III,7(1)(1) No state agency or officer or employee in state government and no political subdivision of the state or officer or employee of a political subdivision may apply for, accept, expend, or use any moneys or equipment in connection with the conduct of any primary, election, or referendum if the moneys or equipment are donated or granted by an individual or nongovernmental entity.

III,7(2)(2) No individual other than an election official designated by law may perform any task in the conduct of any primary, election, or referendum. [2021 J.R. 17, 2023 J.R. 10, vote April 2024]

An “election official designated by law” is synonymous with “election official,” as defined in s. 5.02 (4e), and includes village clerks, municipal clerks, county clerks, municipal and county boards of canvassers, and school district clerks. OAG 1-24.

A “task in the conduct of any primary, election, or referendum” refers to work in directing or leading the administration of an election. Sub. (2) does not apply to more ordinary circumstances in which an election official works with or is assisted by non-election officials in ensuring the proper administration of an election, such as work with vendors on the layout and printing of ballots, information technology personnel on software and hardware security, law enforcement personnel on ballot transport, or employees or volunteers assisting with mailings or other clerical work. It also does not apply to activities that are distinct from the “administration” of an election, such as the kinds of efforts by non-election officials to encourage voting that commonly take place in connection with elections. OAG 1-24.

An act validating existing sewerage districts previously held to be unconstitutionally organized is within the power of the legislature. Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. Stein, 47 Wis. 2d 349, 177 N.W.2d 131.

The power given vocational district boards to levy taxes does not violate this section. The manner of appointing board members is constitutional. West Milwaukee v. Area Bd. Vocational, T. & A. Ed., 51 Wis. 2d 356, 187 N.W.2d 387.

One legislature cannot dictate action by a future legislature or a future legislative committee. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 208 N.W.2d 780.

The legislature may constitutionally prescribe a criminal penalty for violation of an administrative rule. State v. Courtney, 74 Wis. 2d 705, 247 N.W.2d 714.

Provisions of s. 144.07 (1m) [now s. 281.34 (1m)], that void a DNR sewerage connection order if electors in the affected town area reject annexation to the city ordered to extend sewerage service, represents a valid legislative balancing and accommodation of 2 statewide concerns: urban development and pollution control. City of Beloit v. Kallas, 76 Wis. 2d 61, 250 N.W.2d 342.

Mediation - arbitration under s. 111.70 (4) (cm) is a constitutional delegation of legislative authority. Milwaukee County v. District Council 48, 109 Wis. 2d 14, 325 N.W.2d 350 (Ct. App. 1982).

The court will invalidate legislation only for constitutional violations. State ex rel. La Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 338 N.W.2d 684 (1983).

Reference in a statute to a general federal law, as amended, necessarily references the current federal law where the act named in the statute is repealed and the law rewritten in another act. Because reference is stated as part of a contingency, it does not constitute unlawful delegation of legislative authority to U.S. Congress. Dane County Hospital & Home v. LIRC, 125 Wis. 2d 308, 371 N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1985).

The supreme court declined to review the validity of the procedure used to give notice of a joint legislative committee on conference alleged to violate the state open meetings law. The court will not determine whether internal operating rules or procedural statutes have been complied with by the legislature in the course of its enactments and will not intermeddle in what it views, in the absence of constitutional directives to the contrary, to be purely legislative concerns. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 2011 WI 43, 334 Wis. 2d 70, 798 N.W.2d 436, 11-0613.

When administrative agencies promulgate rules, they are exercising legislative power that the legislature has chosen to delegate to them by statute. Stated otherwise, agencies have no inherent constitutional authority to make rules, and their rule-making powers can be repealed by the legislature. It follows that the legislature may place limitations and conditions on an agency’s exercise of rulemaking authority, including establishing the procedures by which agencies may promulgate rules. Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600, 17-2278.

The legislature may enact the laws the executive is duty-bound to execute, but it may not control his knowledge or intentions about those laws. Nor may it mute or modulate the communication of his knowledge or intentions to the public. Because there was no set of facts pursuant to which 2017 Wis. Act 369’s restrictions on guidance documents would not impermissibly interfere with the executive’s exercise of his core constitutional power, they were in that respect facially unconstitutional. Service Employees International Union (SEIU), Local 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35, 19-0614.

Proposed amendments to bills creating variable obscenity laws that would exempt motion picture films shown at theaters that comply with the film ratings of the motion picture association of America constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. 58 Atty. Gen. 36.

The one man-one vote principle is inapplicable to legislative committees since that principle applies only to the exercise of legislative powers and such powers cannot constitutionally be delegated to these committees. There has been no such unconstitutional delegation as to the joint committee on finance, the board on government operations, the joint legislative council or the committee to visit state properties. Legislative oversight of administrative rules discussed. 63 Atty. Gen. 173.

The elections clause under article I, section 4, of the U.S. Constitution does not insulate state legislatures from review by state courts for compliance with state law. Nothing in the elections clause instructs that a state legislature may prescribe regulations on the time, place, and manner of holding federal elections in defiance of provisions of the state’s constitution. A state legislature may not create congressional districts independently of requirements imposed by the state constitution with respect to the enactment of laws. Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. ___, 143 S. Ct. 2065, 216 L. Ed. 2d 729 (2023).

IV,2Legislature, how constituted. Section 2. The number of the members of the assembly shall never be less than fifty-four nor more than one hundred. The senate shall consist of a number not more than one-third nor less than one-fourth of the number of the members of the assembly.

IV,3Apportionment. Section 3. [As amended Nov. 1910, Nov. 1962, and Nov. 1982] At its first session after each enumeration made by the authority of the United States, the legislature shall apportion and district anew the members of the senate and assembly, according to the number of inhabitants. [1907 J.R. 30, 1909 J.R. 55, 1909 c. 478, vote Nov. 1910; 1959 J.R. 30, 1961 J.R. 32, vote Nov. 1962; 1979 J.R. 36, 1981 J.R. 29, vote Nov. 1982]

The phrase “according to the number of inhabitants” in this section was intended to secure the preexisting right to proportionate representation and apportionment as nearly equal as practicable among the several counties for the election of members of the legislature. This section gives the legislature the duty to enact a redistricting plan after each federal census to prevent one person’s vote in an underpopulated district from having more weight than another’s in an overly populated district. Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 2021 WI 87, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469, 21-1450.

Unlike the Wisconsin Constitution’s Declaration of Rights, article IV, sections 3, 4, and 5, of the Wisconsin Constitution express a series of discrete requirements governing redistricting. These are the only Wisconsin constitutional limits the supreme court has ever recognized on the legislature’s discretion to redistrict. Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 2021 WI 87, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469, 21-1450.

The Wisconsin Constitution requires the legislature—a political body—to establish the legislative districts in this state. Just as the laws enacted by the legislature reflect policy choices, so will the maps drawn by that political body. Nothing in the constitution empowers the supreme court to second-guess those policy choices, and nothing in the constitution vests the court with the power of the legislature to enact new maps. Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 2021 WI 87, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469, 21-1450.