The need to transport a person in a police vehicle is not an exigency that justifies a search for weapons. More specific and articulable facts must be shown to support a Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), frisk. While a routine pat-down of a person before a police officer places the person in a squad car is wholly reasonable, evidence gleaned from the search will only be admissible if there are particularized issues of safety concerns about the defendant. State v. Hart, 2001 WI App 283, 249 Wis. 2d 329, 639 N.W.2d 213, 00-1444. Although no traffic violation occurred, a traffic stop to make contact with the defendant was reasonable when police had reasonable suspicion that the defendant had previously been involved in a crime, and the defendant had intentionally avoided police attempts to engage the defendant in voluntary conversation. State v. Olson, 2001 WI App 284, 249 Wis. 2d 391, 639 N.W.2d 207, 00-3383. A warrantless blood draw by a physician in a jail setting may be unreasonable if it invites an unjustified element of personal risk of pain and infection. Absent evidence of those risks, a blood draw under those circumstances was reasonable. State v. Daggett, 2002 WI App 32, 250 Wis. 2d 112, 640 N.W.2d 546, 01-1417. Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), applies to confrontations between the police and citizens in public places only. For private residences and hotels, in the absence of a warrant, the police must have probable cause and exigent circumstances or consent to justify an entry. Reasonable suspicion is not a prerequisite to an officer’s seeking consent to enter a private dwelling. If the police have lawfully entered a dwelling with valid consent and have a reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed, a Terry pat down for weapons is permissible. State v. Stout, 2002 WI App 41, 250 Wis. 2d 768, 641 N.W.2d 474, 01-0904. A warrantless search of a home is presumptively unreasonable, but exigent circumstances that militate against delay in getting a warrant can justify immediate entry and search. Whether the officers acted reasonably in entering the house without a warrant is measured against what a reasonable police officer would reasonably believe under the circumstances. State v. Londo, 2002 WI App 90, 252 Wis. 2d 731, 643 N.W.2d 869, 01-1015. Canine sniffs are not searches within the meaning of the 4th amendment, and police are not required to have probable cause or reasonable suspicion before walking a dog around a vehicle for the purpose of detecting drugs in the vehicle’s interior. A dog’s alert on an object provides probable cause to search that object, provided that the dog is trained in narcotics detection and has demonstrated a sufficient level of reliability in detecting drugs in the past and the officer with the dog is familiar with how it reacts when it smells contraband. State v. Miller, 2002 WI App 150, 256 Wis. 2d 80, 647 N.W.2d 348, 01-1993. But see State v. Campbell, 2024 WI App 17, 411 Wis. 2d 439, 5 N.W.3d 870, 20-1813. Evidence from a warrantless nonconsensual blood draw is admissible when: 1) the blood is drawn to obtain evidence of intoxication from a person lawfully arrested for drunk-driving; 2) there is a clear indication that the blood draw will produce evidence of intoxication; 3) the method used to take the blood sample is reasonable and is performed reasonably; and 4) the arrestee presents no reasonable objection to the blood draw. In the absence of an arrest, probable cause to believe blood currently contains evidence of a drunk-driving-related violation satisfies the first and second prongs. State v. Erickson, 2003 WI App 43, 260 Wis. 2d 279, 659 N.W.2d 407, 01-3367. But see Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2016). When an unlocked vehicle was not: 1) involved in an accident; 2) interrupting the flow of traffic; 3) disabled or damaged; 4) violating parking ordinances; or 5) in any way jeopardizing the public safety or the efficient movement of vehicular traffic, it was unreasonable to impound and tow the vehicle to ensure that the vehicle and any property inside it would not be stolen when there were reasonable alternatives to protect the vehicle. Evidence seized in an “inventory search” of the vehicle was inadmissible. State v. Clark, 2003 WI App 121, 265 Wis. 2d 557, 666 N.W.2d 112, 02-2195. Before the government may invade the sanctity of the home without a warrant, the government must demonstrate not only probable cause but also exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness. When a police officer placed the officer’s foot in a doorway to prevent the defendant from closing the door, the act constituted an entry into the home. A warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the suspect’s blood alcohol level might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant. State v. Larson, 2003 WI App 150, 266 Wis. 2d 236, 668 N.W.2d 338, 02-2881. To perform a protective search for weapons, an officer must have reasonable suspicion that an individual may be armed and dangerous. A court may consider an officer’s belief that the officer’s or another’s safety is threatened in finding reasonable suspicion, but such a belief is not a prerequisite to a valid search. There is no per se rule justifying a search any time an individual places the individual’s hands in the individual’s pockets contrary to police orders. The individual’s hand movements must be considered under the totality of the circumstances of the case. State v. Kyles, 2004 WI 15, 269 Wis. 2d 1, 675 N.W.2d 449, 02-1540. The propriety of a warrantless search of a person’s garbage outside the person’s home comes under a two-part test: 1) whether the person by the person’s conduct has exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy; and 2) whether that expectation is justifiable in that it is one that society will recognize as reasonable. Consideration of curtilage or open fields appropriately falls within an expectation-of-privacy analysis and is not a separate factor. In this case, the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage placed in a dumpster not set out for collection located down a private driveway marked “Private Property.” State v. Sigarroa, 2004 WI App 16, 269 Wis. 2d 234, 674 N.W.2d 894, 03-0703. When the police are lawfully on the suspect’s premises by virtue of a valid search warrant, they may make a warrantless arrest of the suspect prior to the search if the arrest is supported by probable cause. State v. Cash, 2004 WI App 63, 271 Wis. 2d 451, 677 N.W.2d 709, 03-1614. A law enforcement officer acted reasonably when during a routine traffic stop the officer requested the passengers, as well as the driver, to exit the vehicle and individually asked them questions outside the scope of the initial traffic stop after the officer had become aware of specific and articulable facts giving rise to the reasonable suspicion that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed. State v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, 274 Wis. 2d 540, 683 N.W.2d 1, 02-2216. Whether a warrantless home entry is justified based on the need to render assistance or prevent harm is judged by an objective test of whether a police officer under the circumstances known to the officer at the time of entry reasonably believes that delay in procuring a warrant would gravely endanger life. In addition to the circumstances known to the police at the time of entry, a court may consider the subjective beliefs of police officers involved, but only insofar as such evidence assists the court in determining objective reasonableness. State v. Leutenegger, 2004 WI App 127, 275 Wis. 2d 512, 685 N.W.2d 536, 03-0133. Although a known citizen informer did not observe the defendant drive the defendant’s truck in a manner consistent with someone who was under the influence of an intoxicant, the tip was reliable when it was based on the informer’s first-hand observation that the defendant was drunk and was independently verified by the arresting officer. State v. Powers, 2004 WI App 143, 275 Wis. 2d 456, 685 N.W.2d 869, 03-2450. The anonymous caller in this case provided predictive information that, if true, demonstrated a special familiarity with the defendant’s affairs that the general public would have had no way of knowing. When the officer verified this predictive information, it was reasonable for the officer to believe that a person with access to such information also had access to reliable information about the defendant’s illegal activities providing reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle. State v. Sherry, 2004 WI App 207, 277 Wis. 2d 194, 690 N.W.2d 435, 03-1531. Under Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), a person who did not submit to an officer’s show of police authority was not seized within the meaning of the 4th amendment. Until a submission occurs, Hodari D. holds that a person is not seized for purposes of the 4th amendment, and therefore the person may not assert a 4th amendment violation that evidence resulting from the encounter with the police is the fruit of an illegal seizure. State v. Young, 2004 WI App 227, 277 Wis. 2d 715, 690 N.W.2d 866, 03-2968. Blood may be drawn in a search incident to an arrest for a non-drunk-driving offense if the police reasonably suspect that the defendant’s blood contains evidence of a crime. State v. Repenshek, 2004 WI App 229, 277 Wis. 2d 780, 691 N.W.2d 780, 03-3089. But see Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013); Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 195 L. Ed. 2d 560 (2016). An arrest immediately following a search, along with the probable cause to arrest before the search, causes the search to be lawful. A search was not unlawful because the crime arrested for immediately after the search was different than the crime for which the officer had probable cause to arrest before the search. As long as there was probable cause to arrest before the search, no additional protection from government intrusion is afforded by requiring that persons be arrested for and charged with the same crime as that for which probable cause initially existed. Whether the officer subjectively intended to arrest for the first crime is not the relevant inquiry. The relevant inquiry is whether the officer was aware of sufficient objective facts to establish probable cause to arrest before the search was conducted and whether an actual arrest was made contemporaneously with the search. State v. Sykes, 2005 WI 48, 279 Wis. 2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 277, 03-1234. Under Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), an officer is entitled not just to a patdown but to an effective patdown in which the officer can reasonably ascertain whether the subject has a weapon; when an effective patdown is not possible, the officer may take other action reasonably necessary to discover a weapon. When an officer could not tell whether a suspect had any objects hidden in the suspect’s waistband because of the suspect’s bulky frame and heavy clothing, it was reasonable for the officer to shake the suspect’s waistband by the belt loops in order to loosen any possible weapons. State v. Triplett, 2005 WI App 255, 288 Wis. 2d 515, 707 N.W.2d 881, 04-2032. The 4th amendment neither forbids nor permits all bodily intrusions. The 4th amendment’s function is to constrain against intrusions that are not justified in the circumstances or are made in an improper manner. Whether the warrantless administration of laxatives done to assist the police in recovering suspected swallowed heroin was a reasonable search required evaluating three factors: 1) the extent to which the procedure may threaten the safety or health of the individual; 2) the extent of the intrusion upon the individual’s dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity; and 3) the community’s interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence. State v. Payano-Roman, 2006 WI 47, 290 Wis. 2d 380, 714 N.W.2d 548, 04-1029. Deciding when a seizure occurs is important because the moment of a seizure limits what facts a court may consider in determining the existence of reasonable suspicion for that seizure. The Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), test applies when the subject of police attention is either subdued by force or submits to a show of authority. When, however, a person flees in response to a show of authority, Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), governs when the seizure occurs. The Hodari D. test does not supersede the Mendenhall test; it supplements it. State v. Young, 2006 WI 98, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729, 03-2968. An anonymous tip, whose indicia of reliability was debatable, along with behavior observed by the officer at the scene and deemed suspicious provided reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), stop. Terry holds that the police are not required to rule out the possibility of innocent behavior before initiating a Terry stop. Suspicious conduct by its very nature is ambiguous, and the principle function of the investigative stop is to quickly resolve that ambiguity. State v. Patton, 2006 WI App 235, 297 Wis. 2d 415, 724 N.W.2d 347, 05-3084. There is a difference between police informers, who usually themselves are criminals, and citizen informers that calls for different means of assessing credibility. A citizen informant’s reliability is subject to a much less stringent standard. Citizens who purport to have witnessed a crime are viewed as reliable, and police are allowed to act accordingly although other indicia of reliability have not yet been established. That an informant does not give some indication of how the informant knows about the suspicious or criminal activity reported bears significantly on the reliability of the information. State v. Kolk, 2006 WI App 261, 298 Wis. 2d 99, 726 N.W.2d 337, 06-0031. To have a 4th amendment claim, an individual must have standing. Standing exists when an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, which requires meeting a two-prong test: 1) whether the individual’s conduct exhibits an actual, subjective, expectation of privacy in the area searched and the item seized; and 2) if the individual has the requisite expectation of privacy, whether the expectation of privacy is legitimate or justifiable. State v. Bruski, 2007 WI 25, 299 Wis. 2d 177, 727 N.W.2d 503, 05-1516. In considering whether an individual’s expectation of privacy is legitimate or justifiable, the following may be relevant: 1) whether the accused has a property interest in the premises; 2) whether the accused is lawfully on the premises; 3) whether the accused has complete dominion and control and the right to exclude others; 4) whether the accused takes precautions customarily taken by those seeking privacy; 5) whether the property is put to some private use; and 6) whether the claim of privacy is consistent with historical notions of privacy. State v. Bruski, 2007 WI 25, 299 Wis. 2d 177, 727 N.W.2d 503, 05-1516.