The right to an impartial judge is fundamental to our notion of due process. A reviewing court presumes that a judge has acted fairly, impartially, and without bias. To overcome that presumption, the burden is on the party asserting judicial bias to show bias by a preponderance of the evidence. In evaluating whether a party has rebutted the presumption, courts have taken both a subjective and objective approach. A judge must disqualify himself or herself from a case if the judge subjectively determines that the judge is unable to remain impartial. To assess whether the probability of actual bias rises to the level of a due process violation, courts ask whether there is a serious risk of actual bias based on objective and reasonable perceptions. It is the exceptional case with extreme facts that rises to the level of a serious risk of actual bias. Miller v. Carroll, 2020 WI 56, 392 Wis. 2d 49, 944 N.W.2d 542, 17-2132.

The extreme facts of this case, in which a circuit court judge had an undisclosed social media connection with a litigant, rebutted the presumption of judicial impartiality and established a due process violation. Miller v. Carroll, 2020 WI 56, 392 Wis. 2d 49, 944 N.W.2d 542, 17-2132.

To establish specific personal jurisdiction, there must be some act by which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum state. This purposeful availment requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another party or a third person. In this case, the defendant’s sole contact with Wisconsin was its contract with a Wisconsin business. A corporation’s contract with an out-of-state party alone is not enough to automatically establish the requisite minimum contacts needed to satisfy the 14th amendment’s due process clause. CITGO Petroleum Corp. v. MTI Connect, LLC, 2020 WI App 57, 394 Wis. 2d 126, 949 N.W.2d 577, 18-1555.

The due process requirement of Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), does not require any formal written notice listing all policy violations at issue in a municipality’s discipline action against an employee, or that an employee’s right to respond to those violations be available during a formal contested hearing before a neutral adjudicator prior to the discipline. In fact, Loudermill holds to the contrary. Namely, when sufficient post-disciplinary procedures are available, due process is satisfied as long as an employee is provided notice and given some opportunity to respond to the alleged charges against the employee before discipline is imposed. Green Bay Professional Police Ass’n v. City of Green Bay, 2021 WI App 73, 399 Wis. 2d 504, 966 N.W.2d 107, 21-0102.

Affirmed. 2023 WI 33, 407 Wis. 2d 11, 988 N.W.2d 664, 21-0102.

Discussing the standard for overcoming the presumption of honesty and integrity that applies to an assertion of bias of an administrative adjudicator. County of Dane v. PSC, 2022 WI 61, 403 Wis. 2d 306, 976 N.W.2d 790, 21-1321.

A patient does not have a substantive due process right to receive a particular medical treatment. Gahl ex rel. Zingsheim v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., 2022 WI App 29, 403 Wis. 2d 539, 977 N.W.2d 756, 21-1787.

Affirmed on other grounds. 2023 WI 35, ___ Wis. 2d ___, 989 N.W.2d 561, 21-1787.

There is no due process right to impartial decision-makers when a legislative body like a village board enacts, repeals, or amends a generally applicable law like a zoning ordinance. When adjudicative acts are involved, procedural due process requires impartial decision-makers. When legislative actions are at issue, however, those affected by legislation are not entitled to any process beyond that provided by the legislative process. Miller v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 2023 WI 46, 407 Wis. 2d 678, 991 N.W.2d 380, 21-1764.

A public employee terminable only for cause has a property interest in continued employment. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985), generally entitles such an employee to notice of the charges, an explanation of the evidence supporting them, and some pre-termination opportunity to respond. The scope and the nature of the pre-termination procedures can vary depending on the nature of the post-termination proceedings and the interests that are implicated. Loudermill does not require an explanation of the reasons discharge is a chosen punishment as opposed to suspension or something lesser. Rather, Loudermill just requires an explanation of the basic reasons the employee is being disciplined. Andrade v. City of Milwaukee Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 2024 WI 17, 411 Wis. 2d 340, 5 N.W.3d 261, 20-0333.

Discussing prisoners’ due process rights. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974).

Public high school students facing temporary suspension have property and liberty interests protected by due process. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725 (1975).

Garnishment of corporate bank accounts must comply with the due process protections of Fuentes, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), and Sniadach, 395 U.S. 337 (1969). North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 95 S. Ct. 719, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1975).

The Wisconsin Medical Examining Board does not deny due process by both investigating and adjudicating a charge of professional misconduct. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975).

States may deny benefits to those who fail to prove they did not quit jobs in order to obtain benefits. Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 96 S. Ct. 1010, 47 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1976).

Due process does not disqualify an agency as a decision maker merely because of familiarity with the facts of a case. Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482, 96 S. Ct. 2308, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1976).

Dismissal from medical school for academic deficiencies without a hearing did not violate the due process clause. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 98 S. Ct. 948, 55 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1978).

Utility customers’ due process rights were violated when the utility shut off service for nonpayment without advising the customers of available administrative procedures. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 98 S. Ct. 1554, 56 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1978).

A father’s acquiescence in his daughter’s desire to live with her mother in California did not confer jurisdiction over the father in California courts. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 98 S. Ct. 1690, 56 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1978).

The due process clause was not violated when the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) monitored a conversation with the defendant in violation of IRS rules. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 99 S. Ct. 1465, 59 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1979).

A state may not exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over a defendant having no forum contacts by attacking the contractual obligation of the defendant’s insurer licensed in the state. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S. Ct. 571, 62 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1980).

Involuntary transfer of a prisoner to a mental hospital implicated protected liberty interests. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 100 S. Ct. 1254, 63 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1980).

The termination of appointed assistant public defenders, who were neither policymakers nor confidential employees, solely on grounds of political affiliation was a denial of 1st and 14th amendment rights. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S. Ct. 1287, 63 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1980).

Segregation confinement of a prisoner without prior hearing may violate due process if postponement of procedural protections is not justified by apprehended emergency conditions. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 101 S. Ct. 173, 66 L. Ed. 2d 163 (1980).

When an accident involving only Wisconsin residents occurred in Wisconsin, the fact that the decedent had been employed in Minnesota conferred jurisdiction on Minnesota courts, and Minnesota insurance law was applicable. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 101 S. Ct. 633, 66 L. Ed. 2d 521 (1981).

A statute that required a putative father in a paternity suit to pay for blood tests denied due process to indigent putative fathers. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 101 S. Ct. 2202, 68 L. Ed. 2d 627 (1981).

Due process does not require appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parental status termination proceeding. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981).

A life prisoner had no due process right to a statement of reasons why the board did not commute his life sentence. Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 101 S. Ct. 2460, 69 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1981).