Exclusion of testimony about the circumstances of a confession deprived the defendant of due process and other fundamental constitutional rights. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 106 S. Ct. 2142, 90 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1986). When no evidence was present suggesting that police officers sent the suspect’s wife in to see him with the hope of obtaining incriminating information, no “interrogation” was undertaken even though a detective was present and tape recorded the conversation. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 107 S. Ct. 1931, 95 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1987). Police may not interrogate a suspect held in custody after the suspect has previously requested counsel, even when the interrogation relates to an offense different from that for which the suspect requested counsel. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S. Ct. 2093, 100 L. Ed. 2d 704 (1988). The custodian of corporate records may not resist a subpoena for records on self-incrimination grounds, regardless of the size of the corporate entity. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 108 S. Ct. 2284, 101 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1988). The self-incrimination privilege does not support a refusal to comply with a juvenile court’s order to produce a child. Baltimore City Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 110 S. Ct. 900, 107 L. Ed. 2d 992 (1990). When counsel is requested, interrogation must cease and may not be reinstated without counsel present even though the accused previously did have an opportunity to consult an attorney. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S. Ct. 486, 112 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1990). The 6th amendment right to counsel is offense specific. An accused’s invocation of the right during a judicial proceeding did not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel under Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), arising from the 5th amendment guarantees against self-incrimination in regard to police questioning concerning a separate offense. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1991). A police officer’s subjective and undisclosed view of whether a person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to determining whether the person is in custody and entitled to Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), warnings. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1994). Officers need not cease questioning a suspect subject to custodial interrogation when the suspect makes an ambiguous reference to an attorney. Although often good practice, it is not necessary that the officer ask clarifying questions. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994). Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and its progeny govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. Miranda may not be overruled by act of Congress. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000). A prison rehabilitation program that required inmates convicted of sexual assault to admit having committed the crime or have prison privileges reduced did not violate the right against self-incrimination although immunity was not granted and prosecution of previously uncharged crimes that might be revealed by the required admissions was possible. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 153 L. Ed. 2d 47 (2002). It is not until statements compelled by police interrogations are used in a criminal case that a violation of the 5th amendment self-incrimination clause occurs. When a confession was coerced, but no criminal case was ever brought, there could be no violation. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 155 L. Ed. 2d 984 (2003). When the defendant’s refusal to disclose his name was not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be used to incriminate him, or that it would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute him, application of a criminal statute requiring disclosure of the person’s name when the police officer reasonably suspected the person had committed a crime did not violate the protection against self-incrimination. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177, 124 S. Ct. 2451, 159 L. Ed. 2d 292 (2004). A custodial interrogation in which no Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), warnings are given until the interrogation has produced a confession in which the interrogating officer follows the confession with Miranda warnings and then leads the suspect to cover the same ground a second time violates Miranda, and the repeated statement is inadmissible. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643 (2004). A failure to give a suspect Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), warnings does not require suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect’s unwarned but voluntary statements. Miranda protects against violations of the self-incrimination clause, which is not implicated by the introduction at trial of physical evidence resulting from voluntary statements. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 159 L. Ed. 2d 667 (2004). The four warnings Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), requires are invariable, but the U.S. Supreme Court has not dictated the words in which the essential information must be conveyed. The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably convey to a suspect the suspect’s rights as required by Miranda. Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1009 (2010). Under Edwards, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), a voluntary Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), waiver is sufficient at the time of an initial attempted interrogation to protect a suspect’s right to have counsel present, but not at the time of subsequent interrogation attempts if the suspect initially requested the presence of counsel. However, confessions obtained after a two-week break in custody and a waiver of Miranda rights are most unlikely to be compelled, and hence are unreasonably excluded. Lawful imprisonment imposed upon conviction of a crime does not create the coercive pressures identified in Miranda and is not considered continued custody for determining whether custodial interrogation ended. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1045 (2010). An invocation of the right to remain silent must be unambiguous and unequivocal. The defendant did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to talk with the police. Had the defendant made either of these simple, unambiguous statements, the defendant would have invoked the right to cut off questioning. The defendant did neither, so he did not invoke the right to remain silent. A suspect who has received and understood Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), warnings, and has not invoked Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 176 L. Ed. 2d 1098 (2010). The age of a child subjected to police questioning is relevant to the custody analysis of Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). So long as the child’s age is known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test, but a child’s age will not be determinative, or even a significant, factor in every case. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 180 L. Ed. 2d 310 (2011). A prisoner is not always in custody for purposes of Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), whenever the prisoner is isolated from the general prison population and questioned about conduct outside the prison. Imprisonment, questioning in private, and questioning about events in the outside world are not necessarily enough to create a custodial situation for Miranda purposes. “Custody” is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion. In determining whether a person is in custody in this sense, the initial step is to ascertain whether, in light of the objective circumstances of the interrogation, a reasonable person would feel the person is not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. The court will also ask the additional question of whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 182 L. Ed. 2d 17 (2012). No 5th amendment violation was found in this case. The petitioner, without being placed in custody or receiving Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), warnings, voluntarily answered the questions of a police officer who was investigating a murder then balked when the officer asked whether a ballistics test would show that the shell casings found at the crime scene would match the petitioner’s shotgun. The petitioner was subsequently charged with murder, and at trial prosecutors argued that the petitioner’s reaction to the officer’s question suggested that the petitioner was guilty. Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 186 L. Ed. 2d 376 (2013). Collateral estoppel barred the state from introducing evidence of a van theft as an overt act in a conspiracy charge when the accuseds had earlier been acquitted in the van theft trial. The accused’s silence prior to receiving Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), warnings was properly used to impeach the accused. The prosecution’s reference to post-Miranda silence was harmless error. Feela v. Israel, 727 F.2d 151 (1984).