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A finding of unavailability of a witness due to mental illness, made on the basis of a confused and stale record, deprived the defendant of the right to confront witnesses, but the error was harmless. Burns v. Clusen, 599 F. Supp. 1438 (1984).
The use of a child victim’s statements to a psychologist under s. 908.03 (4) violated the accused sexual assaulter’s confrontation rights. Nelson v. Ferrey, 688 F. Supp. 1304 (1988).
The trial court’s wholesale exclusion of the defendant’s proffered expert and lay testimony regarding post-traumatic stress disorder from the guilt phase of a murder trial, without valid state justification, violated the defendant’s right to present a defense and to testify in the defendant’s own behalf. Morgan v. Krenke, 72 F. Supp. 2d 980 (1999).
A Bad Case of Indigestion: Internalizing Changes in the Right to Confrontation After Crawford v. Washington Both Nationally and in Wisconsin. Kinnally. 89 MLR 625 (2006).
State v. Thomas: Face to Face with Coy and Craig—Constitutional Invocation of Wisconsin’s Child-Witness Protection Statute. Vaillancourt. 1990 WLR 1613.
Hearsay and the Confrontation Clause. Biskupic. Wis. Law. May 2004.
I,7counsel
NOTE: See also the notes to article I, section 8 — Self-incrimination.
A defendant is entitled to the presence of counsel at a post-warrant lineup, but the attorney need not participate or object and need not be the ultimate trial counsel. Wright v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 75, 175 N.W.2d 646 (1970).
A city attorney should not be appointed defense counsel in a state case in which city police are involved unless the defendant, being fully informed, requests the appointment. Karlin v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 452, 177 N.W.2d 318 (1970).
A conference in chambers between defendant’s counsel and the prosecutor in regard to a plea agreement, but without the defendant’s presence, was not violative of the defendant’s constitutional rights and not a manifest injustice since the defendant had the benefit of counsel both during the entry of the defendant’s plea and at the sentencing and the defendant on the record expressly acquiesced in the plea agreement. Kruse v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 460, 177 N.W.2d 322 (1970).
A disciplinary action against an attorney is a civil proceeding. An indigent attorney is not entitled to the appointment of an attorney. State v. Hildebrand, 48 Wis. 2d 73, 179 N.W.2d 892 (1970).
An indigent defendant is not entitled to a substitution of appointed counsel when the defendant is dissatisfied with the one appointed. Peters v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 682, 184 N.W.2d 826 (1971).
American Bar Association standards relating to the duty of defense counsel, while approved by the court, do not automatically prove incompetency or ineffectiveness if violated. State v. Harper, 57 Wis. 2d 543, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973).
An arrestee has no right to demand that counsel be present while a breathalyzer test is administered. State v. Driver, 59 Wis. 2d 35, 207 N.W.2d 850 (1973).
A defendant has no right to counsel or to be present when photographs are shown to a witness. The right to counsel exists only at or after the initiation of criminal proceedings. Holmes v. State, 59 Wis. 2d 488, 208 N.W.2d 815 (1973).
While it is not desirable, it is not error to appoint a city attorney from another city, not connected with the testifying police, as defense attorney. Hebel v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 325, 210 N.W.2d 695 (1973).
A person is not entitled to counsel at a lineup prior to the filing of a formal charge, but prosecution may not be delayed while a suspect is in custody merely for the purpose of holding a lineup without counsel. State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506, 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973). But see Garcia v. Hepp, 65 F.4th 945 (2023).
A conviction was not overturned because of the absence of counsel at an informal confrontation where the defendant was identified by the victim. Jones v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 97, 216 N.W.2d 224 (1974).
When a conflict arises in dual representation, a defendant must be granted a vacation of sentence and new hearing because a conflict at sentencing per se renders counsel’s representation ineffective and actual prejudice need not be shown. Hall v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 304, 217 N.W.2d 352 (1974).
Defense counsel’s failure to cross-examine the state’s principal witness at trial did not constitute ineffective representation when cross-examination had proved fruitless at the preliminary. Krebs v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 407, 219 N.W.2d 355 (1974).
The duty to appoint counsel is upon the judicial system as part of the superintending power of the judicial system. When the appointment of counsel for indigent convicted persons for parole and probation revocation proceedings will be recurrent and statewide, the power of appointment will be exercised by the supreme court. State ex rel. Fitas v. Milwaukee County, 65 Wis. 2d 130, 221 N.W.2d 902 (1974).
The trial judge must unconditionally and unequivocably demonstrate in the record that the defendant intelligently, voluntarily, and understandingly waived the constitutional right to counsel, whether or not the defendant is indigent. Keller v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 502, 249 N.W.2d 773 (1977).
When a state agency seeks to enforce its orders through the coercion of imprisonment for contempt, the full constitutional right to counsel arises. Ferris v. State ex rel. Maass, 75 Wis. 2d 542, 249 N.W.2d 789 (1977).
One charged with a crime carrying a penalty of incarceration has the full constitutional right to counsel, regardless of whether incarceration is ordered. State ex rel. Winnie v. Harris, 75 Wis. 2d 547, 249 N.W.2d 791 (1977).
The mere fact that one attorney represents two defendants charged in the same crime is not sufficient evidence of inadequate representation. The defendant has the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that an actual and operative conflict existed. Harrison v. State, 78 Wis. 2d 189, 254 N.W.2d 220 (1977).
A defendant has no right to be actively represented in the courtroom both by self and by counsel. Moore v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 285, 265 N.W.2d 540 (1978).
Discussing the test to determine if the denial of a continuance acted to deny a defendant either due process or effective assistance of counsel. State v. Wollman, 86 Wis. 2d 459, 273 N.W.2d 225 (1979).
The right to counsel does not extend to non-lawyer representatives. State v. Kasuboski, 87 Wis. 2d 407, 275 N.W.2d 101 (Ct. App. 1978).
Discussing withdrawal of a guilty plea on the grounds of ineffective representation by trial counsel. State v. Rock, 92 Wis. 2d 554, 285 N.W.2d 739 (1979).
A defendant’s request on the morning of trial to represent himself was properly denied as untimely. Hamiel v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 656, 285 N.W.2d 639 (1979).
A prerequisite to a claim on appeal of ineffective trial representation is preservation of trial counsel’s testimony at a postconviction hearing in which the representation is challenged. State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).
The trial court did not err in refusing the defendant’s request on the second day of trial to withdraw a waiver of the right to counsel. Discussing self-representation. Pickens v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 549, 292 N.W.2d 601 (1980).
The right to counsel did not preclude incarceration for a second operating while intoxicated conviction when the defendant was not represented by counsel in proceedings leading to the first conviction, since the first offense was a civil forfeiture case. State v. Novak, 107 Wis. 2d 31, 318 N.W.2d 364 (1982).
Counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the heat-of-passion defense in a murder case when the wife who had been maltreated during a 23-year marriage intentionally killed her husband while he lay sleeping. State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983).
A defendant’s uncorroborated allegations will not support a claim of ineffective representation when counsel is unavailable to rebut the claim of ineffectiveness. State v. Lukasik, 115 Wis. 2d 134, 340 N.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1983).
Effective assistance of counsel was denied when the defense attorney did not properly inform the client of the personal right to accept a plea offer. State v. Ludwig, 124 Wis. 2d 600, 369 N.W.2d 722 (1985).
When a trial court fails to make adequate inquiry into a defendant’s last-minute request to replace the defendant’s attorney, the right to counsel is adequately protected by a retrospective hearing at which the defendant may present the defendant’s own testimony. State v. Lomax, 146 Wis. 2d 356, 432 N.W.2d 89 (1988).
Discussing the 5th and 6th amendment rights to counsel and Edwards, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). State v. McNeil, 155 Wis. 2d 24, 454 N.W.2d 742 (1990).
Affirmed. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1991). See also Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 121 S. Ct. 1335, 149 L. Ed. 2d 321 (2001).
Defense counsel’s absence at the return of the jury verdict without the defendant’s consent and the failure to poll the jury were grounds for automatic reversal. State v. Behnke, 155 Wis. 2d 796, 456 N.W.2d 610 (1990).
When a defendant accepts counsel, the decision to assert or waive a constitutional right is delegated to the attorney. The failure of the defendant to object to the attorney’s waiver is waiver. State v. Wilkens, 159 Wis. 2d 618, 465 N.W.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1990).
There is a two-prong test for ineffective counsel: 1) trial counsel was ineffective; and 2) the defense was prejudiced so that absent error the result would have been different. State v. Wilkens, 159 Wis. 2d 618, 465 N.W.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1990).
A court may disqualify a defendant’s chosen counsel over the defendant’s objection and waiver of the right to conflict-free representation when actual or a serious potential for a conflict of interest exists. State v. Miller, 160 Wis. 2d 646, 467 N.W.2d 118 (1991).
A determination of indigency by the public defender under s. 977.07 is not the end of the court ’s inquiry into the need to appoint counsel. State v. Dean, 163 Wis. 2d 503, 471 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1991).
To bring a claim of ineffective appellate counsel, a defendant must petition the court that heard the appeal for a writ of habeas corpus. State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992). See also State ex rel. Warren v. Meisner, 2020 WI 55, 392 Wis. 2d 1, 944 N.W.2d 588, 19-0567.
The question of ineffective counsel is whether there is a reasonable probability that a jury viewing the evidence untainted by counsel’s errors would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. State v. Glass, 170 Wis. 2d 146, 488 N.W.2d 432 (Ct. App. 1992).
A defense attorney’s ex parte petition to withdraw was improperly granted. A minimal due process hearing was required. State v. Batista, 171 Wis. 2d 690, 492 N.W.2d 354 (Ct. App. 1992).
Absent a clear waiver of counsel and a clear demonstration of a defendant’s ability to proceed pro se, courts are advised to mandate full representation by counsel. State v. Haste, 175 Wis. 2d 1, 500 N.W.2d 678 (Ct. App. 1993).
The proper test of attorney performance is reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Counsel is not required to have a total and complete knowledge of all criminal law, no matter how obscure. State v. Hubert, 181 Wis. 2d 333, 510 N.W.2d 799 (Ct. App. 1993).
Appellate counsel’s closing of a file because of no merit without the defendant knowing of the right to disagree and compel a no merit report under s. 809.32 is ineffective assistance of counsel. A defendant must be informed of the right to appeal and to a no merit report, but need not be informed orally. State ex rel. Flores v. State, 183 Wis. 2d 587, 516 N.W.2d 362 (1994).
An appellate defendant represented by counsel has no right to have a pro se brief considered by the court when counsel has submitted a brief. State v. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 523 N.W.2d 727 (1994).
The decision to poll the jury may be delegated to counsel. Waiver by counsel without showing that the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made by the defendant did not violate a constitutional right. State v. Jackson, 188 Wis. 2d 537, 525 N.W.2d 165 (Ct. App. 1994).
If the same counsel represents co-defendants, the trial court must conduct an inquiry to determine whether the defendant waives the right to separate counsel. When an actual conflict of interest is found, specific prejudice need not be shown. If no inquiry is made by the trial court, the court of appeals will examine the record, reversing if an actual conflict of interest is found. State v. Dadas, 190 Wis. 2d 339, 526 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1994).
The prejudice prong of the test for ineffective counsel was met when counsel failed to insure that a defense witness would appear without shackles. State v. Tatum, 191 Wis. 2d 547, 530 N.W.2d 407 (Ct. App. 1995).
A suspect’s reference to an attorney who had previously or is presently representing the suspect in another matter is not a request for counsel requiring the cessation of questioning. State v. Jones, 192 Wis. 2d 78, 532 N.W.2d 79 (1995).
The right to counsel and right to remain silent are the defendant’s. An attorney, not requested by the defendant, could not compel the police to end questioning by stating that no questioning was to take place outside his presence. State v. Jones, 192 Wis. 2d 78, 532 N.W.2d 79 (1995).
A defendant must assert the right to counsel in a timely manner. However, no waiver of counsel is presumed and a waiver must be clear and unequivocal. The state has the burden of overcoming the presumption. Mere inconvenience to the court is insufficient to deny the right to counsel. State v. Verdone, 195 Wis. 2d 476, 536 N.W.2d 172 (Ct. App. 1995), 94-3369.
Withdrawal of a guilty plea after sentencing may be based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Erroneous advice regarding parole eligibility can form the basis for ineffective assistance. State v. Bentley, 195 Wis. 2d 580, 536 N.W.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1995), 94-3310.
A trial court’s failure to conduct a hearing to determine if a defendant’s waiver of counsel is knowingly made is harmless error absent a showing of prejudice. A trial court need not make a finding that a defendant is competent to proceed without counsel unless there is doubt that the defendant is competent to stand trial. State v. Klessig, 199 Wis. 2d 397, 544 N.W.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-1938.
In certain situations a court may find that a defendant has waived counsel without having expressly done so. Waiver was found when the defendant constantly refused to cooperate with counsel while refusing to waive the right and when the court found the defendant’s intent was to “delay, obfuscate and compound the process of justice.” State v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721, 546 N.W.2d 406 (1996), 93-2445.
The test for ineffective assistance of counsel under the state constitution is the same as under the federal constitution. In such cases the burden is placed on the defendant to show that the deficient performance of counsel prejudiced the defense. State v. Sanchez, 201 Wis. 2d 219, 548 N.W.2d 69 (1996), 94-0208.
Read together, ss. 809.32 (4) and 977.05 (4) (j) create a statutory, but not constitutional, right to counsel in petitions for review and cases before any court, provided counsel does not determine the appeal to be without merit. When counsel fails to timely file a petition for review, the defendant may petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the supreme court has the power to allow late filing. State ex rel. Schmelzer v. Murphy, 201 Wis. 2d 246, 548 N.W.2d 45 (1996), 95-1096.
Whether counsel is deficient by not requesting the polling of individual jurors upon the return of a verdict depends on all the circumstances, not on whether counsel explained to the defendant the right to an individual polling. State v. Yang, 201 Wis. 2d 725, 549 N.W.2d 769 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-0583.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of interest there must be an actual conflict that adversely affected the attorney’s performance. Simultaneous representation of a criminal defendant and a witness in that case in an unrelated civil case resulted in an actual conflict. State v. Street, 202 Wis. 2d 533, 551 N.W.2d 830 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-2242.
Counsel is not ineffective when the general theory of the defense is discussed with the defendant, and when based on that theory, counsel makes a strategic decision not to request a lesser-included instruction because it would be inconsistent with or harmful to the theory of the defense. State v. Eckert, 203 Wis. 2d 497, 553 N.W.2d 539 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-1877.
When a prosecutor elicits testimony that can only be contradicted by defense counsel or the defendant, if defense counsel could not reasonably foresee the dilemma and the defendant has decided not to testify, defense counsel must be permitted to testify. State v. Foy, 206 Wis. 2d 629, 557 N.W.2d 494 (Ct. App. 1996), 96-0658.
Counsel was deficient when it failed to object at sentencing to a prosecutor’s sentence recommendation after agreeing in a plea bargain to make no recommendation. The defendant was automatically prejudiced when the prosecutor materially and substantially breached the plea agreement. State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997), 94-3364. But see State v. Nietzold, 2023 WI 22, 406 Wis. 2d 349, 986 N.W.2d 795, 21-0021.
Whenever a defendant seeks to proceed pro se, a colloquy to determine whether the waiver is knowing and voluntary is required. The colloquy is to ensure that the defendant: 1) made a deliberate choice to proceed without counsel; 2) was aware of the difficulties and disadvantages of self-representation; 3) was aware of the seriousness of the charge or charges; and 4) was aware of the general range of the possible penalties. When there is no colloquy and post-conviction relief is requested, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing on the waiver, and the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the waiver was knowingly made for the conviction to stand. State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), 95-1938.
There is a higher standard for determining competency to represent oneself than for competency to stand trial. The standard is based on the defendant’s education, literacy, fluency in English, and any disability that may affect the ability to communicate a defense. When there is no pretrial finding of competency to proceed and post-conviction relief is sought, the court must determine if it can make a meaningful nunc pro tunc inquiry. If it cannot, or it finds that it can but the defendant was not competent, a new trial is required. State v. Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d 194, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997), 95-1938.
It was ineffective assistance of counsel to advise a defendant to go to trial and lie rather than agree to a plea agreement. Despite the defendant’s participation in fraud on the court, the defendant was entitled to vacation of the defendant’s sentence and a return to pretrial status, although offering the prior proposed plea agreement was not required. State v. Fritz, 212 Wis. 2d 284, 569 N.W.2d 48 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-1905.
When a defendant proves ineffective assistance of counsel occurred at the pretrial stage, the defendant must be granted a new trial. State v. Lentowski, 212 Wis. 2d 849, 569 N.W.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2597.
An in-court identification subsequent to a lineup in violation of an accused’s right to counsel is admissible only if the state carries the burden of showing that the in-court identification is based on observations of the suspect other than the lineup. State v. McMorris, 213 Wis. 2d 156, 570 N.W.2d 384 (1997), 95-2052.
A postconviction hearing pursuant to Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797 (1979), to preserve the testimony of trial counsel is required in every ineffective assistance of counsel case. State v. Curtis, 218 Wis. 2d 550, 582 N.W.2d 409 (Ct. App. 1998), 96-2884.
Having disputed relevant portions of the presentence investigation at the sentencing hearing, it was trial counsel’s duty to see that the disputes were fully resolved by a proper hearing. Failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Anderson, 222 Wis. 2d 403, 588 N.W.2d 75 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-3070.
Whether a defendant’s motion for substitution of counsel, with an accompanying request for a continuation, should be granted depends on the balancing of several interests. State v. Wanta, 224 Wis. 2d 679, 592 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-0318.
A defendant’s prejudicial deprivation of appellate counsel, be it the fault of the attorney or the appellate court, is properly remedied by a petition for habeas corpus in the supreme court. State ex rel. Fuentes v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 225 Wis. 2d 446, 593 N.W.2d 48 (1999), 98-1534.
A defendant who alleges counsel was ineffective by failing to take certain steps must show with specificity what the action, if taken, would have revealed and how the action would have affected the outcome. State v. Byrge, 225 Wis. 2d 702, 594 N.W.2d 388 (Ct. App. 1999), 97-3217.
When defense counsel has appeared for and represented the state in the same case in which counsel later represents the defendant and no objection was made at trial, to prove a violation of the right to effective counsel, the defendant must show that counsel converted a potential conflict of interest into an actual conflict by knowingly failing to disclose the attorney’s former prosecution of the defendant or representing the defendant in a manner that adversely affected the defendant’s interests. State v. Love, 227 Wis. 2d 60, 594 N.W.2d 806 (1999), 97-2336. See also State v. Kalk, 2000 WI App 62, 234 Wis. 2d 98, 608 N.W.2d 428, 99-1164; State v. Henyard, 2020 WI App 51, 393 Wis. 2d 727, 948 N.W.2d 396, 19-0548.
There is a distinction between the consequences on appeal of a trial court error and the consequences of that same error when it is raised in an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel context. The fact that a preserved error could lead to automatic reversal does not mean the same result will be reached when the error was waived. State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999), 98-0273.
The defendant’s assertion of the 6th amendment right to counsel was evident during interrogation when the defendant asked whether the police officer thought he should have an attorney and if he could call a person known to the officer to be a criminal defense lawyer. State v. Hornung, 229 Wis. 2d 469, 600 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1999), 99-0300.
Inherent in a defendant’s choice to proceed pro se is the risk, which the defendant knowingly assumes, that a defense not known to the defendant will not be presented during trial. State v. Clutter, 230 Wis. 2d 472, 602 N.W.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1999), 99-0705.
A defendant has a substantive due process right to enforce a plea agreement after the plea has been entered. Defense counsel’s failure to inform the defendant of that right or to pursue enforcement of the agreement constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Scott, 230 Wis. 2d 643, 602 N.W.2d 296 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-2109.
The lack of legal expertise is an impermissible basis on which to deny a request to represent oneself. State v. Oswald, 2000 WI App 3, 232 Wis. 2d 103, 606 N.W.2d 238, 97-1219.
On administrative appeal a probationer may be assisted by counsel, but there is no right to appointed counsel or effective assistance of counsel. State ex rel. Mentek v. Schwarz, 2000 WI App 96, 235 Wis. 2d 143, 612 N.W.2d 746, 99-0182.
Reversed on other grounds. 2001 WI 32, 242 Wis. 2d 94, 624 N.W.2d 150, 99-0182.
A defendant’s unusual conduct or beliefs do not necessarily establish incompetence for purposes of self-representation. Although a defendant may exhibit beliefs that are out of the ordinary and make references that may antagonize jurors, that does not reflect a mental defect that prevents self-representation. State v. Ruszkiewicz, 2000 WI App 125, 237 Wis. 2d 441, 613 N.W.2d 893, 99-1198.
Except when charges have been filed in a closely-related case derived from the same factual predicate, the 6th amendment right to counsel is offense specific and attaches to a particular offense only after adversary proceedings are commenced. The 6th amendment does not prohibit the interrogation of a defendant in regard to a murder in the absence of counsel retained in a bail jumping case. State v. Badker, 2001 WI App 27, 240 Wis. 2d 460, 623 N.W.2d 142, 99-2943.
In making its separate determination of whether a defendant is indigent for purposes of court-appointed counsel, the trial court should consider federal poverty guidelines. If a defendant has no assets and an income well below the poverty level, the trial court should set forth why it determined that the defendant could afford counsel. State v. Nieves-Gonzalez, 2001 WI App 90, 242 Wis. 2d 782, 625 N.W.2d 913, 00-2138.
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Wisconsin Constitution updated by the Legislative Reference Bureau. Published October 4, 2024. Click for the Coverage of Annotations for the Annotated Constitution. Report errors at 608.504.5801 or lrb.legal@legis.wisconsin.gov.