In this case, supervisory conditions limiting the defendant’s internet use were not unconstitutionally overbroad and did not impermissibly infringe the defendant’s 1st amendment rights when the conditions were crafted to provide protection for the public, and the defendant had a history of violating similar conditions. The circuit court could reasonably conclude that the defendant’s prior violations of internet conditions raised significant concerns about the need to protect the public and children in light of the defendant’s convictions for using a computer to facilitate a sex crime, child enticement, sexual assault of a child, and child abuse. State v. King, 2020 WI App 66, 394 Wis. 2d 431, 950 N.W.2d 891, 19-1642. The name change prohibition in s. 301.47 (2) (a) does not implicate the right to free speech by infringing expressive conduct. The 1st amendment right to free speech does not encompass the power to compel the state to facilitate a change of a legal name. Producing one’s legal name is properly understood as conduct subject to government regulation, not speech. State v. C.G., 2022 WI 60, 403 Wis. 2d 229, 976 N.W.2d 318, 18-2205. Discussing free speech and the state’s campaign finance law in light of Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 65 Atty. Gen. 145. A flag misuse statute was unconstitutional as applied to a flag hung upside down with a peace symbol affixed when the context imbued the display with protected elements of communication. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 94 S. Ct. 2727, 41 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1974). Campaign expenditure limitations unduly restrict political expression. Contribution limits impose serious burdens on free speech only if they are so low as to prevent candidates and political committees from amassing the resources necessary for effective advocacy. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976). Reversed in part. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2010). See also McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619, 157 L. Ed. 2d 491 (2003); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 165 L. Ed. 2d 482 (2006); Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 168 L. Ed. 2d 329 (2007); McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. 185, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 188 L. Ed. 2d 468 (2014); Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate, 596 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 1638, 212 L. Ed. 2d 654 (2022). A board of education may not prevent a non-union teacher from speaking on a bargaining issue at an open meeting. City of Madison Joint School District v. WERC, 429 U.S. 167, 97 S. Ct. 421, 50 L. Ed. 2d 376 (1976). The 1st amendment prohibited the prosecution of a newspaper for publishing confidential proceedings of a commission investigating judicial conduct. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 98 S. Ct. 1535, 56 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978). The 1st amendment does not guarantee the public’s or media’s right of access to sources of information within government control. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 98 S. Ct. 2588, 57 L. Ed. 2d 553 (1978). The press and public have no constitutional right to attend a pretrial suppression hearing when the defendant demands a closed hearing to avoid prejudicial publicity. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 99 S. Ct. 2898, 61 L. Ed. 2d 608 (1979). A public utility had the free speech right to enclose with bills inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530, 100 S. Ct. 2326, 65 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1980). For restrictions on commercial speech to stand a constitutional challenge, the restriction must not be more extensive than is necessary to serve the government’s interests. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1980). A statute that prohibits placing unstamped mailable matter in any box approved by the U.S. Postal Service does not violate the free speech clause. U.S. Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 101 S. Ct. 2676, 69 L. Ed. 2d 517 (1981). An ordinance that placed substantial restrictions on billboards other than those used for onsite commercial advertising violated the free speech clause. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800 (1981). A public university that provided a forum to many student groups but excluded religious student groups violated the principle that state regulation of speech should be content neutral. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 102 S. Ct. 269, 70 L. Ed. 2d 440 (1981). There are constitutional limits on the state’s power to prohibit candidates from making promises in the course of an election campaign. Some promises are universally acknowledged as legitimate, indeed indispensable, to decisionmaking in a democracy. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 102 S. Ct. 1523, 71 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1982). A school board’s discretion to determine the contents of school libraries may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or political manner. Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 73 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1982). The government’s substantial interest in maintaining the park in the heart of the capital in an attractive condition sustained a regulation against camping or overnight sleeping in public parks. Free speech was not denied. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 82 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1984). A school district did not violate the free speech clause by disciplining a student for giving an offensively lewd and indecent speech at a school assembly. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 92 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1986). School administrators may exercise control over style and content of student speech in school-sponsored activities as long as control is reasonably related to “legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 108 S. Ct. 562, 98 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1988). The 1st amendment prohibits employment decisions concerning low-level public employees from being based upon political patronage. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 110 S. Ct. 2729, 111 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1990). A public indecency statute barring public nudity and requiring dancers to wear pasties and G-strings did not violate the right of free expression. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 115 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1991). Press freedom does not confer a constitutional right to disregard promises that would otherwise be enforceable under state law. A possible promissory estoppel action for breaching an agreement to keep a source confidential was not barred. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 111 S. Ct. 2513, 115 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1991). A county ordinance requiring permits for all parades, public assemblies, and other private uses of public property that gave the county administrator the power to adjust permit fees to meet police expenses incident to the permitted activity violated the 1st amendment because the ordinance lacked narrowly drawn, reasonable, and definite standards guiding the administrator and because it impermissibly required an analysis of the content of the applicant’s message. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 112 S. Ct. 2395, 120 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1992). Exclusion of “fighting words” from free speech protections did not justify a city ordinance banning displays that convey messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance. A city may not selectively ban fighting words based on the particular idea expressed. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992). A city ban on newsracks for commercial publications violated the right to free speech when the city failed to establish a “reasonable fit” between its legitimate interest in safety and aesthetics and the ban. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 113 S. Ct. 1505, 123 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1993). Denial of the use of a school building to a church seeking to exhibit a film when a nonsectarian group would have been allowed the use of the building to show a secular film on the same topic violated the right of free speech. Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384, 113 S. Ct. 2141, 124 L. Ed. 2d 352 (1993). For a government employee’s speech to be protected, the speech must be on a matter of public concern and the employee’s interest in expressing himself or herself on the matter must outweigh the injury the speech could cause the employer in providing public services through its employees. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 128 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1994). See also Burkes v. Klauser, 185 Wis. 2d 308, 517 N.W.2d 503 (1994). The selection of the makeup a parade is entitled to free speech protection. A parade sponsor’s free speech rights include the right to deny a group’s participation who intends to convey a message contrary to the sponsor’s. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 115 S. Ct. 2338, 132 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1995). A state university that funded printing a broad range of student publications but denied funding for a student religious group’s publication violated free speech guarantees and was not excused by the need to comply with the establishment of religion clause. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 132 L. Ed. 2d 700 (1995). As with government employees whose employment may not be terminated for exercising 1st amendment rights, independent contractors may not have their government contracts terminated for refusing to support a political party or its candidates or for exercising free speech rights. Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 116 S. Ct. 2342, 135 L. Ed. 2d 843 (1996). See also O’Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 116 S. Ct. 2353, 135 L. Ed. 2d 874 (1996). Assessments against commodity producers under an agricultural marketing order to pay for the costs of generic advertising did not violate the producers’ free speech rights. Glickman v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 117 S. Ct. 2130, 138 L. Ed. 2d 585 (1997). A public broadcasting network’s decision to exclude from a televised debate an independent political candidate who had little public support was a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral exercise of journalistic discretion. Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 140 L. Ed. 2d 875 (1998). It is a violation of the 4th amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third persons into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third persons in the home is not in aid of the execution of the warrant. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1999). The financing of student organizations through mandatory student fees does not violate the 1st amendment if viewpoint neutrality is the operational principal. Board of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 120 S. Ct. 1346, 146 L. Ed. 2d 193 (2000). An ordinance prohibiting public nudity was valid when the government’s asserted interest was combating the secondary effect associated with adult entertainment and was unrelated to suppression of the erotic message of nude dancing. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 120 S. Ct. 1382, 146 L. Ed. 2d 265 (2000). A statute that makes it unlawful within regulated areas near a health care facility for any person to knowingly approach within eight feet of another person, without that person’s consent, for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person is constitutional. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 147 L. Ed. 2d 597 (2000). The 1st amendment protects speech that discloses the content of an illegally intercepted telephone call when that speech was by a person not a party to the interception. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 121 S. Ct. 1753, 149 L. Ed. 2d 787 (2001). Speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be excluded from a limited public forum, such as a school, on the grounds that it is discussed from a religious viewpoint. A club’s meetings, held after school, not sponsored by the school, and open to any student who obtained parental consent, did not raise an establishment of religion violation that could be raised to justify content-based discrimination against the club. Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 121 S. Ct. 2093, 150 L. Ed. 2d 151 (2001). A village ordinance making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with the village and obtaining a permit violated the 1st amendment. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 122 S. Ct. 2080, 153 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2002). A state, consistent with the 1st amendment, may ban cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate, but a Virginia statute treating any cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate was unconstitutional. Instead of prohibiting all intimidating messages, a state may choose to regulate this subset of intimidating messages in light of cross burnings’ long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 155 L. Ed. 2d 535 (2003). Regulation of charitable subscriptions, barring fees in excess of a prescribed level, effectively imposes prior restraints on fundraising, and is incompatible with the 1st amendment. However, any and all reliance on the percentage of charitable donations fundraisers retain for themselves is not prohibited. While bare failure to disclose that information to potential donors does not establish fraud, when nondisclosure is accompanied by intentionally misleading statements designed to deceive the listener, a fraud claim is permissible. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 123 S. Ct. 1829, 155 L. Ed. 2d 793 (2003). The 1st amendment requires that an adult business licensing scheme assure prompt judicial review of an administrative decision denying a license. An ordinance providing that the city’s final decision may be appealed to state court pursuant to state rules of civil procedure did not violate the 1st amendment. City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774, 124 S. Ct. 2219, 159 L. Ed. 2d 84 (2004). While a governmental employer may impose certain restraints on the speech of its employees that would be unconstitutional if applied to the general public, the courts have recognized the right of employees to speak on matters unrelated to their employment and to speak on matters of public concern. Because a police officer’s off-duty activities were not related to a matter of public concern and were designed to exploit his employer’s image, they were not protected under the 1st amendment. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 125 S. Ct. 521, 160 L. Ed. 2d 410 (2004). When public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for 1st amendment purposes, and the constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline. Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689 (2006). Enforcement of a rule adopted by a statewide membership corporation organized to regulate interscholastic sports among its members that prohibited high school coaches from recruiting middle school athletes did not violate the 1st amendment. There is a difference of constitutional dimension between rules prohibiting appeals to the public at large and rules prohibiting direct, personalized communication in a coercive setting. Bans on direct solicitations are more akin to a conduct regulation than a speech restriction, but restrictions are limited to conduct that is inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms of misconduct. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Academy, 551 U.S. 291, 127 S. Ct. 2489, 168 L. Ed. 2d 166 (2007). Schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use. School officials did not violate the 1st amendment by confiscating a pro-drug banner and suspending the student responsible for it. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 168 L. Ed. 2d 290 (2007). Offers to provide or requests to obtain child pornography are categorically excluded from the 1st amendment. Offers to deal in illegal products or otherwise engage in illegal activity do not acquire 1st amendment protection when the offeror is mistaken about the factual predicate of his or her offer. Impossibility of completing the crime because the facts were not as the defendant believed is not a defense. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 170 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2008). The free speech clause of the 1st amendment restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech. Although a park is a traditional public forum for speeches and other transitory expressive acts, the display of a permanent monument in a public park is not a form of expression to which forum analysis applies. Instead, the placement of a permanent monument in a public park is best viewed as a form of government speech and is therefore not subject to scrutiny under the free speech clause of the 1st amendment. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 172 L. Ed. 2d 853 (2009). The government may regulate corporate political speech through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that speech altogether. Federal law prohibiting corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech defined as an “electioneering communication” or for speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate is unconstitutional. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2010). While the prohibition of animal cruelty itself has a long history in American law, depictions of animal cruelty are not outside the reach of the 1st amendment altogether. The guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. A federal statute that criminalized the commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty, which encompassed common depictions of ordinary and lawful activities and required merely that the conduct be “illegal” where the alleged violation took place, was substantially overbroad and therefore facially invalid under the 1st amendment. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 176 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2010). A public university may condition its official recognition of a student group, and the attendant use of school funds and facilities, on the organization’s agreement to open eligibility for membership and leadership to all students. In requiring a student religious group, in common with all other student organizations, to choose between welcoming all students and forgoing the benefits of official recognition, a school did not transgress constitutional limitations. The 1st amendment shields groups against state prohibition of the organization’s expressive activity, however exclusionary that activity may be, but a group enjoys no constitutional right to state subvention of its selectivity. Christian Legal Society Chapter v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 177 L. Ed. 2d 838 (2010). The 1st amendment shielded church members from tort liability for their speech when they picketed near a soldier’s funeral service and their picket signs reflected the church’s view that the United States is overly tolerant of sin and that God kills American soldiers as punishment. Whether the amendment prohibits liability for speech in this type of case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 179 L. Ed. 2d 172 (2011). A state cannot create new categories of unprotected speech by applying a simple balancing test that weighs the value of a particular category of speech against its social costs and then punishes that category of speech if it fails the test. Without persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content, such as restrictions on selling or lending “violent” video games to children, is part of a long, if heretofore unrecognized, tradition of proscription, a legislature may not revise the judgment of the American people, embodied in the 1st amendment, that the benefits of its restrictions on the government outweigh the costs. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011). Like the protected books, plays, and movies that preceded them, video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through many familiar literary devices and through features distinctive to the medium. That suffices to confer 1st amendment protection. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011). The 1st amendment does not permit a public-sector union to adopt procedures that have the effect of requiring objecting nonmembers to lend the union money to be used for political, ideological, and other purposes not germane to collective bargaining. The 1st amendment does not allow a public-sector union to require objecting nonmembers to pay a special fee or dues increase that is levied to meet expenses for the purpose of financing the union’s political and ideological activities that were not disclosed when the amount of the regular assessment was set. Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 183 L. Ed. 2d 281 (2012). The federal statute at issue in this case imposed two types of limits on campaign contributions: 1) base limits that restrict how much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or committee; and 2) aggregate limits that restrict how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees. Base limits were previously upheld as serving the permissible objective of combatting corruption. The aggregate limits do little, if anything, to address that concern, while seriously restricting participation in the democratic process. The aggregate limits are therefore invalid under the 1st amendment. McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. 185, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 188 L. Ed. 2d 468 (2014). A Massachusetts act that made it a crime to knowingly stand on a public way or sidewalk within 35 feet of an entrance or driveway to any reproductive health care facility violated the 1st amendment. Although the act was content neutral, it was not narrowly tailored because it burdened substantially more speech than was necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 189 L. Ed. 2d 502 (2014). Judicial candidates have a 1st amendment right to speak in support of their campaigns. States have a compelling interest in preserving public confidence in their judiciaries. When a state adopts a narrowly tailored restriction, like the one at issue in this case, providing that judicial candidates “shall not personally solicit campaign funds . . . but may establish committees of responsible persons” to raise money for election campaigns, those principles do not conflict. A state’s decision to elect judges does not compel it to compromise public confidence in their integrity. The 1st amendment permits such restrictions on speech. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 191 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2015). A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of animus toward the ideas contained in the regulated speech. An innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content-based law into one that is content neutral. Because strict scrutiny applies either when a law is content based on its face or when the purpose and justification for the law are content based, a court must evaluate each question before it concludes that the law is content neutral and thus subject to a lower level of scrutiny. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 192 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2015). A speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter. In this case, the town sign code singled out specific subject matter for differential treatment, even if it did not target viewpoints within that subject matter. Ideological messages were given more favorable treatment than messages concerning a political candidate, which were themselves given more favorable treatment than messages announcing an assembly of like-minded individuals. That is a paradigmatic example of content-based discrimination. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 192 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2015). But see City of Austin v. Reagan National Advertising of Austin, LLC, 596 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 1464, 212 L. Ed. 2d 418 (2022). A speech regulation is content based if the law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed. A regulation that targets a sign because it conveys an idea about a specific event is no less content based than a regulation that targets a sign because it conveys some other idea. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 192 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2015). When government speaks, it is not barred by the free speech clause from determining the content of what it says. That freedom in part reflects the fact that it is the democratic electoral process that first and foremost provides a check on government speech. Thus, government statements and government actions and programs that take the form of speech do not normally trigger the 1st amendment rules designed to protect the marketplace of ideas. As a general matter, when the government speaks it is entitled to promote a program, to espouse a policy, or to take a position. Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 192 L. Ed. 2d 274 (2015). Based on the historical context, observers’ reasonable interpretation of the messages conveyed by Texas specialty plates, and the effective control that the state exerts over the design selection process, Texas’ specialty license plates constituted government speech. Drivers who display a state’s selected license plate designs convey the messages communicated through those designs. The 1st amendment stringently limits a state’s authority to compel a private party to express a view with which the private party disagrees. But here, just as Texas could not require a group to convey the state’s ideological message, the group could not force Texas to include a Confederate battle flag on its specialty license plates. Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 135 S. Ct. 2239, 192 L. Ed. 2d 274 (2015). With a few exceptions, the U.S. Constitution prohibits a government employer from discharging or demoting an employee because the employee supports a particular political candidate. When an employer demotes an employee out of a desire to prevent the employee from engaging in political activity, the employee is entitled to challenge that unlawful action under the 1st amendment and 42 USC 1983—even if the employer makes a factual mistake about the employee’s behavior. A discharge or demotion based upon an employer’s belief that the employee has engaged in protected activity can cause the same kind, and degree, of constitutional harm whether that belief does or does not rest upon a factual mistake. Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 578 U.S. 266, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 194 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2016). A North Carolina statute making it a felony for a registered sex offender to gain access to a number of websites, including commonplace social media websites, violated the 1st amendment. A fundamental principle of the 1st amendment is that all persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then, after reflection, speak and listen once more. To foreclose access to social media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise of 1st amendment rights. Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 198 L. Ed. 2d 273 (2017). Minnesota’s political apparel ban lacked objective, workable standards required for a reasonable content-based restriction on speech in a nonpublic forum and therefore violated the 1st amendment. Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1876, 201 L. Ed. 2d 201 (2018). Under Illinois law, if a public-sector collective-bargaining agreement includes an agency-fee provision and the union certifies to the employer the amount of the fee, that amount is automatically deducted from a nonmember’s wages. No form of employee consent is required. This procedure violates the 1st amendment and cannot continue. Neither an agency fee nor any other payment to the union may be deducted from a nonmember’s wages, nor may any other attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay. By agreeing to pay, nonmembers are waiving their 1st amendment rights, and such a waiver cannot be presumed. Janus v. AFSCME, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 201 L. Ed. 2d 924 (2018).
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wisconsinconstitution
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