Under the due process clause there was an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge earlier had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant’s case. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 195 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2016).

The 14th amendment limits the personal jurisdiction of state courts. Because a state court’s assertion of jurisdiction exposes defendants to the state’s coercive power, it is subject to review for compatibility with the 14th amendment’s due process clause, which limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident defendant. Specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction. For specific jurisdiction, a defendant’s general connections with the forum are not enough. A specific connection between the forum and specific claims at issue is required. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 582 U.S. 255, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 198 L. Ed. 2d 395 (2017).

The forum state may exercise specific jurisdiction if the plaintiff’s claims arise out of “or relate to” the defendant’s contacts with the forum. The “relate to” standard contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing. Specific jurisdiction attaches when a company like Ford Motor Company serves a market for a product in a state and that product causes injury in the state to one of its residents, and the state’s courts may entertain the resulting suit, even if the particular car involved was not first sold, designed, or manufactured in the forum state. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1017, 209 L. Ed. 2d 225 (2021).

The due process clause of the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit a state from requiring an out-of-state corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction to do business there. Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 600 U.S. ___, 143 S. Ct. 2028, 216 L. Ed. 2d 815 (2023).

It is not a violation of the due process clause to tow an illegally parked car without first giving the owner notice and opportunity to be heard regarding the lawfulness of the towing. Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644 (1982).

A village board’s denial of an application for a liquor license did not deprive the applicant of either liberty or property. Scott v. Village of Kewaskum, 786 F.2d 338 (1986).

Where an economic regulation is challenged on substantive due process grounds, the rational basis test is applied. To uphold the statute, a court need only find a reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification. Consumer protection and promoting commerce are both legitimate state interests. On rational-basis review, the state does not need to present actual evidence to support its proffered rationale for the law, which can be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. Minerva Dairy, Inc. v. Harsdorf, 905 F.3d 1047 (2018).

Specific personal jurisdiction requires that a defendant’s contacts with the forum state show that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state or purposefully directed the defendant’s activities at the state. This analysis focuses on the defendant’s contacts with the forum state itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there. Deliberate contact with the resident of a state is not the same thing as deliberate contact with the state itself. Lexington Insurance Co. v. Hotai Insurance Co., 938 F.3d 874 (2019).

A teacher’s alleged de facto tenure is not a protected property interest. Discussing liberty interests. Stevens v. Joint School District No. 1, 429 F. Supp. 477 (1977).

A sheriff violated a tenant’s protectible property interest by executing a stale writ of restitution. Wolf-Lillie v. Kenosha County Sheriff, 504 F. Supp. 1 (1979).

One cannot have a constitutionally protected interest solely in a state law procedure; a separate property interest must also be present. Molgaard v. Town of Caledonia, 527 F. Supp. 1073 (1981).

A high school student enjoys no constitutionally protected property interest in participation in interscholastic athletics. Isabella A. v. Arrowhead Union High School District, 323 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (2018).

The Original Understanding of “Property” in the Constitution. Larkin. 100 MLR 1 (2016).

Demon Rum and the Dirty Dance: Reconsidering Government Regulation of Live Sex Entertainment After California v. LaRue. Diel & Salinger. 1975 WLR 161.

Constitutional Law—Schools & School Districts—Reasonable Corporal Punishment by School Official Over Parental Objection is Constitutional. Splain. 1976 WLR 689.

Procedural Due Process in Public Schools: The “Thicket” of Goss v. Lopez. Ransom. 1976 WLR 934.

Constitutional Law—Due Process—Administrative Law—Impartial Decisionmaker—Authority of School Board to Dismiss Striking Teachers. Gallagher. 1977 WLR 521.

Constitutional Law—Due Process—Property Interest—Government Employment—State Law Defines Limitation of Entitlement. Jensen. 1977 WLR 575.

When Roles Collide: Deference, Due Process, and the Judicial Dilemma. Buchmeyer. 2019 WLR 1589.

Conscience Shocking in the Age of Trump. Farnsworth. 2020 WLR 805.

An adult bookstore has no right to protect the privacy rights of its customers in a public, commercial establishment. City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 170 Wis. 2d 14, 487 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1992).

A narrowly drawn anti-cruising ordinance did not violate the right to assemble or travel. Scheunemann v. City of West Bend, 179 Wis. 2d 469, 507 N.W.2d 163 (Ct. App. 1993).

The right to intrastate travel, including the right to move about one’s neighborhood in an automobile, is fundamental, but infringements on the right are not subject to strict scrutiny. Cruising ordinances, reasonable in time, place, and manner, do not violate this right. Brandmiller v. Arreola, 199 Wis. 2d 528, 544 N.W.2d 894 (1996), 93-2842.

A father who intentionally refused to pay child support could, as a condition of probation, be required to avoid having another child, unless he showed that he could support that child and his current children. In light of the defendant’s ongoing victimization of his children and record manifesting his disregard for the law, this condition was not overly broad and was reasonably related to the defendant’s rehabilitation. State v. Oakley, 2001 WI 103, 245 Wis. 2d 447, 629 N.W.2d 200, 99-3328.

Banishment from a particular place is not a per se violation of the right to travel. There is no exact formula for determining whether a geographic restriction is narrowly tailored. Each case must be analyzed on its own facts, circumstances, and total atmosphere to determine whether the geographic restriction is narrowly drawn. Predick v. O’Connor, 2003 WI App 46, 260 Wis. 2d 323, 660 N.W.2d 1, 02-0503.

In order for a putative biological father to have the necessary foundation for a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his putative paternity, he would have to have taken affirmative steps to assume his parental responsibilities for the child. Randy A.J. v. Norma I.J., 2004 WI 41, 270 Wis. 2d 384, 677 N.W.2d 630, 02-0469.

Parental status that rises to the level of a constitutionally protected liberty interest does not rest solely on biological factors, but rather, is dependent upon an actual relationship with the child where the parent assumes responsibility for the child’s emotional and financial needs. Stuart S. v. Heidi R., 2015 WI App 19, 360 Wis. 2d 388, 860 N.W.2d 538, 14-1487.