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100.18 Annotation Subs. (1) and (9) (a) require that a complaint do more than merely state that there were incentives to sell a more expensive product: it must allege instances of prohibited conduct to withstand a motion to dismiss. State v. American TV & Appliance of Madison, Inc., 146 Wis. 2d 292, 430 N.W.2d 709 (1988). See also Meyer v. Laser Vision Institute, LLC, 2006 WI App 70, 290 Wis. 2d 764, 714 N.W.2d 223, 05-1233.
100.18 Annotation A party prevailing on appeal is entitled to reasonable appellate attorney fees. Radford v. J.J.B. Enterprises, Ltd., 163 Wis. 2d 534, 472 N.W.2d 790 (Ct. App. 1991).
100.18 Annotation The statute of limitations under sub. (11) (b) 3. commences at the time of the act or transaction, not on the date of discovery. Skrupky v. Elbert, 189 Wis. 2d 31, 526 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1994).
100.18 Annotation When a claim of negligent representation was fully tried, it was not necessary that a claim under this section should have been pleaded in order for the plaintiff to assert a post-verdict claim for attorney fees under sub. (11) (b) 2. Gorton v. American Cyanamid Co., 194 Wis. 2d 203, 533 N.W.2d 746 (1995).
100.18 Annotation An award of reasonable attorney fees under this section belongs to the person suffering the pecuniary loss, not the attorney. However, the ultimate ownership of the award may be controlled by the parties' fee agreement. Gorton v. Hostak, Henzl & Bichler, S.C., 217 Wis. 2d 493, 577 N.W.2d 617 (1998), 96-2776.
100.18 Annotation Sub. (11) (b) 3. is a statute of repose. A cause of action must be commenced within three years of the false representation regardless of when the resulting injury is discovered. Kain v. Bluemound East Industrial Park, Inc., 2001 WI App 230, 248 Wis. 2d 172, 635 N.W.2d 640, 00-2250.
100.18 Annotation This section provides a cause of action and remedies separate from common law claims of intentional misrepresentation, strict liability misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation. Kailin v. Armstrong, 2002 WI App 70, 252 Wis. 2d 676, 643 N.W.2d 132, 01-1152.
100.18 Annotation A statement made to one person may constitute a statement made to “the public" under this section. Once a contract is made, buyers are no longer “the public." This section is aimed at untrue, deceptive, or misleading statements made to induce certain actions. Statements made by the seller after a person entered into a contract to purchase do not cause the person to make the purchase or enter into the contract. Kailin v. Armstrong, 2002 WI App 70, 252 Wis. 2d 676, 643 N.W.2d 132, 01-1152. See also Hinrichs v. DOW Chemical Co., 2020 WI 2, 389 Wis. 2d 669, 937 N.W.2d 37, 17-2361.
100.18 Annotation The elements of a viable claim under this section are: 1) the defendant advertised the product; 2) the advertising was misleading; and 3) the plaintiff suffered pecuniary loss as a result of the misleading advertising. Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2003 WI App 75, 261 Wis. 2d 755, 661 N.W.2d 450, 02-1034.
100.18 Annotation That the sellers themselves did not make any representations to the buyers with respect to the property sold and that the buyers cannot hold real estate agents liable under this section for misrepresentations the agents do not know are untrue does not require that the sellers cannot be held statutorily liable for the representations. Ricco v. Riva, 2003 WI App 182, 266 Wis. 2d 696, 669 N.W.2d 193, 02-2621.
100.18 Annotation A general statement that one's products are best is not actionable as a misrepresentation of fact and cannot support a claim under this section. “Premium quality" equates to “the best," and is squarely within the definition of puffery. The term “masterpiece" is arguably more precise than “the best," insofar as it connotes a specific engineering achievement, but this does not move the term out of the domain of puffery. Tietsworth v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2004 WI 32, 270 Wis. 2d 146, 677 N.W.2d 233, 02-1034.
100.18 Annotation When the statutory background of this section and s. 100.183 is considered, it becomes clear that the legislature does not intend “merchandise" in this section to include articles of food. The only sanction for violating s. 100.183 is the criminal penalty specified in s. 100.26 (1) while sub. (1) is amenable to only civil remedies and cannot be enforced via a criminal prosecution. Gallego v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2005 WI App 244, 288 Wis. 2d 229, 707 N.W.2d 539, 04-2533.
100.18 Annotation A plaintiff remains a member of “the public" under this section unless a particular relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, the existence of which will depend upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances and must be tested by the statute in the light of those facts and circumstances. In this case, whether the plaintiff was a member of the public presented a question of fact. K&S Tool & Die Corp. v. Perfection Machinery Sales, Inc., 2007 WI 70, 301 Wis. 2d 109, 732 N.W.2d 792, 05-2148.
100.18 Annotation Although the reasonableness of a plaintiff's reliance may be relevant in considering whether the representation materially induced the plaintiff's pecuniary loss, the plaintiff does not have the burden of proving reasonable reliance. K&S Tool & Die Corp. v. Perfection Machinery Sales, Inc., 2007 WI 70, 301 Wis. 2d 109, 732 N.W.2d 792, 05-2148.
100.18 Annotation A plaintiff is not required to prove reasonable reliance as an element of a misrepresentation claim under this section, but the reasonableness of a plaintiff's reliance may be relevant in considering whether the representation materially induced (caused) the plaintiff to sustain a loss. The reasonableness of a person's actions in relying on representations is a defense and may be considered by a jury in determining cause. A court may determine that the representation did not materially induce the plaintiff's decision to act and that the plaintiff would have acted in the absence of the representation. Novell v. Migliaccio, 2008 WI 44, 309 Wis. 2d 132, 749 N.W.2d 544, 05-2852.
100.18 Annotation A nondisclosure is not an assertion, representation, or statement of fact under sub. (1), and silence is insufficient to support a claim under sub. (1). Goudy v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA, 2010 WI App 55, 324 Wis. 2d 441, 782 N.W.2d 114, 09-0617.
100.18 Annotation A reasonable jury could find that painting over evidence of a leaky basement is a representation that a basement does not leak. Any conduct capable of being turned into a statement of fact is a representation. There is no distinction between misrepresentations effected by words and misrepresentations effected by other acts. Novell v. Migliaccio, 2010 WI App 67, 325 Wis. 2d 230, 783 N.W.2d 897, 09-1576.
100.18 Annotation The state had a constitutional right to a jury trial on its claim under sub. (1). State v. Abbott Laboratories, 2012 WI 62, 341 Wis. 2d 510, 816 N.W.2d 145, 10-0232.
100.18 Annotation The plain language of the statute shows that statements or representations may be actionable even when contained in bills or other documents not traditionally considered “advertisements." The statute includes “bill" as an example of a document that may contain a deceptive or misleading representation and includes documents “similar or dissimilar" to the enumerated items, so long as that document contains misrepresentations. MBS-Certified Public Accountants, LLC v. Wisconsin Bell Inc., 2013 WI App 14, 346 Wis. 2d 173, 828 N.W.2d 575, 08-1830.
100.18 Annotation If a party violating this section could defend its actions using the voluntary payment rule, then the broad, remedial purpose of this section would be undermined. MBS-Certified Public Accountants, LLC v. Wisconsin Bell Inc., 2013 WI App 14, 346 Wis. 2d 173, 828 N.W.2d 575, 08-1830.
100.18 Annotation This section does not provide that a plaintiff may recover fees and costs only to the extent that the plaintiff has incurred fees and costs or is contractually obligated to pay fees and costs to its counsel. To the contrary, both sub. (11) (b) and Gorton, 217 Wis. 2d 493 (1998), support the idea that the award of attorney fees based on private counsel's work was appropriate in this case. State v. Abbott Laboratories, 2013 WI App 31, 346 Wis. 2d 565, 829 N.W.2d 753, 10-0232.
100.18 Annotation A salesperson engages in puffery when the salesperson gives voice to exaggerations reasonably to be expected of a seller as to the degree of quality of a product, the truth or falsity of which cannot be precisely determined. Exaggerations of this sort do not subject the speaker to liability under this section because they convey only the seller's opinion and are not capable of being substantiated or refuted. When a salesperson represented to a client that a specific problem had been fixed, the salesperson was making a specific, factual statement. That the salesperson may not have been familiar with the problems prior to the conversation, or had any idea whether they had been addressed, does not transform the factual statement into puffery. United Concrete & Construction, Inc. v. Red-D-Mix Concrete, Inc., 2013 WI 72, 349 Wis. 2d 587, 836 N.W.2d 807, 11-1566.
100.18 Annotation Sub. (11) (b) 2. grants the right to recover attorney's fees to the plaintiff. Concluding that the client's right to recover statutory attorney's fees is equitably subrogated to the attorney once counsel is retained, despite a fee agreement that does not clearly assign that right, would undermine the legislature's explicit directive to the contrary. Betz v. Diamond Jim's Auto Sales, 2014 WI 66, 355 Wis. 2d 301, 849 N.W.2d 292, 12-0183.
100.18 Annotation Based upon this section's plain language and the deterrent purpose of the statute as recognized in case law, a “pecuniary loss" can include monetary remedies like the cost of repair or diminution in value and may also include the possibility of a full refund of the purchase price. A “pecuniary loss" does not, however, include rescission as a non-monetary remedy. Mueller v. Harry Kaufmann Motorcars, Inc., 2015 WI App 8, 359 Wis. 2d 597, 859 N.W.2d 451, 14-0351.
100.18 Annotation “As is" and exculpatory clauses in a contract did not relieve a property seller of liability under sub. (1) for its deceptive representation in the contract that induced agreement to those terms. The fact that the parties were in negotiations over terms when the misrepresentation was made did not take the potential purchaser out of the realm of “the public" and outside the coverage of sub. (1). A sub. (1) claim requires proof that the misrepresentation caused the plaintiff a pecuniary loss. The test to be applied is whether the plaintiff would have acted in its absence. Fricano v. Bank of America NA, 2016 WI App 11, 366 Wis. 2d 748, 875 N.W.2d 143, 15-0020.
100.18 Annotation The economic loss doctrine does not serve as a bar to claims made under this section. Hinrichs v. DOW Chemical Co., 2020 WI 2, 389 Wis. 2d 669, 937 N.W.2d 37, 17-2361.
100.18 Annotation The heightened pleading standard set forth by s. 802.03 (2) for claims of fraud does not apply to claims made under this section. Hinrichs v. DOW Chemical Co., 2020 WI 2, 389 Wis. 2d 669, 937 N.W.2d 37, 17-2361.
100.18 Annotation The purpose of this section is to protect the residents of Wisconsin from any untrue, deceptive, or misleading representations made to promote the sale of a product. Nothing in this section supports an interpretation that would render liable any standards-setting organization so long as a manufacturer could show that it lost sales as a result of allegedly inaccurate technical data in the standard. When nothing in a standard published by the standards-setting organization suggested that consumers choose one product over another and when the standards-setting organization's actions were not part of a commercial transaction, a claim for a violation of this section failed. Thermal Design, Inc. v. American Society of Heating, Refrigerating & Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc., 755 F.3d 832 (2014).
100.18 Annotation While extrinsic evidence in the form of consumer surveys or market research is not always needed for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law on a deceptive advertising claim, such evidence is necessary where the advertising is not clearly misleading on its face and materiality is in doubt. If the representations at issue are not misleading on their face when taken in context, to survive summary judgment the plaintiff must offer evidence that a reasonable consumer would be materially misled. The plaintiff's own testimony is not sufficient to create an issue of fact for the jury. Weaver v. Champion Petfoods USA Inc., 3 F.4th 927 (2021).
100.18 Annotation References to ingredients used do not imply that ingredient is used exclusively. In this case, representations that food was made with fresh regional ingredients were not clearly misleading—the food did, in fact, contain some ingredients that were fresh and sourced regionally. Weaver v. Champion Petfoods USA Inc., 3 F.4th 927 (2021).
100.18 Annotation This section is reasonably geared toward notice and workable precision and is not so imprecise as to be constitutionally vague. Carpets By The Carload, Inc. v. Warren, 368 F. Supp. 1075 (1973).
100.18 Annotation One person can constitute “the public" under sub. (1). Jersild v. Aker, 775 F. Supp. 1198 (1991).
100.18 Annotation Actual interest payments incurred as a result of misrepresentations may be recovered by the defrauded party. Jersild v. Aker, 775 F. Supp. 1198 (1991).
100.18 Annotation The protections under this section are not restricted to Wisconsin residents. A cause of action under this section requires actual pecuniary loss, not a mere showing of deception. Demitropoulos v. Bank One Milwaukee, N.A., 915 F. Supp. 1399 (1996).
100.18 Annotation There is no indication that the application of this section is restricted to use by consumers. Stoughton Trailers, Inc. v. Henkel Corp., 965 F. Supp. 1227 (1997).
100.18 Annotation Sub. (11) (b) 3. is a statute of repose to which the discovery rule does not apply. Staudt v. Artifex Ltd., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (1998).
100.18 Annotation Under Wisconsin law, the economic loss doctrine does not bar recovery under this section, and it does bar recovery under s. 895.80, at least under the facts of this case. Dow v. Poltzer, 364 F. Supp. 2d 931 (2005).
100.18 Annotation While the plaintiff, a seller of goods through its website, may have been subject to misrepresentations regarding the source of customers directed to its website from defendants' websites through a “typosquatting scheme," the misrepresentations could not be characterized as statements made to the public relating to the purchase of merchandise and were not subject to this section. Lands' End, Inc. v. Remy, 447 F. Supp. 2d 941 (2006).
100.18 Annotation If the Wisconsin courts had intended to exclude from the law only contracting parties as members of the public, it could have stated the rule as whether the parties had a “contracting relationship," not the more general “particular relationship." There was a “particular relationship" when the plaintiff had an ongoing relationship with the defendant for 13 years, selling as much as $12 million of merchandise in a single year, and thus the plaintiff was not a member of the public. Uniek, Inc. v. Dollar General Corp., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (2007).
100.18 Annotation This section does not explicitly require a misrepresentation to the plaintiff, only to “the public." However, the question is whether the representation materially induced the plaintiff's decision to act and whether the plaintiff would have acted in the absence of the representation. Grice Engineering, Inc. v. JG Innovations, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 2d 915 (2010).
100.18 Annotation This section does not provide a cause of action for misrepresentations made to non-parties; this section is not designed to protect product manufacturers from the deceptive acts of their competitors. Riddell, Inc. v. Schutt Sports, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 963 (2010).
100.18 Annotation This section applies to only commercial transactions. Thermal Design, Inc. v. American Society of Heating, Refrigerating & Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (2011).
100.18 Annotation A nondisclosure of facts, combined with an affirmative representation that is undermined by the non-disclosed facts, may result in liability under sub. (1). In such situations, the existence of the undisclosed facts may show that the affirmative representation is untrue, deceptive, or misleading. Price-related misrepresentations that the defendant purportedly made to consumers—namely, that its goods were “regularly" priced at certain values—were indeed related to corresponding omissions—namely, that the “regular" prices appearing on the defendant's goods were not accurate. These affirmative representations were actionable representations of fact under this section. Murillo v. Kohl's Corp., 197 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (2016).
100.18 Annotation Sub. (1) is disjunctive, prohibiting “untrue, deceptive, or misleading" representations. Nothing in sub. (1) states that a plaintiff must plead that a representation is untrue or that it is true but deceptive or misleading. In the same vein, Wisconsin case law does not suggest that a plaintiff must allege the representation was literally true but deceptive or misleading. Wisconsin courts group these three concepts together. Blitz v. Monsanto Co., 317 F. Supp. 3d 1042 (2018).
100.18 Annotation Substantively, sub. (1) does not appear to require anything different from or additional to a labeling or packaging requirement under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 USC 136 et seq. Under Bates, 544 U.S. 431 (2005), therefore, the two statutes' requirements are “equivalent," and the plaintiff's cause of action under sub. (1) is not preempted by FIFRA. Although a verdict awarding damages in favor of the plaintiff might well motivate the defendant to change its label, such a verdict does not create the kind of legal “requirement" prohibited under FIFRA's preemption statement. Blitz v. Monsanto Co., 317 F. Supp. 3d 1042 (2018).
100.18 Annotation Nothing in sub. (1) suggests that its purpose is to regulate advertisers who are physically located in Wisconsin but who advertise elsewhere. The phrase “in this state" must be understood as referring to the location of the advertising rather than the advertiser. The Wisconsin Deceptive Trade Practices Act does not apply unless a person makes a deceptive representation that is likely to reach and induce action by a purchaser in Wisconsin. T&M Farms v. CNH Industrial America, LLC, 488 F. Supp. 3d 756 (2020).
100.18 Annotation Protection for Consumers Against Unfair and Deceptive Business. Jeffries. 57 MLR 559 (1974).
100.18 Annotation The Resurgence of Caveat Emptor: Puffery Undermines the Pro-Consumer Trend in Wisconsin's Misrepresentation Doctrine. Goretzke. 2003 WLR 171.
100.18 Annotation Private enforcement of consumer laws in Wisconsin. Waxman. WBB May 1983.
100.18 Annotation Protecting Consumers in the Modern Age: Wisconsin's Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Hinkston. Wis. Law. Oct. 2008.
100.18 Annotation Navigating Wisconsin's Consumer Protection System. Greene. Wis. Law. Sept. 2017.
100.182 100.182 Fraudulent drug advertising.
100.182(1)(1)In this section, “drug" has the meaning specified in s. 450.01 (10).
100.182(2) (2)No person may advertise the availability of any drug or publish or circulate such an advertisement with the intent of selling, increasing the consumption of or generating interest in the drug if the advertisement contains any untrue, deceptive or misleading representations material to the effects of the drug.
100.182(3) (3)No person may expressly or impliedly represent that a substance may be used to obtain physical or psychological effects associated with the use of a drug in order to promote the sale of the substance unless it is lawfully marketed for human consumption under the United States food, drug and cosmetic act under 21 USC 301 to 392. A representation that the substance is not intended for human consumption is not a defense to prosecution for violating this subsection.
100.182(4) (4)No person may advertise a drug that the person knows is intentionally manufactured substantially to resemble a controlled substance or that the person represents to be of a nature, appearance or effect that will allow the recipient to display, sell, deliver, distribute or use the drug as a controlled substance, unless the drug is controlled under ch. 961.
100.182(5) (5)
100.182(5)(a)(a) Any district attorney, after informing the department, or the department may seek a temporary or permanent injunction in circuit court to restrain any violation of this section. Prior to entering a final judgment the court may award damages to any person suffering monetary loss because of a violation. The department may subpoena any person or require the production of any document to aid in investigating alleged violations of this section.
100.182(5)(b) (b) In lieu of instituting or continuing an action under this subsection, the department may accept a written assurance from a violator of this section that the violation has ceased. If the terms of the assurance so provide, its acceptance by the department prevents all district attorneys from prosecuting the violation. An assurance is not evidence of a violation of this section but violation of an assurance is subject to the penalties and remedies of violating this section.
100.182 History History: 1981 c. 90; 1985 a. 146 s. 8; 1995 a. 27, 448.
100.183 100.183 Fraud, advertising foods.
100.183(1)(1)No person, firm, corporation or association shall, with intent to sell, or increase the consumption thereof, or create an interest therein, make, publish, disseminate, circulate, or place before the public in this state, or cause, directly or indirectly to be made, published, disseminated, or placed before the public in this state, in a newspaper or other publication, or in the form of a book notice, handbill, poster, bill, circular or pamphlet, or in any other manner, an advertisement of any sort regarding articles of food, which advertisement contains any assertion, representation or statement which is untrue, deceptive or misleading.
100.183(2) (2)It shall be unlawful to advertise any dairy or other food product which is of a grade or quality inferior to or less valuable than the usual and ordinary grade established by common understanding or law for such product, or from which a more valuable portion has been removed, without plainly and conspicuously stating that the article advertised is below and inferior to the usual and ordinary grade.
100.183(3) (3)No person, for himself or herself or as an agent, shall advertise at a stated price the sale of turkeys, which have been graded by the U.S. department of agriculture, unless the federal grade is set forth in such advertisement in not less than 10-point type.
100.183 History History: 1993 a. 492.
100.183 Annotation When the statutory background of this section and s. 100.18 is considered, it becomes clear that the legislature does not intend “merchandise" in s. 100.18 to include articles of food. The only sanction for violating this section is the criminal penalty specified in s. 100.26 (1) while s. 100.18 (1) is amenable to only civil remedies and cannot be enforced via a criminal prosecution. Gallego v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2005 WI App 244, 288 Wis. 2d 229, 707 N.W.2d 539, 04-2533.
100.184 100.184 Advertising foods for sale. No person shall, himself or herself, or by a servant or agent, or as the servant or agent of any other person, advertise for sale any article of food in package form when the retail price is mentioned in such advertisement unless the actual weight or volume of the contents of such package as stated on the label shall be plainly and conspicuously set forth in such advertisement in not less than 5-point type.
100.184 History History: 1993 a. 492.
100.185 100.185 Fraud, advertising musical performances.
100.185(1)(1)Definitions. In this section:
100.185(1)(a) (a) “Performing group" means a vocal or instrumental group that intends to advertise or perform under the name of a recording group.
100.185(1)(b) (b) “Recording group" means a vocal or instrumental group to whom all of the following apply:
100.185(1)(b)1. 1. At least one member of the group has released a commercial sound recording under the name of a group.
100.185(1)(b)2. 2. The member identified in subd. 1. has a right by virtue of use or operation to perform under the name of the group that released the commercial sound recording, and the member has not abandoned the recording group's name or the member's affiliation with the group that released the commercial sound recording.
100.185(1)(c) (c) “Sound recording" means a work that results from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds on a material object, including a disc, tape, or other phonorecord.
100.185(2) (2) Production. No person may advertise or conduct a live musical performance or production in this state through the use of a false, deceptive, or misleading affiliation, connection, or association between a performing group and a recording group. For purposes of this subsection, an advertisement, production, or performance is not false, deceptive, or misleading if any of the following applies:
100.185(2)(a) (a) The performing group is the authorized registrant and owner of a service mark for that group registered in the U.S. patent and trademark office.
100.185(2)(b) (b) At least one member of the performing group was a member of the recording group.
100.185(2)(c) (c) The live musical performance or production is identified in all advertising and promotion as a salute or tribute and the name of the performing group is not so closely related or similar to the name of the recording group as to be misleading or confusing to a reasonable person.
100.185(2)(d) (d) The performance or production is expressly authorized by the recording group.
100.185(3) (3) Enforcement.
100.185(3)(a)(a) If the attorney general or a district attorney has reason to believe that a person is advertising or conducting or intends to advertise or conduct a live musical performance or production in violation of sub. (2), the attorney general or district attorney may bring an action in the name of the state against the person to restrain the violation by temporary or permanent injunction. If a court issues a permanent injunction against a violation of this section by a defendant, the court may also order the defendant to pay to a person injured by the violation any amounts or property the defendant obtained as a result of the violation.
100.185(3)(b) (b) A court may require a person who violates sub. (2) to forfeit an amount not less than $5,000 nor more than $15,000 per violation. Each performance or production in violation of sub. (2) constitutes a separate violation.
100.185 History History: 2007 a. 15.
100.186 100.186 Linseed oil, white lead, zinc oxide, turpentine; standards; sale.
100.186(1)(1)No person shall sell as and for “raw flaxseed oil" or “raw linseed oil" any oil unless it is obtained from the seeds of the flax plant and unless it fulfills all the requirements for linseed oil laid down in the U.S. Pharmacopoeia; or as and for “boiled linseed oil" or “boiled flaxseed oil" any oil unless it has been prepared by heating pure raw linseed oil with or without the addition of not to exceed 4 percent of drier to a temperature not less than 225 degrees Fahrenheit. It is a violation of this section if said boiled linseed oil does not conform to the following requirements: First, its specific gravity at 60 degrees Fahrenheit must be not less than 935 thousandths and not greater than 945 thousandths; 2nd, its saponification value (koettstorfer figure) must not be less than 186; 3rd, its iodine number must not be less than 160; 4th, its acid value must not exceed 10; 5th, the volatile matter expelled at 212 degrees Fahrenheit must not exceed one-half of one percent; 6th, no mineral or other foreign oil or free rosin shall be present, and the amount of unsaponifiable matter as determined by standard methods shall not exceed 2.5 percent; 7th, the film left after flowing the oil over glass and allowing it to drain in a vertical position must dry free from tackiness in not to exceed 20 hours, at a temperature of about 70 degrees Fahrenheit.
100.186(2) (2)Nor shall any person sell any raw or boiled linseed oil except under its true name, and unless each tank car, tank, barrel, keg, can or vessel of such oil has distinctly and durably marked thereon in ordinary bold-faced capital letters, not smaller than 60-point type, the words “Pure Linseed Oil — Raw" or “Linseed Oil — Boiled," and the name and address of the manufacturer.
100.186(3) (3)Linseed oil compounds designed to take the place of raw or boiled linseed oil, whether sold under invented proprietary names or titles, or otherwise, shall bear conspicuously upon the containing receptacle in which the same is sold, in ordinary bold-faced capital letters not smaller than 60-point type, the word “Compound," followed immediately with the true distinctive names of the actual ingredients in the order of their greater preponderance, in the English language, in plain legible type of the same style, not smaller than 36-point type, in continuous list with no intervening matter of any kind and shall also bear the name and address of the manufacturer.
100.186(4) (4)No person shall sell:
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2021-22 Wisconsin Statutes updated through 2023 Wis. Act 71 and through all Supreme Court and Controlled Substances Board Orders filed before and in effect on January 31, 2024. Published and certified under s. 35.18. Changes effective after January 31, 2024, are designated by NOTES. (Published 1-31-24)