were imposed. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 182 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2012). When a defendant claims that the defendant’s counsel’s deficient performance deprived the defendant of a trial by causing the defendant to accept a plea, the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. The court rejected a per se rule that a defendant with no viable defense cannot show prejudice from the denial of the right to trial. The decision whether to plead guilty involves assessing the respective consequences of a conviction after trial and by plea. But for his attorney’s incompetence, the defendant would have known that accepting the plea agreement in this case would certainly have led to deportation while going to trial would “almost” certainly have done so. If deportation were the determinative issue for an individual in plea discussions, and if the consequences of taking a chance at trial were not markedly harsher than pleading, that “almost” could make all the difference. Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 198 L. Ed. 2d 476 (2017). A violation of the right to a public trial is a structural error. In the case of a structural error when there is an objection at trial and the issue is raised on direct appeal, the defendant generally is entitled to automatic reversal regardless of the error’s actual effect on the outcome. When a defendant raises a public-trial violation via an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), prejudice is not shown automatically. Instead, the burden is on the defendant to show either a reasonable probability of a different outcome in the defendant’s case or to show that the particular public-trial violation was so serious as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 198 L. Ed. 2d 420 (2017). Counsel may not admit a client’s guilt of a charged crime over the client’s intransigent objection to that admission. To do so violates a defendant’s right to autonomy and constitutes a structural error that requires automatic reversal. McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 200 L. Ed. 2d 821 (2018). Under Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), when an attorney’s deficient performance costs a defendant an appeal that the defendant would have otherwise pursued, prejudice to the defendant should be presumed with no further showing from the defendant of the merits of the defendant’s underlying claims. That presumption of prejudice applies regardless of whether the defendant has signed an appeal waiver. Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 738, 203 L. Ed. 2d 77 (2019). When postconviction counsel failed to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in a postconviction motion under s. 974.02, the defendant’s opportunity to argue that claim on direct appeal was foreclosed. The appropriate forum for asserting ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel for failure to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel was in a collateral motion under s. 974.06. Page v. Frank, 343 F.3d 901 (2003). In Imani, 826 F.3d 939 (2016), and Tatum, 847 F.3d 459 (2017), the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Wisconsin courts violated the clearly established rule of Faretta, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), that a court may not force a lawyer upon a defendant based on a perceived lack of education, experience, or legal knowhow. While a defendant seeking to waive the defendant’s 6th amendment right to counsel must do so knowingly and intelligently and so must be mentally competent to make that decision, the defendant’s technical legal knowledge is irrelevant to a court’s assessment of the defendant’s competency. The focus of the inquiry is on a defendant’s mental competency. Washington v. Boughton, 884 F.3d 692 (2018). Before concluding that a defendant has a right to counsel at a critical stage, a court must also find that the criminal prosecution has commenced. The 6th amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against the accused. In this case, the defendant was arrested without a warrant and detained, and the defendant remained in jail when the police went to the county courthouse two days later to make their case. The defendant’s 6th amendment right to counsel attached when the court commissioner found probable cause, set bail, and executed a form that accused the defendant of a crime. It was of no 6th amendment consequence that the defendant never appeared in court during the probable-cause proceeding. Garcia v. Hepp, 65 F.4th 945 (2023). Right to Counsel: Repayment of Cost of Court-Appointed Counsel as a Condition of Probation. Strattner. 56 MLR 551 (1973).
How Do You Get a Lawyer Around Here? The Ambiguous Invocation of a Defendant’s Right to Counsel Under Miranda v. Arizona. Finger. 79 MLR 1041 (1996).
The Interrogations of Brendan Dassey. Gallini. 102 MLR 777 (2019).
How Courts in Criminal Cases Respond to Childhood Trauma. Denno. 103 MLR 301 (2019).
McNeil v. Wisconsin: Blurring a Bright Line on Custodial Interrogation. Johnson. 1992 WLR 1643.
jury trial and juror qualifications
NOTE: See also the notes to s. 906.06 for decisions relating to overturning verdicts due to juror misconduct.
Contradictory testimony of different state witnesses does not necessarily cancel the testimony and render it unfit as a basis for a conviction. The determination of credibility and the weight to be accorded the testimony is a jury function, and the jury may accept or reject the inconsistent testimony, even under the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof. Embry v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 151, 174 N.W.2d 521 (1970). A resident of Menominee County may properly be tried by a jury drawn from the Shawano-Menominee district. Article IV, section 23, is not violated by using district-based jury lists. Pamanet v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 501, 182 N.W.2d 459 (1971). When two alternate jurors in a murder trial made remarks critical of court procedures and the defense attorney, but were removed prior to the time the case was submitted to the jury, a showing of probable prejudice was required for a mistrial to be ordered. Shelton v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 43, 183 N.W.2d 87 (1971). Asking an improper question that is not answered is not grounds for reversal, especially when the trial court instructs the jury to disregard the question and to draw no inferences therefrom. The instruction is presumed to efface any possible prejudice resulting from asking the question. Taylor v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 453, 190 N.W.2d 208 (1971). The trial court did not err in failing to declare a mistrial because of a statement made by the prosecutor in closing argument, challenged as improper because the prosecutor expressed his opinion as to the defendant’s guilt, when it neither could be said that the statement was based on sources of information outside the record, nor expressed the prosecutor’s conviction as to what the evidence established. State v. McGee, 52 Wis. 2d 736, 190 N.W.2d 893 (1971). When the prosecutor stated in opening remarks that the defendant refused to be fingerprinted but failed to introduce testimony to this effect, the error was cured by proper instructions. State v. Tew, 54 Wis. 2d 361, 195 N.W.2d 615 (1972). Discussing the exclusion of young persons, students, and teachers from a jury list. If a challenge establishes discrimination, the jury list is invalid and the defendant need not show prejudice. Brown v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 158, 205 N.W.2d 566 (1973). Discussing rules for proving discrimination in compiling a jury list and the burden of proof. Wilson v. State, 59 Wis. 2d 269, 208 N.W.2d 134 (1973). Jurors are not necessarily prejudiced by reason of having sat as jurors at the same term on similar cases when the state’s witnesses are the same, but it is better not to use the same jurors. State v. Boutch, 60 Wis. 2d 397, 210 N.W.2d 751 (1973). The absence of persons of the defendant’s race on the jury panel is not ipso facto evidence of prejudice. Jones v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 105, 223 N.W.2d 889 (1974). A defendant, having been found competent to stand trial, must necessarily have possessed the intellectual capacity to waive the right to a jury trial. Norwood v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 343, 246 N.W.2d 801 (1976). A jury must unanimously find participation in a crime, but the jury need not unanimously agree whether a defendant: 1) directly committed the crime; 2) aided and abetted its commission; or 3) conspired with another to commit it. Holland v. State, 91 Wis. 2d 134, 280 N.W.2d 288 (1979).
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wisconsinconstitution
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