In criminal proceedings and in proceedings under ch.48, 51, 55, or 938, if If the court determines that the person has limited English proficiency and that an interpreter is necessary, the court shall advise the person that he or she has the right to a qualified interpreter and that, if the person cannot afford one, an interpreter will be provided at the public’s expense if the person is one of the following [party, witness, alleged victim, parent of a minor party, legal guardian, a person affected by the proceedings if determined appropriate by the court.] When the Legislature amends a statute, it is presumed to have full knowledge of existing statutes. Murphy v. LIRC, 183 Wis. 2d 205, 218, 515 N.W.2d 487 (Ct. App. 1994). Here, the Legislature removed prior language that had limited publicly paid and provided interpreters to indigent persons in criminal, juvenile, mental health, and protective services proceedings. The term “indigent” was also deleted from Wis. Stat. § 885.38(8)(a). The Legislature’s action in striking this limiting language indicates its intention to provide for publicly financed court interpreters whenever the court determines that one is necessary. This interpretation is consistent with federal law protecting the rights of the hearing impaired. As you know, the Americans With Disabilities Act requires reasonable accommodations to qualified individuals in the provision of government services, and that those accommodations be provided at public expense. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101-13 and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f) (2007). Courts cannot require that hearing impaired individuals bear the cost of necessary interpretation. See id. Likewise, the United States Department of Justice (“USDOJ”) has opined that courts (as recipients of federal funding) are responsible to provide language services for those of limited English proficiency at public expense in courtroom proceedings where significant liberties are at stake. The USDOJ reasons that charging persons of limited English proficiency for necessary court interpretation services would have the effect of discriminating against them because of their national origin in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act.
Provision of necessary courtroom interpreters, at public expense, is thus required by Wis. Stat. § 885.38(3) and this interpretation is consistent with federal law. A trial judge does have considerable discretion in implementing the statutory requirements, because the judge determines whether an interpreter is necessary in a given case. For a criminal defendant, it is likely that interpreter services will be considered necessary. There may be many other cases, however, where interpreter services are not necessary either because of the nature of the suit or because there are reasonable, less expensive alternatives available. RESPONSE TO ENUMERATED QUESTIONS
1. For a criminal case, can the difference [between the actual cost of interpretation and the state reimbursement rate] be taxed to the defendant as a cost under §973.06(1)(c)? Wisconsin Stat. § 885.38(8) provides that counties shall pay the expenses of qualified interpreters appointed by the court, and Wis. Stat. § 758.19(8) provides that county interpreter expenses shall be reimbursed by the state at set hourly rates ($40 per hour for a certified interpreter and $30 per hour for non-certified). Because the hourly amount counties must actually pay to qualified interpreters often exceeds the statutory reimbursement rate, counties are left to absorb the costs unless they can pass on the costs to litigants. Nevertheless, I am unable to find support in Wisconsin law for shifting the additional costs to criminal defendants. No Wisconsin case has discussed imposing interpreter costs on criminal defendants. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held, however, that “costs are regulated exclusively by statute as a matter of legislative discretion.” State v. Dismuke, 2001 WI 75, ¶ 19, 244 Wis. 2d 457, 628 N.W.2d 791. “[C]osts taxable against a criminal defendant are limited to those specifically enumerated in Wis. Stat. § 973.06.” Id., citing State v. Ferguson, 202 Wis. 2d 233, 238, 549 N.W.2d 718 (1996). Wisconsin Stat. § 973.06 provides as follows: Except as provided in s. 93.20 [enforcement fees of the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection], the costs, fees, and surcharges taxable against the defendant shall consist of the following items and no others [disbursements and fees of officers allowed by law, drug buy money, costs incurred due to threats to release chemical, biological or radioactive substances, fees and travel of state witnesses at preliminary hearing and trial, fees and disbursements allowed by the court to expert witnesses, and fees and travel of defense witnesses at preliminary hearing and trial]. In Ferguson, the Supreme Court found no statutory support for the state’s argument that crime laboratory testing could be taxed as an expert witness fee or disbursement under Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c), and therefore disallowed shifting such costs to the defendant. Specifically, the court held that, “[t]o constitute a fee under § 973.06(1)(c) [related to expert witnesses], the cost of performing a service must be more than an internal operating expense of a governmental unit which has been prorated or costed out; it must be chargeable to and payable by another.” Ferguson, 202 Wis. 2d at 242, cited in Dismuke, 244 Wis. 2d 457, ¶ 20. Applying the reasoning of Dismuke and Ferguson here, unless there exists a statute that provides for the costs of necessary interpreters to be shifted to the litigants or defendants, such shifting is prohibited. “By its plain language, then, the costs taxable against a defendant under Wis. Stat. § 973.06(1)(c) are limited to the items enumerated therein.” Ferguson, 202 Wis. 2d at 238. The only enumerated section that would seem to be potentially relevant to necessary interpreters would be that provision permitting the charging of defendants for expert witness fees. But interpreters, by their nature, are not normally considered to be expert witnesses, nor indeed are they witnesses of any kind, and we know of no case law or statute that would suggest that interpreters should be treated as expert witnesses for cost purposes. The clear language of the new interpreter statute, coupled with the rules enunciated in Ferguson and Dismuke, is controlling, and prevents the shifting of interpreter costs to defendants in a criminal proceeding. 2. For a civil case, can the unreimbursed amount be taxed as a cost under §907.06 or §814.04(2)? Can it be taxed to another party?