The defendant's confession to a serious crime did not transform a noncustodial interview into a custodial interrogation for purposes of
Miranda,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). Not every confession obtained absent
Miranda warnings is inadmissible. The critical inquiry is not whether the interview took place in a coercive or police dominated environment, but rather whether the defendant's freedom to depart was restricted in any way. In answering that question, the court looks at the totality of the circumstances while keeping in mind that the determination is based on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by the interrogating officers or the person being questioned. Although, in this case, police officers clearly suspected the defendant and had enough evidence to arrest the defendant when he confessed, that by itself did not restrain the defendant's freedom of movement. State v. Bartelt,
2018 WI 16,
379 Wis. 2d 588,
906 N.W.2d 684,
15-2506.
In the context of whether an incarcerated individual is determined to be in custody,
article I, section 8, of the Wisconsin Constitution does not provide greater protection of the right against compelled self-incrimination than what is afforded to individuals under the 5th amendment. State v. Halverson,
2019 WI App 66,
389 Wis. 2d 554,
937 N.W.2d 74,
18-0858.
It is essential to distinguish between, on the one hand, a valid waiver of
Miranda,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), rights and, on the other hand, a later invocation of those rights. The state must always show that a
Miranda waiver is knowing and voluntary, and a suspect's mental condition is a significant factor in this analysis. The suspect may later decide to invoke the right to remain silent or the right to have counsel present. To invoke the right to counsel, a suspect must make an unambiguous and unequivocal request for counsel. A suspect's personal characteristics can be relevant to whether the suspect knowingly and voluntarily waived
Miranda rights, but a suspect's apparent mental state does not relax the requirement that the right to counsel be invoked with an unambiguous and unequivocal statement. State v. Abbott,
2020 WI App 25,
392 Wis. 2d 232,
944 N.W.2d 8,
19-0021.
A witness who refuses to testify on self-incrimination grounds after the judge grants immunity may summarily be found in criminal contempt. United States v. Wilson,
421 U.S. 309.
The accused's silence during police interrogation lacked probative value for impeachment of an alibi at trial. United States v. Hale,
422 U.S. 171. See also Doyle v. Ohio,
426 U.S. 610.
The use of the defendant's income tax returns to prove a gambling charge did not deny self-incrimination protection. Garner v. United States,
424 U.S. 648.
A voluntary interview at a police station was not “custodial interrogation." Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U.S. 492.
An instruction to the jury, over defense objection, not to draw an adverse inference from the defendant's failure to testify did not violate the right against self-incrimination. Lakeside v. Oregon,
435 U.S. 333 (1978).
While statements made by the defendant in circumstances violating
Miranda protections are admissible for impeachment if their trustworthiness satisfies legal standards, any criminal trial use against the defendant of involuntary statements is a denial of due process. Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385 (1978).
Testimony before a grand jury under a grant of immunity could not constitutionally be used for impeachment purposes in a later criminal trial. New Jersey v. Portash,
440 U.S. 450 (1979).
An explicit statement of waiver is not necessary to support a finding that the defendant waived
Miranda rights. North Carolina v. Butler,
441 U.S. 369 (1979).
A voluntary confession obtained during a custodial interrogation following an illegal arrest was inadmissible. Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200 (1979).
A witness compelled by a grant of immunity to testify despite a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination was property prosecuted for perjured testimony. United States v. Apfelbaum,
445 U.S. 115 (1980).
Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291 (1980).
The right against self-incrimination is not violated when the defendant who testifies in his own defense is impeached by use of the defendant's prearrest silence. Jenkins v. Anderson,
447 U.S. 231 (1980).
Upon the defendant's request, the judge must instruct the jury not to infer guilt from the defendant's failure to testify. Carter v. Kentucky,
450 U.S. 288 (1981).
An accused who requests counsel may not be interrogated without counsel unless the accused initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477 (1981).
When, for impeachment purposes, the prosecution cross-examined the defendant as to postarrest silence before the defendant received
Miranda warnings, due process was not violated. Fletcher v. Weir,
455 U.S. 603 (1982).
When the prosecutor improperly commented to the jury that the defendants did not challenge certain accusations against them, the court erred in reversing the conviction on appeal without determining whether the error was harmless. U.S. v. Hasting,
461 U.S. 499 (1983).
A probationer under an obligation to appear before a probation officer and answer questions truthfully was not entitled to
Miranda warnings. A confession was, therefore, admissible. Minnesota v. Murphy,
465 U.S. 420 (1984).
The court adopts an “inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule. Nix v. Williams,
467 U.S. 431 (1984).
The court adopts a “public safety" exception to the
Miranda rule. When the accused, known to have had gun, did not have a gun at time of arrest in a supermarket, the officer properly asked where the gun was before giving
Miranda warnings. New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649 (1984).
A person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to
Miranda warnings regardless of the nature or severity of the offense. Berkemer v. McCarty,
468 U.S. 420 (1984).
A suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning may later waive his or her rights and confess after
Miranda warnings are given. Oregon v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298 (1985).
The prosecutor's use of the defendant's postarrest, post
-Miranda-warnings silence as evidence of the defendant's sanity violated the due process clause. Wainwright v. Greenfield,
474 U.S. 284 (1986).
Police failure to inform the defendant that a third party had retained counsel did not invalidate the defendant's waiver of
Miranda rights. Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412 (1986).
Exclusion of testimony about the circumstances of a confession deprived the defendant of due process and other fundamental constitutional rights. Crane v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 683 (1986).
When no evidence is present suggesting that police officers sent the suspect's wife in to see him with the hope of obtaining incriminating information, no “interrogation" was undertaken even though a detective was present and tape recorded the conversation. Arizona v. Mauro,
481 U.S. 520 (1987).
Police may not interrogate a suspect held in custody after the suspect has previously requested counsel, even when the interrogation relates to an offense different from that for which the suspect requested counsel. Arizona v. Roberson,
486 U.S. 675 (1988).
The custodian of corporate records may not resist a subpoena for records on self-incrimination grounds, regardless of the size of the corporate entity. Braswell v. United States,
487 U.S. 99 (1988).
The self-incrimination privilege does not support a refusal to comply with a juvenile court's order to produce a child. Baltimore Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight,
493 U.S. 474,
107 L. Ed. 2d 992 (1990).
An undercover officer is not required to give
Miranda warnings to a suspect before surreptitious custodial interrogation. Illinois v. Perkins,
496 U.S. 292,
110 L. Ed. 2d 243 (1990).
When counsel is requested, interrogation must cease and may not be reinstated without counsel present even though the accused previously did have an opportunity to consult an attorney. Minnich v. Mississippi,
498 U.S. 146,
112 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1990).
The 6th amendment right to counsel is offense specific. An accused's invocation of the right during a judicial proceeding did not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel under
Miranda arising from the 5th amendment guarantees against self-incrimination in regard to police questioning concerning a separate offense. McNeil v. Wisconsin,
501 U.S. 171,
115 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1991).
A police officer's subjective and undisclosed view of whether a person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to determining whether the person is in custody and entitled to
Miranda warnings. Stansbury v. California,
511 U.S. 318,
128 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1994).
Officers need not cease questioning a suspect subject to custodial interrogation when the suspect makes an ambiguous reference to an attorney. Although often good practice, it is not necessary that the officer ask clarifying questions. Davis v. United States,
512 U.S. 452,
129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994).
Miranda and its progeny govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts.
Miranda may not be overruled by act of Congress. Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428,
147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000).
A witness who denies all culpability has a 5th amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Ohio v. Reiner,
532 U.S. 67,
149 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2001).
A prison rehabilitation program that required inmates convicted of sexual assault to admit having committed the crime or have prison privileges reduced did not violate the right against self-incrimination although immunity was not granted and prosecution of previously uncharged crimes that might be revealed by the required admissions was possible. McKune v. Lile,
536 U.S. 24,
153 L. Ed. 2d 47 (2002).
It is not until statements compelled by police interrogations are used use in a criminal case that a violation of the 5th amendment self-incrimination clause occurs. When a confession was coerced, but no criminal case was ever brought there could be no violation. Chavez v. Martinez,
538 U.S. 760,
155 L. Ed. 2d 984,
123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003).
When the defendant's refusal to disclose his name was not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be used to incriminate him, or that it would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute him, application of a criminal statute requiring disclosure of the person's name when the police officer reasonably suspected the person had committed a crime did not violate the protection against self-incrimination. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County,
542 U.S. 177,
124 S. Ct. 2451,
159 L. Ed 2d 292 (2004).
A custodial interrogation in which no
Miranda warnings are given until the interrogation has produced a confession in which the interrogating officer follows the confession with
Miranda warnings and then leads the suspect to cover the same ground a second time violates
Miranda and the repeated statement is inadmissible. Missouri v. Seibert,
542 U.S. 177,
124 S. Ct. 2601,
159 L. Ed 2d 292 (2004).
A failure to give a suspect
Miranda warnings does not require suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect's unwarned but voluntary statements.
Miranda protects against violations of the self-Incrimination clause, which is not implicated by the introduction at trial of physical evidence resulting from voluntary statements. United States v. Patane,
542 U.S. 600,
124 S. Ct. 2620,
159 L. Ed 2d 667 (2004).
The 4 warnings
Miranda requires are invariable, but the U.S. Supreme Court has not dictated the words in which the essential information must be conveyed. The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably convey to a suspect his or her rights as required by
Miranda. Florida v. Powell,
559 U.S. 50,
130 S. Ct. 1195,
175 L. Ed. 2d 1009 (2010).
Under
Edwards, 451 U.S. 477, a voluntary
Miranda waiver is sufficient at the time of an initial attempted interrogation to protect a suspect's right to have counsel present, but not at the time of subsequent interrogation attempts if the suspect initially requested the presence of counsel. However, confessions obtained after a 2-week break in custody and a waiver of
Miranda rights are most unlikely to be compelled, and hence are unreasonably excluded. Lawful imprisonment imposed upon conviction of a crime does not create the coercive pressures identified in
Miranda and is not considered continued custody for determining whether custodial interrogation ended. Maryland v. Shatzer,
559 U.S. 50,
130 S. Ct. 1213,
175 L. Ed. 2d 1045 (2010).
An invocation of the right to remain silent must be unambiguous and unequivocal. The defendant did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to talk with the police. Had he made either of these simple, unambiguous statements, he would have invoked his right to cut off questioning. He did neither, so he did not invoke his right to remain silent. A suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police. Berghuis v. Thompkins,
560 U.S. 370,
130 S. Ct. 2250,
176 L. Ed. 2d 1098 (2010).
The age of a child subjected to police questioning is relevant to the custody analysis of
Miranda. So long as the child's age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test, but a child's age will not be determinative, or even a significant, factor in every case. J.D.B. v. North Carolina,
564 U.S. 261,
131 S. Ct. 2394,
180 L. Ed. 2d 310 (2011).
A prisoner is not always in custody for purposes of
Miranda whenever a prisoner is isolated from the general prison population and questioned about conduct outside the prison. Imprisonment, questioning in private, and questioning about events in the outside world are not necessarily enough to create a custodial situation for
Miranda purposes. “Custody" is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion. In determining whether a person is in custody in this sense, the initial step is to ascertain whether, in light of the objective circumstances of the interrogation, a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Howes v. Fields,
565 U.S. 499,
132 S. Ct. 1181,
182 L. Ed. 2d 17 (2012).
No 5th amendment violation was found in this case. Petitioner, without being placed in custody or receiving
Miranda warnings, voluntarily answered the questions of a police officer who was investigating a murder then balked when the officer asked whether a ballistics test would show that the shell casings found at the crime scene would match petitioner's shotgun. Petitioner was subsequently charged with murder, and at trial prosecutors argued that his reaction to the officer's question suggested that he was guilty. Salinas v. Texas,
570 U.S. 178,
133 S. Ct. 2174,
186 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2013).
Collateral estoppel barred the state from introducing evidence of a van theft as an overt act in a conspiracy charge when the accuseds had earlier been acquitted in the van theft trial. The accused's silence prior to receiving
Miranda warnings was properly used to impeach the accused. The prosecution's reference to post-
Miranda silence was harmless error. Feela v. Israel,
727 F.2d 151 (1984).
Assertion of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in federal civil litigation: Rights and remedies. Daskal. 64 MLR 243 (1980).
Privilege against self-incrimination-truthful statements may be used in a perjury prosecution. 64 MLR 744 (1981).
Adding (or Reaffirming) a Temporal Element to the Miranda Warning “You Have a Right to an Attorney. Bazelon. 90 MLR 1009 (2007).
The Interrogations of Brendan Dassey. Gallini. 102 MLR 777 (2019).
The privilege against self-incrimination in civil commitment proceedings. 1980 WLR 697.
McNeil v. Wisconsin: Blurring a Bright Line on Custodial Interrogation. 1992 WLR 1643.
I,9
Remedy for wrongs.
Section 9
. Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws.
The constitutional guaranty of a remedy for injuries to person and property does not give a constitutional right to sue the state in tort. There is no right of a citizen to hold the sovereign substantively liable for torts, and the state, being immune from suit without its consent, may define the conditions under which it will permit actions against itself. Cords v. State,
62 Wis. 2d 42,
214 N.W.2d 405.
The action for common-law seduction is extended to allow recovery against the seducer by the woman herself. Slawek v. Stroh,
62 Wis. 2d 295,
215 N.W.2d 9.
The constitution does not entitle state litigants to the exact remedy they desire, but merely to their day in court. Wiener v. J.C. Penney Co.
65 Wis. 2d 139,
222 N.W.2d 149.
Illegal aliens have the right to sue in Wisconsin for injuries negligently inflicted upon them. Arteaga v. Literski,
83 Wis. 2d 128,
265 N.W.2d 148 (1978).
Pre-1981 statutory paternity proceedings, which vested exclusive authority in district attorney to commence paternity action, unconstitutionally denied the child a “day in court." Accordingly, the child's action was not barred by any statute of limitations. In re Paternity of R.W.L.,
116 Wis. 2d 150,
341 N.W.2d 682 (1984).
When an adequate remedy or forum does not exist to resolve disputes or provide due process, the courts can fashion an adequate remedy. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.,
116 Wis. 2d 166,
342 N.W.2d 37 (1984).
A register in probate's fee based on the value of the estate does not violate this section. Treiber v. Knoll,
135 Wis. 2d 58,
398 N.W.2d 756 (1987).
A court faced with a litigant who has engaged in a pattern of frivolous litigation has the authority to implement a remedy that may include restrictions on the litigant's access to the court. Village of Tigerton v. Minniecheske,
211 Wis. 2d 777,
565 N.W.2d 586 (Ct. App. 1997),
96-1933.
This section applies only when a prospective litigant seeks a remedy for an already existing right. It preserves the right to obtain justice on the basis of law as it in fact exists. Legislative actions define how the law does exist. Aicher v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund,
2000 WI 98,
237 Wis. 2d 99,
613 N.W.2d 849,
99-2955.
Although Article I, s. 9, itself may not create new rights, it does allow for a remedy through the existing common law. The goal of providing certainty is not necessarily achievable, and that is not necessarily a bad thing. The common law develops to adapt to the changing needs of society. Thomas v. Mallett,
2005 WI 129,
285 Wis. 2d 236,
701 N.W.2d 523,
03-1528.
A referee's fees increase the costs of litigation and may have a chilling effect on litigants. If the expenses are not circumscribed, people with meritorious claims will be discouraged from pursuing them in court because they cannot afford to go to court. A reference to a referee in effect requires litigants to pay for the court system twice — once through the tax system and a second time by paying fees to a referee for resolution of their suit. Referee fees may offend constitutional mandates “if they chill advocacy severely enough to `effectively end the litigation' or impose `an intolerable burden on a losing litigant.'” Appointment of a referee is for the exceptional case; it is not the general rule. Universal Processing Services v. Circuit Court of Milwaukee County,
2017 WI 26,
374 Wis. 2d 26,
892 N.W.2d 267,
16-0923.
I,9m
Victims of crime.
Section 9m
. [
As created April 1993 and amended April 2020]
I,9m(1)(a)(a) In this section, notwithstanding any statutory right, privilege, or protection, “victim” means any of the following:
I,9m(1)(a)1.
1.
A person against whom an act is committed that would constitute a crime if committed by a competent adult.
I,9m(1)(a)2.
2.
If
the
person
under
subd.
1.
is
deceased
or
is
physically
or
emotionally
unable
to exercise
his
or
her
rights
under
this
section,
the
person's
spouse,
parent
or
legal
guardian, sibling, child, person who resided with the deceased at the time of death, or other lawful representative.
I,9m(1)(a)3.
3.
If the person under subd. 1. is a minor, the person's parent, legal guardian or custodian, or other lawful
representative.
I,9m(1)(a)4.
4.
If the person under subd. 1. is adjudicated incompetent, the
person's legal
guardian or other lawful representative.
I,9m(1)(b)
(b) “
Victim” does not include the accused or a person who the court finds would not act in the best interests of a victim who is deceased, incompetent, a minor, or physically or emotionally unable to exercise his or her rights under this section.
I,9m(2)
(2) In order to preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due process throughout the criminal and
juvenile
justice
process,
victims
shall
be
entitled
to
all
of
the
following
rights,
which shall vest
at
the
time
of
victimization
and
be
protected
by
law
in
a
manner
no
less
vigorous than the protections afforded to the accused:
I,9m(2)(a)
(a)
To be treated with dignity, respect, courtesy, sensitivity, and
fairness.
I,9m(2)(c)
(c)
To proceedings free from unreasonable
delay.
I,9m(2)(d)
(d)
To timely disposition of the case, free from unreasonable delay.
I,9m(2)(e)
(e)
Upon
request,
to
attend
all
proceedings
involving the case.
I,9m(2)(f)
(f)
To
reasonable
protection
from
the
accused
throughout
the
criminal
and
juvenile justice process.
I,9m(2)(g)
(g)
Upon request, to reasonable and timely notification of proceedings.
I,9m(2)(h)
(h)
Upon request, to confer with the attorney for the
government.
