A state agency or officer may not waive the state’s sovereign immunity without specific authorization, nor will principles of estoppel be applied to deprive the state of its sovereign rights. Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976).

Although courts have common law jurisdiction to enforce arbitration awards generally, they cannot enforce an award against the state absent express legislative authorization. State ex rel. Teaching Assistants Ass’n v. University of Wisconsin-Madison, 96 Wis. 2d 492, 292 N.W.2d 657 (Ct. App. 1980).

The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot bar an action for just compensation based on a taking of private property for public use even though the legislature has failed to establish specific provisions for the recovery of just compensation. Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983).

Discussing waiver of sovereign immunity in the creation of a state agency. Busse v. Dane County Regional Planning Commission, 181 Wis. 2d 527, 511 N.W.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1993).

Sovereign immunity does not apply to arbitration. State v. P.G. Miron Construction Co., 181 Wis. 2d 1045, 512 N.W.2d 499 (1994).

A specific performance action is a suit under this section. The legislature has not consented to be sued for specific performance, and such an action is not permitted against the state. Erickson Oil Products, Inc. v. DOT, 184 Wis. 2d 36, 516 N.W.2d 755 (Ct. App. 1994).

The state waives its sovereign immunity when it creates an agency as an independent going concern. Bahr v. State Investment Bd., 186 Wis. 2d 379, 521 N.W.2d 152 (Ct. App. 1994).

A county’s appeal of an ex parte order that it was responsible for court costs incurred by the State Public Defender for an indigent defendant was not an action “brought” against the state. The public defender could not assert that the appeal was barred by sovereign immunity. Polk County v. SPD, 188 Wis. 2d 665, 524 N.W.2d 389 (1994).

Although the general rule is that waivers of sovereign immunity must be read narrowly, when a statute provides a clear, express, and broadly worded consent to sue, the rule of narrow construction will not be applied anew to every type of claim brought under the statute. German v. DOT, 223 Wis. 2d 525, 589 N.W.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1998), 98-0250.

When the state creates an entity independent from the state, which acts as neither its arm nor its agent, such entity falls outside the protection of sovereign immunity. The determination that a state entity is an independent going concern is a narrow exception to sovereign immunity. In determining whether a state entity is an independent going concern, courts should consider both the character and breadth of the statutory powers granted to the entity. Mayhugh v. State, 2015 WI 77, 364 Wis. 2d 208, 867 N.W.2d 754, 13-1023.

Section 301.04, which permits the Department of Corrections (DOC) to sue and be sued, is not an express waiver of DOC’s tort immunity but rather addresses DOC’s capacity to be sued. Mayhugh v. State, 2015 WI 77, 364 Wis. 2d 208, 867 N.W.2d 754, 13-1023.

The court in Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d 417 (1983), endorsed the view that the constitutional directive that persons receive just compensation for takings of their private property is “self-executing,” and no express statutory provision for its enforcement against the state is necessary. Conversely, no language in the uniformity clause is analogous to that constitutional command. Just compensation is a constitutional directive contained in the takings clause; nowhere does the uniformity clause authorize general damages for an alleged violation of the uniformity principle. Klein v. DOR, 2020 WI App 56, 394 Wis. 2d 66, 949 N.W.2d 608, 18-1133.

Congress lacks the power to subject the states to private suits in their own state courts. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 144 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1999).

The U.S. Constitution does not permit a state to be sued by a private party without the state’s consent in the courts of a different state. Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, 587 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 203 L. Ed. 2d 768 (2019).

The state has removed only the substantive defense of governmental tort immunity, and the state constitutional barrier providing that the state may be sued only upon its consent remains. Knox v. Regents of University of Wisconsin, 385 F. Supp. 886 (1975).

State Immunity from Suit Without Consent—Scope and Implications. Harring & Harring. 1971 WLR 879.

IV,28Oath of office. Section 28. Members of the legislature, and all officers, executive and judicial, except such inferior officers as may be by law exempted, shall before they enter upon the duties of their respective offices, take and subscribe an oath or affirmation to support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the state of Wisconsin, and faithfully to discharge the duties of their respective offices to the best of their ability.

IV,29Militia. Section 29. The legislature shall determine what persons shall constitute the militia of the state, and may provide for organizing and disciplining the same in such manner as shall be prescribed by law.

IV,30Elections by legislature. Section 30. [As amended Nov. 1982] All elections made by the legislature shall be by roll call vote entered in the journals. [1979 J.R. 36, 1981 J.R. 29, vote Nov. 1982]

IV,31Special and private laws prohibited. Section 31. [As created Nov. 1871 and amended Nov. 1892 and April 1993] The legislature is prohibited from enacting any special or private laws in the following cases:

IV,31(2)(2) For laying out, opening or altering highways, except in cases of state roads extending into more than one county, and military roads to aid in the construction of which lands may be granted by congress.

IV,31(9)(9) For incorporating any city, town or village, or to amend the charter thereof. [1870 J.R. 13, 1871 J.R. 1, 1871 c. 122, vote Nov. 1871; 1889 J.R. 4, 1891 J.R. 4, 1891 c. 362, vote Nov. 1892; 1991 J.R. 27, 1993 J.R. 3, vote April 1993]